




THE ADEQUACY AND EFFICACY OF ANTI-MONEY 
LAUNDERING LEGISLATIONS WITHIN THE CONTEXT 
OF ELECTRONIC BANKING AND INFORMAL 
REMITTANCE SYSTEMS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 








Submitted in furtherance of the requirements of the 






UNIVERSITY OF LONDON 












I declare that the work presented in this dissertation is mine alone. 
 
Timinipere David 






In recent times, international, regional and local legislation has been couched to 
strengthen anti-corruption institutions and deter corrupt public officials from 
syphoning public wealth for their benefits, but this has continued unabated in spite 
of some successes recorded from these anti-graft agencies.  Electronic banking 
notable for timeliness in executing transfers have helped in facilitating ease of 
doing business and as well accelerated the transfer of illicit wealth to secrecy 
jurisdictions.  So regardless of internal and prudential controls instituted by 
regulatory authorities to ensure transparency in handling transactions and the 
reporting requirements for suspicious transactions, money laundering persists. 
Tracing and recovering the loot becomes another financial, legal and inter-state 
hurdle on the part of law enforcement agencies while the perpetrators live in 
exquisite luxury believing that the loot is their fair share of the ‘national cake.' 
This dissertation sought to assess the adequacy and efficacy of anti-money 
laundering legislation given the complexities of the local environment: namely 
nepotism, weak institutions, and predominance of a cash-based economy, lack of 
independence and the politicisation of corruption.  First, we consider the enormity 
of the problem of corruption and its effect on developing countries with due regard 
to security, judicial fairness and stability of the economy.  After that is an 
examination of international and local money laundering initiatives with a 
considerable emphasis on the United Nations Convention against Corruption and 
the role of the Financial Intelligence Unit in providing intelligence for tracing of 
corrupt proceeds.  The researcher asserts that anti-money laundering legislation 
will be efficacious where good governance prevails and the incentives for 
corruption including nepotism and prebendal attitudes are discouraged.  A State, 
which provides social safety nets for its populace, would strengthen the anti-
corruption fight thereby discouraging new entrants into public office positions from 
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In recent years, the need to curb economic crimes has become a burning issue in 
domestic and international policy circles.  Discussions about Sub Saharan Africa 
involving economic and infrastructural development, failure of governments, the 
judiciary, poverty, and aids to the continent, conflicts and other issues would in one 
way or the other trace its problems to endemic corruption and mismanagement of 
the wealth of the state.  They use the machinery of government as a conduit to 
form their illegitimate empires.  The focus of most international media coverage 
about Sub Saharan Africa has been about corruption, underdevelopment and 
poverty, political and social unrest.  
 
Covering an area of just over 30 million km2, around 20% of the earth's total land 
mass, and a current population of over one billion people, Africa is the second 
largest continent in both size and population.  The continent, with 54 UN-
recognised states is politically and culturally divided into two regions: North Africa 
more often affiliated with the Arab World and Sub-Saharan Africa, the Sahara 
desert providing a natural boundary.  Sub Saharan Africa made up of 48 countries, 
home to about 85% of Africa’s population with most governments democratically 
elected.1  The region accounts for about $1.591 trillion of Africa’s GDP With an 
average per capita income of $16152.  Alarmingly, most of the countries in the 
                                                            
1 The World Bank, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ <https://data.worldbank.org/region/sub-saharan-africa> accessed 
28 October 2014 
2 The World Bank, ‘Sub-Saharan Africa’ <http://data.worldbank.org/region/sub-saharan-africa>  accessed 
28 October 2014 
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region fall below the Transparency International Perception Index on Corruption 
with very many states occupying the bottom half of the table (figure1).3   
 
   
Figure 1 - Corruption Perception Profile in SSA 
Adapted from TI’s Corruption perception index 2013.  
<https://www.transparency.org/cpi2013/results>  assessed 28 October 2014 
 
Additionally, the illicit capital flows survey indicates that for about ten years 1.36 
trillion USD was lost from the region arising from illicit outflows.4  Nigeria ranked 
among the top 10 states having the highest measure of cumulative illicit financial 
flows accounting for about 129 billion US dollars.5  The same is true of other 
countries within SSA ranked in the table of illicit financial flows as high contributors 
to the outflows. 
 
                                                          
3 Transparency International, ‘The 2013 Corruption Perceptions Index: Measures the Perceived Levels of 
Public Sector Corruption in 177 Countries and Territories’ <https://www.transparency.org/cpi2013> 
accessed 28 October 2014 
4 The outflow represents 28.3% of the total illegal discharges from developing countries. 
5 Dev Kar and Joseph Spanjars, ‘Illicit Financial Flows from Developing Countries: 2003 – 2012’ 
<http://www.gfintegrity.org/report/2014-global-report-illicit-financial-flows-from-developing-countries-
2003-2012/>  accessed 3 October 2015 
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Culturally, there is a close family link within the region.  The continent is one of the 
most ethnically diverse in the world with thousands of different ethnic groups, 
nearly all having their distinct language, traditions, social norms, and history.  
Colonialism, however, did not do any good to the varied ethnic groups because 
nations created had no recourse to their diversity within the system.  A noticeable 
cultural characteristic across Sub-Saharan Africa is that most inhabitants look to 
traditional communities when social services and security provided by the state 
deteriorates.6  Regardless of the nation in which they live, Africans tend to have 
their strongest loyalties to family, clan, and tribe. These loyalties are likely to matter 
most to Africans, regardless of the task, and are depended upon when trouble 
brews or conflict erupts. Extended family ties are maintained and also affects 
bureaucracies.7   Where government employees help individuals and friends with 
special treatments, even if, occasionally this behaviour might require bending or 
even breaking some administrative rules and departing from ‘universalistic 
principles.'8  Such cultural ties in some ways substantially affect the corruptive 
attitude of government officials and institutions of government holding the public 
trust.  
 
                                                            
6 Karl P. Magyar, ‘Culture and Conflict in Africa's History: The Transition to the Modern Era' in Stephen J. 
Blank, Lawrence E. Grinter, Karl P. Magyar, Lewis B. Ware, and Bynum E. Weathers (eds), Conflict, Culture, 
and History: Regional Dimensions (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press 1993) 264. 
7 The concept of impersonal bureaucracies in economic theory is practically difficult in most Sub Saharan 
African countries where family ties override objective decision making.  The relationships between people 
who work in a bureaucracy are defined strictly concerning their roles and responsibilities.  Relationships are 
thus based on divisions of labour and expertise rather than on interpersonal considerations. People are 
expected to communicate to each other from the role they occupy and nature of functions they are required 
to perform. Thus a bureaucracy is characterised by impersonal social relationships.  The reverse is the case 
where elected public officials appoint their close family relations (wives, brothers, and cousins as special 
advisers, commissioners, and ministers in their cabinet). 
8 Vito Tanzi, Policies, Institutions and the Dark Side of the Economics (Edward Elgar 2000) 91 
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An essential geographic characteristic of Sub Saharan Africa is the immense 
wealth embedded in its natural resources.  An unusually large number of countries 
within the region is landlocked, so they struggle to develop economically placing 
much reliance on their neighbours for access to the international markets9.  Sadly, 
the resources of SSA are distributed10 in many countries, whereas a few have used 
the resources prudently for the benefit of the people.11  Control over natural 
resources has brought several factors to bear including but not limited to colonial 
legacy, tribalism, and religious pressure.  Cultural factors try to ensure that quid-
pro-quo exists between the haves and have-nots in the determination of the 
utilisation of these resources.  The result has been lack of economic, social and 
political improvements but wanton mismanagement of the state resources, where 
each successive administrator considers the wealth of the nation as ‘national cake’ 
meant to enrich oneself. 
 
The region also presents an array of security challenges.  Most states struggle to 
provide essential services such as electricity, water, education and internal 
security.   In the mid-2000s, organised crime became an international security 
concern in West Africa due to the detection of significant cocaine shipments 
transiting the region to Europe.12  Other transnational crimes such as oil bunkering, 
                                                            
9 Some examples are Chad, Niger, Mali, Eritrea, Ethiopia, and DR Congo. 
10  African Development Bank Group, ‘Annual Development Effectiveness Review 2013: Towards sustainable 
growth for Africa’ <https://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Project-and-
Operations/ADER-%20Annual%20Development%20Effectiveness%20Review%202013.pdf> accessed 3 
October 2015.  While many African countries have continued to grow at above the global average, not all 
states within Africa are benefiting from this growth.  Six of the ten most unequal countries in the world as 
in Africa and there is yet any evidence of progress in reducing income inequality; poverty remains 
unacceptably high and over 60% of Africans – many in isolated and rural communities and fragile states as 
they earn less than $2 a day. 
11 Botswana is a good model in Africa, utilising its resources for the good of the people.  
12 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime ‘Transnational Organized Crime in West Africa: A Threat 
Assessment’ (2013) 3 <https://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-
analysis/tocta/West_Africa_TOCTA_2013_EN.pdf> accessed 3 October 2015 
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illegal diamond sale, arms trafficking,13 human trafficking, migrant smuggling, fake 
medicine, kidnapping are now commonplace in the West Africa sub-region and 
East Africa where sea piracy and abduction are significant security concerns. 
 
In the midst of these teething problems, there are high growth potentials with the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF) projecting that some SSA countries will have 
fast economic growth similar to some Asian economies like China.14  Some 
published indices show Nigeria ranked as the most significant economy in Sub 
Saharan Africa with strong growth potentials, the same with other countries such 
as South Africa, Kenya, and a host others.  One major factor, however, that have 
impeded the development of Sub Saharan Africa is bad governance marked by 
political instability and policy somersaults.  Because political actors are most times 
elected to office on the wrong premise,15 insincerity marked by grand corruption 
and other irrational vices becomes the order of the day, subjecting the welfare of 
the common person to the secret dungeons of the heart, with tremendous 
implication on development, growth, regional stability. 
 
A major problem of developing countries is corruption, which amongst others fuels 
the massive remittance of stolen money to safe havens and or the conversion of 
                                                            
13 Ibid 4.  As the report noted, ‘there is great concern about the security implications of weapon 
trafficking…many weapons continue to circulate from past conflicts and diversion of from official weapons 
stock.  The recent flood of perhaps 10,000 to 20,000 firearms from Libya to the West African sub-region 
represents a serious threat, this appears to have been realised in northern Mali.’  
14 International Monetary Fund, ‘Regional Economic Outlook. Sub-Saharan Africa Staying the Course’ 
<http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2014/afr/eng/sreo1014.pdf> accessed 22 October 2014.  The 
IMF maintains that the outlook for SSA remains favourable.  Projected growth was 5% to 5.75% in 2015.  
The sustained demand stems from infrastructural projects, the expansion of productive capacities, buoyant 
service sector and rebound in agricultural production are some factors responsible for growth. 
15 Politicians paying large sums to bribe their way through, seeing elected position as on the only means to 
get rich quickly, some have had to commit suicide for losing elections for their inability to pay back borrowed 
money.  Others have had to hire political thugs armed with dangerous equipment to cajole their opponents 
into submission.    
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illicitly acquired wealth into legitimate use.  In addition, criminal activities such as 
trafficking of drugs, illegal crude oil bunkering, kidnapping, and prostitution 
generate enormous proceeds, which flow to legitimate use through the laundering 
process.  More so, the problem of capital flight subsists as funds repatriated to 
home countries follow processes aimed at payment of lower taxes and dues 
through trade mispricing, under-invoicing or a combination of complex techniques.  
In the absence of proper enforcement of laws and standards, SSA has become a 
breeding ground for offenders to perpetuate economic crimes.  Furthermore, the 
lack of political will and a flawed judicial system helps to foster the actions of money 
launderers.  
 
The new wave of terrorist activities in Sub Saharan Africa, the need for 
governmental action to craft and enforce adequate legislation to curb this growing 
tide and the urgent need to ensure illegitimate funds laundered under any guise is 
traced and recovered and adequately utilised underscores the importance of this 
research effort.  Also, the cumbersome judicial processes including the inability of 
enforcement agencies to coherently coordinate and prosecute offenders in time 
further highlight the reason for law reforms.    
 
This thesis is concerned with the adequacy and efficacy of anti-money laundering 
legislation within the context of electronic banking and informal economy and 
informal value transfer systems in developing countries with particular reference to 
Nigeria and South Africa.  It attempts to explore the role of the informal economy 
and remittance system both formal and informal in the promotion of laundering 
activities.  An attempt to unravel within the context of an academic discussion, the 
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impact of economic crimes either negative or positive particularly corruption and 
organised crime have and continues to exert on Sub Saharan African economies.  
The effect of financial offences evaluated from the following perspectives: 
sustainable development, real fairness, security, and stability. 
 
Sub Saharan Africa constitutes one of the high profile areas in the world where 
corruption thrives16 with its attendant conflicts.  There is a high agitation for self-
determination due to the long-term neglect experienced by the populace in the 
hands of a few elites using the machinery of government as a conduit to amass 
wealth for themselves.  Conflicts abound, and the scourge of underdevelopment 
have ranked most Sub Saharan African countries, as constituting the worlds’ 
poorest with many living below the poverty line.17  In recent years, there is a 
growing wave of terrorism with very dire consequences to the weak/innocent.  In 
Northern Africa, the Arab spring erupted resulting in several deaths; this is mainly 
due to the high level of unemployment and imbalance in the social structure.  In 
West Africa, Nigeria and Mali and other countries in the sub-region have varied 
forms of insurgency, each demanding for self-determination.  
 
This study expounds this thesis in nine chapters.  The first discusses the 
vulnerability of developing countries in detecting and combating economic crimes.  
As Roger Bowler put it: ‘crime, whether it involves theft, or apparently ‘non-
                                                            
16  Transparency International ranking of corrupt countries in the world list most of the African countries in 
the bottom half of the table due to their unethical nature.  The figure though is not always acceptable to 
national governments but at the least provides a reasonable expectation of the corruption perception of 
countries. 
17Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, ‘The DAC List of ODA Recipients’ 
<http://www.oecd.org/dac/stats/49483614.pdf> accessed 22 October 2014. 
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economic’ actions like violence, is assumed to benefit the offender in some way.’18  
No doubt, economic crimes creates many problems not readily discernible by the 
populace but noticeable in the long term with adverse consequences.  The chapter 
discusses the issue of financial crime in the context of sustainability.  It implies that 
the actions of an individual should neither be detrimental to the present populace 
nor fail to guarantee the sufficiency of the future generation.  Would the continuous 
looting of public fund by corrupt public officials sustain infrastructural development 
and foster good governance?19 In addition, why do public office holders lack the 
political will to curb this hydra-headed monster called corruption?  Funds allocated 
for welfare and provision of social services, are looted and stashed in foreign bank 
accounts for personal aggrandisement, would it foster stability in developing 
countries? Other issues examined in the chapter include economic crime and its 
implication on security, regional stability and the impact on the judiciary regarding 
fairness and confidence.  The chapter concludes by determining the reasons for 
money laundering in Nigeria including but not limited to political factors, flight 
capital, looting and the activities of organised criminal organisations.  
 
Distinctive characteristics of money laundering activities in developing countries 
are the focus of Chapter 2.  Two countries selected for this study:  Nigeria and 
South Africa.  They are the two most significant economies in Sub Saharan 
                                                            
18 R. Bowlers, The Economics of Crime (Martin Robertson and Company Ltd 1982) 54 
19 Brigitte Unger B and Dan van der Linde, Research Handbook on Money Laundering (Edward Elgar 2013).  
The authors show that good governance ‘encompasses the duty to pay attention to everything that is 
necessary for the government to serve a community well.’  Aspects of good governance include: 
i. the rule of law which forms the basis of the current government models; ii. Second is democratic demands 
which become increasingly important in developing societies; iii. and, the functioning and quality of 
government as such, the set of instruments that the public institutions have at their disposal and the legal 
norms observed.’ 372 
26 
 
Africa,20 have more developed infrastructure; investment and market; are 
Anglophone countries with relative political stability.  Nigeria forms the basis for the 
inference about corruption, and the proceeds of grand corruption, whereas the 
focus on South Africa is capital flight.   
 
In Chapter 3, we focus on International Money Laundering Initiatives, their 
usefulness and adoption as a basis to curb the surge in money laundering 
activities.  The fourth chapter analyses specific anti-money laundering legislation 
in developing countries, efforts in place to confiscate illegitimately acquired wealth, 
proceeds of crime and enforcement of offenders.    
 
Chapter 5 gives attention to the vulnerabilities of internet banking in respect of 
laundering the proceeds of illicit wealth.  It ascertains and examines the adequacy 
or otherwise of legislation as well as prudential guidelines aimed at regulating the 
payment system.  The chapter also evaluates the controls placed on politically 
exposed persons, outline the justifications for strengthening the regulations relating 
to PEPs, justify the need for restrictions on beneficial owners.  It also examined 
why penalties for breaching the rules by defaulting banks are inadequate to curb 
the problem of illicit fund transfers.   
 
Developing countries in SSA are predominantly cash-based.  Cash is the basis for 
all transactions irrespective of the value.   Chapter 6 examines the informal 
economy and informal value transfer systems available and how it facilitates the 
                                                            
20 International Monetary Fund, World Economic and Financial Surveys (IMF) – Regional Outlook:  Sub 
Saharan Africa – Maintaining Growth in an Uncertain World (IMF Publishers 2012) 28,38  
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laundering of proceeds of unlawful activities.  We consider local and international 
regulations on cash and cross-border cash management; it's adequacy in 
controlling trans-border movement of money including disguised proceeds of 
corruption and available remittance corridors.  
As money laundering is usually multi-jurisdictional, chapter 7 explores associated 
benefits of civil recoveries as a means to recover the proceeds of corruption and 
other unlawful activities.  Notably criminal procedures for the seizure and forfeiture 
of the proceeds of crime is principally conviction based.  Much progress has been 
attained using civil recovery legislation to deprive corrupt public officials of 
benefitting from their fruits of corrupt enrichment.  In the chapter, we compared 
non-conviction based recoveries in South Africa and Nigeria with further insight 
from the UK civil recovery regime.  South Africa having had an operational civil 
recovery regime whereas Nigeria still uses fragments of criminal law provisions 
and has proposed a bill (proceeds of crime bill) to address this challenge.  Chapter 
8 examines good governance, political will, and executive immunity and suggest 
applicable reforms.  It underscores the need to strengthen the regulatory 
framework, ensure that the judicial processes are devoid of corrupt tendencies as 
a means to combat money laundering and the speedy administration and 
dispensation of justice.  In Chapter 9, we discuss and conclude on the research 
work and highlight recommendations towards the effective enforcement of AML 
legislation, law reforms and measures to prevent the growing tide of money 





WHY IS ECONOMIC CRIME A PROBLEM FOR DEVELOPING COUNTRIES? 
 
Globally, the fight against economic and financial crimes have gained close 
international attention with far-reaching effects.  According to former Solicitor 
General of the UK, Oliver Heald, ‘the profile of economic crime is now higher than 
ever before.  Since the global financial crisis began in late 2007, it seems that 
financial institutions, markets and businesses have endured years of perpetual 
crises.’21  In addition, the concept of borders and jurisdictions are facing an 
incredible challenge in most situations and meaningless in others due to 
connectivity caused by the internet.  Laws, policies and procedures that were once 
under the control of individual states have now become the focus of the 
international community.  Criminal groups who operate in an organised manner 
can now easily commit economic crimes and avoid sanctions across jurisdictions, 
which have now necessitated increased cooperation among the global criminal 
justice agencies.  Financial crime pose threats to world economies and individual 
states alike akin to the problems associated with the use of proceeds from 
economic crime to finance terrorist activities.  Furthermore, the last two decades 
have witnessed a paradigm shift in criminal law in the area of crimes that generate 
profit.   There is now increased effort to strengthen the effectiveness of legal 
                                                            
21 Attorney General’s Office and The Rt Hon Sir Oliver Heald QC MP, ‘Fighting Economic Crime in the Modern 
World’ <https://www.gov.uk/government/speeches/fighting-economic-crime-in-the-modern-world> 
accessed 8 October 2014.   The Solicitor General of the United Kingdom, speaking in the 31st Cambridge 
International Symposium on Economic Crime. He further noted that rarely has a week passed without the 
emergence of some new allegation of financial misfeasance, fraud and corruption.  The most high profile 
current issue in the United Kingdom is the LIBOR scandal; the accusations that bankers have conspired to 




instruments meant to detect, seize and confiscate illicitly acquired wealth causing 
a decline in the motivation of those who intend to engage in such criminal activity. 
 
Economic crime has been defined as ‘any non-violent crime that results in financial 
loss’22 and would comprise ‘a broad range of illegal activities including fraud, tax 
evasion and money laundering’.23  The term is used to describe some crimes 
associated with industry and commerce and other organised criminal activities that 
are financial either in the private or public sector.  It can refer to illegal acts 
committed by individuals to obtain a financial or professional advantage with the 
principal motive of the offender being an economic gain.  Such crimes include 
cyber-crimes, tax evasion, robbery, selling of controlled substances, and abuses 
of economic aid.  Economic crimes can also be in the form of profit motivated, 
illegal activities conducted within or arising out of the economic activity that is itself 
legal or is seen to be legal.  Economic crimes are acquisitive crimes.  Such crimes 
generate huge profits aptly described as ‘profit-oriented’ crimes.  They appear as 
not to cause any direct harm to any identifiable victim. Therefore, legal instruments 
designed to punish crimes that cause immediate damage to an identifiable victim 
is ineffectual in attempts to confiscate proceeds of economic crimes thus the 
increased need for non-conviction based recovery legislations.  In the same vein, 
there are numerous means available to disguise the proceeds of the crime, 
thereby, making it completely difficult for enforcement agencies to trace any direct 
                                                            
22 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Economic and Financial Crimes: Challenges to Sustainable 
Development’ The Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 18-25 
April 2005, Bangkok, Thailand <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/05-82108_E_5_pr_SFS.pdf> accessed 
15 October 2014 
23 United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, ‘Economic and Financial Crimes: Challenges to Sustainable 
Development’ The Eleventh United Nations Congress on Crime Prevention and Criminal Justice, 18-25 
April 2005, Bangkok, Thailand <http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/05-82108_E_5_pr_SFS.pdf> accessed 
15 October 2014 
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link or the perpetrator to the original crime committed.  With the continued 
improvement in internet technology, globalisation and regional integration, 
economic crimes and corruption are getting more and more sophisticated and free-
flowing.  White-collar crime is another concept often associated with financial crime 
and refers to crimes committed in conjunction with professional life by persons 
highly placed in society24 or a crime committed in connection with an organisation.   
Economic crimes are much becoming organised and transnational with 
globalisation and internet connectivity playing a pivotal role. They are transnational 
because they transcend national and international boundaries and transgress laws 
of several states.  The Fourth UN Survey of Crime Trends and Operations of 
Criminal Justice Systems identified eighteen categories of transnational organised 
crime.  These include:  
i. money laundering;  
ii. illicit drug trafficking;  
iii. corruption and bribery of public officials; 
iv. infiltration of legal businesses;  
v. bankruptcy fraud;  
vi. insurance fraud;  
vii. computer crime;  
viii. theft of intellectual property; 
ix. illicit trafficking in arms;  
x. terrorist activities;  
xi. aircraft hijacking;  
xii. sea piracy;  
                                                            
24 Hans Sjogren and Goran Skogh, New Perspective of Economic Crime (Edward Elgar 2004) 128 
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xiii. abduction on land;   
xiv. trafficking in persons;  
xv. trade in human body parts,  
xvi. theft of art and cultural objects, environmental crime and other 
offences.25   
Furthermore, ‘insurgent, paramilitary and other extremist groups’ have been 
identified to be increasingly involved in organised crime and drug trafficking 
syndicates. 
 
While varied forms of economic crimes exist, the thesis focused mainly on 
corruption as a predicate crime leading to money laundering and its impact on 
developing countries.  From a Sub-Saharan African perspective, we examined the 
effect of post-colonialism on the political situation as grounds for festering corrupt 
practices.  Additionally, the thesis underscores why the issue of economic crime is 
relevant given the reasons for corruption, money laundering and capital flight in 
Nigeria and South Africa. 
 
1.1 The Prevalence of Corruption in Sub Saharan Africa. 
 
The historical basis for the emergence of corruption was traced to the industrial 
revolution of the nineteenth century which brought about substantial financial 
growth accompanied by an elaborate economy characterised by increasing 
dependence on finance and investment, large banking networks, stocks and 
credits, and a complicated legal system. This development required the need for 
                                                            




lawyers, financiers and other professionals and in turn aided the expansion of the 
potential of white-collar crime now popularly called corruption. 
 
Some scholars have argued that the menace of corruption is deeply rooted in the 
historical processes of colonialism26.  The practice is viewed as a bye product of 
traits of fraudulent anti-social behaviour derived from the colonial masters with 
particular reference to the scramble for the resources of Africa27 that led to the 
partitioning of the continent into spheres of interest by the European.  Munyae 
identified three ways colonialism is linked to corruption in Africa:  First, drawing 
from Robb's argument28 that the new economic order made possible by the 
industrial revolution led to the emergence of white-collar crime, posit that corruption 
required a well-developed monetary economy characterised by a clear 
differentiation of interests to thrive, and while the precolonial economies lacked 
one, the colonial governments instituted it, thereby ‘laying the structural 
groundwork for the origins and sustenance of corrupt practices.’29  Second: the 
introduction of ‘compulsory cash taxation payable’ to meet the objective of covering 
the ‘cost of administration or acquiring the cheap African labour to meet the 
establishment of productive economic activities.’30  The modus operandi of cash 
taxation was to give the privilege of tax collection to the local chiefs who were 
required to retain 10 percent of the amount collected, this inadvertently, led to 
                                                            
26 Munyae M.Mulinge and Gwen N. Lesetedi, ‘Corruption in Sub-Saharan Africa: Towards a More Holistic 
Approach’ [2002] 7 African Journal of Political Science 1,54 
27 Tseliso Thipanyane, ‘Current Claims, Regional Experiences, Pressing Problems: Identification of the Salient 
Issues and pressing Problems in an African Post-colonial perspective' in George Ulrich and Louise Krabbe 
(eds) Human Rights in Development Yearbook 2001: Reparations: Redressing Past Wrongs (Kluwer Law 
International 2003) 37 
28 George Robb, White Collar Crime in Modern England: Financial Fraud and Business Morality 1845-1929 
(Cambridge University Press 1992) 
29 Ibid 54 
30 Ibid 54 
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taking of kickbacks by the leaders.  Besides, the practice of rewarding tax collectors 
became a method for the accumulation of private property and abuse of office.31 
The rewards blinded the chiefs from the plight suffered by their people from the 
effects of the introduced taxation.32 Thirdly, the divide and rule.33  A method 
employed to subdue and control the natives promoted corruption.  This divide and 
rule method favoured one tribe above the other, with the dual objective of securing 
the loyalty of the group to the administration and encouraged rivalry between 
various tribes aimed at preventing unity who could become opposed to the colonial 
authority.  The favoured Chiefs received perquisites in the form of access to 
western education and government-sponsored economic activities.  
 
Furthermore, colonialism in sub-Saharan Africa was characterised by brutal rule 
where scores of groups of people massacred.34  After the plundering of the 
resources and subjecting the people to the most gruesome treatment, and, when 
independence was granted, it has been argued that the colonial masters did not 
prepare the new rulers to manage their devastated economies.35  The same pattern 
of brutalism, insatiate greed for the nation’s resources and brigandage bequeathed 
by the colonial masters have been emulated by some of the African leaders and 
                                                            
31 Ibid 55 
32 Ibid 55 
33 Ibid 55 
34 Tom Masland, The Forgotten Genocide, NEWSWEEK, August 21, 2000 (hereinafter, Masland, The 
Forgotten Genocide) (narrating the systematic and horrendous German extermination of the  
35 Rand Richards Cooper, ‘History as Tragedy: ‘Lumumba’ [2001] 128,17 Commonweal; 
 See also Abdullahi A. An-Na’im, ‘The Contingent Universality of Human Rights: The case of Freedom of 
Expression in Africa and Islamic Contexts’, Emory Int’l Law Review, Vol. 11, page 55 (Spring 1997) (‘After a 
long history of encouraging and institutionalizing European settlement of Kenya and the total subjugation 
of its native African population, Britain was finally forced to return the country to its people with little 
preparation for democratic self-governance.’  ‘For example, the so-called ‘council of ministers appointed by 
the British government in 1954 to run the daily administration of Kenya consisted of three Europeans, two 
Asians and one African’. 
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have so far heaped misery, violence and poverty on their people.  These leaders 
pitted ethnic groups against each other to preserve their political power and live in 
unabashed luxury while robbing their countries blind.36  The colonial rule, therefore, 
culminated in the current spate of sheer recklessness and endemic corruption that 
is now typical of sub-Saharan Africa.  More so, some newly formed governments 
in Africa imposed a dictatorial system of government resulting in political 
exploitation by the revolutionary forces.37  Admittedly, some of the nationalists had 
the noble intention of letting go the colonial yoke and improved the lots of their 
fellow Africans.  Other leaders adopted the greed and violence of the colonialist 
and their self-serving lifestyles.38  The colonial masters left their colonies 
unprepared and a fertile ground for corruption.  As Akinseye George observed, 
there was ‘uneasy relationships between the post-colonial state and its public; 
between the received socio-political and legal systems on the one hand and the 
African pre-colonial systems of governance on the other hand.’39  The basic law in 
an application in most African countries is a wholesale replica of the colonies' law 
not taking into cognisance their socio-cultural peculiarities.40  As a result, the 
applicable laws are unable to adapt to the acceptable patterns of behaviour and 
conceptions of the organisations they are to regulate.  African traditional norms 
became side-lined, thus creating conflicting value systems open to exploitation by 
                                                            
36 The case of Mobutu Sese Seko and General Sani Abacha are notable. 
37 Hisashi Owada, ‘Development in an Unstable World: A Japanese Experience to promote Human Security’ 
in Francois Bourguignon, Boris Pleskovic and Jacques van der Gaag (eds.) Annual World Bank Conference on 
Development Economics – Europe 2006: Securing Development in an Unstable World (The World Bank, 
2000).  
38 Emmanuel O. Ihuekwumere and Chukwuemeka A. Ihuekwumere, ‘Colonial Rapacity and Political 
Corruption: Roots of African Underdevelopment and Misery' [2003] 3 CHI-KENT J. INT'l & COMP. Law 1, 19 
39 Yemi Akinseye-George, Legal System, Corruption and Governance in Nigeria: Including the Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000 (New Century Law Publishers Ltd 2000) 9 
40 British colonies in Africa applied the common law of England in their respective jurisdictions, whereas 
French and Portuguese law applied in their colonies. 
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the political elites.41  The introduction of European legal system no doubt brought 
about the modernisation of procedures in Africa, but ‘the European organisational 
pieces that were brought to Africa were disembodied of their moral content, and 
their substratum of implicating ethics’.42   
 
The term corruption as defined by Osoba refers to: 
A form of antisocial behaviour by an individual or social group which confers 
unjust or fraudulent benefits on its perpetrators, is inconsistent with the 
established legal norms and prevailing moral ethos of the land and is likely 
to subvert or diminish the capacity of the legitimate authorities to provide 
fully for the material and spiritual well-being of all members of society in a 
just and equitable manner’.  
Perhaps two definitions I prefer to use are those provided by Tanzi, that corruption 
is the ‘intentional non-compliance with arm's length relationships, aimed at deriving 
some advantage from this behaviour for oneself or related individuals’43 And the 
World Bank's definition, as ‘abuse of public office for private benefit’44.  Public office 
is abused for private gains when an official accepts, solicits, or extorts a bribe; 
when individual agents actively offer bribes to circumvent public policies or 
processes for competitive advantage and profit; and, abuse can occur even if no 
bribery happens through patronage and nepotism.   
                                                            
41 Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Modernization and Corruption’ in Arnold J. Heidenheimer and Michael Johnson 
(3rd ed.)  Political Corruption:  Concepts and Contexts (Transaction Publishers, 2002). 
42 Peter Palmer Ekeh, Colonialism and Social Structure: An Inaugural lecture delivered at the University of 
Ibadan on Thursday, 5 June 1980 (University of Ibadan, 1983) 17 Cited by Akinseye-George, Y.  Legal 
System, Corruption and Governance in Nigeria: Including the Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Act 2000 (New Century Law Publishers Ltd 2000) 8  
43 Tanzi (n8) 134 
44 Poverty Reduction and Economic Management, The World Bank, ‘Helping Countries Combat Corruption’  





Corruption is most prevalent where governments are not accountable to the 
people; spends a considerable amount on large-scale capital projects abandoned 
half-way; official accounting practices are not well informed; government officials 
are not well remunerated; political elections are monetised and not well controlled; 
weak legal instrument and lack of political will to enforce laws and standards.  A 
behaviour deemed to be corrupt would therefore incorporate acts such as the use 
of public authority, office or official position for the intent of extracting personal or 
private monetary benefits or other privileges at the expense of public good and in 
violation of rules and ethical considerations, theft, embezzlement or public funds 
or appropriation of state property by other means, as well as nepotism or granting 
favours to personal acquaintances.  The issue that corruption has eaten deep into 
the very fabric of Sub Saharan African is not disputable.   
 
Many agree that corruption is pandemic in Sub Saharan Africa and has reached 
cancerous proportions.  It has permeated virtually all institutions, both public and 
private, government and non-governmental and has become a way of life.  It is a 
principal method for the accumulation of private property.  Illicit enrichment is one 
predicate offence of corruption which results from embezzlement of public funds 
by high ranking officials. Additionally, records show that corrupt rulers have 
starched away billions of dollars of states money into private overseas bank 
account for their personal and family benefits.45  In the same vein, some have 
converted the apparatus of government to family run business whereby family 
                                                            
45 See R v Ibori (Theresa) [2011] EWCA Crim 3193; R v Ibori [2013] EWCA Crim 815, [2014] 1 Cr App Rep 
(s)73.  Ibori was sentenced for conspiracy to commit money laundering, money laundering and obtaining a 
property transfer by deception.    
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members and or their cronies hold all sensitive departments and functions, to 
prevent any form of opposition when their nefarious acts are committed.46  Aids 
money received from donor organisations fall into white elephant projects resulting 
in numerous abandoned projects.47  Some despotic rulers have had to change the 
country's constitution to prolong their stay in office. 
 
The judiciary is subject to executive and political influences and cases of judicial 
corruption are widespread.48 Legal processes are abused continuously by 
influential and highly placed officials for their aggrandizement.  There is a high level 
of impunity among officials with many walking tall when there is ample evidence to 
convict them of misuse of state funds.  In some countries, rulers do not have the 
political will to implement far-reaching reforms aimed at sanitising the system or 
purging its arm of corrupt officials.  Citizens face long delays and frequent requests 
for bribes from judicial officials to expedite cases or to obtain a favourable ruling.  
More so, due to prohibitive legal cost and the time-consuming process, many lack 
confidence in the judiciary for the speedy dispensation of justice.  In some cases, 
judicial processes are abused to frustrate the administration of justice by corrupt 
wealthy people in business, politicians and highly placed government officials.   
                                                            
46 According to Adams Smirzir, ‘owing to personal rule, newly established African states have lacked the 
capabilities to create conditions for capital accumulation.  The economic rationality of state actions is low.  
The government administration and the public enterprises are characterised by mismanagement, 
inefficiency and widespread corruption.’  In this case, ‘an impersonal, predictable and bureaucratically 
rational functioning of the state apparatus becomes impossible.’ 
47 Dambisa Moyo, Dead Aid: Why aid is not working and how there is a better way for Africa (Farrar, Straus 
and Giroux 2009) 
48 According to Transparency International, perceptions of judicial corruption are discouraging: seven out 
of eight African countries covered by TI's Global Corruption Barometer, majority of respondents perceive 
the judicial system to be corrupt; Cameroon tops the list with more than 80% of citizens regarding the 
judiciary as corrupt. Among African countries surveyed, an average of one respondent in five who had 
contact with the judicial system reported having paid a bribe. Transparency International Secretariat, 
‘Judicial corruption fuels impunity, corrodes rule of law, says Transparency International report’  
<https://www.transparency.org/news/pressrelease/20071002_judicial_corruption_fuels_impunity_corro




Transparency International corruption perception index as well as other studies 
ranks most institutions of government in the region as corrupt.  Institutional 
corruption is pervasive among member states in the Sub Saharan Africa region.  
In Cameroun, for example, Global Corruption Barometer 2013 reported that the 
police49 ranked as the most corrupt public institution in the country; the same is for 
all other states in the region.  Business executives are not confident in the police 
to protect companies from crime and uphold law and other.  In some public 
universities in Nigeria, extortion by lecturers and non-academic staff from students 
is a routine, ranging from payments for high grades, extortion through the sale of 
sub-standard handouts and harassments of students by lecturers for sexual 
gratification.  Other institutions of the states in the region are also not free from 
corrupt practices: The World Bank 2012 report considers Ethiopia's customs 
administration the most corrupt sector in the country.  The burden of customs 
procedure in the country is considerable, and ranked close to the bottom in the 
world ranking.  In Burkina Faso, despite the government's efforts to increase 
customs and tax incomes, the customs administration in that country is very 
corrupt.  Notably, economically efficient institutions are those that motivate self-
interested individuals to act in ways that contribute to collective welfare and 
economic development, because of the menace of corruption, these organisations 
are less efficient. 
 
                                                            
49 Transparency International, ‘Global Barometer Report 2013: National Results - Cameroun’ 
<https://www.transparency.org/gcb2013/country/?country=cameroon> accessed 27 October 2014 
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Each year millions of dollars are spent by respective countries on the fight against 
drug trafficking, human trafficking and child labour and some progress has been 
made in this respect including arrest, prosecution and imprisonment and the 
laundered monies confiscated.  This is in contrast with economic crime perpetrated 
by officials in the comfort of their offices and homes, as there has not been 
significant arrest and prosecution of high profile officials.   
 
Some scholars have argued that corruption is an unavoidable consequence of 
economic development and modernisation.  Bayley explains that corruption, could 
in extreme cases, be not only desirable but essential to keep the economy going.  
He noted that ‘the opportunity of corruption may serve to increase the quality of 
public servants.50  Alam argues that in modern bureaucracies, corruption is an 
attribute of all principal-agent relationships.  Usually, the people or principal, grant 
the government (their agent) the power to impose taxes and provide them with 
public goods and services.  However, in carrying out their duties, the agent may 
sacrifice the interests of the principal for his own.51  While the term corruption does 
convey a negative connotation in terms of cost and many see it as having a 
devastating effect for the country, a non-orthodox view, on the contrary, could see 
corruption as beneficial in certain circumstances.52 Inefficient and corrupt 
                                                            
50 David H. Bayley, ‘The Effects of Corruption in a Developing Nation’ (1966) 19, 4 the Western Political 
Quarterly 719, 732. Also, David Kennedy, ‘Laws and Developments’, in John Hatchard and Amanda Perry-
Kessaris (eds), Law and Development: Facing Complexity in the 21st Century.  Essays in Honour of Peter Slinn, 
(Cavendish Publishing, 2003), contends that corruption which can also refer to ‘public discretion’, would run 
parallel to those of formalisation.  Eliminating corruption can seem much like eliminating judicial and 
administrative discretion.  The State acts corruptly when it works by preference rather than mechanically, 
by rule. 
51 M. Shahid Alam, ‘Anatomy of Corruption:  An Approach to the Political Economy of underdevelopment’ 
(1989) The American Journal of Economics and Sociology 48,4  
52 In her discussion of the Economic Impact of Corruption, Susan Aker-man provides some situations in 
which widespread corruption can determine who benefits and bears the cost of government actions.  These 
situations include: 1. Where government is charged with the allocation of a scarce benefit to individuals and 
firms using legal criteria other than a willingness to pay in which case Bribe clear the market.  2.  Officials in 
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governments are characterised by bribes,53 and gifts which are the means that 
enable the penetration of domestic and foreign investors and possibly promote the 
accumulation of capital.  In the same vein, the high rate of corruption in developing 
countries arguably is due to the transitional period they are in for which most 
developed countries had also experienced.  A consideration of the impact of 
economic crime in Sub Saharan Africa will no doubt bring to bear the two faces of 
corruption and underscore the reason for effort in curbing the surge of this pattern 
of crime.  From a cultural perspective, I argue that if existing regulations aimed at 
reducing the menace of corruption when modified to adapt to the local environment 
would yield positive results.54  For example, would the promotion of homegrown 
havens discourage the laundering and concealing of corrupt proceeds overseas?  
I also argue that corruption thrives due to poor and ineffective enforcement of 
existing laws hinged upon strong socio-cultural, ethnic and vindictive system.  But 
who will bring about the radical change we desire?  Could it be the Parliament, with 
less and less credible individuals who vie for such elected political office, some 
been past governors alleged with one form of corrupt practice or the other? Would 
credible and willing individuals defy the norm of electoral violence, rigging, god-
fatherism, cultural and social expectation of graft, the stigma of poverty and other 
                                                            
the public sector may have little incentive to do their jobs well, given official pay scales and the level of 
internal monitoring. As a result, officials may impose delays and other roadblocks leading to brides, thereby 
reducing the cost.  
53 According to Susan Aker-man, ‘the economic impact of bribes paid to avoid regulations and lower taxes 
depends on the efficiency of the underlying programs that are subject to corrupt distortions.’  She further 
argued that ‘suppose a state has many inefficient regulations and levies burdensome on business.  Then, 
given the existing inefficient legal framework, payoffs to avoid regulations and taxes may increase 
efficiency.’ 
54 Mbaku, argued that corruption in Africa is a direct consequence of poorly developed and inappropriate 
institutional arrangements as immediate independence leaders never took the time to engage the people 
in state reconstruction through democratic constitution making so that they could impact by themselves 
their own institutional arrangements.  Instead, constitution making was top-down, elite-driven, 
opportunistic and reluctant.  Thus, the outcome was laws and institutions that were not locally focused and 
did not reflect the values of the people to be governed.  See John Mukum Mbaku, Corruption in Africa: 
Causes, Consequences and Cleanups (Lexington Books 2010) 3 
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societal expectations to steer the affairs of the state and promote the 
developmental strides necessary to snowball the economies for efficiency and 
effectiveness?55 
 
Corruption obscures the truth and leads to damaging consequences.  In the first 
place, it undermines the revenue accruing to the coffers of government, and, 
therefore, limits the ability of government to invest in productivity-enhancing areas 
such as education, infrastructure and health that are vital ingredients for 
development.  When government officials allow corruption to thrive, they promote 
an environment of distrust and impunity, thereby allowing taxpayers to by-pass 
processes or blatantly refuse to pay their taxes.  Since corruption can reduce the 
revenue base of government, it will lead to inadequate funds necessary for 
infrastructural development resulting in borrowing by the government to meet the 
shortfall in expenditure.  Borrowed money generates additional interest payment, 
which will further constrain government's ability to satisfy other obligations. 
 
Corruption also distorts the entire decision-making process connected with public 
investment projects.56  Large-scale public investment projects provide opportunities 
for corrupt public officials to inflate the value of such contracts for their gains 
                                                            
55 This attitude is known as prebendalism.  This draws from the work of Richard Joseph, whose 1987 study 
of Nigeria’s Second Republic (1979 – 1983) highlighted the importance of prebendal or neopatrimonial 
networks based on ethnic and regional solidarity throughout Nigeria.  Prebendalism refers to ‘the pattern 
of political behaviour that rests on the justifying principle that offices should be competed for and then 
utilized for the personal benefit of office-holders as well as their reference support group.’  See Leena 
Hoffmann and Insa Nolte, ‘The Roots of Neopatrimonialism: Opposition Politics and Popular Consent in 
SouthWestern Nigeria’ in Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer Obadare (eds), Democracy and Prebendalism in 
Nigeria: Critical Interpretations (Palgrave Macmillan 2013) 25   
56 Vito Tanzi and Hamid Davoodi, ‘Corruption, Public Investment, and Growth’ [1997] IMF WP 97/139 




resulting in some instances to abandoned white elephant projects. In other cases, 
the projects are of a sub-standard nature because the contractor would have failed 
to provide the minimum acceptable standard since the money voted into the project 
have been used as payment of bribes, or to serve an individuals' political interest. 
Often the projects are built with external loans, and when not completed, depletes 
the meagre revenues generated by the state, and, leading to reduction in spending 
in socially vital areas of the economy, or the maintenance of existing infrastructure. 
 
 
1.2 The Cultural Perspective of Corruption 
 
Culture is embedded in the language of the people.  While there is no precise 
transliteration of the word ‘corrupt’ in the dialects and languages of many societies 
in sub-Saharan Africa, the nature and practice of corruption are now commonplace, 
and, as identified earlier, is the product of western civilisation in the form of 
colonialism.   How does the culture - the way of life - of most communities, promote 
corruption?  How far reaching is this menace of corruption globally? 
 
Corruption is understood as behaviour that corrupts and undermines the cultural 
system in which it occurs.  Since cultures operate in different ways, practices that 
are considered questionable in one culture may appear acceptable in others.  As 
Hooker observes:  ‘the West tends to be universalist in its outlook: every society 
works or should work, essentially the same way…, a country that fails to conform 
to this model is underdeveloped or dysfunctional.  It follows from this view that 
corruption is the same in Sweden as in Sudan.  The reality, however, is that 
different cultures use radically different systems to get things done.  Whereas 
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western cultures are primarily ruled – based, most of the world’s cultures are 
relationship based.’57 For example, bringing of lawsuits for breach of contract may 
be corrupting and dysfunctional elsewhere.58  In SSA, social solidarity is a 
necessary element of the African cultural basis.  Gift giving is one of the noblest 
gestures in a relationship.  It is accepted practice because indigenous people 
believe in prior anticipation of a new relationship before it is borne.  This practice 
of gift giving promotes peaceful coexistence and harmony in the society.  The 
defence counsel in the case of World Duty Free vs the Republic of Kenya argued 
that ‘gifts are given as a way to say ‘hello' or recognise the authority of the leader 
in many African communities in Kenya.  In many cultural settings, when one visits 
friends or a relative, one does not go ‘empty handed’ nor does he leave the 
homestead of that friend or relative empty-handed.  Exchange of gifts irrespective 
of their worth is customarily acceptable, and failure to comply with those customary 
practices is indicative of extreme poverty, meanness or rebellion against cultural 
norms.’59  It is worth noting though that the tribunal found the existence of Kenyan 
cultural practice, but did not invalidate that such cash payments intended to 
influence an official.60   Akinseye-George also argued, ‘the culture of gift giving as 
constituting the primordial infrastructure for the edifice of corruption, 
is…..misleading.  African traditional practice of gift giving is by no means a factor 
                                                            
57 John Hooker, ‘Corruption From a Cross-Cultural Perspective’ 
<http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.157.4546&rep=rep1&type=pdf >  accessed 8 
September 2014 
58 Ibid, 1 
59 Chatham House, ‘World Duty Free v The Republic of Kenya: a Unique Precedent?’  
<http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/sites/corruption-
cases/files/documents/arw/Moi_World_Duty_Free_Chatham_House_Mar_28_2007.pdf> accessed 8 
September 2014 
60 Chatham House, ‘World Duty Free v The Republic of Kenya: a Unique Precedent?’ 
<http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/sites/corruption-




in explaining ‘systematic’ and ‘grand’ forms of corruption.   The undeniable 
proclivity of many African political leaders, for subverting the law and constitution 
of their countries in the bid to personalise state resources or to perpetuate them in 
power’61 is rather responsible for corruption.  Mbaku also shares the same position 
when he argued that in Africa ‘gift giving is a highly valued practice and remains 
an important part of the cultures and customs of societies on the continent.’62    
More so, ‘acts of political corruption as election rigging, manipulation of election 
results, oppression of minorities, and elimination of political opposition…..have 
nothing to do with the so-called culture of gift-giving.’63  Some development 
economics have contended that such a tradition makes it difficult to distinguish 
between wrong and right behaviour.  The abuse therefore of a legal culture is by 
no means an indication of the greed of the practice.  The respective languages 
have different expressions of gift drawing a contrast between legitimate and 
illegitimate gift giving.  No basis exists in assuming ‘a uniform gift-giving culture in 
Africa which constitutes an affirmation of the venal practice of bribery.’64  Whereas 
gift giving is an acceptable norm in African societies, Bribery is not.  Bribery is 
corrupting since it induces people to depart from established rules and procedures.  
Where corruption becomes commonplace, it makes people lose faith in the system 
resulting in the flouting of rules routinely.  Gift given to influence the 
decision/performance of a public official in the carriage of his lawful duties, no 
longer serves the custom as described above but it is in reality corruption. 
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The African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption definition 
provides what constitutes a corrupt practice.  It includes, ‘the solicitation or 
acceptance, the offering or granting, directly or indirectly, by a public official or any 
other person, of any goods of monetary value, or other benefit, such as gift, favour, 
promise or advantage for himself ……in exchange for any act or omission in the 
performance of his or her public functions.’   In the same vein, ‘an act of omission… 
for illicitly obtaining benefits’ or ‘the diversion by a public official….for purposes 
unrelated to those for which they were intended… of any property belonging to the 
state or its agencies, to an independent body, or to an individual that such official 
has received by his position.  The definition also includes acts geared towards 
promoting the use of public office to give undue advantage to individuals in the 
private sector and even encompasses illicit enrichment, concealment of the 
proceeds of corruption, the participation and acting as an accomplice to perpetuate 
the corrupt act. 
 
Corruption is widespread as it cuts across regional and international boundaries. 
In nearly all Asian countries, there has always been the tradition of corruption.65  
Public office means perquisites.66  In India corruption with the passage of time 
became ‘a convention, a psychological need and a necessity to say’.67  Sajo 
observed, ‘there is stealing and corruption in everywhere….but in Russia, I think 
there are more stealing and corruption than in any other state.’68 The same is for 
                                                            
65 Daniel Treisman, ‘The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study' [2000] 76 Journal of Public 
Economy 399  
66 Mohammed Usman, ‘Corruption in Nigeria: A challenge to Sustainable Development in the Fourth 
Republic’ (2013) 9 European Scientific Journal 118.  
67 Ibid 118 
68 Andras Sajo, ‘Traditions of corruption, Corruption and Democracy. Political institutions, processes and 
corruption in transition states in East-Central Europe and in the former Soviet Union’ [1994] Budapest 
Institute for Constitutional and Legislative policy 43-46 
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Europe and Latin America.  Most societies in Sub Saharan Africa are bedevilled 
with corrupt practices in such a way that when an individual is appointed to hold 
any political or public office, the expectation from the people becomes what he or 
she can offer from his office to his immediate and extended family and friends.  
Non-performance is adjudged failure to meet these expectations.  Popular sayings 
include, ‘politics of settlement’,69 ‘this is your time’, or ‘our time has come’ or ‘it is 
national cake so eat yours’, or in other cases, ‘since you assumed office, what have 
you done for the community’?  This expectation is so intense that, an individual is 
expected to donate or provide money to support any/whatever activity being 
organised within ones locality or state.  In addition to the role expectation, job 
insecurity is another major factor.  Because public office is seen as a means to an 
end, those who vie and eventually occupy it, quickly get enriched by engaging in 
fraudulent activities before their tenure expires.  Hence, when they leave the office, 
the expectation is what they were able to achieve, in terms of personal enrichment.   
This paradigm shift in cultural values has made instant gratification an acceptable 
norm in society.  This is similar to the period of the collapse of communism whereby 
moral values declined to a low ebb.  Because they ran a ‘system of 
government…so completely in the hands of officials that their powers jeopardizes 
the liberties of ordinary citizens’,70 these ‘could expect neither serious consideration 
nor fair treatment without some means of ‘interesting' the official in their case.’  Use 
of bribes and contacts became commonplace.  In some instances, bribery or 
connections facilitates change to unwelcome work assignment or to get a dull child 
into a good university department.  The same is true of some countries in SSA 
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70 William L. Miller, Tatyana Koshechkina and Ase Grodeland, ‘How Citizens Cope With Post-Communist 




where bribes and connections play a dominant factor in the award of government 
contracts, appointment of officials to responsible positions in government, entry 
into reputable universities for graduate and post-graduate studies and lots more.  
Notable too is the continuous recycling of corrupt government officials from one 
successive administration to the other in the pretext of their being ‘elder 
statements’, ‘godfathers’, or ‘the wise men’.  Officials indicted or accused of large-
scale corruption later celebrated and cleared for further political responsibilities.  
New governments do not purge outgoing politicians; competent professionals are 
lost to the private sector, which offers better-paid jobs with less stress and 
harassment, rather than get their reputations tarnished by political foes and hawks. 
 
The lack of cultural and moral discipline and the spirit of desperation or popularly 
called ‘do or die politics’ have metamorphosed into sophisticated rigging 
techniques adopted during elections.  Free and fair elections are a mirage.  The 
purpose of free and fair elections should ‘do more than offer an often misleading 
choice of programmes and leadership, but should affect the general political 
culture, set the tone for democratic governance…..turn officials and bureaucrats 
into civil servants and encourage government to respect individual citizens as well 
as the collective decision of the whole electorate.  Voters get paid either in cash or 
kind; political thugs employed to compel the electorate to vote in favour of the 
preferred candidate; or the electorate is out rightly intimidated by the snatching of 
ballot boxes, stuffing of the boxes with multiple voters card, or providing an already 




1.3 Corruption and Its Effect on Development 
Corruption as an economic crime has adverse socio-economic climate and moral 
chaos as a direct consequence of the handing over of power to the nationals from 
the colonial masters.  A number of studies have documented that the elite in many 
developing countries had long placed assets offshore, but there appeared to have 
been a more recent acceleration of such capital flight.  African leaders have been 
accused of looting government treasuries, with estimated billions of US Dollars 
leaving Africa yearly and find its way into the international banking system and 
often into western banks.71  To underscore the neglect in infrastructural 
development, fiscal spending on infrastructure is about 6-12 percent of GDP,72 
which is less than $50 per person.  Road access rate in Africa is only 34% 
compared with 50% in other parts of the developing world, while transport cost is 
higher by 100%.  Only 30% of the population in Africa have access to electricity 
compared to 70-90% in other parts of the developing world.  Water resources are 
under-used with only 5% of agriculture under irrigation.73  A report suggested that 
deficit infrastructure has been found to sap growth by 2% a year. Comparing SSA 
to most East Asian countries, the level of infrastructural development pales.  For 
                                                            
71 According to Sharman, ‘in a strict legal sense, taking public assets for private benefit abroad often may 
not have constituted a crime at all in the country that ended up hosting the stolen assets.  Even if there 
were laws on the books against hosting the proceeds of foreign corruption, ..kleptocrats knew that their 
chances of being investigated, let alone prosecuted or convicted, were close to zero.  See J. C. Sharman, The 
Despot’s Guide to Wealth Management: On the International Campaign against Grand Corruption (Cornell 
University Press 2017)  
72 African Development Bank Group, ‘Handbook on Infrastructure Statistics’ 
<http://www.afdb.org/fileadmin/uploads/afdb/Documents/Publications/AfDB%20Infrastructure web.pdf>  
accessed 1 November 2014 
73 African Development Bank Group, ‘Programme for Infrastructure Development in Africa (PIDA): 
Addressing the Infrastructure Gap in Africa, to Speed up Regional Integration’ Seventh Conference of 
African Ministers in charge of Integration 14-18 July 2014 Swaziland 
<https://au.int/sites/default/files/newsevents/workingdocuments/12582-wd-pida-




example, fixed capital formation doubled in China between 1998 and 2005 and by 
2006 capital infrastructural investment was higher than 14% of GDP.74  
Infrastructure contributes to economic growth and is an important input to human 
development.  It is a key ingredient for achieving the millennium development goals 
(MDGs).  For instance, safe and potable water supplies save time and arrest the 
spread of serious diseases.  Availability of electricity powers the health and 
education sectors and boosts small and medium scale businesses.  For countries 
in SSA, the negative effect of inadequate infrastructure is estimated to be at least 
large as that of ‘crime, red tape, corruption, and financial market constraints’.75  If 
the amount of money carted away by corrupt leaders is channelled towards 
infrastructural development, or worse case, reinvested in the marketplace to create 
jobs for the teeming population of youths, this action would provide foreign 
exchange earnings and taxes to the government; fund charities and go a long way 
in addressing the severe developmental gap in the continent.  
 
                                                            
74 The African Development Bank Group, ‘Handbook on Infrastructure Statistics’ 
<https://www.afdb.org/> accessed 1 November 2014 






Figure 2- Africa Infrastructure Development Index 2015 
 
A culture of distrust and private spiritedness is responsible for fostering the high 
rate of corruption.  As Heywood noted, maladministration increases the 
discretionary and arbitrary power of administrators in every phase of the process 
which leads to public measures being purchased by bribery: the artificial creation 
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controls.76  Akin to distrust and private spiritedness is ethnic polarisation.  Treisman 
noted that ‘the demand for corrupt services may be higher at any given price.  For 
one thing, generalised trust is likely lower.  Members of ethnic groups may feel that 
demanding favours from co-ethnics in office is the only effective way to obtain 
government services’.77   
 
Corruption obstructs development, harms the poor and impedes business growth, 
impedes investment, the proceeds of corruption been stashed overseas. 
Corruption can also reduce tax revenues reducing the funds available to 
governments for public spending. Thus, corruption lowers the quality of public 
services and infrastructure, distorts government-spending decisions, and 
decreases tax and customs revenues and damages confidence in the rule of law.  
Analysis shows that, if more is spent on education, this ensures enhanced human 
capital development, which is crucial to poverty eradication through good 
leadership; but sadly, corruption has robbed the developing countries' 
governments of their political legitimacy. 
 
1.4 Economic Crimes and Sustainable Development 
According to the 1987 Brundtland report, sustainable development is: 
Development that meets the needs of current generations without 
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their needs.78 
                                                            
76 Ibid page 117.  See Nicholas Ibekwe, ‘Battle Over Kaduna DISCO: Reserved Bidder Threatens to sue BPE’ 
Premium Times (Lagos, 2 September 2014); Bassey Udo, ‘How VP Sambo, BPE DG Unilaterally Awarded 
Enugu DISCO to Emeka Offor’ Premium Times (Lagos, 29 September 2013) 
77 Treisman (n65) 
78 United Nations, ‘Our Common Future, Chapter 2: Towards Sustainable Development’ <http://www.un-




Sustainable development contains within it two concepts:  the concept of ‘needs', 
in particular, the essential needs of the worlds’ poor to which overriding priority 
should be given, and the idea of limitations imposed by the state of technology and 
social organisation on the environment's ability to meet present and future needs.  
A comprehensive approach to sustainable development should encompass 
environmental, economic, social and cultural sustainability.  This method is about 
an improvement in the human condition and focuses more on the underlying 
philosophy that what is done now to improve the quality of life of people, should 
not degrade the environment and resources such that the future generations are 
put at a disadvantage.  Extreme poverty and economic inequality undermines the 
concept of sustainable development, made worse where corruption and other 
forms of financial crimes thrive uncontrollably. 
  
Poverty eradication was one of the three overarching objectives of the summit on 
sustainable development, and it is a significant challenge facing sub-Saharan 
Africa.  The objectives include: to halve by 2015, the proportion of people who have 
an income less than US$1 a day; establish a fund to eradicate poverty and promote 
social and human development; develop national programs to empower poor 
people and other organizations; deliver essential health services for all and reduce 
environmental health threats; build rural infrastructure through diversification of the 
economy and improvement of access to market and market information.  The 
Development Assistance Communities factsheet shows that about 66% of 
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countries in SSA are least developed.79  No doubt adequate development in 
infrastructure and flow of foreign direct investment is necessary to achieve 
meaningful progress.  A country ranked as least developed would have met three 
criteria: low incomes; human resource weaknesses, based on indicators of health, 
nutrition, education and literacy; and economic vulnerability, based on an array of 
factors, including the stability of agricultural production and the exposure to natural 
disasters.80  An environment that breeds corruption and weak political will to 
implement policies aimed at sustainability will undoubtedly remain in the web of 
poverty and backwardation.   Of the 47 countries profiled in the DAC list, only six 
states representing 13% are among the upper-middle-income nations and 
territories in the world, seven countries are in the lower middle income but the most 
of countries in SSA, 72% are in the bottom half. 
 
                                                            
79 UN-OHRLLS, <http://unohrlls.org/about-ldcs/> accessed 02.11.2014.  A Least Developed Country (LDC) is 
one that exhibits the lowest indicators of socioeconomic development, with the lowest Human 
Development Index ratings of all countries in the world.  The Least Developed Countries represent the 
poorest and weakest segment of the international community. They comprise more than 880 million people 
(about 12 percent of world population) but account for less than 2 percent of world GDP and about 1 
percent of global trade in goods. 
80 United Nations News, ‘UN advocate salutes Cape Verde’s graduation from category of poorest States’ 







Figure 3 - Gross National Income Classification 
Source:  Adapted from the DAC list of ODA recipients, Factsheet – January 2012 
www.oecd.org_dac_stats_49483614.pdf 
 
Totentino noted that, ‘it would indeed, be politically and environmentally disastrous 
for a country’s population to grow without development.’81 Therefore, it is imperative 
that for economic crimes to be controlled and reduced significantly, there should 
be good governance.  Good governance here means ‘public service that is 
efficient, a judicial system that is reliable and an administration that is accountable.’ 
While the practical meaning could vary ‘according to the socio-economic and 
political characteristics’, it means ‘promoting limited government through 
strengthening public accountability, by the way of promoting participation in 
development and resource management’.82  This will amongst others, include a 
                                                          
81 Amado S. Tolentino, ‘Good Governance Through Popular Participation in Sustainable Development’ in 
Konrad Ginther, Erik Denters, and Paul J.I.M de Waart (ed.) Sustainable Development and Good Governance 
[Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1995]  137 
82 Ibid 157 
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transparent and violence-free electoral process that selects leaders to manage the 
state's affairs that will themselves be accountable.  Studies have indicated that 
states where governments have become more responsive, leads to increased 
infrastructural development, improved quality of education and health, peace and 
security.83  The obvious fact however, is that in SSA it’s common scene for electoral 
processes flawed with rigging, stuffing of ballot boxes and vote buying.  In an 
inaugural speech, a governor in one Nigerian state assured the electorate of 
providing adequate ‘stomach infrastructure’ for their commitment towards his 
election to office.  Opposition is repelled through violent means, or abuse of the 
judicial process.   
 
To determine the effect of economic crime especially in relation to sustainable 
development, the role of the state is pertinent.  Economic theorist have argued that 
the role of the state is to provide an enabling environment to maximize social 
welfare.  According to Fischer and Thomas:  
 The new consensus on development policy places greater stress than 
before on the central role of the markets and on the private sector…as the 
engine of growth.  The role of the public sector is seen as the creation of a 
favourable enabling environment for economic activity.  The enabling 
environment consist of the legal, institutional and policy framework within 
which economic agents operate.  A government that creates a favourable 
enabling environment has a large role to play, for instance in ensuring the 
provision of infrastructure, including social services, such as poverty 
                                                            
83 Deepa Narayan, Lant Pritchett and Soumya Kapoor, Moving out of Poverty: Success from the Bottom Up 
(Palgrave Macmillan 2009) 2 
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alleviation, basic education, and access to health care; public security; a 
stable macroeconomic framework; and an efficient fiscal and regulatory 
system.84 
 
Some have equated development, which signifies progress in human well-being 
with economic growth.  As long noted, increase in average per capita incomes 85 is 
an essential means to measure development.  The World Bank uses one 
International Dollar a day as its poverty line and reports estimates of the 
percentage change of each country's population living below the line.  However, 
most times average income fails to capture other essential aspects of human well-
being such as people's health, education or security. The enhancement of people's 
capabilities or the opportunities that are open to people of being and doing a variety 
of things suggested as a development objective.86  Viewed from this perspective, 
development objectives can be seen as those that enlarges people's choices in 
such a way that enables them to live longer, healthier and fuller lives.  Furthermore, 
the problem of development in most countries can no longer be measured by such 
criteria as the growth of income in per capita of individuals, or the wealth of a nation 
as the size of its GDP.  Instead, development is now defined primarily as ‘the issue 
of freedom from want’ being ‘separately linked with the issue of freedom from 
fear’,87 because human security cannot be erased from issues of development.  
                                                            
 84 Stanley Fischer and Vinod Thomas. ‘Policies for Economic Development’ [1990] 72 AJAE 809.  Adapted 
from Meier G. M and Rauch J.E, Leading Issues in Economic Development (7th Edition, Oxford University 
Press 2000) 422 
85 Gerald M Meier and James E Rauch, Leading Issues in Economic Development (7th Edition, Oxford 
University Press 2000) 5.  Per Capita Income is an average over all the residents of a country.  It is calculated 
by taking a measure of all sources of income in the aggregate and dividing it by the population of the 
country.   
86 Amartya Sen, Development as Freedom (Oxford University Press 1999) 




In the first UNDP human development report, it stated that ‘the primary objective 
of development is to create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, 
healthy and creative lives.  The UNDP developed the concept of human security 
to encompass not only the achievements of minimal levels of material needs, but 
to also include the absence of severe threats to them of an economic or political 
kind: ‘Job security, income security, health security, environmental security, 
security from crime – these are the emerging concerns of all over the world.'88  
According to Sen, ‘human security is concerned with reducing and – when possible 
– removing the insecurities that plague human lives.89  The definition of Human 
Security as provided by the Commission of Human Security states that:  ‘Human 
security in its broadest sense embraces far more than the absence of violent 
conflict.  It encompasses human rights, good governance, access to education and 
healthcare.  Also ensuring that each has opportunities and choices to fulfil his or 
her potential…freedom from want, freedom from fear, and the freedom of the future 
generations to inherit a healthy natural environment – these are the interrelated 
building blocks of human, and therefore national, security.90 
 
The definition above is adversely affected by individual or national insecurity 
concerns because insecurity cuts life short and thwarts the use of human 
potential91.  In the same vein, if development ensures human happiness, insecurity 
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caused by underdevelopment will also cause severe adverse effects even when 
there are no violent conflicts.  According to a UN Report, Kofi-Annan, then 
Secretary-General remarked: ‘we will not enjoy development without security, we 
will not enjoy security without development, and we will not enjoy either without the 
respect of human rights’.92   Frances Stewart argues that ‘social stability is implicitly 
premised on a social contract between the people and the government: people 
accept state authority as long as the state delivers services and provides consistent 
employment and incomes.  With economic stagnation or decline, and worsening 
state services, the social contract breaks down and violence results.  Hence high 
and rising levels of poverty and a decline in state services would be expected to 
cause conflict.’93  Furthermore, what matters in reducing conflicts is not only the 
increase in the level of development but the reduction of levels of poverty, 
horizontal inequalities and public spending on social services.94  Where 
government resources are diverted by a few privileged individuals who control the 
machinery of government under the guise of corruption, it can inevitably lead to 
violent conflicts.95  Following this argument, it is evident that a vicious cycle would 
continue to exist, which is: lack of development leading to conflict leading to lack 
of progress.  The virtuous cycle of security leading to development and 
development further promoting security in their view can be broken if economic 
growth is not inclusive because the potentials for conflicts in that case remains.96   
Corruption erodes the foundations of a stable society and economy.  To a 
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93 Frances Stewart, ‘Development and Security’ in Robert Picciotto and Rachel Weaving Security and 
Development:  Investing in Peace and Prosperity (Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 2006) 55   
94 Ibid 59 
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considerable extent, it undermines government revenues and limits its ability to 
invest in productivity-enhancing activities such as education, health and social 
infrastructure.  In developing countries where road and rail networks are in a state 
of disrepair, much-needed funds necessary for upgrade or repair are either 
starched away to foreign bank accounts or spent in frivolous activities by 
politicians.  Payment of taxes is seen a questionable business proposition because 
monies are not reliably utilised, the government is neither accountable nor willing 
to take responsibility for their financial recklessness.  For sustainable development, 
there is the need for much-needed funds to be channelled into beneficial 
infrastructural development initiatives that would help both in the short and long 
run to alleviate the many difficulties experienced in sub-Saharan Africa.   
 
Economic crimes infringe on the rights of individuals.  Recent rulings in some 
jurisdictions lay credence to this point.  For instance, the Constitutional Court of 
South Africa has held that ‘corruption and maladministration are inconsistent with 
the rule of law and the fundamental values of our constitution.97  They undermine 
the constitutional commitment to human dignity, the achievement of equality and 
the advancement of human rights and freedoms’.98  Human right as defined by 
Nickel is ‘international norms that help to protect all people everywhere from severe 
political, legal, economic and social abuses, or that serve to secure and preserve 
essential goods, protections and freedoms in those important areas for all people 
                                                            
97 The Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996. 
98 (CCT 27/00) [2000] ZACC 22 South African Association of Personal Injury Lawyers v Health and Others, 28 
November 2000 par 4.  See also Hugh Glenister v President of the Republic of South Africa and other, 17 
March 2001 (CCT 48/10); [2011] ZACC 6 par. 176: ‘Endemic Corruption threatens the injunction that 
government must be accountable, responsive and open (…)’: Par 177: ‘it is incontestable that corruption 
undermines the rights in the Bill of Rights, and imperils Democracy.’ 
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everywhere’.99  Kofele-Kale argues that economic crimes deprives the society in 
general of their human rights, and using available statistical information, there is 
no doubt that corruption deprives the entire population of their rights.  For instance, 
when one defines human rights as ‘an international norm that helps protect all 
everywhere from severe political, economic and social abuses’, then the multi-
dimensional index on poverty in Sub Saharan Africa lends credence to the fact that 
corruption is perhaps the most.  For a privileged few to divert the collective good 
defeats the purpose of government, defeats the declaration that humans are born 
equal in dignity and rights and that their moral claims are inalienable and inherent 
by their humanity.  Consistent with the Lockean vision of rights, the owners of these 
evidently basic rights of humankind – life, liberty and property have never 
surrendered them to the state, rather, all that the individual surrenders upon 
entering civil society are the right to have these rights enforced by the state.100  The 
right to a corruption free society according to Kofele-Kale is a ‘basic human right, 
because other important values depend on this right and it derives from the right 
of a people to exercise permanent sovereignty over their natural resources and 
wealth.  That is, their right to economic self-determination, recognized in common 
in article 1 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights and the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’.101  The right to 
the exercise of sovereignty over a nation's natural wealth and resources, he argues 
meant two things: first, the right of states to exercise control over their natural 
resources; and, second, the right of all peoples within the state to freely use, exploit 
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100 Ndiva Kofele-Kale, Combating Economic Crimes; Balancing Competing Rights and Interests in Prosecuting 
the Crimes of Illicit Enrichment [Routledge Taylor & Francis Group 2012] 135 
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and dispose of their natural wealth and resources in the supreme interest of their 
national development.102  A violation occurs where the state ‘alienates the people's 
patrimony in its resources by corrupt or unwise concessions to companies’ or it 
‘engages in the corrupt transfer of ownership of national wealth to those select 
nationals who occupy positions of power or influence in the society.’  Furthermore, 
the right to a corruption free society also ‘implicates the collective right to 
development.’  The importance of development in the human rights context rests 
on the ‘predicate that, without development, it would not be possible to respect and 
insure individual rights.’  Corruption by public officials infringes on the human rights 
of those in the state, and as shown by several studies, the economic cost of 
corruption and other financial crimes are intrinsically linked to the overall enjoyment 
of the right to development.  More so, corruption does pose a formidable threat to 
democratic governance and the rule of law both of which are essential to the 
implementation of the United Nations Declaration of Human rights.    
 
1.5 Economic Crimes Impugns Physical Fairness And Stability 
 
That corruption remains unchecked and continues unabated in developing 
countries results in the general call for equity, justice and fairness.  What is fair and 
equitable has being a subject of controversy.  For example, a renowned professor 
may not earn a salary as much as a footballer playing in one of the premier league 
top sides, or a farmer's meagre wages who toils all day long to produce the very 
essence of our continued living (food) is not comparable to a movie star.  While 
arguments may arise by a professor's earnings and that of a footballer's, it does 
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not extinguish the burning desire for fairness.  A cursory view of justice from the 
perspective of national wealth distribution becomes even more worrisome.  
Granted, the foundation of taxes assumes that there should be no quid pro quo in 
aspects of societal life, premised on the equitable distribution of wealth as to assure 
the provision of social welfare to the masses.  The everyday news about corruption 
and looting of the resources cuts short this expectation instead, the economy is 
characterized by a growing number of unemployed youths, rising levels of poverty, 
lack of welfare infrastructure such as potable water, electricity, road network and 
affordable transportation, and insecurity of lives and property. Good governance 
and equity are thrown to the wind, there is social unrest resulting in military 
takeovers in some parts of the continent and continued unrest in other areas.  
Conflicts have given rise to the proliferation of small arms resulting in the high rate 
of armed robberies, kidnapping and increased political assassination.  In recent 
times, the rise of insurgency premised by the long period of misrule and bad 
governance have resulted in vices such as suicide bombings and kidnappings, 
concepts which were strange to the continent some years ago. 
 
Fairness is a value of universal appeal, and in every facet of life, there are some 
notions concerning equality and justice in economic, social and political status.  It 
governs all aspects of our society and grips issues both considered trivial and 
essential.  Sen defines fairness as: ‘Demand for impartiality uninfluenced by our 
respective vested interests, or by our priorities or eccentricities or prejudice.’103  
Fairness is the foundation of justice.104  As Pierre-Joseph Proudhon noted: ‘Justice, 
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under various names, governs the world – nature and humanity, science and 
conscience, logic and morals, political economy, politics, history, literature and art.  
Justice is that which is most primitive in the human soul, most fundamental in 
society, most sacred among ideas and what the masses demand today with most 
ardour.  It is the essence of religions and at the same time the form of reason, the 
secret object of faith, and the beginning, middle and end of knowledge.  What can 
be imagined more universal, more strong, more complete than justice?’105  A fair 
system is one that ensures ‘stability and progressive change’106 and have 
‘consequential values by which institutions and processes are judged: do they 
provide the consequences which people expect, using an appropriate discursive 
and distributive process?107  A system that fails to provide for basic needs108 in a 
manner that satisfies reasonable expectations such as food, peace, good order 
and security and those duly authorised fails to act by procedures which protect 
against corrupt, arbitrary or idiosyncratic decision-making processes would 
inadvertently show as an unfair system.  As stated by Franck, ‘the fairness of 
a….system will be judged, first by the degree to which the rules satisfy the 
participant's expectations of justifiable distribution of costs and benefits, and 
secondly by the extent to which the rules are made and applied in accordance with 
what the participants expect as the right process.’109  Therefore, when government 
fails to distribute burdens equitably, it will provoke resistance and discord within 
the society.  Conversely, when individuals perceive the system to promote 
distributive justice, it will engender compliance within and outside government.    
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The search for fairness begins with ‘a search for agreement on a few basic values 
which take the form of shared perceptions as to what is unconditionally unfair.’110  
What are those fundamental values?111  In most countries, the constitution is the 
primary source of law to elaborate in varying degrees the limits of government 
power and their exercise.  Because of the prevalence of corruption, the 
development of active codes of conduct to regulate public office holders and 
commercial organizations112 will help to stem this social and economic problem.  
Indeed all arms of government should be independent, accountable and maintain 
a high degree of honesty and integrity.  About the judicial arm, fairness requires 
‘impartial and fair legal institutions’, which means ‘guaranteeing the independence 
of judicial decision making against political interference’.  Fairness entails that the 
courts would not be perceived to be partisan or arbitrary in their application, judges 
are held accountable for their actions, and the entire judicial system is socially 
responsible.  It has been suggested that one way to build social accountability in 
the legal order is through the free media and civil society organisations.113 
 
The abuse of executive power results in corruption with facets such as bribery, 
inflation of contracts, and nepotism which is very widespread in the routine 
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operations of government.  The constitution and other laws regulate executive 
activities and provide an accountability framework for governance that would justify 
that the people and their elected representatives have the power to control the 
operations of government.  According to Brentham, the self-interest of rulers is in 
a state of natural and diametrical opposition to that of the subjects will inevitably 
harm the interests of the vast majority of the community who are subject to them 
in promoting their selfish ambitions.  To ensure fairness in the performance of their 
responsibilities, public office holders114 are to abide by the constitution, take an oath 
of office, conform to existing codes of conduct and conform to all rules and 




Economic crimes mostly perpetrated by political office holders and their cronies 
create the much adverse effect on the economy.  Inadequate infrastructure, lack 
of essential social amenities such as potable water supply, electricity, education, 
just to mention a few are the order of the day.  The teaming masses provide social 
welfare for themselves whereas funds appropriated for meaningful developmental 
activities are misappropriated, laundered out of the country to safe havens, thereby 
creating the development gap.  The attitude exhibited by these egocentric leaders 
promotes an opportunistic culture in the minds of potential office holders to ‘grab’ 
whatever they can within their stay in office.  The fear that future office holders with 
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differing political ideologies may subject the past administration to investigation and 
ridicule, an effort is made to impose only desired candidates in office contrary to 
the mandate of the people.  Elections are fraught with massive rigging marred by 
violence and bloodshed; sensitive election materials are high jacked, ballot boxes 
stuffed, electoral officers are either intimidated or compromised with juicy financial 
offers.  The judiciary to make matters worse is highly compromised with judges 
bribed for favourable judgments, and in other instances, series of injunctions and 
counter injunctions are filed to abuse the judicial process and the smooth 
administration of justice. 
Good governance, transparency and accountability are real hallmarks of a sane 
society, and this is lacking in most sub-Saharan Africa countries.  Impunity, ethnic 
and religious differences, greed and non-compliance with laid down procedures 
makes the fight against economic crimes mostly corruption unsuccessful.  I argue 
that there are laws, institutions and processes in these countries otherwise there 
would be total anarchy, however, what is lacking is respect for the rules by the 
highly placed, the so-called elites and leaders. They use their positions to loot and 
perform all sorts of fraudulent activities for personal gains.  The few public office 
holders with integrity are suppressed; no protective whistleblowing legislative 
framework in place, and no respect for the rule of law.  Therefore, an honest person 
is practically on his/her own.  Governance is more or less an investment initiative 
as those vying for political offices embark on massive capital accumulation from 
friends and associates to pursue such interest and when successful, loot or 
embezzle to recoup their investment.   
To manage economic crimes in the sub-region requires attitudinal change 
especially on the part of political office holders and their sponsors since it is the 
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fastest means of making money.  Similarly, the incentives associated with political 
offices curtailed to desensitise potential occupants to focus mainly on service 
delivery and good governance other than to gain wealth illicitly.  In spite of 
adequate regulatory and institutional reforms and enforcement of civil service 
procedures and controls, the drawback is that those who are responsible for the 
monitoring and enforcement are the perpetrators themselves!   Encourage 
cooperation between Financial Intelligence Unit and the office of the Auditor-
general to monitor graft and share information including all procurement activities 
of government.  In the same vein, introduce whistle-blowing legislation to 
encourage anonymous reporting of non-compliant officers with adequate 
protection for whistle-blowers. 
As will be highlighted in Chapter 8, an impediment to good governance and 
accountability is the immunity clause enshrined in some constitutions in the region.  
Because serving government officials are immune from prosecution during their 
tenure of office, even with glaring allegations of corruption and embezzlement, no 
one can arrest the situation until the office holder completes his/her tenure.  
Suggested constitutional amendments, include the reverse onus clause, criminal 
immunity and independent funding of anti-graft agencies.  There is the need for 
legislative and judicial reforms to strengthen existing institutions.  Chapter 8 
highlights vital areas in which improvements would be required primarily to 
enhance the systems of government established to fight economic and financial 
crimes other than allowing a so-called ‘strong man’ in the helm of affairs to dictate 




SPECIAL CHARACTERISTICS OF MONEY LAUNDERING IN DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 
 
Africa enjoys significant attention in world affairs partly due to the negative signals 
of high levels of underdevelopment; it's historical past including but not limited to 
colonialism, the slave trade, the varied forms of dictatorships and misrule and the 
grand level of corruption perpetrated by the political elites.  On a positive note, the 
continent is seen as the next destination for investors. It is estimated that half of 
the world's population growth between now and 2050 will occur in Africa with longer 
life expectancy as ‘rising per capita income coupled with rising population equals 
an expanded market’.  In the same vein, it has the fastest growing population of 
young people.  Additional opportunities such as the spread of urbanisation and the 
increase in technological development resulting in increased socio-political 
connectivity, with its rich natural endowment, available workforce, enviable tourist 
attractions, access to market information and finance are all positive signals of 
growth.115 While each state government makes considerable effort in providing 
infrastructural development to its teeming population, the continent is overwhelmed 
with failure of leadership and good governance with enormous consequences.   
Africa is a fertile ground for money laundering due to its corrupt and weak 
institutions lacking the capacity to stem the tide favourably.  Some regions in the 
continent are good routes for narcotics and drug trade, sea piracy,116 oil theft and 
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bunkering,117 and, of late, there is the increase in human118 and organ trafficking 
activities, poaching activities,119 kidnapping and smuggling creating vast amounts 
of profits necessary for laundering activities.   This chapter is in four parts.  First is 
a consideration of money laundering and its general features.  Second, the varied 
forms of corruption in Nigeria and how money is laundered using the peculiar 
methods available in the country.  Third, capital flight within sub-Saharan Africa, 
with some focus on South Africa.   The fourth part concludes with a discussion on 
the issues raised within the chapter.  
  
2.1 Money Laundering Defined 
In line with most social constructs, there is no consensus on the definition of money 
laundering. Multiple definitions have been developed by criminologists, 
economists, legal practitioners and law enforcement agencies over the years with 
most scholars agreeing that it involves the concealment of value (not restricted to 
monetary funds or cash), in order to hide its origin or destination from legal 
authorities. It is the process used by criminals to move, conceal and legitimise their 
proceeds of crime. The purpose is ‘to render it almost impossible for evidence to 
be obtained which allow a court to establish the derivation of the money.’120  The 
goal of the money laundering process is to make funds derived from, or associated 
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with the illicit activity appear legitimate.’121  The expression money laundering, 
some have believed emanated from the United States authorities122 given, quite 
understandably, the fight against drug cartels when ‘describing the mafia's use and 
ownership of ‘washing salons' through which they intermixed their criminal 
proceeds with legitimate business revenues to avoid potential seizure by 
authorities’123, but as Professor Rider noted, Money laundering has been for a long 
time.124 
 
The European Community Directive of October 2005 definition of money 
laundering as intentional conduct  include predicate crimes125 other than drugs and 
proceeds of illicit narcotics as part of the scope of money laundering: it defines it 
as: 
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‘(a) the conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is derived 
from criminal activity or an act of participation in such activity, for concealing 
or disguising the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is 
involved in the commission of such activity to evade the legal consequences 
of his action; 
(b) the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, disposition, 
movement, rights concerning, or ownership of property, knowing that such 
property is derived from criminal activity or an act of participation in such 
activity; 
(c) the acquisition, possession or use of property, knowing, at the time of receipt, 
that such property was derived from criminal activity or an act of participation 
in such activity; 
(d) Participation in, association to commit, attempts to commit and to aid, to abet, 
facilitating and counselling the commission of any of the actions mentioned 
in the preceding points’.126 
 
Predicate crime is the underlying crime that generates the money laundered.  
Black's Law dictionary defines predicate act as ‘an act that must be completed 
before legal consequences can attach either to or to another act or before further 
action can be taken.  A predicate act itself may be criminalised if it is followed by 
or performed in tandem with another prohibited act.’127  Based on the United 
Nations Conventions against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic 
Substances (1988) (Vienna Convention), predicate offences was limited to drug 
trafficking offences so crimes unrelated to drug trafficking were not within the ambit 
of money laundering offences.  However, with the Palermo convention, the 
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definition of predicate crime expanded to include other serious crimes.  The United 
Nations Convention against Transnational organised crime (2000) requires all 
participant nations to apply it to ‘the widest range of predicate offences.’  Predicate 
offences ‘include: the categories of criminal offences defined in Article 3(1)(a) of 
the Vienna Convention;  the activities of criminal organization as defined in Art 1 of 
Joint Action 98/733/JHA; serious fraud as defined in Art 1(1) and Art 2 of the 
Convention of the protection of the European Communities' financial interests; 
corruption; and any other offence which may generate substantial proceeds and 
which is punishable by severe sentence of imprisonment in accordance with the 
penal law.’   In Nigeria, predicate crimes are included in the definition in Part II S.15 
of the Money Laundering Act 2011.128  The European Directive defined serious 
crimes as: ‘all offences which are punishable by deprivation of liberty or a detention 
order for a maximum of more than one year or, as regards those States which have 
a minimum threshold for offences in their legal system, all offences punishable by 
deprivation of liberty or a detention order for a minimum of more than six months’129.  
This is in addition to such recognised criminal activities as ‘corruption, offences 
defined in Article 3(1)(a) of the 1988 United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic 
in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances, fraud and the activities of criminal 
organisations’.130 
 
Money laundering is not only related to the proceeds of drug trafficking, terrorism, 
arms dealings or the proceeds of organised crime but also includes all indictable 
                                                            





offences which among others includes forgery,131 corruption, theft, or obtaining 
money by deception, advanced fee fraud and the like.  A preferred definition of 
money laundering is the process by which the proceeds of crime132 are hidden from 
investigators by moving it around financial and economic systems with the sole aim 
of making it difficult to know the source.  As observed by Professor Rider, the 
processes involved in money laundering are not necessarily harmful or abusive per 
se, simply keeping wealth secret may not be intolerable in either a legal or moral 
sense, and it might even be prudent and beneficial in certain circumstances. 
However, the money laundering process ‘will inevitably involve resort to 
transactions, real or imagined, which will be designed to confuse the onlooker and 
confound the inquirer’.133  
  
Available literature categorised money laundering into three distinct stages: 
placement, layering and integration (Samantha Maitland Irwin et al., 2011; 
Buchanan, 2004).  Hinterseer observes money laundering, ‘as a process that links 
the informal and formal economies, the money laundering process is dynamic.’134 
Money laundering ‘does not merely facilitate the flow of goods and services…the 
associated methods and techniques can be used to create coherent, adaptive, and 
flexible strategies that enable entrepreneurs to move resources back and forth 
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Context (Kluwer Law International 2002).  He observed: ‘Governments may be inclined to support money 
laundering activity’. He contends that Money laundering helps to facilitate a range of political objectives. 
133 Barry A.K. Rider, ‘The Practical and Legal Aspects of Interdicting the Flow of Dirty Money’ (1996) 3(3) JFC 
234 
134 Hinterseer (n132) 
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between the two economies on a regular basis’.135  The placement state sees the 
generated proceeds put into the financial system (Austrac, 2015; Samantha 
Maitland Irwin et al., 2011).  The methods used to launder proceeds of criminal 
activities and finance illicit activities are in constant evolution: as the international 
financial sector implements the FATF standards, criminals must find alternative 
channels.136  Typologies of money laundering includes identity theft and use of 
documents and straw men; concealment within complex business structures; 
through politically exposed persons; exploitation of international jurisdictions; 
physical transportation of cash and many more.  In some cases, criminal proceeds 
often begin in the form of cash or cash equivalents137 or in other cases in the 
acquisition of assets in favour of the receiving party where it involves bribes or kick-
backs.   Additionally, objects138 of value can also be hidden, disguised and 
concealed.  Therefore, money laundering does not only involve cash but relates to 
all items acquired illegally for which the launderer intends to conceal that illicit 
enrichment and finally transform it to legitimate use.  This can be done in a variety 
of ways: physical transportation of cash in suitcases;139 stored in safe deposit 
facilities; lodged into domestic or foreign bank accounts; cash exchanged for 
precious metals and gems; purchase of art and antiquities; purchase of real estate, 
shares or given out as loans.    Alldridge notes that ‘except small thefts of fungibles 
like cash, and the fantasy of case of a criminal art collector who wishes to sit alone 
                                                            
135 Ibid 13 
136 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Methods and Trends: Money laundering and Terrorist Financing Risks’ 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/publications/methodsandtrends/> accessed 16 January 2015 
137 Cash equivalents can be in the form of bank cheque; stock, treasury bills or bond certificates; or other 
promissory notes.   
138 Hinterseer (n132) 14 
139 The African Sun Times 3 September 2015, reported that a Nigerian man was caught with 1.05Billion 
Naira (4.6M Euros) at the Diori International Hamani Airport in Niamey, en route Dubai in the United Arab 
Emirate.  <http://africansuntimes.com/2015/09/niger-arrests-nigerian-with-5-2-million-in-cash-seizes-
money/> accessed 15 June 2016.   
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gloating over a painting so famous that it could not be resold, virtually all income 
from activities must be disguised to be of use to the criminal.’140  The cash involved 
in money laundering is always huge, and since criminals are unable to absorb small 
amounts of cash into their lifestyle, the need for money laundering will continue.  
The propelling factor in money laundering is that these criminal activities (in the 
case of SSA, mostly the proceeds of bribe and corruption of public office holders) 
generate huge profits which would attract high suspicion.  The perpetrators strive 
to devise the strategy of concealing the source of the proceeds to evade the glare 
of the public, by moving the funds to a country or business activity where they are 
less likely to attract a suspicion and detection.  In many cases, secrecy domains 
offer ease of nominee company formation,141 banking confidentiality and a 
minimum amount of banking regulation.  Other havens are the hub of centres of 
financial service in the world thereby attracting illicitly acquired wealth laundered 
through their jurisdiction.142  Money launderers take advantage of the loopholes in 
the financial laws of financial havens to effect corporate transactions and transfers 
as corporate structure is a most suitable means of disguising criminal proceeds. 
Until very recently where some countries in Sub Saharan Africa have made modest 
effort to achieve cashless policy143 and a handful are in the bid of doing so,144 most 
economies in Sub Saharan Africa is principally cash based.  Payments are 
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141 Naomi O’Leary, ‘British Property has become a Safe Haven for Stolen Cash’ (Business Insider, Mar 4, 
2015) <http://www.businessinsider.com/afp-british-property-safe-haven-for-corrupt-cash-campaigners-
2015-3> accessed September 3, 2015.  
142 The US and UK are recipients of Illicit Wealth, see Secrecy Index.   
143 World Bank, ‘Outcomes of Global Payment Systems Survey 2010: Preliminary Outcomes' (The World 
Bank 2010).  It is estimated that 0.2% of Africa's population use non-cash payment systems in their 
transaction.  
144 Ibid.  Over 12% compared with the world’s average of 2% of adults in Sub Saharan Africa.  In a survey 
carried out between Kenya and Nigeria, 80% of payment for utility bill made in Nigeria was by cash as against 




denominated in cash ranging from minor purchases of groceries to purchase of 
cars and other high-value items as property and equipment.  Though major 
contracts are bank driven, officials nonetheless, use cash to bribe those who may 
have masterminded their winning the job.  Because of this trend, large amounts of 
cash are maintained in the houses of political office holders who virtually receive 
all facilitating payments and bribes in cash. 
 
2.2   Corruption and Money Laundering 
From a historical perspective, corruption is traceable to the very origin of man 
himself.  Lending credence to the holy writings, man is said to have fallen from 
grace to grass as a result of ‘eating from the tree of knowledge of good and bad’ 
having being influenced by ‘the serpent’ which appears to be one of the ‘cautious 
of the wild beast of the field’.  By eating from the forbidden fruit man became 
morally corrupt, the ‘inclination of the thoughts of his heart was only bad all the 
time’145 In his classic work, James Scott noted that corruption ‘we would all agree, 
involves a deviation from certain standards of behaviour….what criteria do we use 
to establish those standards? If our concern is public corruption, perhaps the most 
obvious place to start is..., corruption involves the violation of the law.’146  When 
government actors commit such unlawful activities as bribery, fraud, 
embezzlement and take kickbacks on public contracts, these are deemed corrupt 
practices.  Corruption is a breach of duty.  Breach of duty has been identified as 
the very essence of the corrupt act.  Duties involve both acts and omissions.  
McMullen noted that corruption is the ‘common understanding that a public official 
                                                            
145 Watchtower Bible and Tract Society, New World’s Translation of the Holy Scriptures (Watchtower Bible 
and Tract Society of Pennsylvania 2010) Genesis 6:5 
146 James C. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption in Laura S. Underkuffler (eds), Captured by Evil: The 
Idea of Corruption in Law (p. 253).   
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is corrupt if he accepts money or money's worth for doing something that he is 
under duty to do anyway, that he is under a duty not to do, or to exercise a 
legitimate discretion for improper reasons.’147  Seen through the eyes of confidence 
reposed on someone, corruption by public officials is a betrayal of those whom he 
serves148, and as Laura observed ‘the existence of trust and its betrayal is the core 
of the corrupt conduct.  It is the particular nature of the trust relationship between 
the citizen and her legislator, or the citizen and her judge, which makes the 
relationships particularly crucial and their betrayal particularly heinous. As a result, 
her intentional violation of those sworn duties is particularly condemnatory; she has 
betrayed that relative weakness and trust she has exploited’.149 
 
Corruption can be seen from different perspectives: economic, cultural, political 
and so on.  As an ethical problem, it has no regional bound; it is a global 
phenomenon that affects developed, developing and the underdeveloped nations 
of the world.  Corruption is widespread in Nigeria and has engulfed discussions of 
daily life with the civil service is at the core of it.  Between 1960 and 1999, Nigerian 
officials had stolen or wasted more than $440 billion.  That is six times the Marshall 
Plan, the total sum needed to rebuild a devastated Europe in the aftermath of the 
Second World War.  The festering corruption within the civil service has been 
traced to the inherited colonial legacy.150  Feseke, posit that Nigerian civil service 
                                                            
147 M. McMullen, A Theory of Corruption, in Laura S. Underkuffler (eds) Captured by Evil: The Idea of 
Corruption in Law (Yale University Press  2013) 255 
148 Ibid 334 
149 Ibid 335 
150 Faseke remarked that ‘under the British colonial administration, the civil service was an instrument of 
exploitation because it served the interest of the colonial overlords and structured to perpetuate colonial 
economic imperialism, given that, the Nigerian economy was meant to generate surpluses for metropolitan 
power through the supply of cheap raw materials for the British industries in return for manufactures with 
the terms of trade continuously against Nigeria. 
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transformed ‘from an instrument of exploitation in the colonial era to one of 
corruption and fraud in post-independence period especially under military rule 
which created job insecurity….and consequently deepened the tendency to short-
change the system for self-enrichment.’151 Ekanem and Ekefre maintained that 
‘corruption has its root in the civil service’ which was made worse ‘with the 
incessant military coups in the country.  With the military at the helm of affairs, 
there was no respect for the constitution, rules and due process.  Everything was 
done with military fiat and dispatch.  These uniquely cleared the way for corruption 
to strive in the civil service and top military.’152   The regime of Major Gen. Ibrahim 
Badamasi Babangida was credited with the dubious achievement of ‘democratising 
corruption’ in Nigeria.  As cited in Akinola, Babangida's government encouraged 
official peculation, warning military officers being appointed as state governors 
‘don't come back and tell me you are still poor.’153  Since corruption flourishes in 
conditions of poverty and weak public institutions,154 the wrong incentives of senior 
civil servants also makes those in the middle and low level of the structure to cut 
corners in a bid to get rich quickly, perpetuating acts such as hiding files in an 
attempt to force Nigerians to pay before they are found and treated expeditiously, 
expecting a bribe for every bit of government work that is to be performed.  The 
motivation to extract corrupt payments is high when irregular salaries are received, 
and workers face significant risks of illness, accidents due to the deplorable 
condition of road infrastructure, and unemployment.  Because people are 
                                                            
151 Modupeola Faseke, ‘Corruption and the Image of the Nigerian Civil Service: A Historical Discourse’ (2006) 
6,1 The Constitution, 101  
152 Samuel Asuqo Ekanem and Ekeng Nyong Ekefre, ‘Governance and Corruption in Nigeria: A Philo-
Psychological Management Analysis’ (2013) 4(14) Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 142 
153 Samson Adesote and John Ojo Abimbola, ‘Corruption and National Development in Nigeria’s fourth 
republic: A historical discourse’ (2012) 14(7) Journal of Sustainable development in Africa 
154 Daniel Kaufmann and Phyllis Dininio, ‘Corruption a Key Challenge for Development’ in Rick Stapenhurst, 
Niall Johnson and Riccardo Pelizzo (eds) Role of Parliament in Curbing Corruption (World Bank 2006) 14 
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impoverished, civil servants with large family dependency ratio are more focused 
on survival, therefore, cutting corners to get rick quickly is seen as a way out.  
Corruption can be categorised into political corruption, judicial corruption, contract 
inflation and kickbacks, bribery, fraud of diverse kinds, embezzlement, nepotism 
and cronyism. 
 
Political corruption in the public sector stems from the nature of government itself.  
Fundamentally, government is responsible for the provision of goods and services 
that the private sector is unable or unwilling to provide, sometimes due to the size 
and nature of capital involved.  Such opportunities can be exploited by corrupt 
individuals because of the discretionary powers they enjoy.  The risk of corruption 
exist whenever someone has discretionary authority to influence the others' 
framework condition which depends on the specific authority he or she exercises 
and the benefits obtainable from the service.  Soreide asserts that ‘if an extra price 
is demanded a service provided free or at low price, the extra charge is a form of 
theft.  The amounts accruing to the civil servant who makes such demand can be 
significant even if the extra payment made by each client is low’.  Where the 
demand for such service is higher than the supply, and the civil servant have the 
powers to create some form of shortage - in this instance, limiting the number of 
pre-qualified bidders – the desperate client will have the willingness to pay.  
Lederman argued that the institutional design of government largely influences the 
occurrence of corrupt opportunities.155  First, is political accountability: this is a 
mechanism which encourages punishment of corrupt individuals and reduces 
                                                            
155 Daniel Lederman, Norman V. Loayza, and Rodrigo R. Soares,‘On the Political Nature of Corruption’ in 
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informational problems relating to government activities.  It includes the degree of 
competition in the political system, the existence of checks and balances and the 
transparency of the system.  Political competition arises where there is free and 
fair election, which ensures that the populace can hold politicians liable.  The more 
a system allows politicians to face the electorate, giving the risk of losing office due 
to poor performance, the higher their incentives to stick too good governance.  
Political corruption arises when politicians apply unethical and illegal means within 
the political system to bring themselves to political office.  This can occur through 
the rigging of elections arising from outright intimidation of the voting population, 
buying of votes, multiple thumb printing, stuffing of ballot boxes, falsification of 
results and many more.  The general apathy shown by Nigerians in the general 
elections reflects the growing concerns of the populace as people refused to go 
out to vote because of the firm belief that votes will not count.156  Electoral fraud is 
one of the unusual challenges in Nigeria, as it tends to destroy and deny the 
legitimacy of government.  Because elections are not transparent, the politicians 
act in a way they owe the people no commitment hence the looting of the public 
treasury.  Second, the structure relating to the provision of public good is 
questionable.  A system that allows competition in the provision of public good 
tends to minimise corruption.   The most prevalent forms of corruption are bribery 
and kickbacks; extortion; self-dealing and conflict of interest; embezzlement by a 
variety of fraudulent including securities vote fraud and inflation of contracts. 
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Bribery mainly occur from a private entity to a government official in exchange for 
the grant of some government concession, or by government to government 
through one or more of its agencies for national security concerns,157 or for a 
contract for the supply of goods or services, or the right to extract a resource from 
the state.  Payments to win significant contracts and concessions are the preserve 
of large businesses because it represents a substantial expenditure of funds and 
would have a considerable impact on government budget and the growth prospects 
of the country.  The powers to approve such magnitude of investment lies in the 
hands of top government officials, and for capacity, contracts are performed by 
multinational corporations operating either alone or jointly in partnership with local 
operators.  As Rose-Ackerman observed, a firm could pay bribe to officials to 
include it in the list of prequalified bidders and to restrict the length of the list or for 
insider information or to induce officials to structure the bidding specifications so 
that the corrupt firm is the only prequalified supplier or to be selected as the winning 
contractor; and, once a firm wins the contract, it may pay to get inflated prices or 
                                                            
157 Regina (Corner House Research and Another) v. Director of the Serious Fraud Office (JUSTICE intervening) 
[2008] EWHC 714 (Admin).  The investigation, which commenced in July 2004, pursuant to Section 1(3)3 of 
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advice from several sources as to the national security threat posed by continuing the investigation, and 
clearly weighed that advice carefully before acting on it, as he was so entitled. Even supposing the House 




to skimp on quality’.158  There are allegations that leading politicians manipulated 
the procurement process for a South African arms deal worth USD 5 billion at the 
time in return for bribes of as much as USD 300 million.159  Allegations of improper 
payments by TSKJ agent of about $180 million to Nigerian Government officials in 
exchange for favourable treatment in contracts connected with the construction of 
a multibillion-dollar natural gas liquefaction complex at Bonny Island, Nigeria.160  
The infamous Siemens scandal, Siemens made approximately $12.7 million in 
suspicious payments for the Nigerian telecommunications projects.161  An alleged 
bid to secure the acquisition of an offshore oil block in Nigeria two multinational 
companies operating in Nigeria (Shell and Eni) paid $1.1billion to the Nigerian 
Government.162  Bribery also occurs among public officials seeking to occupy 
perceived juicy offices in government or to increase budgetary allocation to the 
ministry or agency of government.  A past Nigerian Senate President, Adolphus 
Wabara was alleged to have received a bribe of 55 million Naira from the then 
Education Minister to inflate the budgetary allocation to the education ministry. 
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159 Samuel Piero-Freeman, ‘The South African Arms Deal’ 
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Contract Inflation and Kick-backs:   
Kickbacks are mainly a government official's share of a contract awarded in favour 
of the contractor.  In some cases, this amount ranges from between 5 to 20% of 
the contract value and as Hobbes suggests bribes are usually between 10-15% of 
the contract value, often recovered in the mark up the bidder places on the unit 
prices of the procurement items.  As Rose-Ackerman observed that, ‘top officials 
may select projects and make purchases with little or no rationale…if kickbacks 
are easier to obtain on capital investments and input purchases than on labour, 
rulers will favour capital-intensive projects irrespective of their economic 
justification’.  Tanzi and Davoodi noted that ‘high levels of corruption are associated 
with higher levels of public investment as a share of GDP.  More corrupt countries 
spend relatively less on operations and maintenance and have lower level of 
infrastructure’.  Because kickbacks have to be paid, the contract value is increased 
to proportions far exceeding the actual cost of the project to cover the interest of 
all stakeholders in the approval process.  In a case brought before a Federal High 
Court In Kano, a  past governor of Jigawa State, Nigeria, was alleged to have of 
received over 1.35 Billion Naira in bribes and kickbacks as share of contract 
awarded to Dantata & Sawoe (a road construction company) for some road 
projects in the state.  The proceeds of the kickback, paid into accounts controlled 
by the governor and his sons.  Contract inflation constitutes a serious drain on a 







Embezzlement.   
This is outright theft of entrusted funds by public officers and involves the 
misappropriation of money or property.  Embezzlement is a widespread form of 
corruption in Nigeria.  In embezzlement schemes, money flows can occur in a 
different number of ways and involve a variety of techniques.  Techniques such as 
outright diversion of allocated funds, presentation of the false funding request, 
payments to non-existent companies for contracts deemed to have been 
performed, physical defalcation of government property.  Defalcation of 
government property occurs where political office holders and their cronies cart 
away government property, from vehicles, office furniture, air conditioning set and 
every other valuable equipment for personal use.  A former National Security 
Adviser to the Nigeria President, created and presented false funding request on 
national security issues, duly approved by the president, and physically siphoned 
cash in truckloads from the Central Bank of Nigeria and laundered these through 
domestic banks and foreign businesspersons to offshore accounts held by family 
members.  In a related development, a Central Bank of Nigeria survey of highways 
in Nigeria between 1999 and 2001 revealed that through outright embezzlement, 
most of the road construction contracts awarded of over 2.03billion naira ($13.54 
million) were not performed as less than 10% of the appropriated amounts were 
actually expended, the rest amounts were embezzled by politicians and their 
cronies.  Other notable cases of charges brought against past serving governors 
include: Orji Uzor Kalu of Abia State, charged with criminal diversion of public fund, 
official corruption and money laundering of 5.4 billion Naira ($36 million);  a former 
head of the anti-corruption agency, Ibrahim Lamorde is alleged to have diverted 
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over 1 Trillion Naira ($5 Billion) of seized funds into his private use,163and the 
alleged embezzlement of pension fund.164   
 
2.1.1 Money Laundering in The Real Estate Sector 
Luxury investment such as in goods and real estate are preferred means for 
concealing illicit wealth from public office holders and criminals alike.  The 
proceeds of corruption are often used to acquire real estates, sports cars and 
limousines, jet planes, yachts, precious metals and jewellery.  This sector goes 
mostly unchecked by law enforcement agents in spite of the many known cases.  
Newspaper headlines abound as to the use of illicitly acquired wealth hidden in the 
purchase of assets of different magnitude.  The following excerpt testifies:  ‘Abuja 
court orders seizure of property over pension fraud; ‘ICPC seizes 100 houses 
acquired with the proceeds of corruption’;165 ‘EFCC confiscates Igbinedion’s 
property’;166 ‘The UK property market has become a haven for corrupt capital stolen 
from around the world, facilitated by the laws which allow UK property to be owned 
by private secret offshore companies’.167  In an article entitled ‘Put an end to money 
laundering, bribery and corruption’, Cobus de Swardt, Managing director of 
Transparency International stated that ‘banks, real estate companies, and retailers 
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on high-end goods are the final links in this chain as they facilitate criminal 
behaviour by accepting illicit money as payment’.168   
 
The real estate sector has the following characteristics, which makes it vulnerable 
to money laundering:  it has high value, making it attractive to both legal and illegal 
investment; it is a safe and prestigious investment; it has objective value that is 
difficult to access and dwells in a sector in which speculation is the order of the 
day.  Criminals launder illicit funds in the real estate sector because it provides the 
opportunity for cash payment; the ultimate beneficial owner can be disguised; value 
of the estate can be increased through renovation or improvements; and most 
importantly, the purchases escape appropriate due diligence checks even in 
countries that require their non-financial businesses to comply with anti-money 
laundering regulations.  In some cases, the acquisition of luxury goods occurs in 
jurisdictions different from where funds were initially misappropriated or 
mismanaged.  The purchase of these luxury goods while it tends to extend the 
lavish lifestyle of the criminal perpetrators but ultimately seeks to allow dirty money 
to enter into the legitimate economy by converting it to seemingly clean assets.  In 
an investigation into arms deal by former president Goodluck Jonathan's 
administration, it was alleged that proceeds of corrupt enrichment by a former 
governor of Sokoto State amounting to N4.6 billion are allegedly linked to 
‘ownership of luxury property in Abuja and Dubai in the United Arab Emirates.’  The 
investigators also alleged that a then serving state governor, ‘built for himself a 
multi-billion naira sprawling palatial complex at Iyamho.  This one of a kind country 
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home, referred to as Mobutu Sese Seko Ranch, so named after the late brutal 
dictator of former Zaire, complete with a 18-hole golf course; swimming pools and 
Jacuzzi; kebab/suya grottos; mini-zoo with exotic animals/birds' sanctuaries; 
football/basketball court and an underground discotheque; amphitheatre; 
manmade lakes and caves as well as an helipad. Mobutu had an airstrip! 
Astonished observers refer to it as the Versailles of the jungle.’169 
 
The following reasons adduced by the GIABI report provides the attractiveness of 
the real estate sector as a vehicle for money laundering in West African region: 
‘Investment in real estate easily serves as a means to wash criminal proceeds in 
order to gain legitimate profits, which are then used to commit further crimes: as 
financing the proliferation of small arms and light weapons used to fuel conflicts in 
most parts of the region; illicit fund directly invested in real estate are laundered 
when properties are subsequently hired, leased or used as educational, health or 
other facilities; ownership of real estate can often be held as trusts and companies; 
and in the names of fictitious persons or front men, while beneficial owners live in 
other countries’.170  Other reasons adduced as responsible for laundering in the 
real estate sector include: lack of AML/CFT experience and expertise within the 
region, purchasing of real estates are done mainly in cash thereby leaving no trail.  
 
According to PIDA estimates, urbanisation in Africa will increase from 40% in 2010 
to 56% in 2040, which portends the increase in portable houses for the inhabitants 
of major cities throughout the continent.  This is coupled with the growth of real-
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estate-backed investment and the development of property investment funds that 
offers attractive returns.  Corrupt officials who steal government monies have found 
this as a legitimate means of integrating their illicit proceeds.  The motive of corrupt 
enrichment in some cases is to guarantee their future.  Purchasing real estate 
provides officials with a significant investment that has the appearance of financial 
stability as it offers them a prolonged supply of cash to meet their daily needs after 
leaving office.    To political office holders, the knowledge that the position held is 
temporary is inevitable; therefore for sustainability, illicit wealth can be invested in 
the construction of portable houses, build hotels and shopping complexes to earn 
rental income.  These estates can be acquired using front men (solicitors, 
accountants, other professionals, investment fund managers or agents). 
 
2.1.2 Security Votes and Money Laundering 
Internationally and locally, the issue of national security is continuously on the front 
burner, and its administration sits within the top hierarchy of government.  National 
security has been broadly seen to consist of the protection and defence of a 
country's territorial integrity, promotion of peaceful co-existence in the polity, 
containing/eliminating threats to internal security, ensuring systemic stability and 
bringing about sustainable and equitable socio-harmony, peaceful culture, 
nurturing civility, promoting good governance, transparency and structural reforms 
amenable to democratization.171  Governments often get involved in corrupt deals 
in the guise of national security, for public interest or on legal grounds.172  For 
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instance, moneys paid for tipoffs to informants and whistle blowers is a corrupt deal 
in itself but for legal and national security considerations, it is defined otherwise.   
 
In Nigeria three security agencies – State Security Services (SSS), National 
Intelligence Agency (NIA) and Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA) are the creation 
of law173 requires to carry out security operations within and outside the country 
and to be co-ordinated by the National security Adviser.174  The agencies have their 
respective spheres of coverage.  The Defence Intelligence agency is responsible 
for the ‘prevention and detection of crime of a military nature against the security 
of Nigeria;175 the protection and preservation of all military classified matters 
concerning the security of Nigeria within and outside the country;176 and such other 
responsibilities affecting defence intelligence of a military nature.177  The National 
Intelligence Agency is charged with the responsibility of the general maintenance 
of the security of the country concerning matters that are not related to military 
issues and such other matters affecting national intelligence that is outside the 
country.  The last creation of the Act is the State Security Service, whose 
responsibility is to protect and defend the Federal Republic of Nigeria against 
domestic threats; to uphold and enforce the criminal laws of Nigeria; and, to provide 
leadership and criminal justice services to both Federal and State law-enforcement 
organs responsible for intelligence gathering within the country and for the 
                                                            
operation against an enemy, an operation for the protection of life or property or the military operation of 
a foreign country or territory’ who gives a bribe for the purposes of performing his lawful duty may have no 
case to answer. 
173 National Security Act No. 19 of 1986 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
174 Section 4(1) states that ‘to coordinate the intelligence activities of the National Security Agencies…there 
should be appointed by the President a Co-ordinator on National Security.  National Security Act No. 19 of 
1986 Laws of the Federal Republic of Nigeria.  
175 National Security Act S.2(1)(a) – Laws of the |Federal Republic of Nigeria 
176  National Security Act S.2(1)(b) – Laws of the |Federal Republic of Nigeria 
177 National Security Act S.2(1)(c) – Laws of the |Federal Republic of Nigeria 
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protection of senior government officials, particularly the President and State 
Governors.  Specifically, S.3 provides the responsibilities of the state security 
services, which includes: the prevention and detection within Nigerian of any crime 
against the internal security of Nigeria, the protection and preservation of all non-
military classified matters concerning the internal security of Nigeria; and such 
other responsibilities affecting internal security within Nigeria.  As Nwozor 
observes: National security in Nigeria is still conceived from the prism of the realist 
paradigm. The strategy often adopted by the Nigerian state is anchored on the 
deployment of superior firepower to contain what the state has identified as threats 
to it, which often coincides with the interest of the ruling elite.’178  Worldwide, 
national security expenditure is substantial and Nigeria is not an exception.  The 
Nigerian government spends significant portions of its federal budget on defence 
and national security.  It is estimated that between 2005 and 2015 over 768 billion 
Naira ($4.6 billion)179 have been budgeted and spent on national security alone and 
non-budgetary spending based on national interest has been allowed in some 
appropriation Acts.  
 
Security vote is a budget line that acts as a source of discretionary spending that 
the executive arms of government can use to respond quickly and efficiently to 
threats of peace and security in their jurisdictions.   It is a known fact that national 
security issues are dealt with utmost secrecy and over time evidence of abuse and 
the utility value of the covert operations have been questioned.180  During the 
                                                            
178 Nwozor, A ‘National Security, Religious Anarchism and the Politics of Amnesty in Nigeria’ (2013) 1(1) 
Convent Journal of Politics and International Affairs 
179 Based on researcher's computations from the Nigerian Approved Appropriation Acts. 
180 John Stockwell, In Search of Enemies: A CIA Story (George J. McLeod Limited 1979) 
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Nigerian military regimes, large-scale violations of the security vote system 
occurred at the very top of the hierarchy. The issue of corruption and outright theft 
through the diversion of public funds under the guise of national security has raised 
very alarming signals in Nigeria. Egbo argued that this abuse of security vote 
commenced with the administration of General Ibrahim Babangida who was 
‘ruthless in the way he amassed his immense wealth through the illegal self-
allocation of free oil, sold on the spot market, and how he initiated the corrupt 
culture of maintaining a huge monthly security vote virtually as personal pocket 
money.’181  Under Babangida, it was widespread for government cheques running 
into millions of tens of dollars to be in ones' name.  A case in point was a $75 million 
cheque for the procurement of arms and ammunition for the armed forces intended 
to fund weapons procurement for Nigerian troops stationed in Liberia written in the 
name of General Sani Abacha with little or nothing received.182  During the regime 
of General Sani ‘between November 1993 and June 1998, Abacha directed his 
national security adviser, Alhaji Ismail Gwarzo to withdraw from the Central Bank 
of Nigeria a total of $1.6 billion and £417 Million for security purposes, only 
£250,000 and $195 million went for that purpose.’183  Former President Olusegun 
Obasanjo is alleged to have tried to force through a constitutional amendment that 
would allow him to contest for the presidency a third time with the aid of the security 
vote.184  In a related instance, the then Minority leader of the Federal House of 
Representatives Mr Ndume asserted that ‘it was during his tenure (Olusegun 
Obasanjo) that corruption moved from low to high level.  It was during his tenure 
                                                            
181 Obiamaka Egbo, Ifeoma Nwakoby, and Josaphat Onwumere, Chibuike Uche, ‘Legitimizing Corruption in 
Government:  Security Votes in Nigeria’ (2010) ASC Working Paper 91/2010 
182 ibid 
183 ibid 
184 Although Olusegun Obasanjo denied to have lobbied for a third term in office, former President 
Goodluck Jonathan confirmed otherwise. 
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that he (Obasanjo) gave N50 million each to members of this house to extend his 
tenure.’  To further underscore the wanton looting of public fund in the name of 
national security, President Muhammadu Buhari opened an investigation on the 
procurement of hardware and munitions in the armed forces from 2007 till 2015 
with the mandate to identify irregularities and make recommendations for 
streamlining the procurement process in the Nigerian armed forces.  Preliminary 
findings of the committee reveal extra-budgetary interventions of N643.8 billion 
($3.2 billion) and a foreign currency counterpart of $2.2 billion.  Furthermore, the 
committee observed that of the ‘513 contracts awarded at $8.356 billion; N2.2 
trillion and €0.054 million; Fifty Three (53) were failed contracts amounting to $2.4 
billion and N13.7 billion respectively’.  It further observed that the amount of foreign 
currency spent on failed contracts was more than double the $1 billion loan 
approved to fight the insurgency in the country.  Other findings include the payment 
to a single company N3.85 billion without documented evidence of contractual 
agreements or fulfilment of tax obligations; the award of fictitious contracts not 
executed of N2.2 trillion, $1.67 billion and €9.9 million respectively; and the transfer 
of $132.05 Million and €9.9 million to the accounts of Societe D'equipmente 
Internationaux in West Africa, United Kingdom and United States of America for 
un-ascertained purposes, without any contract documents to explain the 
transactions.185  Further investigations revealed that some moneys appropriated 
for security vote were used to finance the 2015 presidential election of the 
incumbent.  According to a Chairman of DAAR Communications Group, Mr 
Raymond Dokpesi, alleged to have received N2.1 Billion in the arms deal scandal, 
he explained to the anti-graft agency that payments were received from the 




national security adviser's office ‘for publicity and media political campaigns during 
the 2015 general elections which were dutifully carried out based essentially on 
contractual obligations/relationships.’ 
 
The abuse of security votes in Nigeria is not only limited to the office of the national 
security adviser but across the three tiers of government (federal, state and local 
government).  According to Chief Ebitu Ukiwe, a retired air commodore and former 
Chief of General Staff (Vice – President) in the administration of General Ibrahim 
Babangida, ‘the amounts mentioned as security votes these days… are 
outrageous and subject to abuses since nobody accounts for them’.  Human Rights 
Watch asserted that ‘the use of the funds is notoriously opaque; there are no 
requirements that governors or local government chairpersons account for the use 
of those funds.  In many cases, security vote has been used by state and local 
governments to incite violence and co-opt political opponents or has been lost to 
graft and patronage.’   The use of security vote has been widely criticised as a 
virtual carte blanche to the president and state governors to squander billions of 
naira in state allocations without scrutiny.  For instance, in a single year over N410 
billion is allocated to security vote to the state governors who in most cases are 
accused of pocketing the funds for their private use186.  While security vote is a 
yearly appropriated item, it is evident that accountability on the part of its 
discretionary use is what fuels corruption in the system.  Although the 
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constitution187 empowers the national assembly to have an oversight function over 
the expenditure of the executive, this is far from the case as both arms cases use 
such as bargaining chips for their interest. 
 
 
2.2 Capital Flight 
Sub Saharan African countries are riddled with heavy debt burdens, shortages in 
foreign exchange, infrastructural deficits, and poverty which has created a lot of 
concerns among policymakers and researchers.  However, the problem of capital 
flight is one area in which substantial proportion of resources has gone unchecked, 
would have helped to finance economic growth necessary to reverse the 
perversely apparent economic trend.  A report released emphasising the enormity 
of the problem of capital flight; it is estimated that between 1970 and 2010 total 
capital flight from 33 countries in SSA amounts to USD 814.2 billion.  These 
countries lost USD 202.4 billion between 2005 and 2010 alone.  Regarding 
cumulative capital flights, the African LDCs account for 69 percent of total capital 
outflow from the world LDCs, followed by Asia (29 percent) and Latin America (2 
percent). 
 
Historically, several initiatives and legislations have been put in place to curtain 
capital flight in SSA:188 Exchange Control laws, Indigenization laws, controls on 
diamond trade, peso black market, sanctions and other policy measures just to 
name a few geared towards retaining the outward flow of capital. 
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Capital flight has been given a wide range of definition as there is no consensus 
about its meaning.  Outflows from developed countries are called foreign direct 
investment or development aids, while from developing nations the same activity 
is called capital flight.189  Perception also varies between investors in developed 
countries who are seen as responding to opportunities abroad as opposed to an 
investor in the developing country seen to be escaping the high risks perceived at 
home.  In this regard, Capital flight has been defined as one that, ‘appears to 
consist of a subset of international asset redeployment or portfolio adjustments – 
undertaken in response to significant perceived deterioration in risk/return profiles 
associated with assets located in a particular country – that occur in the presence 
of conflict between objectives of asset holders and government.  It may or may not 
violate the law.  It is always considered by authorities to violate an implied social 
contract.’190  The definition rather focuses on the capital flight as private sector 
phenomena and does not address the situation of developing countries since it 
makes no distinction between government officials and private enterprises191.  
Capital flight is an economic activity performed by rent seekers who intend to 
maximise their portfolio by investing in reasonably safer climes.  Evidence indicates 
that ‘African agents move their portfolios as a result of deteriorating domestic 
investment climate where the risk adjusted rate of return is unfavourable’ and this 
is a direct consequence of policy distortions, poor profitability as well as the 
structural and institutional features of African economies.  While this would explain 
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the outflow of private capital from SSA arising from legitimate business dealings, 
one cannot fathom the huge deposits in foreign banks the stolen wealth by officials 
in government.  For instance, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire) 
was enmeshed in heavy debt burden, but it was reported that the President, 
Mobutu Sese Seko siphoned between USD 4 to 6 billion well invested in Swiss 
accounts and in foreign real estate.  From 2004 to 2008, Teodoro Nguema Obian 
Mangue, the son of the president of Equitorial Guinea, used U.S lawyers, bankers, 
real estate agents, and escrow agents to move over USD 100 million in suspect 
funds in to the United States.   The Swiss account of General Sani Abacha who 
ruled Nigeria for five years, reportedly contain as much as USD 2 billion at the time 
it was frozen in 1999 and a US Senate enquiry in the same year revealed that the 
Abacha family held multi-million dollar accounts with Citibank in London and New 
York. Ajayi noted that ‘capital flight is motivated by corruption and political 
instability’192 for many countries in sub-Saharan Africa.  He explains that ‘when 
corrupt officials have access to foreign exchange through political offices and the 
prerequisites of the office, there is the tendency to siphon some of the money 
abroad not primarily to earn interests but to a safe haven where the money cannot 
be easily detected, and outside the purview of domestic authorities.’193  Funds are 
less subject to seizure if a new regime takes over power, it could provide access 
to luxury goods that may not be available locally and such funds could be used to 
curry favour in other countries which might later provide a haven if the new 
government decides to clamp down on past corrupt officials. Taking this into 
cognisance, he defined capital flight as: 
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  The acquisition or retention of a claim on non-residents that is motivated by 
the owner's concern that the value of this asset would be subject to discrete 
losses or impairment if his claims continued to be held domestically.194 
Capital flows from developing countries could reasonably be labelled capital flight, 
first ‘for the presumption in economics that the movement of capital should be from 
capital surplus countries to scarce capital countries'.  It is therefore unusual that 
developing countries suffering from the scarce capital have huge capital outflows.  
According to a recent estimate, the cumulative stock of capital flight – the voluntary 
exits of private resident capital either for a safe haven or for investments made in 
foreign currency – from sub Saharan Africa amounts to USD 606.7 billion over the 
three decades spanning 1970 – 2004.195  Furthermore, a recent study by 
Ndikumana and Boyce shows that SSA is a ‘net creditor’ to the rest of the world.  
 
Second, from a policy perspective, external funds held abroad could be utilised at 
home to reduce the level of foreign indebtedness and relieve the inherent liquidity 
problems brought about by external debt service obligations.'196  Capital flight 
undermines economic growth and the effectiveness of debt relief and foreign aid.  
Ajayi argues that any ‘money sent away to foreign lands cannot contribute to 
domestic investment, therefore, capital flight is a diversion of domestic savings 
away from real domestic investment.'197  The monies are also not available for the 
importation of equipment and materials that are necessary for the growth of the 
domestic economy.  Furthermore, foreign aids, direct investment, and debt relief 
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are intended to allow d eveloping countries to use domestic resources to exit from 
poverty rather than forcing domestic savings to flow out of the country.  Sachs et 
al. argue that poor nations, especially in Africa are caught in the coils of poverty 
trap characterized by high transport costs, low agricultural productivity, high 
disease burdens, unfavourable geopolitical factors, and slow diffusion of 
technology from abroad.198  Unfortunately, many of these countries are losing more 
resources through capital flight than through debt servicing.  The efforts by donor 
countries to improve savings is ineffective as capital flight results in loss of scarce 
domestic resources.  The issue of capital flight is best described in the words of 
Ajilore: ‘capital enters the country in the guise of external borrowing and 
simultaneously slips out of the country as private capital flight’.199  More so, capital 
flight weakens not only capital formation but ‘also causes an economic slowdown, 
leading to a sluggish rate of regional integration and productivity'.  It is also argued 
that the tendency ‘puts on adverse effects on performance of the economy as it 
makes the financial sector to lose potential resources and negatively affect the 
balance of payment and as well develop rent-seeking behaviours.’200  While public 
sector corruption accounts for some percentage of capital flight, it has been argued 
that ‘the lion’s share of developing countries tax losses result from tax dodging 
(evasion and avoidance) by multinational corporations.’201   
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Capital flight defined as ‘the unrecorded and (mostly) untaxed illicit leakage of 
capital and resources out of a country’202 Flight capital involves ‘domestic wealth 
put beyond the reach of appropriate domestic authorities due to deliberate 
misreporting.   It is associated with active attempts to hide its origin, destination, 
type, true ownership and flees to secrecy; and it is associated with public loss and 
private gain because little or no tax is paid on it.’203  Capital flight is interchangeably, 
referred to as illicit financial flows.  Illicit financial flows are ‘generated by methods, 
practices and crimes aiming to transfer financial capital out of a country in 
contravention of national and international laws’204.  The definitive characteristics 
of illicit are that: ‘(1) the acts involved are themselves illegal (corruption or tax 
evasion) in a regime that has some democratic legitimacy, or (2) the funds are the 
indirect fruits of illegal acts (for example, benefits given to those who have provided 
illegal funding of a presidential election)’.205 About nine times the amount of world's 
total development assistance budgets ends up in rich countries using illegal capital 
flights.206 Illicit financial flow involves the following practices: money laundering, 
bribery by international companies, tax evasion and trade mispricing.  It could also 
include embezzlement of borrowed funds, kickbacks on government contracts, 
misappropriation of revenues from state-owned enterprises and smuggling of 
natural resources.207 Evidence shows that between 2003 to 2012 Sub Saharan 
Africa accounts for 8% of illicit financial flows and has the highest illicit outflow to 
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GDP ratio of 5.5%208 which represents significant lost capital and investment 
resources with adverse ripple effects far into the future.  The motivation for illicit 
flows from political actors in SSA as Blankenburg and Khan (2014) contends is that 
‘their opponents may expropriate their assets if the opponents come to power’.209  
Since the legality of their wealth can be ‘questioned by the ruling coalition for some 
reasons, including expeditious political reasons…to undermine the ability of 
previous ruling factions to return to power’.210  Weeks asserts that, it is quite difficult 
to transform the common sense ideas that money runs away to avoid taxation, 
confiscation, in search of better treatment or of higher returns into rigorous 
economic definitions and analysis.  It is perhaps better to first identify capital flight 
as ‘an illegal or semi-legal activity that governments must take action to prevent, 
not as financial reallocation in reaction to government macroeconomic policies’.211  
He contends that capital flight results from ‘anti-social activities recognised to be 
illegal in all but a few countries….its control requires interventions specifically 
designed for the regulation of cross-border financial flows’.212   
 
Capital flight is further facilitated by tax havens and offshore financial centres who 
offers an extensive array of facilities to willing investors who are unwilling to 
disclose the source of their assets.  It is estimated that $21 - $32 trillion of private 
wealth is located, untaxed or lightly taxed in secrecy jurisdictions around the world, 
of which since 1970 African countries alone have lost over $1 trillion in capital flight 
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while combined external debts are less than $200 billion.213  Offshore financial 
centres secure global business through the provision of trust and company 
administration; provide specialized services involving banking, shipping, corporate 
consultancy, structured financial transactions, insurance and mutual fund 
administration prompting wealthy citizens and companies with keen advise from 
professionals.   Professionals give advice on appropriate tax planning mechanisms 
to claim residence in such havens with a view to avoid or reduce tax payments and 
a host of regulations.   
 
The secrecy world creates a ‘criminogenic hothouse for multiple evils including tax 
fraud, tax cheating, escape from financial regulations, embezzlement, insider 
dealing, bribery, money laundering and many more.’214  Below are countries with 
high financial secrecy ranking attracting proceeds from corrupt public officials who 
embezzle the public treasury. 
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1,466.1  73 5.625
2 Hong Kong
2
1,259.4  72 3.842
3 USA
2
1,254.8  60 19.603
4 Singapore
2
1,147.1  69 4.280
5 Cayman Islands
1,2
1,013.2  65 4.857
6 Luxembourg
2
817.0      55 11.630
7 Lebanon
2
760.2      79 0.377
8 Germany
2
701.9      56 6.026
9 Bahrain
2
471.4      74 0.164
10 United Arab Emirates (Dubai)
2,3
440.8      77 0.085
11 Macao 420.2      70 0.188
12 Japan
2
418.4      58 1.062
13 Panama
2
415.7      72 0.132
14 Marshall Islands 405.6      79 0.053
15 United Kingdom
1,2
380.2      41 17.394
16 Jersey
2
354.0      65 0.216
17 Guernsey 339.4      64 0.231
18 Malaysia (Labuan)
3
338.7      75 0.050
19 Turkey 320.9      64 0.182
20 China 312.2      54 0.743
21 British Virgin Islands
1,2
307.7      60 0.281
22 Barbados 298.3      78 0.024
23 Mauritius
1
297.0      72 0.049
24 Austria
2
295.3      54 0.692
25 Bahamas
1
273.1      79 0.017
26 Brazil
2
263.7      52 0.678
27 Malta 260.9      50 0.990
28 Uruguay
2
255.6      71 0.037
29 Canada
2
251.8      46 1.785
30 Russia 243.3      54 0.397
 




The table shows that among the top financial havens are the world's biggest and 
wealthiest nations such as the USA, UK and its colonies, Switzerland which 
underscores the problem of curtailing capital flight in sub-Saharan Africa. Senator 
Patrick Leahy a United States Senator who played a crucial role in passing the 
congressional amendment barring corrupt officials from entering the United States 
once said, ‘natural resources are the only significant source of wealth in many 
developing nations, and we have seen how the proceeds can be exploited by 
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government officials for their self-interest.  Some of these depots have used this 
ill-gotten wealth to live in luxury in the United States.  We should not facilitate their 
crimes against their people’.215 Some have identified the lack of action by these 
developed economies for curbing the tide of illicit capital flows to the close 
relationship between developing countries' wealth and multinational oil and other 
natural resources companies in the developed economies.  Global Witness – a UK 
based non-governmental organisation, states that ‘British banks have accepted 
millions of pounds from corrupt Nigerian politicians raising questions about their 
commitment to talking financial crime.’  Global Witness argues that without ‘access 
to the international financial system corrupt politicians from the developing world’ 
would find it ‘difficult to loot their national treasuries’ and transfer to safe havens.  
The typical image of a tax haven is a tropical island like Bermuda or the alpine 
scenery of Switzerland, but tax havens are also found in the European Union.216  It 
is estimated that the city of London is the world’s biggest tax haven.217  According 
to one report, ‘the European Union and its leaders appear to be active in tackling 
capital flight, but concrete initiatives have so far had only a minor impact on the 
capital flight leaving developing countries’.218 Since access to the international 
financial system is not restricted, and businesses transacted through proxies, 
agents and other legal means, it behoves on the governments of developed 
countries to use necessary control mechanisms to prevent the illicit flow.  In most 
instances, poor PEP controls have resulted in states receiving millions of stolen 
wealth.  Pierre Falcone, a notorious arms dealer and ally of Angolan President 







Jose Edmondo dos Santos, for 18 years, between 1989 to 2007 made use of 30 
bank accounts (made up of personal, family and shell companies) in Bank of 
America to bring in millions of US dollars in suspect funds into the United States 
and move those monies among a worldwide network of accounts.219  The report 
admits that ‘although aware of his status as an arms dealer, the Bank of America 
did not treat Mr Falcone as a PEP, did not designate his account as high risk and 
maintained the Falcone accounts with few questions’.220  Similarly, Teodoro Obiang 
was able to move over $100million in suspect funds into or through the US financial 
system221 mainly due to lack of amphitheatre PEP controls and safeguards.  Capital 
flight also takes other forms among which are criminal acts, tax evasion, trade 
based money laundering, over/under invoicing and trade mispricing. 
 
Trade Based Money Laundering 
The FATF defines Trade Based Money Laundering (TBML) as ‘the process of 
disguising the proceeds of crime and moving value through the use of trade 
transactions in an attempt to legitimize their illicit origins’.222  Trade based money 
laundering can be achieved through the misrepresentation of the price, quantity or 
quality of imports and exports.  The FATF study identifies the following TBML 
techniques: 
• over-and under-invoicing of goods and services; 
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• multiple invoicing of goods and services; 
• over-and under-shipments of goods and services; and 
• falsely described goods and services 
TBML practices varies in complexity which involves the abuse of both the  financial  
international trade system and more complex schemes integrate the above 
mentioned techniques into a web of multifarious transactions that obscures the 
money trail and complicates detection.  TBML risk arises due to the enormous 
volume of cross border trade, often-complex trade/financing transactions, 
possibility of commingling of illicit funds with legitimate fund transactions and 
limited exchange of customs date on international level.  The FATF also notes that, 
‘the size and scope of Free Trade Zones makes it difficult to effectively monitor 
incoming and outgoing cargo, repackaging and relabeling.  Some FTZs export 
billions of dollars of transactions per year but have fewer authorities to monitor and 
examine cargo and trade transactions.  The relaxed oversight in FTZs makes it 
more challenging to detect illicit activity and provides opportunity for misuse.  As a 
result, the FTZs provide a setting in which certain TBML schemes are more easily 
conducted’.223 
 
Trade Mispricing refers to the intentional misstating of the value, quantity, or 
composition of goods on customs declaration forms and invoices, usually for the 
reason of evading taxes of money laundering.  Trade mis-invoicing could be in the 
way of import under-invoicing, import over-invoicing, export under-invoicing and 
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export over-invoicing.  The excess of funds to cover the inflated invoice are 
transferred abroad and deposited in offshore bank accounts, while in under-
invoicing, the aim is to reduce associated tax payments and retain the difference.  
Companies also engage in fictitious trade transactions in the form of services 
rendered which are paid for even though the products or services do not exist.  
Capital flight occurs in a disguised way since it is under a legitimate sounding 
transaction aimed at recording the invoice value in spite of the fact that the real 
value is not captured in official government statistics.  As a result, millions of dollars 
are deprived of developing countries by corporations.  In one survey, Global 
financial integrity estimates that in 2006 €375 – 400 billion were sent offshore from 
developing nations through transfer pricing mechanisms. The primary issue with 
capital flight related to trade mispricing is that in SSA commodities imports are 
over-priced whereas exports are low-priced thereby creating a loss position in the 
region.  The money transferred abroad in the form of capital flight entails that the 
domestic entity reports below-normal profits, as a result, pays lesser taxes that 
would be required.  In sub-Saharan Africa, trade mispricing accounts for 68.2 
percent while illicit hot money outflows accounts for 31.8%.224  As Kepa report 
observes, 3.5% of all capital flights in developing countries is due to corruption, 
30% due to international crime and 64% is due to illegal commercial capital flights.  
Studies indicate that for South Africa alone, mis-invoicing is an important source of 
capital flight and has remained consistently high for the period under review.225    
                                                            
224 Kar (n208) 16 
225 Gabriel Palmer, ‘The Three Routes to Financial Crises: The Need for Capital Controls’ (2000) 18 Centre 
for Economic Policy Analysis 17; Seeraj Mohamed and Kade Finnoff, ‘Capital Flight from South Africa, 1980 
– 2000’ (Forum on African Development and Poverty Reduction The Macro-micro linkage, Somerset West, 
South Africa, October 2004) 
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Tax evasion by companies, especially multinational corporations is apparently a 
significant source of capital flight.  Funds generated are transferred to a subsidiary 
located in tax haves at either high or low price, the associated profits distributed to 
minimise the tax burden.  Attention in this research is focused on capital flight 




Combating capital flight and illicit financial flows, which is a cross-border activity, 
requires international cooperation and support from the developed countries.  It is 
widely believed that the developed countries do little or rather pay lip service to the 
massive looting of the economies of developing countries since they inadvertently 
benefit from the inflows.  While this belief may not be sufficiently substantiated, in 
the end, illicit flows help to fund development in those tax havens at the expense 
of the looted economies.  There is, therefore, the need to strengthen bilateral and 
multilateral agreements and cooperation between the known shelters and most 
countries in Sub Saharan Africa to curtail the tide of illicit financial flows.  All 
relevant deliberations and proceedings initiated by the appropriate agencies of 
government geared towards developing strategies and mechanisms in the entire 
range of international cooperation including extradition, mutual legal assistance, 
and transfer of sentenced persons, transfer of criminal proceedings, international 
cooperation for confiscation including asset recovery and international law 
                                                            
226 According to Amnesty international, the vast majority of (illegal) capital flight in South Africa arises out 
of transfer pricing by conglomerates, especially in and around mining and forms part and parcel of a more 
general adjustment.  See Sam Asman, Ben Fine and Susan Newman, ‘Amnesty International? The Nature, 
Scale and Impact of Capital Flight from South Africa’ (2011) 37(1) Journal of South African Studies,7  
108 
 
enforcement cooperation.  A robust framework developed within the region to 
enhance cooperation and discouragement of the tide of illicit financial flows. 
 
Greater transparency in the financial systems is at this moment advocated which 
amongst others things includes: curbing the opacity in the global economic system 
such as tax haven secrecy, the formation of anonymous companies and improving 
detection techniques of politically exposed persons and their modus operandi.  
Also, institutional reforms necessary to strengthen existing laws and framework 
designed to mitigate illicit outflows from the region should be pursued vigorously.  
In the same vein, appropriate mechanism and legal framework to seek the 
repatriation of stolen funds hidden in havens and appropriate sanctions imposed 
on political office holders who are involved in this selfish act be pursued.  As 
emphasised in Chapter 8, strong political will, independence of the judiciary and 
other law enforcement agencies, will reduce the impunity by political elites.  
Individual countries should strengthen initiatives to check tax evasion by ensuring 
that there are adequate checks in place to investigate transfer pricing, trade 
mispricing, over/under-invoicing and tax planning methods employed by 
multinational cooperation who under disclose profits thus reducing the tax payable.  
Also, trust schemes and other offshore investments embarked upon by legal 
entities should be ex-rayed to determine the beneficial owners of those entities, 
since politically exposed persons could be owners of these companies.  
Strengthening anti-money laundering controls, increase the cost of sanctions and 






IMPLEMENTATION OF INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING INITIATIVES 
 
Over the years we have witnessed the ever increasing burdens imposed by law, 
regulation or just best conduct, on those who mind other people’s wealth in the 
ordinary course of their business to be fully aware for whom they act and the 
circumstances and derivation of any relevant property.227   How appropriate are 
measures designed to inhibit the laundering of criminal property and other suspect 
wealth, when balanced against the risks and responsibilities and therefore costs 
imposed on banks, other financial institutions and increasingly professional 
advisers. The obligation to report suspicions that wealth is the proceeds of crime 
or related to terrorist activity has resulted in arguably the great burden on 
intermediaries and their advisers.228  There are jurisdictions in which there is a 
broad obligation to report to the authorities almost all serious crime, but, there are, 
of course, exceptions and the one that is perhaps most pervasive relates to 
suspicion that property constitutes or represents a benefit derived from criminal 
conduct.229  The principle of collective security entails that nations could deal with 
mutual problems through collaboration and by concerted effort instead of handling 
issues in isolation.  Money Laundering initiatives is further necessitated by growth 
of international regimes and institutions; proliferation of non-state actors, the 
increasing interpenetration of domestic and international systems,230 and the 
creation of formal and informal regimes within the international arena.   
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Though earlier efforts abound in a bid to provide an international framework to deal 
with drug trafficking,231 a coordinated action against money laundering began in 
earnest in the 1980s within the context of international efforts to combat drug 
trafficking and money laundering.  It was then thought that criminal organizations 
generate substantial profits from illicit drug trafficking and related crimes which 
enables them to penetrate, contaminate and corrupt the structures of government, 
notable effort could be made to develop and strengthen law enforcement strategies 
aimed at disrupting the organization and management of these criminal elements 
which may ultimately break their economic power. 
 
Furthermore, a significant factor giving rise to the increased international attention 
on money laundering and corruption is the ‘appreciation of the negative impact 
which significant flows of ‘dirty money’ can have on the banks and other financial 
institutions through which they pass, or which they are deposited or invested.’232  
Also, there is the realisation that money launderers can utilise ‘any form of 
corporate and trust activity to launder their profits.  The mainstream and 
underground financial systems in all their varieties are susceptible.  Describing how 
money launderers can use corporate entities and trust to launder profits Lord 
Denning in the case of Wallersteiner v. Moir said: 
Even so, I am quite clear that these distinct legal entities were just puppets 
of Dr Wallersteiner.  He controlled their every movement.  Each danced to 
his bidding.  He pulled strings….they were his agents to do as he 
                                                            
231 Alldridge (n125) 93 
232 Srivastava (n121) 238 
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commanded.  He was their principal behind them.  I am of the opinion that 
the court should pull aside the corporate veil and treat these concerns as 
his creatures’.233 
Several corporate vehicles such as companies, trusts, foundations, non-
governmental organisations, fictitious entities and even unincorporated economic 
organisations are within the wimps of launderers.  In the same vein, and more 
recently, there is the increased focus on the involvement of professionals such as 
lawyers and accountants serving as advisers to money launders. Akin to the 
participation of professionals is the continued use of the world's financial system 
and offshore financial centres for money laundering activities.  Below, we, 
therefore, look at international initiatives designed to combat corruption and money 
laundering. 
 
This chapter examines various international, legal and policy instruments and 
initiatives created to surmount the problem of corruption and money laundering 
and by extension other transnational organised crimes.  In particular, 
organizational efforts such as the United Nations organization, the European 
Union, the African Union, the Organization for Economic cooperation and 
Development, Financial Action Taskforce, Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence, 
would be the focus of the research effort as a means of finding better ways of 
combating the trend in sub Saharan Africa. 
 
                                                            
233 Wallersteiner v. Moir  [1974] 1 WLR 99, 1013;  Willebois and others, The Puppet Masters: How the 
Corrupt Use Legal Structures to Hide Stolen Assets and What To Do About It (Solomon & Peters Ltd Stolen 
Asset Recovery Initiative, World Bank 2011) 11   
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3.1 The United Nations Organization. 
Corruption and money laundering are a global phenomenon involving cross-border 
financial transactions, which require international cooperation for the fight against 
it to be successful.  Remarkably, commonwealth countries have made a significant 
effort at influencing the making of an international legislative framework to combat 
money laundering.  Among these are Interpol, 45th General Assembly Session, 
Accra, 14th-20th October 1976, the Commonwealth law ministers meeting held in 
Winnipeg, August 1977, and the Commonwealth law ministers meeting held in 
Barbados, August 1980.   
 
The United Nations has established some initiatives to deal with the threat posed 
by money laundering.  At the very heart of anti-money laundering strategy is the 
need to criminalise money laundering and impose sanctions to serve as a deterrent 
to money launderers, and to garner international support these requirements must 
be designed to meet global acceptance. 
 
3.1.1 Vienna Convention of 1988 
Among the first instruments released to address the challenge of money laundering 
are the United Nations Convention against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and 
Psychotropic Substances (called the ‘Vienna Convention’.) 
 
Article 3(1)234 Provides that parties are required to enact legislation necessary to 
establish a modern code of criminal offences of illicit trafficking in all dimensions 
                                                            




this will in so far as it is not contrary to its constitutional principles and the basic 
concepts of the country's legal system.  It also obliges signatory nations to take 
steps to ensure that bank secrecy does not impede enforcement, and in particular, 
cross-border enforcement.  This article of the convention criminalizes money 
laundering. In particular Article 3(1)(b) requires that money laundering is 
established as a criminal offence when committed intentionally.  The scope of the 
Article's requirement is as follows: 
‘i. The conversion or transfer of property, knowing that such property is 
derived from any offence or offences established in accordance with 
subparagraph a) of this paragraph, or from an act of participation in 
such offence or offences, for the purpose of concealing or disguising 
the illicit origin of the property or of assisting any person who is 
involved in the commission of such an offence or offences to evade 
the legal consequences of his actions; 
ii. The concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights with respect to, or ownership of 
property, knowing that such property is derived from an offence or 
offences established in accordance with subparagraph a) of this 
paragraph or from an act of participation in such an offence or 
offences;’ 
To ensure uniformity in its application, the Article requires each state to ‘adopt 
measures to establish a criminal offence under its domestic law,235 to render as 
criminal ‘the acquisition, possession or of use of property, knowing at the time of 
the receipt, that such property was derived from an offence or.., in accordance with 
                                                            
235 Article 3(1) 
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the offences of subparagraph (a) of this paragraph or an act of participation in such 
offence or offences.236 The domestic laws should provide for the confiscation of all 
forms of property, proceeds or instrumentalities used in or derived from covered 
offences.237  Participating signatories to the convention are to empower its courts 
or other competent authorities to order that bank, financial or commercial records 
be made available in such a way as to override its local bank secrecy laws.238  
Furthermore, Article 6 provides for the extradition of launderers,239 participating 
countries to provide legal assistance and prohibit state signatories from invoking 
banking secrecy240 as a basis not to proffer mutual legal assistance. 
 
Admittedly, the Vienna convention is the first significant anti-money laundering 
framework set up internationally but its primary focus is money laundering 
emanating from drug trafficking and proceeds arising therefrom.241  However, its 
importance cannot be overemphasized as it remains the pioneer effort towards the 
criminalisation of money laundering, the trial of offenders, extradition and 
confiscation of the proceeds arising from the crime. 
 
                                                            
236 Article 3(1)(C)(i) 
237 Article 5(1) 
238 Article 5(3) 
239 Article 6(2).  In particular, S.6 (9) provides that ‘without prejudice to the exercise of any criminal 
jurisdiction established by its domestic law, a party whose territory an alleged offender is found, shall a).  if 
it does not extradite him in respect of an offence established in accordance with paragraph 3, paragraph I, 
on the grounds set forth in article 4, paragraph 2, subparagraph a) submit the case to its competent 
authorities for prosecution, unless otherwise agreed with the requesting party; b) if it does not  extradite 
him in relation to that offence in accordance with article 4, paragraph 2 subparagraph b) submit the case to 
its competent authorities for the purpose of prosecution, unless otherwise requested by the requesting 
party for the purpose of preserving legitimate jurisdiction.’  
240 Article 7(5) 
241 Article 2(1) provides that the ‘purpose of the convention is to promote co-operation among parties so 
that they may address more effectively the various aspects of illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances having an international dimension.’ 
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3.1.2 Palermo Convention242 in 2000  
The adoption of the United Nations Convention Against Transnational Organised 
Crime is another landmark effort towards the fight against money laundering and 
organised criminal activities.  The Vienna convention made adequate provision for 
money laundering activities arising mainly from the trafficking of drug and 
psychotropic substances, this agreement made significant inclusions in the areas 
of criminalizing proceeds stemming from corruption and organized crime, the 
addition of corporate liability and sort to clarify the prevention, investigation and 
prosecution of stipulated offences and other serious crimes.243 
 
 The scope of the convention applies ‘to the prevention, investigation and 
prosecution of a). Offences established by articles 5244, 6245, 8246, and 23247 of this 
convention; and b).  Serious organised crime as defined in article 2 of this 
convention; where the offence is transnational and involves an organised criminal 
group.’248  The convention expands the definition of predicate offences to include 
                                                            
242 United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime of 2000.   
243 Article 2(b) defines serious crime as ‘conduct constituting an offence punishable by a maximum 
deprivation of liberty of at least four years or a more serious penalty.’ 
244 Article 5 relates to the criminalisation of participation in an organised criminal group.  Each state is to 
adopt such ‘legislative and other measures’ to establish as criminal offences when committed intentionally.  
245 Article 6 provides for the criminalisation of laundering of the proceeds of crime.   
246 Article 8 of the convention provides for the criminalisation of corruption.  Corrupt practices as provided 
by the convention includes a).  The promise, offering or giving a public official, directly or indirectly, of an 
undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or entity, so that the official act or 
refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties; b).  The solicitation or acceptance by a public 
official, directly or indirectly, of an undue advantage, for the official himself or herself or another person or 
entity, so that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her duties.   
247 Article 23 criminalises the obstruction of justice.  States are to ensure through domestic legislation to 
establish as criminal offences when committed intentionally:  the use of force, threats or intimidation or 
the promise or giving of an undue advantage to induce false testimony or to interfere  in the giving of 
testimony or the production of evidence in a proceeding in relation to the commission of offences; and the 
use of force, threats or intimidation to interfere with the exercise of official duties by a justice or law 
enforcement official in relation to the commission of offences as prescribed by the convention.  
248 Article 3(1) (a) and (b). 
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other serious crimes and urges all participants to apply the convention’s money 
laundering offences to ‘the widest range of predicate offences.’249 
 
The convention also made vital provisions which ensures that there is adequate 
regulatory and supervisory framework for banks and non-bank financial institutions 
as well as other bodies particularly susceptible, to have machinery in place to 
detect, deter all forms of money laundering which must among other things 
emphasize customer identification, record keeping and the reporting of suspicious 
transactions.  In addition, signatories to the convention are to consider 
‘implementing feasible measures to detect and monitor the movement of cash and 
appropriate negotiable instruments across their borders, subject to safeguards to 
ensure proper use of information and without impeding in any way the movement 
of legitimate capital.’250   It also calls for the establishment of a financial intelligence 
unit251 which will serve as a national centre to collate, analyse and disseminate 
information regarding potential money laundering.  Furthermore, parties are 
advised to use as a guideline252 ‘the relevant initiatives or regional, interregional 
and multilateral organisations against money laundering’253 and authorise the 
cooperation and exchange of information both domestically and internationally. 
 
3.1.3 The United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
The issue of corruption has always been on the front burner of discussions, the 
earliest and quite ambitious project embarked upon was Resolution No. 3514 of 
                                                            
249 Article 2(2) 
250 Article 7(1) 
251 Article 7(1)(b) 
252 The best known and most firmly established such guidance is contained in the 40 FATF 
Recommendations.  See Srivastava (n121) 247 
253 Article 7(3) 
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August 1975.254 The General Assembly, ‘concerned by the corrupt practices of 
certain transnational and other corporations, their intermediaries and others 
involved’ resolved to condemn all corrupt practices, including bribery, and 
reaffirmed the rights of member states to enforce laws against corporations 
involved in corrupt practices.  It further invited the UN Commission on 
Transnational Corporations to prepare recommendations that would help to 
eliminate corrupt practices, including bribery.  Understandably, this resolution 
lacked substance, but it paved the way for more work to be done leading to the 
signing by 96 countries of a more robust convention in 2004 now referred to as the 
‘United Nations Convention against Corruption‘. 
 
The adoption of this convention provides the opportunity for a global response 
towards the fight against corruption.  The convention has as its principal focus ‘to 
promote and strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption more 
efficiently and effectively;255 facilitate and support international cooperation and 
technical assistance in the prevention and fight against corruption, including asset 
recovery;256 and to promote integrity, accountability and proper management of 
public affairs and public property.’257  Principally, the convention's central elements 
relate to the prevention, criminalisation, international cooperation and asset 
recovery.  To this end, it recommends the establishment of anti-corruption bodies 
and enhanced transparency in the financing of election campaigns and political 
parties.  Signatories to the convention are urged to promote the involvement of 
                                                            
254 United Nations, ‘General Assembly: Resolutions Adopted by the General Assembly during its Thirtieth 
Session’ <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/30/ares30.htm> accessed 5 July 2016. 
255 Article 1(a)  UNCAC 
256 Article 1(b) UNCAC 
257 Article 1(c) UNCAC 
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non-governmental organisations and community-based groups as well as 
elements of civil society258 to raise awareness of corruption.  
 
To strengthen the state apparatus to fight corruption of public officials whether, in 
the form of bribery, embezzlement, money laundering or related acts, the 
convention established a variety of measures.  Foremost is the requirement by all 
states to ‘develop and implement or maintain effective, coordinated anti-corruption 
policies that promote the participation of society and reflect the principles of the 
rule of law, proper management of public affairs and public property, integrity, 
transparency and accountability’.259  In addition, a comprehensive overhaul of the 
states’ apparatus in terms of the relevant ‘legal instruments and administrative 
measures’ is required to ensure effectiveness while ensuring that there is adequate 
collaboration ‘with each other and with international and regional organizations in 
promoting and developing the measures’.260  Akin to the development of policy 
framework is the establishment within the legal system ‘the existence of a body, or 
bodies, as appropriate, that prevent corruption by such means as: ...overseeing 
and coordinating the implementation of policies; and increasing and disseminating 
knowledge about the prevention of corruption’.261  The body so established to fight 
corruption is to be independent to enable it to perform effectively and without undue 
influence.  Other measures aimed to ensure the seriousness in the fight against 
corruption are approaches to be adopted in the procurement process,262 proper 
                                                            
258 Article 13  UNCAC 
259 Article 5(1)  UNCAC 
260 Article 5(4)  UNCAC 
261 Article 6(1)  UNCAC 
262 Article 9(1)  UNCAC 
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accounting263 both in the private264 and public sectors, ensuring judicial 
independence by strengthening integrity of the process and preventing 
opportunities where the judicial process could be compromised.265 
 
There is also an explicit provision on measures to prevent money laundering.  The 
convention provides that each state shall institute ‘a comprehensive domestic 
regulatory and supervisory regime for banks and non-bank financial institutions, 
including natural or legal persons that provide formal or informal services for the 
transmission of money or value…. To deter and detect all forms of money 
laundering, which regime shall emphasise requirements of the customer and, and 
where appropriate, beneficial owner266 identification, record keeping and the 
reporting of suspicious transactions.’  The convention appreciated the importance 
of ensuring ‘that individual country put in place measures to ensure that transfers 
of funds could be properly tracked and that a particular paper trail be created which 
could assist law enforcement authorities investigating the transfers of illicit assets 
and enrichment’.267  It is provided that appropriate codes of conduct for public 
officials are crafted within the legal system for the ‘honourable performance of 
public functions,’268 in addition to having appropriate channels to facilitate the 
reporting of acts of corruption perpetrated by corrupt officials in the discharge of 
their duties.  To ensure transparency, public officials are required to declare to the 
appropriate authorities, ‘their outside activities, employment, investments, assets 
                                                            
263 Article 10  UNCAC 
264 Article 12  UNCAC 
265 Article 11(1) provides that ‘bearing in mind the independence of the judiciary and its critical role in 
combating corruption, each state party shall…, take measures to strengthen integrity and to prevent 
opportunities for corruption among members of the judiciary.’ 
266 Beneficial Owner discussed in Chapter 5.  See Van der Does de Willebois (n234) 19  
267 Srivastava (n121) 248 
268 Article 8(2) UNCAC 
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and substantial gifts or benefits from which a conflict of interest may result 
concerning their functions as public officials’.269  
 
The convention identified a broad range of activities that fall under the umbrella of 
corruption.  It includes bribery of public officials, bribery of foreign public officials 
and officials of international organisations, embezzlement, misappropriation or 
diversion of property by a public official, trading in influence, abuse of functions, 
illicit enrichment,270 bribery in the private sector, embezzlement of property in the 
private sector, laundering in the proceeds of crime, concealment, and obstruction 
of justice.  The convention defined a public official as ‘any person holding a 
legislative, administrative or judicial office of a state party, whether appointed or 
elected, whether permanent or temporary, whether paid or unpaid, irrespective of 
the person’s seniority; or a person who performs  a public function, including for a 
public agency or public enterprise, or provides  a public service; or any other person 
defined as public official in the domestic law of a state’.271  A foreign official similar 
to a public official is one who exercises the legislative, administrative or judicial 
office of a foreign country.   
To underscore the severity of bribery the convention requires states to adopt 
measures as may be necessary to establish as a criminal offence when committed 
intentionally the act of bribery and expressly defines it as: 
The promise, offering or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, 
 of an undue advantage, for himself or herself or another person or  
                                                            
269 Article 8(5) UNCAC 
270 Defined as ‘a significant increase in the assets of a public official that he or she cannot reasonably explain 
in relation to his or her lawful income.’ Article 20  UNCAC 
271 Article 2(a) UNCAC 
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entity, so that the official act or refrain from acting in the exercise 
 of his or her official duties; the solicitation or acceptance by a public 
official.  
One of the most significant innovations of the convention is the asset recovery and 
return of such stolen assets to the country of origin.  This is contained in Chapter 
Five of the convention and includes provisions such as prevention and detection 
of transfer of proceeds crime; measures for direct recovery of property; 
mechanisms for the recovery of property through international cooperation in 
confiscation, international cooperation for the purposes of confiscation; return and 
disposal of assets; the requirement for the establishment of financial intelligence 
unit as well as bilateral and multilateral agreements and arrangements.   
 
The convention has faced some criticisms in the number of ways: first, that even 
though it starts with some sort of mandatory provisions, most critical provisions are 
left to the discretion of states to adopt since it relies heavily on non-mandatory 
wordings.272  Also, the convention was drafted with a ‘tendency to give priority to 
political and economic interest, besides human, legal and moral interests’.273  The 
requirement that member states…..return assets obtained through corruption to 
the country from which they were stolen’ has a significant setback as states parties 
have noted ‘many difficult and implicit slow progress’ because it is difficult to 
                                                            
272 Y, A, Shehu, ‘International Initiatives against Corruption and Money Laundering: An Overview’ (2005) 
12(3) JFC 221 
273 Antonio Argandoña, ‘The United Nations Convention against Corruption and its Impact on International 
Companies’ <http://iese.edu/research/pdfs/DI-0656-E.pdf> accessed 9 July 2016.  Argued that the West is 
interested in promoting democracy and human rights values most vigorously in those areas of the world 
where it has significant economic interests, so the West only seems interested in enforcing corrupt practices 
law when it is profitable and when it does not compromise their national interests.  See Thompson A. Keith, 
‘Does Anti-Corruption Legislation Work?’ (2013) XVI International Trade and Business Review Law 51 
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‘establish …and [prove] a link between proceeds of corruption in the requested 
state and the crime committed in the requested state’ 
 
3.2 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption 
This convention was adopted by the African Assembly of Heads of State and 
Government on July 1, 2003 and came into force August 5, 2006.  African leaders 
acknowledged that corruption not only undermined accountability and 
transparency in the management of public affairs274 but also results in impunity on 
the political, economic, social and cultural stability of African states.275  Corruption 
has its devastating effect on the socio-economic development of the African 
people. The convention aims to achieve the following five objectives: to promote 
and strengthen the development in Africa mechanisms required to prevent, detect, 
punish and eradicate corruption and related offences in the public and private 
sectors;276 promote, facilitate and regulate cooperation among state parties to 
ensure the effectiveness of measures and actions to prevent corruption and related 
offences;277 to coordinate, harmonise the policies and legislation between state 
parties for prevention, detection and eradication of corruption in the continent;278 
remove obstacles to the enjoyment of human rights, including economic, social and 
cultural rights;279 and, to establish conditions necessary to foster transparency and 
accountability.280  The convention seeks to criminalise corruption in the public and 
                                                            
274 African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), Preamble Para.7 
275 Ibid, Preamble Para. 6 
276 Ibid, AUCPCC 2006, art 2(1) 
277 Ibid, AUCPCC 2006, art 2(2) 
278 Ibid, AUCPCC 2006, art 2(3) 
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private sector by obligating states to adopt legislative, administrative and other 
measures to tackle corruption. 
 
The convention defines corruption and related offences to include: the solicitation 
or acceptance either directly or indirectly by a public official of any goods of 
monetary value or other benefits in exchange for an act or omission in the 
performance of his functions;281 the granting or offering to a public official of any 
goods of monetary value or other benefits in exchange for an act or omission in the 
performance of his functions;282 any act or omission in the discharge of his or her 
duties for the purpose of illicitly obtaining benefits for himself or a third party;283 the 
diversion of property belonging to the state for purposes unrelated to those for 
which they are intended that such official has received by virtue of his position;284 
offering or giving of any undue advantage,285 illicit enrichment,286 use or 
concealment of proceeds derived from any acts referred to in the convention,287 
and participation as a principal, co-principal or accessory after the fact, or on any 
other manner in the commission or attempted commission, any collaboration or 
conspiracy to commit, any acts referred to in Article 4.288 
 
Article 5 on legislative and other measures mandates member states to adopt 
measures to establish as offences acts mentioned in article 4 and quite significantly 
to create and maintain an independent national anti-corruption authorities or 
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agencies.  This is a worthy inclusion because where tailored correctly, it will help 
in the fight against corruption and money laundering.  Among other notable 
provisions in the convention includes the strengthening of internal control 
framework regulating accounting, auditing and follow up systems in such areas as 
public income, tax and customs receipts, procurement and management of public 
goods. 
 
Since whistleblowing is a useful feature in the fight against corruption, Article 5 
requires member state to provide legislative and other measures to protect 
informants and witnesses in corruption and related offences, including the 
protection of their identities.289  As Transparency International noted, ‘corruption is 
a notoriously secretive activity, and it is usually those engaged in corrupt deals or 
those who work with them that are aware of it.’290  Insiders are among the very few 
who can report cases of corruption and identify the risk of future wrongdoing.291  
Whistleblowers help to ‘convert a vicious cycle of secrecy to a virtuous cycle’.292 
Without adequate protection, informants could become victims of corrupt officials, 
and information gathering becomes a tedious job.  Detection of corruption is a 
precondition for investigation and prosecution of the offence.  Informants who 
refuse to break the law or decide to alert the relevant agencies could be victims of 
demotion, dismissal or they may face other personal hardships.  Like the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Corporate Reform Act of 2002, internal and external 
whistleblowing protection provided to government employees who desire to report 
                                                            
289 Ibid, AUCPCC 2006, art 5(7)  
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cases of wrongdoing and sue a government official or contractor deemed to be 
defrauding the government.  For instance, the Sarbanes-Oxley Act makes it illegal 
to discharge, demote, suspend, threaten, harass or in any manner discriminate 
against whistle-blowers and establishes criminal penalties against executives who 
retaliate against whistle-blowers.  While this Act protects individuals in the private 
sector, its provisions could be adopted in the public sector to ensure that corruption 
cases are quickly reported to deter would be offenders.  Similarly, respective 
governments could design programmes to encourage employees and other 
officials to bring ethical and legal violations they are aware of to an appropriate 
agency that would guarantee their protection and identity. Transparency 
International further observes that ‘major bribery and corruption scandals 
demonstrate the damage done by failure to report wrongdoing as soon as it is 
discovered.  Indifference, fear of reprisal and misplaced loyalty as well as a culture 
of silence often deter potential witnesses and whistle-blowers from speaking out.’293  
While the convention requires member states to have legislative and other 
measures in place for the establishment of whistleblowing legislation, it is 
imperative that established legislations are enforced and practical approaches 
adopted to protect informants.  
 
Article 10 proscribes the use of funds acquired through illegal and corrupt practices 
to finance political parties and requires member states to incorporate the principle 
of transparency into the funding of political parties.  Party politics is one of the many 
conduits of corruption and corrupt practices in the sub-region.  For instance, in 
Nigeria, before the General Elections of 2015, the nomination form for the People's 
                                                            
293 Ibid 2 
126 
 
Democratic Party (PDP) ranges from N1million to N10million depending on the 
seat one is vying for, which shows in clear terms that securing candidature for an 
elective position is not for the poor. As Oji observed, ‘parties are seen as 
investments bereft of any ideological foundation.  There must be returns if they 
must stay in business.  This profit motive has consistently given rise to the 
Godfather syndrome where an individual or group of individuals bankrolls the party 
and claims ownership.’294  Elections cost money, and the tendency exists for 
government officials to use public funds to support their political ambition or support 
another.  Before the 2015 Nigerian elections, the All Progressive Congress, is said 
to have embarked on raising N10 billion from the general public through direct 
contribution and N40 billion donations from the party's elected members including 
state governors.295 Admittedly, most countries in Sub Saharan African are 
signatories to the convention but as the Institute of Democracy and Electoral 
Assistance observed, ‘all parties in government try to use their incumbency in some 
way to increase their chances of re-election.  When often scant public funds are 
redirected from their intended purposes to campaign activities, however, the abuse 
of state resources threatens both a country’s effective and inclusive democracy’.296  
Besides abuse of state resources, there is also the problem of illicit funding of the 
political process297 from the proceeds of drugs, oil bunkering and other organised 
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criminal activities.  This makes political office holders who are direct beneficiaries 
complicit and unable to combat corruption.  
Article 11 addressed the influence of the private sector, which requires state parties 
to adopt legislative and other measures to prevent and combat acts of corruption 
in the private sector including measures to ‘prevent companies from paying bribes 
to win tenders’298.  Bribery to win a contract is one visible form of corruption.  Bribery 
scandals discussed in Chapter 2 provides obvious basis for state commitment.   
Article 16 of the convention provides for the confiscation and seizure of the 
proceeds and instrumentalities of corruption.  It requires parties to adopt legislative 
measures to enable: its competent authorities to search, identify, trace, administer 
and freeze or seize the instrumentalities of corruption pending final judgment; 
confiscate the proceeds or property derived from the offences; repatriate the profits 
of corruption.  The repatriation of the proceeds of corruption and other offences 
requires cooperation from other member states.  Additionally, Article 17 requires 
measures to be adopted to empower its courts of member states to order the 
confiscation or seizure of banking, financial or commercial documents.  State 
parties are refrained from invoking banking secrecy laws to justify their refusal to 
cooperate about acts of corruption, and where there are doubtful accounts, 
competent authorities should be allowed to obtain from banks and other financial 
institution evidence from their possession relating to the proceeds of corruption. 
 
A major issue with the convention is the level of compliance from member states 
and their preparedness to implement the fine provisions contained therein.  African 
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governments would need to strengthen institutional and legal reforms to 
successfully combat corruption. 
 
3.3 Council of Europe 
European countries have played a fundamental role in shaping legislation towards 
the fight against money laundering and corruption.  Established in 1949 with the 
primary purpose to ensure the values underpinning the European Convention on 
Human Rights have over the years, extended its reach with agreements to states 
to criminalize various crimes.299   
 
One of the foremost significant regional efforts against money laundering is the 
European Convention on Laundering, Search, Seizure and Confiscation of the 
Proceeds of Crime 1990.300  This was a direct fall out of the request by the 
European Ministers of Justice to develop ‘international norms and standards to 
guarantee effective international cooperation between judicial (and where 
necessary police) authorities as regards the detection, freezing and forfeiture of 
the proceeds of illicit drug trafficking.’301  The convention provides for and 
emphasizes the search and seizure of proceeds of crime through collaborative 
efforts by member states, through the adoption of special investigative techniques 
aimed to foster and strengthen cross-border cooperation.  The collaboration was 
to be fostered through cooperation among the Central banks and for individual 
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banks to perform ‘identity checks’ on customers.  Article 6302 Of the convention 
sought to extend the criminalisation of money laundering activities beyond drug 
trafficking to include other predicate offences and should not be limited to money 
laundering offences committed within one's immediate jurisdiction.  The convention 
further requires cooperation in the investigation and confiscation of proceeds.    
 
Due to the evolution in money laundering techniques and strategies whereby 
launderers target the non-bank sector and massively use professional 
intermediaries and legal persons to invest their criminal proceeds, the need arose 
to have yet an updated convention that would be all-inclusive. The New 2005 
European Convention, ‘Laundering, Search, Seizure of the proceeds of Crime and 
on the Financing of Terrorism‘ came into force on May 1, 2008.303  The convention 
expands the list to include what constitutes ‘predicate offences' for money 
laundering purposes other than drug trafficking. This includes: participation in an 
organized criminal group; terrorism (including terrorist financing); human trafficking 
and migrant smuggling; sexual exploitation; illicit traffic in narcotic drugs and 
psychotropic substances; illegal arms trafficking; unlawful trafficking in stolen and 
other goods; corruption and bribery; fraud; counterfeiting currency; counterfeiting 
and piracy of products; environmental crime; murder, grievous bodily injury; 
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kidnapping, illegal restraint and hostage-taking; robbery or theft; smuggling; 
extortion; forgery; piracy; and insider trading and market manipulation.304  
 
Besides the need to introduce clauses to deal with terrorism,305 the convention 
brought in a couple of notable innovations not present in the previous convention,306 
among which are:  the inclusion of clauses for Financial Intelligence Unit given the 
predominance of each state of the EU having fully functional Unit following the 
FATF 40 recommendations.  Article 12 requires states to ‘adopt such legislative 
and other measures as may be necessary to establish FIU’307 and to ensure that 
‘it’s FIU has access, directly or indirectly, on a timely basis to the financial, 
administrative and law enforcement information that it requires to properly 
undertake its functions, including the analysis of suspicious transaction reports;’308  
 
Secondly, the introduction of corporate liability309 given the diverse and talented 
methods devised to integrate into the legitimate economy the proceeds of crime.  
This article provides for criminal liability of legal persons310 where money laundering 
offence is established to have been perpetrated by such person, committed ‘for 
their benefit by any natural person, acting either individually or as part of an organ 
of a legal person, as well as for involvement of such a natural person as accessory 
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or instigator.’311  The legal person can be held liable where a lack of supervision or 
control of a natural person results in committing a criminal offence.312  The liability 
of the legal person shall not exclude the natural persons who are perpetrators, 
instigators of, and accessories to the criminal offence.313  Where a legal person is 
held liable for committing a criminal offence, it shall be subjected to effective, 
proportionate and dissuasive criminal or non-criminal sanction including monetary 
sanctions’;314  
 
Thirdly, the convention under investigative assistance provides that parties should 
take measures to answer to request of a criminal investigation sent by one party to 
the other relating to either natural or legal person.  Ensure to provide particulars of 
identified bank accounts, monitor the banking operations within a specified period 
that are being carried out through one or more accounts of the natural or legal 
person under investigation.  
 
Fourthly, each member state to institute a comprehensive regulatory and 
supervisory regime to require financial institutions and non-bank financial 
institutions having the potentials for money laundering activities to perform 
appropriate know your customer and due diligence.  Report suspicious activities 
as well prohibit personnel from disclosing the fact that a suspicious transaction 
report or related information has been transmitted to the appropriate authority,315 
train internal personnel and establish internal policies316 and procedures aimed at 
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strengthening the internal control systems in the organisation.  In carrying out the 
customer identification requirement, financial institutions are required to satisfy 
themselves that the identity of their customers is consistent with the account in 
order to prevent the institution used as a channel for criminal activity.  The holding 
of anonymous account is not consistent with the provision for customer due 
diligence as particular care is required to be taken to ascertain beneficial 
ownership.  Since cash can be laundered across border in large quantities,317 it is 
required that member states respond appropriately to adopt legislative or other 
measures to detect the ‘significant physical cross-border transportation of cash and 
bearer negotiable instruments’.318 
 
3.4 The Financial Action Task Force 
At its 1989 summit held in Paris, the Group of Seven (‘G-7’) formally recognized 
the threat money laundering had to the banking and financial system and moved 
to establish a Financial Action Taskforce comprising of summit participants and 
other interested parties with a view to evaluating contemporary anti-money 
laundering measures  and to propose additional preventive measures.  In 1990, 
the task force issued forty recommendations aimed at stopping money laundering.  
Having admitted to the ever-changing nature of money laundering techniques, 
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more so, money laundering taking a higher and sophisticated dimension where 
launderers adopt legal persons and seasoned professionals to legitimize criminal 
proceeds, the task force is poised to review and implement a comprehensive 
framework of combative and preventive measures to tackle the hydra-headed 
monster of money laundering and terrorist financing.    The FATF can best be 
described as the most comprehensive multidimensional and multi-sectorial319 
approach in the global fight to combat money laundering.  In its introductory page, 
The FATF has as its core mandate ‘to set standards and promote effective 
implementation of legal, regulatory and operational measures for combating 
money laundering, terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation, and other 
related threats to the integrity of the international financial system.’320  
 
The first 40 recommendations by the FATF were issued in 1990, which place 
greater emphasis upon financial institutions, laying a foundation of a serious of 
concrete steps the banks should take to combat money laundering activities.   In 
1996 the FATF required that predicate offences should extend beyond drug-related 
offences to also include serious crimes.  Further amendment was substantially 
made in 2003 to include proper customer due diligence, the need to identify 
beneficial owners and the role of the financial intelligence unit.  More recently, in 
2012 the FATF adopted revised recommendations with a view to ‘strengthen the 
requirements for higher risk situations, and to allow countries to take a more 
focused approach in areas where high risk remain or implementation could be 
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enhanced.’  This approach will help countries to conduct a risk assessment by first 
identifying and assessing what money laundering and terrorist financing risk they 
face, and identify proper measures to mitigate these identified risk.  This risk-based 
approach would allow countries to adopt flexible measures, to target their 
resources more effectively and apply preventive measures that are commensurate 
with the nature of risks. 
 
The FATF sets out the essential measures to combat money laundering.  They 
include:  identification of money laundering and terrorist financing risk;, developing 
policies and ensuring domestic coordination; pursue money laundering and 
terrorist financing and the financing of proliferation; apply preventive measures for 
the financial sector and other designated sectors; establish powers and 
responsibilities for the competent authorities and other institutional measures; 
enhance the transparency of and availability of beneficial ownership information of 
legal persons and arrangements; and facilitate international cooperation.321  The 
FATF strongly recommend the criminalisation of all money laundering offences by 
the Vienna and Palermo conventions of the United Nations and apply the crime of 
money laundering to all serious offences, to include the most comprehensive range 
of predicate offences.322   
 
The FATF is not part of the OECD or any other international organisation.  It is a 
freestanding specialist body with the primary focus on the fight against money 
laundering.  In so far as, its functions are concerned, it publishes a wide range of 
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guidance notes, best practice papers and conducts the country assessment of anti-
money laundering and counter-terrorism frameworks and their performance to 
determining a level of compliance of member countries and provide necessary 
support in the implementation of the recommendations.   
 
To ensure proper dissemination of the recommendations, the FATF has eight 
partners, FATF-style regional bodies.  The local bodies act as focal points for the 
implementation of the recommendations.  In sub-Saharan Africa two regional 
bodies exist: Inter-Governmental Action Group against Money Laundering in West 
Africa (GIABA)323 and the Eastern and Southern Africa Anti Money Laundering 
Group (ESSAAMLG).324  In furtherance to this objective of seeking to encourage 
and monitor the implementation of the programme of action, it has in place an 
innovative multilateral surveillance and peer review mechanism which centres 
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around an annual-self assessment exercise duly complemented by a more detailed 
mutual evaluation process under which each member is subjected to an on-site 
examination.  The purpose of the evaluation is to ascertain if the necessary laws, 
regulations or other measures required under the FATF are in force and effect and 
correctly implemented and to determine if the system in place is adequate and the 
review is then ranked against each of the FATF recommendations.  
The FATF has also sought to remain dynamic to the nature of money laundering 
since it is ever evolving, and to this effect has initiated a periodic review of the 
recommendations to stay in tandem with global financial innovations and practice.  
It noted that ‘the risk-based approach is central to the effective implementation of 
the FATF recommendations adopted 2012.’325  To achieve this objective the FATF 
sought to partner with the public and private sectors in reviewing current practices, 
strengthen international safeguards against money laundering and in turn bring it 
in line with the requirement of the revised recommendations.   For instance, the 
guidance note on risked-based approach to virtual currencies was updated in July 
2015 and seeks to ‘show how specific FATF recommendations should apply to 
convertible virtual currency exchangers in the context of VCPPS, identify AML/CFT 
measures that could be required, and provide examples; and identify obstacles to 
applying mitigating measures rooted to VCPPS technology, and/or business 
models and in legacy legal frameworks’.326  The report noted, ‘The FATF 
recognises financial innovation, and at the same time, VC payment products and 
services present money laundering and terrorist financing risks and other crime 
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risks that must be identified and mitigated.   The periodic reviews also stem from 
the need for the recommendations to address challenges being faced by the 
different global financial scenarios such as ‘the role of gatekeepers (accountants 
and lawyers), international payment system, corporate vehicles, stolen state 
assets, beneficial ownership and issues on transparency.327  
 
3.5 The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) 
The organization for economic cooperation and development (OECD)328 is one of 
the significant regional bodies that have shown considerable will in the fight against 
corruption and money laundering.  Against the backdrop of corruption scandals 
and resulting dramatic cases which engulfed Europe in the late 1980s and early 
1990s, the OECD Convention on Bribery of Foreign officials was signed on 17th 
December 1997 and came into force on 15 February 1999.  The convention deals 
with ‘active corruption’ or active bribery, meaning the offence committed by a 
person who promises or gives the bribe as contrasted with passive bribery, the 
offence committed by the person who receives the bribe.  It also seeks to assure 
a functional equivalence among the measures taken by parties to sanction bribery 
of foreign public officials without requiring uniformity or changes in the party's legal 
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countries were to consider making such information available to financial institutions and other regulated 
businesses. Trust information should be collected and accessible, the principles explained, but only to law 
enforcement. 
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system.329  In its footnote to Commentary on combating bribery, bribe solicitation 
and extortion, the Convention defines a bribe as ‘...offer, promise, or give(ing) of 
any undue pecuniary or other advantage, whether directly or through 
intermediaries, to a foreign public official, for that official or for a third party, in order 
that the official act or refrain from acting in relation to the performance of official 
duties, in order to obtain or retain business or other improper advantage in the 
conduct of international business.’  The main elements and scope of the convention 
fall into three distinct categories: the criminalisation of bribery and inducement of 
officials in their official conduct; imposing specific responsibilities and obligations 
and impose dissuasive penalties and sanctions on offenders; and with multilateral 
initiatives, allow international cooperation and mutual legal assistance.  The 
convention, in particular, requires member states to establish as a criminal offence 
for any person to intentionally offer, promise or give any undue pecuniary 
advantage either directly or through a subsidiary to obtain or retain an international 
business advantage.  Furthermore, complicity in, including incitement, aiding and 
abetting, or authorisation of an act of bribery constitutes a criminal offence.  To 
give further bite on the extent of the definition of bribery.  In the same vein, 
‘improper advantage’ is explained as something ab-initio to which the business 
entity concerned was not entitled.  It does not matter whether the offer or promise 
was given on the official's behalf or legal body or any other natural person. 
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3.6 The Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units 
As part of the provisions of the conventions described above, it has been 
recognised that regional and international cooperation is a crucial factor in the fight 
against money laundering and corruption with specific emphasis on mutual legal 
assistance, extradition, and cooperation in the tracing, seizure and confiscation of 
the proceeds of crime.  While most of the legislation has been carried out by the 
public sector, there was a real need for private sector actors to collaborate with the 
public sector for the fight against money laundering to get more momentum that is 
significant.  The creation of the Egmont Group is a meaningful response in this 
regard, as it serves to face the challenges posed for ‘national authorities in securing 
the effective implementation of agreed anti-money laundering measure.'  The 
formation of the group has helped to provide new, extensive and valuable sources 
of information now at the disposal of national authorities arising from an elaborate 
collaboration of state actors and information received from the private sector, 
principally banks and other financial institutions.  A case in point is the mandatory 
reporting of suspicious transactions as directed by the FATF recommendations and 
the European Directive.  The Egmont group consist of national FIUs serves as a 
forum for FIUs to improve their respective national anti-money laundering 
programmes. The support includes ‘expanding and systemizing the exchange of 
financial intelligence information, improving expertise and capabilities of personnel 
of such organisations, and fostering better communication among FIUs through 
application of technology’.330  A financial Intelligence unit has been defined as:  ‘a 
central, national agency responsible for receiving (and, as permitted, requesting), 
                                                            
330 Egmont Group, ‘Information Paper on Financial Intelligence Units and the Egmont Group’ 




analysing and disseminating to the competent authorities, disclosures of financial 
information:  (i) concerning suspicious proceeds of crime; or (ii) required by national 
legislation or regulation, in order to counter money laundering and terrorist 
financing.’  The FUIs are responsible for receiving the suspicious transaction and 
other reports, analysing them and then disseminating the resulting financial 
intelligence.   In its statement of purpose, priority is given to the enhancement of 
international information exchange and other measures to improve cooperation 
between participating jurisdictions.  To this effect, the Egmont Secure Website 
permits members to have access to information on FIUs, money laundering trends, 
financial analysis tools and technological developments.  Thus, information 
received from this pool provides assistance to law enforcement (police) and 
prosecutorial authorities to combat money laundering. 
 
3.7 The Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles 
This private sector initiative put forward to combat money laundering arising mainly 
from the initial efforts of eleven banks who originally signed the principles.  These 
principles are the non-binding set of best practices governing the establishment 
and maintenance of relationships between private bankers and their clients.  In its 
preamble, to guidance on a risk-based approach for managing money laundering, 
the group recognises that to curtail the continuing threat of money laundering 
through financial institution is by understanding and addressing the potential risk 
associated with customers and transactions.  Individually, the following principles 
are in place as measures to prevent the facilitation of money laundering operations 




First, in general terms, the principles require banks to set up policies that will 
prevent the use of its operations for criminal purposes.  This can be achieved 
through ‘reasonable measures to establish the identity of its clients’, be it natural 
or legal persons (corporations, partnerships, foundations), and trust companies.  It 
also requires proper identification of beneficial owners, conducting appropriate due 
diligence exercise on each account holder, given attention to ascertaining if the 
client is acting on his or her behalf.  Where a limited liability company is involved, 
the bank needs to understand the structure of the company sufficiently to 
determine the provider of the funds, the principal owners of the company and their 
shareholding and those who have control of the funds.  In the case of a trust 
company, the banker must take reasonable care as to identify settlors, trustees, 
and any persons or entities with power to remove the trustees.  Evidence shows 
that out of 150 cases of grand corruption reviewed, companies were used to hide 
the proceeds of corruption in 128.331  A trust, which hides the identity of the grantors 
and the beneficiaries, has become a standard part of money laundering 
arrangements.  A reported case of misuse of the trust company is that of Diepreye 
Alamieyeseigha.332  On the advice of UBS bank, Diepreye Alamieyeseigha 
(popularly called ‘Alamco’), settled a Bahamian trust – the ‘Salo Trust’, for the 
benefit of himself and his family.  Upon examination by the court,333 he admitted 
being the Settlor; the trustee in so far as the UBS account, legally opened and 
controlled in his name, was held to be a trustee account; and a beneficiary.  This 
case showed that he was a trust in name only with no valid legal separation 
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332 Diepreye S.P. Alamieyeseigha was once a Governor of Bayelsa State, Nigeria. 
333 In the case of Nigeria v Santolina Investment Corporation & Ors [2007] EWHC 437 
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between himself and the asset.334  The case also underscores the need for 
customer due diligence.335     
 
The Principles also requires banks as part of their internal policies to define 
categories of persons whose circumstances needs additional due diligence336 to be 
performed on them as a measure to prevent money laundering.  The indicators337 
include: persons residing in/or having funds sourced from countries identified by 
credible sources as having inadequate anti-money laundering standards, 
representing high risk of crime and corruption; persons engaged in types of 
business activities or sectors known to be susceptible to money laundering; and 
‘politically exposed persons’, referring to individuals holding or having held 
positions of public trust, such as government officials, senior executives of 
government corporations, politicians, important political party officials, etc., as well 
as families and close associates.338 Furthermore, the internal policies of the bank 
should provide for senior management approval339 for persons identified above 
falling within the threshold of the indicators. 
 
Principle 3 concerns the updating of client files.  The private banker is required to 
update the client file on a defined basis, and where there are significant changes, 
                                                            
334 van der Does de Willebois (n234) 46  
335 Principle 1.3 states that it is essential to collect and record information covering the following categories: 
purpose and reason for opening the account; anticipated account activity; source of wealth (description of 
the economic activity which has generated the net worth); estimated net value; source of funds (explanation 
of the origin and means of transfer for monies that are accepted for the account opening); and references 
or other sources to corroborate reputation information where available.  
336 Principle 2.1 Wolfsberg AML Principles 
337Principle 2.2, Wolfsberg AML Principles  
338 The Wolfsberg Group, ‘Global Anti-Money Laundering Guidelines for Private Banking’ 
<https://www.ethic-intelligence.com/images/Resources/Anti-
money_laundering_texts/wolfsberg_aml_principles2.pdf> accessed 10 July 2016 
339 Principle 2.3 Wolfsberg AML Principles 
143 
 
there should be a regular review of the client's activities by either the supervisor or 
an independent control person to ensure consistency and completeness of the 
action.  In red flag cases, the internal policies should indicate if senior management 




There are laudable international and regional legal framework designed to combat 
money laundering and corruption.  Notable among all the pieces of UN, EU and 
AU legislations are the provisions of mutual legal assistance, bilateral and 
multilateral cooperation which underscores the recognition that money laundering 
is a global phenomenon and requires a comprehensive approach to combat it.  Sub 
Saharan African countries have adopted many facets of the legislation in their local 
laws to form a formidable force against corruption and money laundering - see 
Chapter 4.  Additionally, whistleblowing as a piece of legislation should be 
encouraged and pursued vigorously as a means of building confidence within the 
public and private workforce to deter potential corrupt officials from embarking on 
that course.  When there are the visible signals that a corrupt act will be reported 
and the informant is adequately protected, it can serve as an incentive to honest 
and law-abiding individuals to perform their work without fear or intimidation.  
Finally, political will is one essential ingredient in the implementation of these 





NON-INTERNATIONAL MONEY LAUNDERING RELATED LAW 
 
One of the most pervasive economic crimes in Nigeria and Sub Saharan Africa, in 
general, is the endemic corruption of which a right companion is money laundering.  
Money laundering by its nature is an offence, which involves several persons from 
the planning to the final execution stages, comprising the corrupt government 
officials and his cronies - professional intermediaries such as solicitors, 
accountants, bank officials and agents - traversing different country's jurisdictions.  
Money laundering can distort and corrupt the economic system because officials 
responsible for the implementation of rules become compromised, funds allocated 
to developmental initiatives diverted for personal self-aggrandisement leaving the 
populace at the mercy of poor welfare infrastructure and social unrest.  In 
recognition of the adverse consequences to the domestic and international 
economy, several global initiatives and measures have been out in place to curb 
money laundering and corruption among which are the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption (UNCAC), African Union Convention on Preventing and 
Combating Corruption (AUCPCC), and the Financial Action Task Force 
recommendations. 
Corruption and money laundering in sub-Saharan Africa is attributable partly 
because of weak institutions to implement legislations geared towards curbing this 
hydra-headed menace and the tendency of high-level impunity amongst the 
various arms of government regarding accountability and non-compliance with 
rules and procedures relating to procurement and expenditure controls.  The 
Chapter recognises that SSA has adequate legislations that conform to 
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international requirements and in most cases are amended to meet with current 
realities, but there are setbacks in implementation. In SSA the system relies mainly 
on a ‘strongman’ to enforce rules other than allowing the process (institutions) to 
work, ethnic and religious affiliations are the overarching factors to determine if an 
individual is deemed to be corrupt or prosecuted other than relying on prosecutorial 
evidence.   
The chapter examines Nigeria and South African legislation and underscores their 
relevance in the fight against corruption and money laundering.   It further makes 
an evaluation of their objective and substantive offences, highlights the relevant 
provisions in the constitution targeted at preventing corruption and money 
laundering, examines the nature of obligations assumed by the state parties to 
criminalise money laundering and corruption and provide an assessment of the 
extent to which domestic legislations are compatible with the international 
conventions.  Furthermore, we make an analysis of these laws vis-a-viz the 
provisions of the UNCAC and AUCPCC with particular emphasis on offences, 
mutual legal cooperation, asset recovery, problems arising from jurisdiction and 
identification of channels of laundering relating to the process of corruption and 
money laundering.  The chapter concludes with the need for adequate reforms 
aimed at improving the institutional framework, recommends a paradigm shift in 
cultural and attitudinal behaviour in respect of political appointment and mostly 
public service, and the need to reinforce legislative framework towards greater 




4.1 Anti Money Laundering/Anti-Corruption Agencies 
Article 5(3) of the African Union Convention on Preventing and Combating 
Corruption, requires states to ‘establish, maintain and strengthen independent and 
national anti-corruption authorities or agencies' for the purposes of: (i) preventing, 
detecting, punishing and eradicating corruption and related offences in the public 
and private sectors; and (ii) establishing the necessary conditions to foster 
transparency and accountability in the management of public affairs.’  Similarly, the 
UNCAC requires state parties to ‘ensure the existence of a body or bodies as 
appropriate that prevents corruption’.  Article 36 of UNCAC which deals with 
‘specialised agencies' provides that each party ‘shall ensure the existence of a 
body or bodies or persons specialised in combating corruption through law 
enforcement.’  There is no mandatory requirement for the setting up of an 
independent commission340, however, it provides the opportunity for state actors to 
either establish a stand-alone commission or vest the anti-corruption provisions 
into an existing institution(s).  While some countries have preferred to have a stand-
alone agency vested with the powers to enforce and prosecute offenders, others 
have conferred such powers to an existing institution.  Those who sought to 
establish a separate anti-corruption commission341 have based this on the Hong 
Kong Model342 owing to its ‘relative operational success, freedom from internal 
corruption and outside interference, its ability to attract widespread public support 
                                                            
340 John Hatchard, Combating Corruption. Legal Approaches to Supporting Good Governance and Integrity 
in Africa (Edward Eglar 2014) 178 
341 Such countries like Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroun, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Ethiopia, 
Gabon, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Senegal, South Africa and a host of others.  
342 Hatchard (n340) 178 
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and…...ability to work across both public and private sectors.’343  In stating the 
preference for a separate anti-corruption body, Hatchard noted the OECD's 
position that ‘developing countries often establish specialised anti-corruption 
bodies due to the high level of corruption in existing agencies.’344  The reality is that 
in most agencies of government, public sector officials are more likely to be 
opportunistic in their attitude of ‘grabbing it now before the time is no more’.  
In Nigeria, The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act 2004 established 
the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission; The Corrupt Practices and other 
Related Offences Act 2000, established the Independent Corrupt Practices and 
Other Related Offences Commission (ICPC).  Besides the EFCC and the ICPC, 
which forms the arrowhead agencies, there is the Code of Conduct 
Bureau/Tribunal for public office holders, Director of Public Prosecutor, the 
Attorney General, the Financial Intelligence Unit, Police and other law enforcement 
agencies.    
In South Africa:  the Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act No 12 of 
2004 as amended, and Financial Intelligence Centre Act No. 38 of 2001 are the 
primary piece of legislation regulating the fight against money laundering and 
corruption.  Examined also is the state capture report of the Public Protector 
2016,345 observations and remedial actions aimed at preventing corruption and 
state capture. 
                                                            
343 Rick Stapenhurst and Shahrzad Sedigh, ‘An Overview of the Costs of Corruption and Strategies to Deal 
with It’ in Stapenhurst R, Kpundeh S. J (eds.) Curbing Corruption: Toward a Model for Building National 
Integrity (The World Bank 1999) 27 
344 Hatchard (n340) 178 
345 ‘State of Capture - A Report of the Public Protector, 14 October 2016’ 




We begin with the relevant laws in Nigeria thereafter highlight the pertinent 
provisions of South Africa Legislations.  Then make a comparative analysis with 
the AUCPCC and UNCAC for any areas of a gap and possible remediation. 
 
4.1  The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 
2004 
 
Nigeria signed the United Nations convention against corruption on December 9, 
2003, and ratified it on October 24, 2004.  The ratification instrument with the 
Secretary-General of the United Nations was deposited on December 14, 2004.346  
The Constitution of Nigeria 1999, provides that ‘the state shall abolish all corrupt 
practices and abuse of power’347 this provides the basic framework for this fight 
against corruption. 
 
In response to the provisions of the AUCPCC and UNCAC, the Economic and 
Financial Crimes commissions were established and represented the ‘designated 
Financial Intelligence Unit (FIU) in Nigeria,’348 it has the responsibility of 
coordinating the various institutions349 involved in the fight against money 
laundering and enforcement of all laws dealing with economic and financial crimes 
in Nigeria.’  The EFCC is established as a law enforcement agency charged with 
                                                            
346 UNODC (Implementation Review Group), ‘Review of Implementation of the United Nations Convention 
against Corruption' (4 June 2014) UN Doc CAC/COSP/irg/2014/crp.9 Vienna, 2 
347 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. [Nigeria] Act No. 24, 5 May 1999, s 15(4) 
348 EFCC Act 2004, s 1(2)(c) 
349 Notable institutions involved in the fight against corruption in Nigeria includes the Economic and financial 
crimes commission, the code of conduct bureau, Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC), Bureau of Public Complaints, supreme audit institution, bureau of public procurement.  
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the responsibility to investigate economic and financial crimes and prosecute 
offenders.  Specifically, S.7(2) confers the responsibility on the Commission to 
enforce the provisions of the following laws: the Money Laundering Act 2004 as 
amended, the advance fee fraud and other related offences Act, 1995; the failed 
banks (recovery of debts) and financial malpractices in banks Act 1994, the banks 
and other financial institutions act 1990 as amended, Miscellaneous Offences Act 
and any other law or regulations relating to economic and financial crimes, 
including the criminal and penal code.350   
The Act defines economic and financial crimes to mean the ‘non-violent criminal 
and illicit activity committed with the objectives of earning wealth illegally either 
individually or in a group or organised manner thereby violating existing legislation 
governing the economic activities of government and its administration and 
includes any form of fraud, narcotic drug trafficking, money laundering, 
embezzlement, bribery, looting  and any form of corrupt practices, illegal arms deal, 
smuggling, human trafficking  and child labour, illegal oil bunkering  and illegal 
mining, tax evasion, foreign exchange  malpractices including counterfeiting  of 
currency, theft of intellectual property and piracy, open market abuse, dumping of 
toxic waste and prohibited goods’.351 
 
4.1.1  Functions of the Commission 
S.6 provides the functions of the commission which includes: the enforcement and 
the due administration of the provisions of the Act;352 the investigation of all financial 
                                                            
350 EFCC Act 2004, s 7(2)(a-f) 
351 S. 46 in the interpretation. 
352 EFCC Act 2004, s 6(a) 
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crimes including advance fee fraud, money laundering, counterfeiting, illegal 
charge transfers, futures market fraud, fraudulent encashment of negotiable 
instruments, computer credit card fraud, contract scam;353 the coordination and 
enforcement of all economic and financial crimes law and enforcement functions 
conferred on any other person or authority;354 the adoption of measures to identify, 
trace, freeze, confiscate or seize proceeds derived from terrorist activities, 
economic and financial crime related offences or the properties, the value of which 
corresponds to such proceeds; the adoption of measures to eradicate the 
commission of economic and financial crimes; the adoption of measures which 
include coordinated preventive and regulatory actions, introduction and 
maintenance of investigative and control techniques on the prevention of economic 
and financial related crimes; the facilitation of rapid exchange of scientific and 
technical information and the conduct of joint operations geared towards the 
eradication of economic and financial crimes; the examination and investigation of 
all reported cases of economic and financial crimes with a view to identifying 
individuals, corporate bodies or groups involved; the determination of the extent of 
financial loss and such other losses by government, private individuals or 
organisations; and collaborating with government bodies both within and outside 
Nigeria carrying on functions wholly or in part analogous with those of the 
Commission. 
 
                                                            
353 EFCC Act 2004, s 6(b) 
354 EFCC Act 2004, s 6(c) 
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4.1.2   Offences 
The following offences are provided in the Act about economic and financial 
crimes: ‘A person who, without lawful authority: 
• Engages in the acquisition, possession  or use of property knowing at the 
time of its acquisition, possession or use that such property was derived 
from an offence under this act;355 or 
• Engages in the management, organisation or financing of any offences 
under this act;356 or 
• Engages in the conversion or transfer of property knowing that such 
property is derived from any offence under this act;357 or  
• Engages in the concealment or disguise of the true nature, source, location, 
disposition, movement, rights, concerning or ownership of property knowing 
such property is derived from any offence referred under the act,358 commits 
and shall be liable on conviction to imprisonment for a term not less than 
two years and not exceeding three years.’359 
The Act also criminalises the retention of proceeds of economic and financial 
crimes. Retention of proceeds could be perpetrated through concealment, removal 
from jurisdiction, transfer to nominees, or otherwise retention of the control of the 
proceeds of a criminal conduct or an illegal act on behalf of another person knowing 
that the proceeds are as a result of criminal conduct by the principal; or knowing 
that the property in question represents another person's proceeds of a criminal 
                                                            
355 EFCC Act 2004, s 18(1)(a) 
356 EFCC Act 2004, s 18(1)(b) 
357 EFCC Act 2004, s 18(1)(C) 
358 EFCC Act 2004, s 1(1)8(d) 
359 EFCC Act 2004, s 18(2) 
152 
 
conduct, acquires or uses that property or has possession of it.  Such action is 
liable on conviction to a prison term of five years or a fine equivalent to five times 
the value of the proceeds of the property or both such imprisonment and fine.’360 
Other offences include: 
i. Giving of false information to the commission, the penalty is imprisonment 
for a term not less than two years and not exceeding three years and for a 
public officer for a term not less than three years and not exceeding five 
years.361 
ii. Any person who, without due authorisation by the commission, deals with, 
sells or otherwise disposes of any property or assets which is the subject of 
an attachment, interim order or final order commits an offence and is liable 
on conviction to imprisonment for five years without the option of fine.362 
iii. Offences relating to terrorism.  This takes a life imprisonment sentence on 
conviction and includes a person who willfully provides or collects by any 
means, either directly or indirectly, any money with the intent that the funds 
shall be used for any act of terrorism;363 any person who commits or attempts 
to commit a terrorist act, or participates in or facilitates the commission of a 
terrorist act;364 and any person who makes funds, financial assets or 
economic resources or financial or other related services for use….., in the 
commission of a terrorist act.365  
                                                            
360 EFCC Act 2004, s 17(a)(b)  
361 EFCC Act 2004, s 16(1) & (2) 
362 EFCC Act 2004, s 32(1) 
363 EFCC Act 2004, s 15(1) 
364 EFCC Act 2004, s 15(2) 
365 EFCC Act 2004, s 15(3) 
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iv. An individual who fails, neglects or refuses to make a declaration or 
furnishes any information required in the asset declaration form, for persons 
arrested for an offence under the Act, commits an offence and is liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for a term of five years.366 
v. Offences relating to financial malpractices.  Where an officer of a bank or 
financial institution or designated non-financial institution: 
a. fails or neglects to secure compliance with the provisions of the act; 
or 
b. fails or neglects to secure the authenticity of any statement submitted 
under the provisions of the Act, commits an offence and is liable on 
conviction to imprisonment for a term not exceeding five years or to 
a fine of Five Hundred thousand Naira (N500, 000) or both such 
imprisonment and fine.367 
 
4.1.3   Seizure and forfeiture of assets 
The Act makes some extensive provisions relating to forfeiture of assets.  Upon 
arrest, it requires full disclosure of assets and property from the individual by filling 
out the appropriate declaration of assets form.  As indicated earlier, it is an offence 
to give false information in the asset declaration form and on the basis of the form, 
the EFCC is required to trace and attach all the assets and properties of the person 
which he acquired as a result of such economic and financial crime to obtain an 
interim attachment order from the court.  The act authorises the EFCC to: 
                                                            
366 EFCC Act 2004, s 27(3) 
367 EFCC Act 2004, s 14(1)(a)&(b) 
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• Freeze the bank account(s)368 of the individual, seize the asset,369 place it 
under seal370 or remove the property to a place designated by the 
commission.371 Where the individual is convicted, confiscate the asset or 
property and forfeit to the government. 
Assets or property to be forfeited will include:  
• assets and properties which are the subject of an interim order granted by 
the court as contained in the asset declaration form;372  
• any asset or property confiscated, or derived from the proceeds of an 
offence not disclosed in the asset declaration form;373  
• any of the person’s property or instrumentalities used in a manner to commit 
or facilitate the commission of such offence;374  
• assets or properties in a foreign country acquired as a result of the criminal 
activity, such assets subject to any treaty or arrangement shall be forfeited;  
• the passport of any convicted person of an offence under the act.   
• any property, whether real or personal, which represents the gross receipts 
a person obtains directly as a result of the violation of the Act or which is 
traceable to such gross receipts375; and within Nigeria which represents the 
proceeds of an offence under the laws of a foreign country within whose 
jurisdiction such offence …would be punishable by imprisonment for a term 
                                                            
368 EFCC Act 2004, s 34 
369 EFCC Act 2004, s 26 
370 EFCC Act 2004, s 26(2)(a) 
371 EFCC Act 2004, s 26(2)(b) 
372 EFCC Act 2004, s 20(1)(a) 
373 EFCC Act 2004, s 20(1)(b) 
374 EFCC Act 2004, s 20(1)(c) 
375 EFCC Act 2004, s 24(a)  
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exceeding one year and which would be punishable under this act, is 
subject to forfeiture.376 
The Economic and Financial Crimes Commission has achieved great strides in its 
determined fight against corruption and money laundering.  One way it has 
achieved this is by creating formal relationships with other agencies such as the 
police and the office of the Attorney General of the Federation.  Specifically, under 
Section 8(3), the act requires the  ‘commission ….to appoint such other staff or 
second officers from government security or law enforcement agencies or such 
other private or public services as it may deem fit’ for the purpose of performing 
the functions of the Act.  A staff of the commission for the purpose of enforcing or 
carrying out the provisions of the act are given ‘same powers, authorities, privileges 
(including the power to bear arms) as are given to members of the Nigerian 
Police’.377   
Secondly, in assessing the success of the proceedings of the Alamieyeseigha 
case, the following factors were evident about the EFCC, namely: thorough 
investigation work performed by the team, efficient and quick execution of requests 
for mutual legal assistance including the use of a criminal restraint order to secure 
assets, close cooperation between countries and civil lawyers, and sheer 
professionalism.378  However, one major problem affecting its effectiveness is the 
domination of the executive arm of government in its operations.  It has been 
argued that due to its nature of activities, the anti-corruption agency ‘may well come 
into conflict with powerful political and economic interest which make it particularly 
                                                            
376 EFCC Act 2004, s 24(b) 
377 EFCC Act 2004, s 8(5) 
378 Nicholls (n111) 6 
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vulnerable to external pressure and control.’  The research has come to this view 
because the EFCC by its operations has not been seen to be independent but has 
been used by the government in power to witch-hunt those in opposition, perceived 
enemies of the president and those no longer in the good books of the existing 
administration.    For the commission to be effective, it must be independent and 
be seen to be so.  The provision of the EFCC in respect of the appointment of the 
Chairman of the commission has some loopholes since it allows some executive 
interference.  Section 2(3) states that the chairman and members of the 
commission shall ‘be appointed by the President…subject to the confirmation of 
the Senate’379  In comparison with other jurisdictions in SSA the appointment 
process is somewhat inadequate because the choice of the chairman is very much 
at the discretion of the President and where the legislature is a rubber stamp as is 
most probably is in Nigeria, then the chairman would be one who would only act 
on the prodding of the President otherwise serious conflict will ensue between both 
parties.  Similarly, the Agency is expected to investigate corrupt government 
officials including those in the legislative arm of government.  In Nigeria where 
corruption sweeps across all arms of government, the candidate to be ratified by 
the legislature must undoubtedly be seen to be loyal otherwise his appointment 
would be jeopardised.  The case of executive interference stalling the 
independence of the EFCC is well illustrated in the case of Nuru Ribadu, a one-
time chairman of the EFCC.  According to Stuart S. Yeh (2013), Nuru Ribadu the 
then Chairman of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission ‘had done 
everything to institutionalise the EFCC.  He obtained a $5 million grant from the 
World Bank, permitting the EFCC to target political corruption at the highest level 
                                                            
379 EFCC Act 2004, s 2(3) 
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without fear of financial consequences to his agency’, but when the fight against 
corruption affected some of the supporters of the then existing president, President 
Yar' Adua, the government announced that ‘the independent prosecutorial powers 
granted to the EFCC were unconstitutional’ and all future prosecutions would be 
vetted by the office of the Attorney General of the Federation.  In addition to 
removing or subjecting the prosecutorial powers to the office of the Attorney 
General of the Federation, relying on Section 3(3), which provides that ‘a member 
of the commission may at any time be removed by the President for inability to 
discharge the functions of his office…..or if the president is satisfied that it is not in 
the interest of the commission or the interest of the public that the member should 
continue in office’ the government removed the chairman and sent him for training 
in an institute.  In so doing, the government blocked the EFCC's prosecution of 
some notable governors such as Joshua Dariye, Orji Uzor Kalu and James Ibori, 
the latter being tried in a London court for money laundering charges and 
sentenced to imprisonment.  This also suggests that while the tenure of the anti-
graft agency's Chairman is specified in the act for five years and renewal for yet 
another term, it is not guaranteed since at the discretion of the president he could 
be removed for one flimsy excuse or the other or as the president deems fit.  A 
more recent example of perceived interference of the executive in the affairs of the 
anti-corruption agency is the Dasuki scandal, in which the anti-corruption body has 
been accused of being biased and one-sided in prosecuting perceived looters of 
the nation's treasury.  Granted, a case of corruption could be established against 
the former National Security Adviser to President Goodluck Jonathan, 
nevertheless, the mode of operation suggests that the body language of the 
incumbent president dictates the manner of activities of the EFCC.  This leaves the 
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Commission with reports of violation of court procedures and infringement of the 
rights of the accused, all to serve the expectations of the executive.  
 Another notable setback of the commission is the lack of operational 
independence regarding funding of the anti-corruption agencies.  As Hatchard 
noted, ‘adequate funding is a prerequisite for an ACB. It must enjoy financial 
autonomy and access to adequate and secure funding to develop and retain 
appropriate staffing levels, resources and the like.’380 The commission does not 
have an independent funding arrangement but relies on ‘such monies as may be 
approved by the federal government for the commission.’381  To gain financial 
autonomy in the Nigerian context the anti-graft agency ought to have a first line 
charge on the consolidated revenue fund, and also with the capacity to source its 
fund for proper administration of its affairs without much recourse to the president.  
In the case of the EFCC, this is completely lacking.  Since it cannot present its 
budget and approval from the national assembly, there is a very high over-
dependence on the executive arm thereby making it susceptible to the wishes and 
directions of the president.  
In a similar context, a change in the political disposition or will of the president may 
alter the smooth functioning of the anti-corruption body.  For example, the EFCC 
was set up by President Olusegun Obasanjo and given all the executive support 
to fight money laundering and corruption in the country.  Within the eight-year 
tenure of the president, the anti-graft agency was able to arrest and prosecute high 
ranking government officials who illicitly enriched themselves such as the then 
Inspector General of the Nigerian Police Force, Tarfa Balogun who was imprisoned 
                                                            
380 Hatchard (n111) 197 
381 EFCC Act 2004, s 35(2),  
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for embezzlement and corruption.  Also, some notable fraudsters engaged in 
advanced fee fraud and cyber-crimes were arrested, prosecuted and jailed and 
assets seized and returned to their victims. 
Independence can be achieved if the creation of the anti-corruption agency is 
enshrined in the constitution of the respective countries to build confidence among 
the citizenry otherwise it would be subjected to the wimps and caprices of the 
powerful few in society.  Furthermore, the constitutional amendment procedures 
are far more cumbersome than the ordinary acts of parliament so that efforts to 
weaken the effectiveness of the agency could be put into check.  In the same vein, 
as Hatchard suggest, the security of tenure of the office holder (in this case the 
chairman of the commission and crucial other office holders) should be guaranteed 
by the constitution and not subjected to the preference of the president.  It is 
suggested that the same constitutional provision for the removal of judges be 
adopted for crucial office holders of the anti-graft agency because leaving it in the 
hands of the president or the legislature could undermine public confidence and 
trust. 
 
Another critical factor militating against the operations of the EFCC is the 
dependency on cash related transaction in the economy and the failure of the 
government to enforce the applicable laws since it is the primary defaulter of the 
law.  The prescribed limit for cash handling is five and ten million naira for 
individuals and corporate organisations respectively.  Ridiculously, government 
agencies and departments withdraw from the Central Bank of Nigeria (CBN) 
amounts more than the stipulated amounts in the cover of the night and under full 
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security protection to carry out their activities.  Many of these withdrawals were 
authorisations for national security matters for which the national security adviser 
or an individual authorised by him are meant to withdraw the cash from the CBN in 
whichever currency (local or foreign).  Both the executive and legislative arm of the 
Nigerian government have been found in the passion for cash withdrawal.  For 
instance, it has been alleged that at several occasions, both houses of the national 
assembly made cash withdrawals of more than Two hundred and Fifty Million Naira 
($1.25Million) in a single day through a commercial bank in clear violation of the 
act.382    The question therefore is, how does CBN allow and facilitate the withdrawal 
of these large cash transactions?  After the withdrawals are made and for whatever 
‘security’ reasons they allude, it is not accounted.  Are such huge withdrawals 
reported to the financial intelligence unit? Why does the EFCC not initiate the 
action until perhaps a friendly president comes into power with a hunch for anti-
corruption?  Why is the compliance unit of the central bank (if any) unable to 
enforce standards relating to cash withdrawals, or rather, why are government 
departments excluded from the operation of the money laundering act which 
stipulates prescribed limits? Similar questions can be posed to the commercial 
banks as well as some of the substantial chunk of cash are also dispensed through 
it.  Surprisingly as it would be, in the case of the commercial banks, the senior 
executives are complicit to the crime since they have failed to enforce rules 
applicable to all merely to curry favour from legislators or to solicit deposits. 
                                                            
382 Festus Owete, Richard Akinwumi and Joshua Olufemi, ‘Fresh Facts Expose How Ekweremandu, 
Others Withdrew N8billion, Laundered Funds in Failed Constitutional Amendment’ Premium 
Times (Lagos, 17 December 2015) <http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/headlines/195297-
fresh-facts-expose-how-ekweremadu-others-withdrew-n8-billion-laundered-funds-in-failed-
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4.2 The Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences 
Commission (ICPC) 
The Commission came into existence through the Corrupt Practices and Other 
Related Offences Act of 2000 with the sole aim to ‘prohibit and prescribe 
punishment for corrupt practices and other related offences.’383  The act seeks to 
establish the agency necessary for the prosecution of corruption-related offences 
and to protect whistle-blowers who give valuable information to the commission to 
stem the tide of corruption. 
 
4.2.1   Membership of the Commission 
The ICPC Act establishes the office of the Chairman and twelve (12) other 
members who shall be of proven integrity and shall be appointed by the President, 
upon confirmation by the Senate.  The tenure of office of the chairman is five years 
and may be reappointed for another five years but will not be eligible for 
reappointed after that.  Other members of the commission will have a four (4) years 
tenure and could be reappointed for another four years.  While the act provides for 
the qualification of the members of the commission, it is silent about the selection 
process, which in the research opinion could be subject to manipulation, and 
influence by the executive arm since the president is primarily responsible for their 
appointment.  However, to cater for the diverse nature of the country, the act 
requires that the twelve members so appointed to the commission two shall come 
                                                            
383 Explanatory memorandum to the corrupt practices and other related offences act 2000. Italics added. 
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from each geopolitical zone of the country,384 but the unanswered question 
remains: who recommends these two representatives of the geopolitical zones for 
the appointment?  No doubt because of the nature and purpose of the Commission 
a rigorous internal methodology should be used in the selection but this is shrouded 
in secrecy and devoid of any sense of transparency.  This legislation is weak as it 
essentially allows the President to pick a candidate of his choice subject to 
confirmation by the Senate.  In contrast, Kenya has a different and more 
transparent selection process. The selection panel, though appointed by the 
president385 would comprise of a person from the office of the president,386 the office 
of the prime minister,387 the ministry responsible for ethics and integrity,388 the 
judicial service commission,389 the commission responsible for matters relating to 
human rights,390 the commission responsible for matters relating to gender,391 the 
media council of Kenya,392 the joint forum of religious organisations,393 and the 
association of professional societies of East Africa.394   The selection panel, when 
constituted, is required to place advertisement395 in at least two daily newspapers 
of national circulation inviting applications from persons who possess the requisite 
qualification396 as defined by the Act for the position of chairperson and members 
of the commission. Among other provisions to ensure transparency are the 
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385 Kenyan Ethics and Anti-Corruption Commission Act, No 22 of 2011, revised s 6(1) 
386 EACC Act 2011, s 6(1)(a)  
387 EACC Act  2011, s 6(1)(b)  
388 EACC Act 2011, s 6(1)(c) 
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390 EACC Act 2011, s 6(1)(e) 
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394 EACC Act 2011, s 6(1)(i) 
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publishing of the names of shortlisted candidates in at least two national dailies 
with national circulation,397 conducting the interview in the open398 and the 
dissolution of the panel upon the appointment of the chairperson and members of 
the commission.399  Selected candidates are forwarded to the President who then 
picks the chairperson and members and forwards such names to the National 
Assembly for approval.  While the selection process in this instance seems more 
transparent than the Nigerian scenario, a major setback has been the involvement 
of the legislature and executive members who in most cases are the one to be 
investigated for corruption-related offences.  As Hatchard noted which agrees with 
the research opinion, ‘by involving ministers and other parliamentarians in the 
process, those who may well be subject to investigation are responsible for vetting 
the proposed appointees’ poses the challenge of compromised judgement as the 
tendency may exist for the ‘vetters’ to harbour bias in the final choice of the 
candidate to be selected given their pedigree and track record in the denouncing 
corruption. 
 
4.2.2   The range of offences 
The ICPC Act defines corruption to include bribery, fraud and other related 
offences which notably agrees with the anti-corruption convention of the African 
Union and well as the United Nations Convention on Corruption, both require all 
states to adopt a wide range of offences by legislative and other measures. 
 
                                                            
397 EACC Act 2011, s 5(c) 
398 EACC Act 2011, s 5(d) 
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Offences related to Gratification 
Gratification, as defined by the Act, means a) money, donation, gift, loan , fee, 
reward, valuable security, property of any description whether movable or 
immovable, or any other similar advantage, given or promised to any person with 
the intent to influence such person in the performance or non-performance of his 
duties; b) any office, dignity, employment, contract empowerment or service and 
any agreement to give employment or render services in any capacity; c) any 
payment, release, discharge or liquidation of any loan, obligation or other liability, 
whether in whole or in part; d) any valuable consideration of any kind, any discount, 
commission, rebate, bonus deduction or percentage; e) any forbearance to 
demand any money or money's worth or valuable thing; f) any other service or 
favour of any description, such as protection from penalty or disability incurred or 
apprehended or from any action or proceedings of a disciplinary, civil of criminal 
nature, whether or not already instituted, and including the exercise or forbearance 
from the exercise of any rights or any official power or duty; and g) any offer, 
undertaking or promises, whether conditional or unconditional, of any gratification 
within the meaning of any of the preceding paragraphs (a) to (f).400   
Under section 8, it is an offence for an official to corruptly ask, receive, obtain, 
property or cash for himself or for any other person;401 agrees or attempts to receive 
or obtain any property or benefit of any kind for himself or any other person,402 on 
account of anything already done or omitted to be done of favour or disfavour 
shown by himself in the discharge of his official function is punishable at conviction 
to a prison term of 7 years.  In the same vein where a person corruptly gives, 
                                                            
400 ICPC Act 2000, S. 2 
401 ICPC Act 2000, s 8(1)(a) 
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confers or procures any benefit of any kind to, on or for a public officer or promises 
or offer to give or attempts to procure any property or benefit of any kind shall on 
conviction be liable to imprisonment for seven (7) years.  Notwithstanding sections 
8 and 9 mentioned above which debars officials from requesting for or obtaining 
gratification of any form either in cash or property of any kind, the act also prohibits 
corrupt demands by persons for anything already done or omitted to be done or 
any favour or disfavour shown to any person; or anything to be afterwards done or 
omitted or any favour or disfavour to be afterwards shown to any person by a public 
officer in the discharge of his duties is also guilty of an offence punishable on 
conviction to a prison term of seven years.403   The Act also prohibits the asking, 
obtaining and receiving gratifications through an agent.404  Furthermore, 
gratification offered to or solicited by a public officer in respect of voting or 
abstaining from voting at a general meeting to showing favour or disfavour against 
any measure, resolution or question submitted to the public body is outlawed and 
constitutes an offence.  Similarly, gratification as an inducement or reward for 
aiding in procuring or preventing the passing of any vote or the granting of any 
contract, award, recognition or advantage in favour of any person; performing or 
abstaining from performing or preventing the performance of any official act; or 
showing or forbearing to show any favour or disfavour is deemed unlawful and 
punishable upon conviction to a prison term of five (5) years.405  
It is worth noting that  AUCPCC and UNCAC highlighted in chapter three required 
state parties to adopt a wide range of offences by legislative and other measures 
which include offences relating to bribery, abuse of office, trading in influence, 
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diversion of public funds, extortion, illicit enrichment, laundering of the proceeds of 
corruption and other related offences.  To a considerable extent, the ICPC Act have 
met these expectations of the conventions. However, a significant setback for the 
agency as widely publicised is its inability to operate independently without direct 
influence from the executive.  Besides, high profile cases, which involve top 
government officials and legislators, are handled with kid gloves, therefore, lacking 
the transparency and effectiveness that is expected of such agency. 
 
Offences related to Bribery 
UNCAC request all states to address the criminalization of bribery of officials of 
public international organisations406 and as well adopt ‘such legislative and other 
measures to establish as criminal offence when committed intentionally: a) the 
promise, offering, or giving, to a public official, directly or indirectly, of an undue 
advantage, for himself  or herself or another person or entity, in order that the 
official act or refrain from acting in the exercise of his or her duties; b) the 
solicitation or acceptance by a public official….in order that the official act or refrain 
from acting in the exercise of his or her official duties.407  In a similar fashion the 
AUCPCC although not expressly mentions bribery but in its scope of application 
defines acts of corruption to ‘include the solicitation or acceptance directly or 
indirectly by a public official  or any other person, of any goods of monetary value 
or other benefit, such as gift, favour, promise or advantage for himself ….in 
exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or her public functions; 
                                                            
406 No. 6 requests the Conference of the State Parties to address the criminalization of bribery of officials 
of public international organizations, including the United Nations Convention Against Corruption 
407 UNCAC 2004, art 15(a)(b)  
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the offering or granting … to a public official or any other person, of any goods of 
monetary value….in exchange for any act or omission in the performance of his or 
her public functions.’408  These conventions underscore the importance of state 
governments having legislations to curb the problems associated with bribery and 
corruption.   
Under sections 19, 21, 22, 23 and 24 of the ICPC Act 2004, it provides offences 
about bribery of public officials, in auctions, in assisting primarily in the 
contract/procurement process and contains a clear directive on reporting 
occasions of bribery to the appropriate authority.  Bribery is classified as a corrupt 
practice and involves using one's office or position to gratify or confer any corrupt 
or unfair advantage to oneself or associate.409   Corruption and collusion are 
strategic complements as they generate more illegal rents.  We have noted 
separately in previous chapters that both private sector and public sector players 
are involved in one form of bribery or the other.  For example, reports from Stolen 
Asset Recovery noted that from late 2003 through March 2005, Willbros made 
corrupt payments totalling more than $6.3 million to Nigerian government officials 
to assist in obtaining and retaining a $387 million contract for work on a major 
engineering, procurement and construction of gas pipeline project. In exchange for 
the EGGS project, the conspirators corruptly paid officials of the Nigerian National 
Petroleum Corporation (NNPC), NNPC’s subsidiary, the National Petroleum 
Investment Management Services (NAPIMS); a senior official in the executive 
branch of the Nigerian federal government; officials of a multinational oil company 
serving as the operator of the EGGS joint venture; and a political party.’410  
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410 <http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/node/18634>  assessed 1 September 2015 
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Paradoxically no notable case of bribery has been successfully prosecuted in 
Nigeria, many of such cases have been muddled up in one form of judicial rascality 
or the other, of which injunctions and permanent injunctions have become the order 
of the day.  However, many of the bribery cases have gained success outside the 
shores of the country, perhaps due to stringent international measures adopted by 
such nations compared with the pervasive internal political influence and corruption 
that have permeated the Nigerian judiciary thereby obstructing the course of 
justice.  In the filing by the Noble Corporation with the US Securities and Exchange 
Commission, Noble-Swiss reached a settlement with the U.S. Department of 
Justice and the Securities and Exchange Commission in connection with their 
investigation under the United States Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of certain 
reimbursement payments made by its Nigerian affiliate to customs agents in 
Nigeria. In January 2011, the Nigerian Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission and the Nigerian Attorney General Office initiated an investigation into 
these same activities. Through the execution of a non-prosecution agreement 
dated January 28, 2011, it was resolved that Noble subsidiary will pay $2.5 million 
to settle all charges and claims of the Nigerian government.411 
 
4.3 Anti-corruption agencies in South Africa 
Unlike Nigeria where two independent anti-graft agencies are created by law to 
tackle corruption and money laundering, namely: the EFCC and ICPC, it is not the 
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sa1me with South Africa as the country given its complex political economy does 
not resort to the creation of distinct agencies but have vested such powers within 
existing government agencies and bodies.  Some of these institutions are the 
creation of the Constitution, such as the office of the Auditor-General, Office of the 
Public Prosecutor, the Public Service Commission and The Independent 
Complaints Directorate (ICD).  Others are agencies associated with the criminal 
justice system: the South African Police Services Anti-corruption Unit (SAPS ACU), 
the South African Police Services Commercial Crime Unit (SAPS CCU), National 
Prosecuting Authority, Directorate of Serious Operations, Asset Forfeiture Unit and 
Special Investigating Unit.  The other key players include the Department of Public 
Service and Administration, National Intelligence Agency, South African Revenue 
Services and National Anticorruption Forum.  The primary law enforcement body 
in South Africa is the South African Police Services (SAPS), which is the first port 
of call for any person wanting to report a suspected act of corruption and open a 
criminal case. Within the SAPS is the Directorate for Priority Crime Investigations 
(colloquially known as the Hawks).  While the SAPs has carried out investigations 
leading to the prosecution of some notable political figures in South Africa, report 
indicates that there is widespread corruption particularly in the police and 
Department of Home Affairs with shallow public perception.  Significantly corrupt 
behaviour has been uncovered at the highest levels of the SAPS.412  For instance, 
it was reported that a former National Commissioner Jackie Selebi, under whose 
direction the Anti-Corruption Unit (ACU) operated before it was shut down in 2006 
was accused of involvement in criminal affairs, this matter was investigated by the 
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National Prosecuting Authority (‘the Scorpions'), charged with corruption, defeating 
the ends of justice in 2008 but convicted in 2010.413  Whereas a single agency 
vested with the fight against corruption and money laundering would have 
specialised training as well as enjoy some degree political independence, the 
SAPS has been found to compromise independence, especially in some high 
profile political cases.   It has been argued that ‘the provisions of the South African 
Police Service Act which creates the Hawks is inconsistent with the constitution 
and invalid to the extent that it fails to secure an adequate degree of independence 
for the Hawks.’414 There have also been allegations of the SAPS senior 
management irregularly interfering with the tender process for political reasons.415 
Research indicates that the country has the necessary legislative tools to fight 
corruption and money laundering but requires renewed and sustained enforcement 
and broader engagement by government, business and the private sector.  There 
are, however, issues regarding the overlapping of functions associated with the 
agencies, budgetary constraint on the part of the public protector's mandate to 
investigate, make adequate recommendations to the state and create confidence 
in the citizenry by being accessible to all. 
 
4.4 Laws on Money Laundering 
The principal laws on combating of money laundering and corruption in Nigeria are 
the Money Laundering Act of 2011 as amended in 2012, Miscellaneous Offences 
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414 Bowman Gilfillan, ‘Legal Review: Anti-Corruption Tools in South Africa’ 
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415 Newham (n412) 23  
171 
 
Act, the Cybercrime Act 2015.  In addition to the constitution, other relevant public 
service Acts and regulations such as the Public Procurement Bureau Act, Code of 
Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act and the Financial Regulation are viable legal 
tools.   In South Africa, the Prevention of Organised Crime Act, the Financial 
Intelligence Centre Act and the Protection of Constitutional Democracy against 
Terrorism and Related Activities Act are the primary anti-money laundering 
statutes. Others include the Bank Act No. 94 of 1990 and Public Finance and 
Management Act of 1999.   
Below we examine the relevant provisions as they affect the fight against money 
laundering and corruption.  We first consider statutes applicable to Nigeria, and 
after that, we look at South African legislation.  
 
4.4.1 The Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2012 as Amended - Nigeria 
There are mandatory provisions obliging state parties to adopt legislative measures 
to criminalise laundering of the proceeds of corruption and other crimes in both the 
AUCC and UNCAC.  The UNCAC seeks to prohibit the laundering of the proceeds 
of crime, while the AUCC's focus is the laundering of the proceeds of corruption or 
related offences perhaps in the realisation that the principal proceeds of crime that 
are being laundered in Africa is that of corruption. 
The act makes general provisions to prohibit the financing of terrorism, the 
laundering of the proceeds of a crime or an illegal act, provides appropriate 
penalties and expands the scope of supervisory and regulatory authorities to 
address the challenges faced in the anti-money laundering regime in Nigeria. This 
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work stems from the need to respond to international initiatives on the measure to 
curb money laundering and terrorist financing and perhaps the realisation of the 
negative consequences of money laundering to the national economy. 
 
There is an outright prohibition of money laundering in Nigeria.416  The MLA 
provides that where ‘any person or body corporate, in or outside Nigeria, who 
directly or indirectly: conceals or disguise the origin of; converts or transfers; 
removes from the jurisdiction; or acquires, uses, retains or takes possession or 
control of; any fund or property, knowingly or reasonably ought to have known that 
such fund or property is, or forms part of the proceeds of an unlawful act, commits 
a money laundering offence.’417  S.15(6) defines unlawful acts to include 
‘participation in organised criminal group, racketeering, terrorism, terrorist 
financing, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants, sexual exploitation, sexual 
exploitation of children, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs and psychotropic 
substances, illicit arms trafficking, illicit trafficking in stolen goods, corruption, 
bribery, fraud, currency counterfeiting, counterfeiting and piracy of 
products…….tax crimes, insider trading and market manipulation or any other 
criminal act specified in this act or any other law in Nigeria.’418 To deter money 
laundering in the country stiffer penalties have been introduced in the Act ranging 
from prison terms of between seven (7) and fourteen (14) years for individuals419 
and fine on conviction in the case of a body corporate420 of not less than one 
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hundred percent of the funds and properties acquired as a result of the offence 
committed,421 withdrawal of licence and or withdrawal422 or revocation of the 
certificate or licence of the body corporate.423    In the sections to follow, an attempt 
will be made to highlight the specific provision of the act about crimes related to 
the opening of bank accounts and customer identity, limits on volumes of 
payments, reporting on suspicious transactions, the scope of persons and 
institutions covered and other checks and offences. 
 
4.4.1.1 Account Opening and Specific Prohibitions 
 
Depending on the scale of financial inclusion, transactions performed world over 
require some level of intermediation by a bank or other financial intermediary 
requiring their customers to open an account to facilitate the operations.  It is 
therefore imperative that the institutions obtain the minimum information necessary 
from their clients to promote the account opening and this can also help to reduce 
the risk of the intermediary becoming a vehicle for or a victim of financial crime and 
suffer reputational damage.  In the same vein, the customer due diligence 
requirement has become the standard best practice measure recommended by the 
Basel Committee as well as the Financial Action Taskforce.   In particular, banks 
and other financial institutions are required to ensure that they ‘have adequate 
policies and practices and procedures that promote high ethical and professional 
standards and prevent the bank from being used, intentionally or unintentionally by 
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criminal elements.’424  Also, they must ensure that critical elements such as 
customer acceptance policy, customer identification, ongoing monitoring of high-
risk account and risk management are included in the design of the know-your-
customer programmes.  One cannot overemphasise the need for this requirement 
because those with criminal tendency to launder the proceeds of crime will try to 
obscure their identity perhaps through sometimes legal channels.  Admittedly, 
there are situations where the bank is challenged by its operating environment to 
provide sufficient information about the customer's identity,425 in such a case, the 
bank if it has reasonable grounds to conclude that the individual is not able to 
produce a detailed evidence and cannot be reasonably expected to do, may accept 
instead a statement from a person in position of responsibility as to the new 
customer’s identity.426  Still, there are other instances where the bank may be 
unsure as to who precisely is the customer,427 an example is where a bank is 
dealing with a fund manager, corporate vehicle, nominee and fiduciary accounts.  
Though there are money-laundering controls applicable to such entities, the bank 
would carry out reasonable care appropriate to high-risk investors to prevent the 
risk of money laundering or using the bank to launder proceeds of criminal acts. 
In keeping with the need to ensure that adequate preventive measures are in place, 
the MLA requires all financial and designated financial institution to identify a 
customer, whether permanent or occasional, natural or legal person, or any form 
                                                            
424 Bank for International Settlement, ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Core Principles for 
Effective Bank Supervision’ <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs230.pdf> accessed 14 July 2016 
425 In some parts of Northern Nigeria where streets are not numbered, either landmarks (notable mosque, 
wards, church or government institution) are the basis for account opening.  Other complexities abound 
such as individuals in the same locality answering same names, except for biometric information, now 
widely used, only passport photos help to differentiate such individuals.   
426 Ross Cranston, Principles of Banking Law (2nd Edition, Oxford University Press 2008) 134 
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of legal arrangement, using identification documents as may be prescribed in any 
relevant regulation.428  It further requires the institution responsible for using 
reliable, independent source document and information to verify the identity of the 
customer429.  This is very important because the customer due diligence 
requirement also mandated by the Financial Action Taskforce is the minimum best 
standard for the combating of money laundering activities.  More recently in 
Nigeria, The Bank Verification Number (BVN) has been introduced in the country 
as a means of bringing together the multiplicity of accounts maintained by 
individuals and corporate organisation to map customer identities and their related 
transactions.  The MLA has also taken reasonable measure to ensure that 
beneficial owners are identified by compelling institutions to ‘take reasonable 
measures to identify the beneficial owner using relevant information or data 
obtained from a reliable source such that the financial institution or designated 
financial institution is satisfied that it knows who the beneficial owner is.’430  A 
beneficial owner as defined by S. 25 is ‘a natural person who ultimately owns or 
controls a customer; or the natural person on whose behalf a transaction is 
conducted; and a person who exercises ultimate control over a legal person or 
arrangement.’431  Also, the MLA has broadened the definition of a financial and 
designated non-financial institution to cover the full ambit of money laundering 
activities.  A financial institution means, ‘banks, body association or group of 
persons, whether corporate or incorporate, which carries on business of 
investment and securities, a discount house, insurance institution, debt 
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factorisation and conversion firms, bureau de change, finance company, money 
brokerage firm whose principal business includes factoring, project financing, 
equipment leasing, debt administration, fund management, local purchase order, 
financing export finance, project consultancy, financial consultancy, pensions 
funds management and such other business as the Central Bank or other 
appropriate authorities may from time to time designate,’432 while a Designated 
Non-Financial Institution means ‘dealers in Jewellery, cars and luxury goods, 
chartered accountants, audit firms, tax consultants, clearing and settlement 
companies, legal practitioners, hotels, casinos, supermarkets or such other 
businesses as the Federal Ministry of Commerce or appropriate regulatory 
authorities may from time to time designate.’433 
Under section 3 (2) institutions are also required to perform adequate due diligence 
measures434 when: establishing business relationships;435 carrying out occasional 
transactions above the applicable designated threshold prescribed by the relevant 
regulation.436  Notably, Section 10 provides that lodgements exceeding 
N5,000,000.00 and N10,000,000.00 for individuals and corporate organisations 
respectively are to be reported to the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission/the Nigerian Financial Intelligence Unit;437 carrying out occasional 
transaction that is wire transfers;438 there is a suspicion of money laundering or 
terrorist financing, regardless of the threshold;439 or the financial or designated non-
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financial institution has doubts about the veracity or adequacy of previously 
obtained customer identification data.440  
As earlier cited, there are some practical difficulties in performing customer due 
diligence or obtaining information about the identity of a potential customer in some 
areas in Nigeria.  For instance, in the northern part of the country where there are 
no street numbers other than wards or notable locations like schools and wards, 
verification of client’s address will substantially be linked to those wards and 
prominent locations.   
 
4.4.1.2 The Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act No 12 
of 2004 – South Africa 
 
The legal framework for bribery of public officials in South Africa is provided by the 
Prevention and Combating of Corrupt Activities Act, 2004 (PCCAA).  The law 
criminalises corruption and bribery.  In the preamble to the act, it is recognised that 
corruption and related corrupt activities undermines the rights of all people, 
endangers the stability and security of society, undermines the institutions and 
values of democracy and ethical values and morality, jeopardise sustainable 
development, the rule of law and the credibility of governments and provides the 
breeding ground for organised crime.441   Furthermore, the following stark realities 
of corruption were acknowledged, namely: 
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• that illicit acquisition of personal wealth can be particularly damaging to 
democratic institutions, national economies, ethical values and the rule of 
law; 
• that there are linkages between corruption and other forms of organised 
crime and economic crime, including money laundering; 
• that corruption is a transnational phenomenon, is cross-border in nature and 
affects all societies and economies which is equally destructive and 
reprehensible in both the private and public spheres of life.  
Given the adverse effect of corruption and its attendant problems, the act seeks to 
strengthen measures to prevent and combat corruption and related corrupt 
activities, provide necessary offences of corruption and related corrupt activities.  
Also, the Act provides investigative measures, establishes a register of offenders 
with specific restrictions on persons and enterprises convicted of corruption and 
associated activities and places a duty of care on persons holding a position of 
authority to report corrupt transactions.442 The scope also includes the provision of 
extra-territorial jurisdiction in respect of the offence of corruption and offences 
relating to corrupt activities and to provide for matters connected therewith.443 
Section 3 of the Act defined the general offence of corruption.  Any person who 
accepts or agrees to take any gratification from any other person, whether for the 
benefit of himself or for the benefit of another person; or gives or agrees or offers 
to provide to any other person any gratification, whether for the benefit of that other 
                                                            




person or for the benefit of another person in order to act, personally or by 
influencing another person so as to act in a manner: 
i. that amounts to the: 
• illegal, dishonest, unauthorised, incomplete, or biased; or 
• misuse or selling of information or material acquired in the course of 
the exercise, carrying out or performance of any powers, duties or 
functions arising out of a constitutional, statutory, contractual or other 
legal obligation; 
ii. that amounts to: 
• the abuse of a position of authority; 
• a breach of trust; or  
• the violation of a legal duty  or a set of rules; 
iii. designed to achieve an unjustified result; or 
iv. Amounts to any other unauthorised or improper inducement to do or not to 
do anything, is guilty of an offence of corrupt activities relating to a public 
officer.444 
Gratification is also extremely broadly defined and includes, but is not limited to, 
money, donations and gifts, employment, avoidance of loss or liability and any 
other valuable consideration, or benefit of any kind. 
Chapter two of the Act defines in a robust sense what constitutes corrupt activities 
and covers corruption-related activities in virtually all sectors of public life445 and 
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includes: foreign public official,446 activities related to agents,447 the legislature,448 
judicial officials,449 prosecuting authority.450  Other specific matters covered in the 
act classified as offences include: corrupt activities relating to witnesses and 
evidential material during certain proceedings;451 offences relating to corrupt 
activities relating to contracts,452 procuring and withdrawal of tenders,453 corrupt 
activities relating to auctions,454 corrupt activities relating to sporting events,455 
gambling games and games of chance.456  In the same vein, miscellaneous 
offences relating to possible conflict of interest and other unacceptable behavioural 
conduct such as the acquisition of private interest in contract, agreement or 
investment of public body;457 unacceptable behaviour relating to witnesses which 
among others include intimidation, coercion, use of outright force or improper 
persuasion with the intent to prevent, influence or delay the testimony of a witness 
in a trial or cause or induce the individual to testify in a way or fashion in an 
untruthful manner in a trial, withhold evidence or record, alter, destroy or mutilate, 
or conceal a record with the intent to impair the availability of such record;458 and 
intentional interference with, hindering  or obstruction of investigation of offence.459  
Additionally, other offences relating to corrupt activities defined in the act include: 
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accessory to or after offence;460 and attempt or conspiracy and inducing another 
person to commit offence.461 
It is interesting to observe that the Act specifies stiff penalties for corruption 
offenders prescribing sentences up to a maximum of three, five, eighteen and life 
imprisonment depending on the court of competent jurisdiction handling the 
matter.462   Specifically, cases involving general corruption, corrupt activities 
relating to specific persons, the offering and giving of unauthorised gratification and 
corruption activities relating to particular matters identified above, incur a prison 
sentence of up to life imprisonment.463  For the individuals involved, the penalty 
provisions in the Act differentiate between certain categories of offences. The 
penalties in relation to the majority of the offences (including the general offence 
of corruption) are the following:  in the case of a sentence to be imposed by a High 
Court, a fine or imprisonment up to a period in prison for life; in the case of a 
sentence to be imposed by a regional court, a fine or imprisonment up to a period 
not exceeding 18 years; and in the case of a sentence to be imposed by a 
magistrate's court, to a fine or to imprisonment up to a period not exceeding five 
years.  Corruption offences bordering on witness intimidation, the concealment of 
the offence of corruption and being an accessory to or after the offence of 
corruption carry lesser penalties and incurs a maximum prison sentence of ten 
years.  Thus, in the case of a sentence to be imposed by a High Court or regional 
court, a fine or imprisonment up to a period not exceeding 10 years; and, in the 
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case of a sentence to be imposed by a magistrate’s court, to a fine or to 
imprisonment up to a period not exceeding three years. 
It is noteworthy that in cases of award of fine, the value to be determined by the 
trial judge would have a maximum of five times the amount of the gratification 
involved in the offence.464  Furthermore, the Act provides for a register of entities 
and individuals convicted of acts of corruption relating to contracts and the 
procurement and withdrawal of tenders, with the consequence being that the 
National Treasury may terminate any agreement and prevent such persons from 
doing business with the government for ten years.  The National Treasury may also 
recover from the person or enterprise any damages incurred or sustained by the 
State as a result of the tender process or the conclusion of the agreement, or that 
the State may suffer by having to make less favourable arrangements afterwards.  
In spite of its well-developed ant-corruption laws, there is widespread corruption 
reported in South Africa.465  And while the law behoves on any person holding 
position of authority and who knows or ought to reasonably know or suspected that 
another person has committed the general offence of corruption or other offences 
specified above to report to the appropriate authority, it is still unclear why 
corruption-related offences are less likely reported with the agility and speed. 
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4.4.1.3 The Financial Intelligence Centre Act, No. 30 of 2001 (FICA), 
Act No. 33 of 2004, No. 11 of 2008, No 11 of 2013 and No. 1 of 
2017 – South Africa 
The Financial Intelligence Centre Act 2001 establishes a Financial Intelligence 
Centre as an institution outside the public service but within the public 
administration as envisaged in Section 195 of the Constitution466. The centre is a 
juristic person467.  The principal objectives of the Centre is to assist in468:  
• the identification of the proceeds of unlawful activities; 
• the combating of money laundering activities and the financing of terrorist 
and related activities;   
• implementation of financial sanctions pursuant to resolutions adopted by the 
Security Council of the United Nations, under Chapter VII of the Charter of 
the United Nations.  
The other objectives of the Centre are469: 
i. to make for information collected by it available to investigating authorities, 
supervisory bodies, the intelligence services and the South Africa Revenue 
Services to facilitate the administration and enforcement of laws of the 
Republic; 
ii. to administer measures requiring accountable institutions to freeze property 
and transactions pursuant to financial sanctions that may arise from 
resolutions adopted by the Security Council of the United Nations referred 
to in a notice contemplated in section 26A. 
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iii. to exchange information with similar bodies with similar objectives in other 
countries regarding money laundering activities, the financing of terrorist 
and related activities and other similar activities;470 and 
iv. to supervise and enforce compliance with FICA or any directive made in 
terms of FICA and to facilitate effective supervision and enforcement by 
supervisory bodies471. 
The 2017 Amendment Act expands the list of institutions to which the Centre will 
make information it collects available.  Under the 2001 FICA, one of the objectives 
of the Centre was to make such information available to “investigating authorities, 
the National prosecuting Authority, the intelligence services and the South African 
Revenue Services.”  The list now includes the Independent Police Investigative 
Directorate, the Intelligence Division of the National Defence Force, a Special 
Investigating Unit, the office of the Public Protector, an investigative division in an 
organ of state, and a supervisory body.     
 
The Act provides for the strengthening of customer due diligence measures on 
beneficial ownership, anonymous and persons in prominent positions; the 
obligation to keep identity and verification and transaction records, and an on-going 
due diligence of the customer’s transaction records and sets out the procedure in 
respect of financial sanction control measures pursuant to the notification of 
persons and entities identified by the Security Council of the United Nations.  Below 
are relevant sections that relates to customer due diligence which forms the 
fulcrum of this research. 
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Schedule 3A and 3B classified prominent official to domestic and foreign.  It defined 
a domestic influential person as, “an individual who holds, including in an acting 
position for a period exceeding six months, or has held at any time in the preceding 
12 months, in the Republic: 
i. a prominent public function including that of: the President or Deputy 
President; a government minister or deputy minister; the Premier of 
the province; a member of the Executive Council of a province; an 
executive mayor of a municipality elected in terms of the Local 
Government: Municipal Structures Act, 1998; a leader of a political 
party registered in terms of the Electoral Act, 1996; a member of a 
royal family or senior traditional leader as defined in the Traditional 
leadership and Governance Framework Act, 2003; the head, 
accounting officer or chief financial officer of a national or provincial 
department  or government component as defined in section 1 of the 
Public Service Act, 1994; the municipal manager of a municipality 
appointed in terms of section 54A of the Local Government: 
Municipal Systems Act, 2000; the chairperson of the controlling body, 
the chief executive officer, or a natural person who is the accounting 
authority, the chief financial officer or chief investment officer of a 
public entity listed in schedule 2 or 3 to the Public Finance 
Management Act, 1999; the chairperson of the controlling body, the 
chief executive officer, or a natural person who is the accounting 
authority, the chief financial officer or chief investment officer of a 
municipal entity as defined in section 1 of the Local Government: 
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Municipal Systems Act, 2000; a constitutional court judge or any 
other judge as defined in section 1 of the Judges’ Remuneration and 
Conditions of Employment Act, 2001; an ambassador or high 
commissioner or other senior representative of a foreign government 
based in the Republic; or an officer of the South African Defence 
Force above the rank of major-general. 
ii. the position of: chairperson of the board of directors; chairperson of 
audit committee; executive officer; or chief financial officer, of a 
company defined in the Companies Act 2008 (Act No. 71 of 2008), if 
the company provides  goods and services to an organ of state and 
the annual transactional value of goods and services or both exceeds 
an amount determined by the Minister by notice in the Gazette; and,  
iii. the position of head, of an international organisation based in the 
Republic.”472 
The risk-based approach for domestic prominent influential person requires the 
accountable institution to determine that the prospective client with whom it 
engages to establish a business relationship, or the beneficial owner of that 
prospective client, is a domestic prominent influential person and that, in 
accordance with its Risk Management and Compliance Programme, obtain senior 
management approval for establishing the business relationship, take reasonable 
measures to establish the source of wealth and source of funds of the client, and 
conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.473 
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A foreign prominent public official on the other hand is an individual who holds, or 
has held at any time in the preceding 12 months, in any foreign country a prominent 
public function including that of: Head of State or head of a country or government; 
member of a foreign royal family; government minister or equivalent senior 
politician or leader of a political party; senior judicial official; senior executive of a 
state owned corporation; or a high ranking member of the military.474  To establish 
a business relation with a foreign public official, the institution must obtain senior 
management approval for establishing the business relationship, take reasonable 
steps to establish the source of wealth and source of funds and conduct enhanced 
ongoing monitoring of the business relationship.475 
Under section 21H of the Act, immediate family members and known close 
associates of the domestic and foreign prominent public officials (these include 
current or previous spouses, civil partners, or life partners; children, step-children, 
and their spouses or partners; parents; and close relatives by consanguinity or 
affinity) are as well be subjected to due diligence measures by the accountable 
institution.476     
 
The Act introduced a risk-based approach to customer due diligence when 
contemplating the establishment of a business relationship with a potential client 
or when concluding a transaction on behalf of a potential or existing client477.  This 
is in tandem with the Financial Action Task Force AML/CFT standard that 
introduced the implementation of a “risk-based” approach in the execution of AML 
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and combating financing terrorism (CFT) measures.  Under this approach, an 
accountable institution must identify, assess, and understand its AML/CFT risks 
which largely depends on the effective implementation of its risk and compliance 
programme.  FICA places responsibility on the board of directors and senior 
management for complying with the relevant provisions and its risk management 
and compliance framework. 
 Some essential provisions set out in Chapter 3, Part 1 includes: 
i. that accountable institutions are required not to establish a business 
relationship or conclude a single transaction with an anonymous client or a 
client with an apparent false of fictitious name;478  
ii. when an accountable institution engages with a prospective client to enter 
into a single transaction or to establish a business relationship, the 
institution must, in the course of concluding that single transaction or 
establishing that business relationship and in accordance with its Risk 
Management and Compliance Programme:  establish and verify the identity 
of the client; if the client is acting on behalf of another person, establish and 
verify that other person and the client’s authority to establish the business 
relationship or to conclude the single transaction on behalf of the other 
person; and, if another person is acting on behalf of the client, establish and 
verify the identity of that other person and that other person’s authority to 
act on behalf of the client;479 
iii. where an accountable institution engages to establish a business 
relationship with a prospective client, the institution must obtain information 
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about the nature of the business relationship, intended purpose of the 
business relationship concerned and the source of funds that the 
prospective client expects to use in concluding the transactions; and the 
institution to ensure that the information will assist to reasonably enable it 
determine whether future transactions are consistent with the knowledge of 
the prospective client;480 
iv. in relation to legal persons, trusts and partnerships or similar arrangement 
between natural persons, additional customer due diligence are introduced 
by the ACT481.  Accountable institution must establish the nature of the 
client’s business and the ownership structure482.   
Under section 21B(2), if a client contemplated is a legal person, the accountable 
institution must: 
a. establish the identity of the beneficial owner of the client by: 
i. determining the identity of each natural person who, 
independently or together with another natural person, has a 
controlling ownership interest in the legal person; 
ii. if in doubt whether a natural person contemplated is the 
beneficial owner of the legal person or no natural person has 
controlling interest in the legal person, determining the identity 
of each natural person who exercises control of that legal 
person through other means; or 
iii. if a natural person is not identified, determining the identity of 
each natural person who exercises control over the 
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management of the legal person, including his or her capacity 
as executive officer, non-executive director, independent non-
executive director, director or manager; and 
iv. take reasonable steps to verify the identity of the beneficial 
owner of the client, so that the accountable institution is 
satisfied that it knows the beneficial owner.483 
b. take reasonable steps to verify the identity of the beneficial owner of 
the client, so that the accountable institution is satisfied that it knows 
who the beneficial owner is. 
Where the client is acting on behalf of a partnership between the natural person, 
section 21B(3) requires the accountable institution to take further steps in addition 
to sections 21 and 21A to: 
i. identify of the name of the partnership (if applicable);  
ii. identify every partner including every member of a partnership en 
commandite, an anonymous partnership or any similar partnership;  
iii. establish the identity of the person who exercises executive control over 
the partnership; establish the identity of each natural person who purports 
to be authorised to enter into a single transaction or establish a business 
relationship with the accountable institution on behalf of the partnership; 
iv. take reasonable steps to identity the particulars of the partnership; and, 
v. take reasonable steps to identify the natural persons involved in the 
partnership so that the accountable institution will be satisfied that it knows 
the identities of the natural persons concerned.  
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Additional due diligence on the part of the accountable institution is also required 
when a business relationship for trust agreements and natural persons.  In addition 
to the section 21 and 21A respectively, the accountable institution must establish 
the identifying name and number of the trust, the address of the  Master of the High 
Court where the trust is registered, establish the identity of the founder, establish 
the identity of each trustee or the natural person who purports to be authorised to 
enter into a single transaction, establish the identify of each beneficiary referred to 
in the trust agreement by name or the particulars of how the beneficiaries are to be 
determined, verify the particular of the trust, and take reasonable steps to verify 
the identities of the natural persons concerned in order to satisfy the accountable 
institution that it knows the natural persons concerned.484 
 
A significant part of its risk-based approach is the need for continuous or on-going 
customer due diligence.  The Act requires the accountable institution to conduct 
on-going due diligence through regular monitoring of transactions (including 
complex and unusually large transactions, unusual patterns of transactions that 
have no apparent business or lawful purpose) undertaken throughout the course 
of the business relationship, and in particular focus on the client’s source of fund.485 
Where the accountable institution is unable to conduct customer due diligence as 
specified in the relevant sections of the Act in relation to any particular business 
relationship, the institution may not establish a business relationship or conclude a 
single transaction with the client.  In addition, the institution must terminate in 
accordance with its Risk Management and Compliance Programme, an existing 
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business relationship with a client as the case may be and consider making a report 
under section 29 of the Act.486 
There is an obligation on the accountable institution to keep customer due diligence 
records that must include copies of or references to information provided or 
obtained to verify the customer’s identity, and in the case of a business 
relationship, information obtained concerning the nature, intended purpose and the 
source of funds which the prospective client is expected to use in concluding 
transactions in the course of the business relationship.487  Furthermore, the 
accountable institution, must keep transaction records488 whether of a single 
transaction which record must reflect the amount and currency in which the 
transaction was denominated, the date of the transaction, the parties involved, the 
nature of the transaction, business correspondence and if an account facility was 
provided to the client, the particulars of the account and files related to such 
transactions.  Such records either in electronic form and by third parties489 must be 
kept by the accountable institution for: 
• the establishment of a business relationship, at least five years after the 
termination of the business relationship; 
• a transaction as contemplated in section 22A which is concluded for at least 
five years from the date on which the transaction is concluded; and 
• a transaction or activity which gave rise to the contemplation of a report 
under section 29, for at least five years from the date on which the report 
was submitted to the Centre.490 
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4.4.1.4 Public Proctector Report on State Capture 
 
There is a great deal of challenge on how firms influence the state or collude with 
public officials to extract advantages. Media reports as well as widespread 
allegation of private companies’ undue influence on the policies, regulations and 
appointment of public office holders in South Africa is commonplace.  State capture 
is the extent to which firms make illicit and non-transparent private payments to 
public officials in order to influence the formation of laws, rules, regulations or 
decrees by state institutions.  In discussing state capture, the state and the 
economy are not perceived as two separate entities but is seen as a fusion of 
economic and political power.  Martins and Solomon observes state capture as 
having several forms: (1) it can occur in terms of an individual or family that exerts 
control over both the state and the economy; (2) the development of oligarchies 
with a quasi-feudal structure of dependants; (3) a complex range of networks with 
more equal reciprocal relations.491 
Based on complaints of alleged improper and unethical conduct by the president 
and other state functionaries relating to alleged improper relationships and 
involvement of the Gupta family in the removal and appointment of ministers and 
directors of State Owned Entities (SOEs) resulting in improper and possibly corrupt 
award of  state contracts and benefits to the Gupta family, the Public Protector by 
virtue of section 182(1)(b) of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, 
and section 3(1) of the Executive Members Ethics Act and section 8(1) of the Public 
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Protector Act, 1994, undertook an investigation into the alleged complaints.  The 
investigation emanates from complaints lodged against the President by Father S. 
Mayebe on behalf of the Dominican Order; Mr. Mmusi Maimane, the leader of the 
Democratic Alliance and leader of the Opposition in Parliament; and a member of 
the public.  Complaints followed media reports of Gupta’s family influence in the 
appointment and removal of government ministers, directors of state owned 
companies and influence in the procurement processes of government.  The 
findings include: that President Zuma improperly and in violation of the Executive 
Ethics Code, allowed members of the Gupta family and his son, Duduzane Zuma, 
to be involved in the process of removal and appointment of the Minister of Finance 
in December 2015; Deputy Minister Jonas was offered a job by the Gupta family in 
exchange for extending favours to their family business; Minister Van Rooyen – 
who replaced Minister Nene – can be placed at the Saxonwold area on at least 
seven occasions including on the day before he was announced as Minister; that 
between the period 2 August 2015 and 22 March 2016, Eskom CEO Brain Molefe 
has called Mr Ajay Gupta a total of 44 times and Mr Ajay Gupta has called Mr 
Molefe a total of 14 times; the Eskom board was improperly appointed; Zuma and 
the Executive failed to take action to verify Ms Mentor’s allegations, as well as Mr 
Maseka’s allegations, as well as regarding the alleged cosy relationship between 
Brian Molefe and the Guptas; President Zuma and other Cabinet members 
improperly interfered in the relationship between banks and Gupta owned 
companies; President Zuma improperly and in violation of the Executive Ethics 
Code used his position or information entrusted to him to enrich himself and 
businesses owned by the Gupta family and his son to be given preferential 
treatment in the award of state contracts, business financing and trading licences; 
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the South African people were prejudiced by the conduct of President Zuma, in not 
following up on Jonas’s allegations; Minister Zwane’s trip to Switzerland was 
irregular; Eskom’s awarding of the coal contract to Tegeta was irregular; that 
government advertising was deliberately channelled to the Gupta’s newspaper, the 
New Age; that the President may have been in breach of his legal duties in failing 
to investigate these matters or put act against them. 
The report recommended that government should address the systemic 
procurement deficiencies and as well: 
i. appoint a judicial commission of enquiry to investigate the findings of the 
Public Protector, with powers of evidence collection that are not less than 
that of the Public protector; 
ii. the National treasury to adequately fund the commission of inquiry in 
order that it is adequately resourced; 
iii. commission of inquiry to submit report not later than 180 days from the 
commencement of the investigation to the President, who shall submit a 
copy with an indication of his/her intentions regarding the 
implementation to Parliament within 14 days of the releasing of the 
report; 
iv. Parliament to review within 180 days the Executive Members’ Act to 
provide better guidance regarding integrity, including avoidance and 
management of conflict of interest; 
v. The president to ensure that Executive Ethics code is updated in line 
with the review of the Executive Members’ Act; and, 
vi. The Public Protector, in terms of section 6 (4) (c) (i) of the Public 
Protector Act, brings to the notice of the National Prosecuting Authority 
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and the DPCI those matters identified in this report where it appears 
crimes have been committed.492 
It is noteworthy that the president and his family are personally implicated and due 
to a conflict of interests, the public protector limited both his choice of a 
commissioner to conduct the inquiry and the power to specify certain terms of 
reference.  President Zuma challenged the remedial action on the basis that it 
is the sole prerogative of the head of state under section 84(2)(f) of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, to appoint commissions of 
inquiry and that it is an unfettered discretionary power, which may not be limited. 
It was held amongst others, that the remedial action taken by the Public Protector 
against President Jacob Zuma in terms of section 182(1)(c) is binding; that the 
failure by the president to comply with the remedial action taken against him is 
inconsistent with section 83(b) of the Constitution read with sections 181(3) and 
182(1)(c) of the Constitution and is invalid; that the resolution passed by the 
National Assembly absolving the President from compliance with the remedial 
action taken by the Public Protector in terms of section 182(1)(c) is inconsistent 
with relevant sections of the Constitution, is invalid and is set aside.493  
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Chapter III of the United Nations Convention on Corruption requires member states 
to be legislative and other measures to establish as criminal offences about bribery 
of national public officials, foreign public officials and officials of international public 
organisations.  Local legislations exist in their most robust form to address the 
issues of corruption and money laundering in the two jurisdictions covered in this 
chapter being Nigeria and South Africa.  There are also apparatus of government 
aimed at enforcing these laws to preventing corruption.  The efficacy of the anti-
money laundering laws is noticeable in the level of deterrence and awareness it 
has created over time as many now fear that the proceed of their illicit wealth can 
be traced and seized given that anti-corruption agencies would work.  What is not 
adequate is the executive will and the political acceptance of the fight against 
corruption.  As noted by Rider,494 in considering economic crimes, it is important to 
recognize the practical realities.  The ability of those in position of influence who 
may already have disproportionate authority as a result of their scant regard for the 
law and good governance, to discourage criticism let alone effective investigation 
within their society, is a reality.  The case of former President Jacob Zuma of South 
Africa and state capture is a typical example, with similar routines in Nigeria as 
well.  Those who have, in this context, amassed power and wealth for themselves, 
are unlikely to play by the rules.495  They over time almost institutionalise this 
protection through further patronage and domination presents an almost 
insurmountable barrier to effective action within their society or state496.  When the 
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gatekeepers and the highly privileged are the ones complicit in corruption, it more 
or less ridicules the process.497  In the same vein, the powerful tend to undermine 
the very values that they are asked to protect by either underfunding the very 
institutions established to combat money laundering498 or deter them from 
implementing the rules especially when their cronies or party members are 
involved.   Corruption becomes a politicised affair so much so that the anti-graft 
agencies only prosecute members of the opposition who are disloyal to those in 
the ruling party. The Implementation Review Group in its assessment of Nigeria 
identified areas of improvements which includes;499 
• It has not comprehensively criminalised trading in influence but has 
adopted relevant measures in section 17, 19, 21 and 22 in the ICPC Act. 
• It has partially criminalised bribery in the private sector through the 
application of Sections 8, to some extent section 9 and 17 of the ICPC Act. 
• It is yet to adopt measures for the protection of witnesses, experts and 
victims, including their physical protection and related evidentiary rules or 
relocation agreements with other states. 
• It is yet to establish whistleblowing protection measures 
• There is no comprehensive legislation on international cooperation. 
In respect of South Africa the initial review to update FICA Act to be risked based 
has been completed, however, there are still ongoing reviews on the domestication 
of other relevant articles of UNCAC as applicable. 
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An attitudinal change and a review of procedures are fundamental for the working 
of these institutions.  Similarly, it is necessary to streamline crime fighting, not to 
share aspects with different agencies of government and thereby losing the focus.  
The ICPC and the EFCC, for example, can be integrated into one body with the 
sole responsibility of enforcing financial crimes and comically, the Nigerian police 





INTERNET BANKING AND MONEY LAUNDERING RISK 
 
In recent times the traditional banking method in which customers and bank 
employees meet face to face using paper-based instructions and settlement 
process for individual transactions have now been taken over by computers, 
telecommunications and internet technologies making communication links more 
flexible, seamless and at the comfort of one's private home.  Internet banking aims 
to assist customers in accessing accounts and general information on a bank's 
products and services through a personal computer or other intelligent devices.  
Currently, banks use their virtual existence to perform an actual transaction using 
their website.  Electronic finance via the internet provides a new dynamic platform 
for cross-border communication and interaction among issuers, investors, financial 
institutions and public authorities thereby opening the way for commercial 
transactions in an open and competitive market.  The internet has provided access 
to unlimited sources of capital and financial services even in areas where markets 
and efficient financial institutions are lacking.  Similarly, electronic finance has 
contributed positively to growth and development, providing access to overseas 
financial markets, and has facilitated secure payments for goods and services 
across several jurisdictions.  Also, new providers are emerging within and across 
countries, including brokerages and companies that allow consumers to compare 
financial services such as mortgage loans, insurance policies and trust services; 
and non-financial entities including telecommunication and utility companies offer 




The entire banking process relies on the smooth functioning of sophisticated 
computer applications and network systems, which brings to fore the concerns of 
security of systems and network and availability of service.  Banks may become 
vulnerable to malicious action from outsiders and any weakness in the 
implementation of security standards will likely result in disruption of operations 
and losses to both customer and the bank.  An example of a security risk is when 
an unauthorised individual gains access to account data and personal information 
of a customer causing a breach to privacy, or the individual maliciously manipulates 
the data leading to fraud, corruption, duplication or alteration, theft and misuse of 
critical information and repudiation of valid transactions.  The ease of internet 
access, the impersonal and remote nature of the contract between the financial 
institution and the customer and the rapidity of electronic transactions underscores 
why electronic banking activities are particularly vulnerable to money laundering 
activities.  Difficulties may also arise if the procedures for opening an internet 
banking account take place without face-to- face contact or a link to an existing 
account.  There is a wide range of legal risks (that is, the possibility of losses due 
to the violation or non-compliance with laws, rules, regulations or prescribed 
practices or when the rights of parties are not well established) associated with 
banks providing services over the internet.  In most national jurisdictions, the 
leading regulatory authority assumes the pivotal role of regulating entities and 
enforcing general and specific anti-money laundering provisions tailored for 
banking institutions.  The Financial Intelligence Unit/Centre serves as a stand-
alone agency domiciled within the nation’s Treasury with the aim of collecting 
financial intelligence necessary to support law enforcement as well enforcing rules 
on reporting of activities of politically exposed persons (PEPS) and suspicious 
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activities.  This chapter examines the link between corruption and money 
laundering through the banking system with particular emphasis on electronic 
banking and other online non-bank payment mechanisms owing to their lack of 
face-to-face contact with customers, and the extra vigilance required to monitor 
online transactions.  First part sought to consider internet-banking security and 
other security infrastructure geared toward the safety and soundness of the 
financial system.  Next, we examine the underlying principles of privacy and 
confidentiality in internet banking and its relationship with anti-money laundering 
legislation.  These international regulatory and prudential requirements on 
electronic finance/banking examined with local initiatives to determine the 
appropriateness or otherwise of the controls.  Then we examined the fight against 
money laundering and politically exposed persons.  We conclude with 
recommendations on tightening institutional and regulatory framework as well as 
international cooperation to prevent the laundering of the proceeds of corruption. 
 
5.1 Electronic Banking 
The electronic funds transfer is any transfer of funds initiated or processed using 
automated techniques.  The United States Electronic Fund Transfer Act defines 
electronic funds transfer as: ‘the transfer of funds, other than a transaction initiated 
by cheque or similar paper instruments, made through an electronic terminal or 
computer or by means of magnetic tape so as to order, instruct, or authorise a 
participating financial institution to credit or debit an account.’  Internet banking, on 
the other hand, refers to the provision of electronic banking services via the 
internet, commonly through a personal computer or additional access devises with 
installed internet capabilities.  The three elements of making payments: the 
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payment message; movements on accounts; and settlement also exist in internet 
banking.  Admittedly, internet banking still maintains the banker-customer 
relationship because opening an internet banking account is parallel to the 
traditional way of opening a regular bank account.  The relationship between the 
online bank and the customer is one of contract and this consist of the general 
contract, which comes into being upon the establishment of the banker-customer 
relationship; and special contracts that arise by specific agreements entered into 
between the bank and the customer.  The bank account is the anchor in the banker-
customer relationship since upon opening the bank account; the bank agrees to 
accept the customer's deposit and to repay sums of equivalent value on demand 
or at a specified date on the customer's orders.  Using the appropriate technology 
the honours the customer's mandate with reasonable care and skill in order not to 
facilitate fraud or allow unauthorised access to the client's account.  The 
electronically transmitted instruction to the originator's bank is a mandate from the 
customer to his bank and lies within the framework of the banker-customer 
relationship.  The authority to transfer funds to bank accounts held with the same 
or another bank, the other bank is impliedly authorised to accept credit by its 
customer and beneficiary of the transfer by their relationship.500  Electronic Banking 
is the term used to describe the use of electronic delivery channels for banking 
products and services.  Electronic delivery channels include the internet, wireless 
communication networks, automatic teller machines (ATM) and telephone/mobile 
banking.  Electronic banking products and services now commonly used include:  
                                                            
500 Apostolos Gkoutzinis, Internet Banking and the Law in Europe: Regulation, Financial Integration and 
Electronic Commerce (Cambridge University Press 2006) 33 
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• Mobile/telephone banking:   This targets consumers without a computer as 
an alternative to transacting their business over the telephone.  Banks can 
create a computer-controlled system that allows customers to dial through 
a phone to access their accounts and perform routine banking functions 
such as obtaining account balances information, payment to customers, pay 
other bills and as well do cheque clearance operations.  A mobile money 
product connects to prepaid accounts with a financial institution and in some 
cases even with-non bank entities.  The financial institutions that facilitate 
mobile payments can be a traditional payment service provider (banks or 
depository institutions) or a non-bank payment service provider (designated 
as money or value transfer services – MVTS). 
• Smart/prepaid card services.  These are prepaid cards, which store a 
specified value in itself with a computer chip; this enables the customer to 
use it as a substitute for cash.  Prepaid cards come in a variety of forms.  
So-called ‘open loop’ cards carry credit card company logos and are re-
loadable.  Gift cards used at specific outlets, are ‘closed loop’ cards.  As the 
FATF noted, ‘the functionality of prepaid cards varies as they have evolved 
from a replacement for store gift certificates and limited purpose closed loop 
applications to, in some cases, embody all the functionalities of a payment 
instrument tied to a payment account.’501  There is a money laundering risk 
associated with payment network-branded cards502 or open-loop cards that 
                                                            
501 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Prepaid Cards, Mobile Payments and 
Internet-Based Payment Systems’<http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/recommendations/Guidance-RBA-NPPS.pdf>  accessed 23 May 2017  
502 The Wolfsberg Group, ‘Guidance on Prepaid and Stored value cards’<https://www.wolfsberg-
principles.com/sites/default/files/wb/pdfs/wolfsberg-
standards/11.%20Wolfsberg_Guidance_on_Prepaid_and_Stored_Value_Cards_Oct_14%2C_2011.pdf> 
accessed 3 June 2017. Defines prepaid and stored value cards as ‘the physical card is either the token access 
value recorded remotely and linked to the card, or the value is 'stored on' and accessible from the physical 
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allow transactions with any merchant or service provider participating in the 
payment network since customers use the prepaid cards to access the 
related funds held in an associated payment account.503  Since there is 
associated money laundering risk involved in the use of prepaid card, the 
FATF recommends a risk-based approach to regulation by individual 
countries.504  As the FATF observes, ‘the level of AML/CFT measures 
required should be in proportion to the risk posed by the NPPS…..the closer 
the functionality of an NPPS is to a bank account, the greater the need to 
apply comparable regulation, including the application of full CDD 
measures.’505  The following one or more features could make a NPPS 
functionally similar to that of a bank account; 
i. The NPPS is capable of been reloaded an unlimited number of times;  
ii. No or very high funding, loading or spending limits are envisaged; 
iii. It is possible to make and receive funds transfer cross-border, and 
within the country where product is issued; 
iv. The NPPS can be funded through cash, and cash can be withdrawn 
through the ATM network; or 
                                                            
card's chip.  It means that all stored value cards are prepaid cards, but not all prepaid cards are stored valued 
cards.’  The general characteristics of prepaid and stored valued cards which increases money laundering 
risk include:   
a.  ability to transfer funds (domestically/internationally);  
b.  Speed of transfer of funds; ability to move unloaded inactivated cards across borders;  
c.  Lack of, or difficulty in providing, an audit trail;  
d.  Lack of, or difficulty in compiling, an aggregated view of multiple transactions;  
e.  lack of face-to-face contact;  
f.  identification material either not taken or taken and not validated; 
g.  High negotiability through wide acceptance; ability to reload; 
h.   Ability to load/reload card with cash; and,  
i.  Ability to withdraw cash. 
503 ibid 
504 The essential elements of a risk-based approach includes: countries should identify, assess and 
understand the risks of money laundering and terrorist financing that they face in the use of prepaid 
cards, in addition, countries and financial institutions  
505 Ibid 33 
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v. The ability to add or withdraw funds to the account, using cash or 
cash equivalents, whether directly or through another provider or 
intermediary.506 
 
5.2 Controls Over Wire Transfer and Correspondence Banking 
Operations 
The term wire transfer or funds transfer refers to any communication carried 
out on behalf of an originator person (both natural and legal) through a 
financial institution by electronic means to making an amount of money 
available to a beneficiary person at another financial institution.  The 
originator and beneficiary may be the same person.507  Wire transfers can 
be domestic or cross-border.  Domestic wire transfer refers to wire transfers 
where the originator and beneficiary institutions are located in the same 
country whereas cross-border transfers mean where the originator and 
beneficiary reside in different countries.  There are a variety of computer-
based networks used for effecting international transactions and 
settlements, but CHIPS and SWIFT have dominated the global financial 
sector.  The primary distinction among the systems is whether they are for 
secure communication or actual transfer and settlement.508  According to 
Gkoutzinis,509 cross border internet banking upsets the international legal 
framework in two ways:  
                                                            
506 FATF (Mobile Payments n496) 35 
507 Ibid 35 
508 Arthur I. Stonehill, David K. Eiteman and Michael H Moffett, Multinational Business Finance (11th ed., 
Pearson Education 2007) 728 
509 Gkoutzinis (n495) 33 
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• online banking as a form of global trade in financial services is 
inherently different from traditional mode of entering foreign markets 
by way of establishment of commercial presence locally and 
therefore it is not entirely compatible with the prevailing principle of 
territoriality which determines the application of national law to cross 
border transactions and activities; and,  
• as a form of banking service, online banking relies upon a delivery 
channel that presents a new range of risks.510  
 
5.2.1 CHIPS and SWIFTS 
The New York Clearinghouse Systems operates the Clearing House Interbank 
Payment Systems (CHIPS).  CHIPS, is a computerised network that connects 
major banks globally, owned and run by its member banks being the single largest 
privately operated and final-payment system in the world.511  Business to business 
and intra business transfers globally use banks for effecting payments and the 
banks in turn utilise CHIPS.  A developed payment infrastructure has four key 
components:  
• an interbank communications network for the on-line electronic transmission 
of large-value payment orders and associated message;  
• a clearing house for the physical exchange of paper-based payment order 
and the netting of matured payment obligations;  
                                                            
510 Eric Helleiner, ‘Sovereignty, Territoriality and The Globalization of Finance’ in David A. Smith, Dorothy J. 
Solinger and Steven C. Topik (eds), States and Sovereignty in the Global Economy, (Routledge 1999) p.140.  
511 Ibid, p.728 
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• an automated clearing house for the batch processing of large-volume off-
line, mainly low-value payment orders stored in magnetic form on tapes and 
diskettes; and, 
•  the involvement of the Central Bank as the vehicle for settlement of 
dealings between the banks participating in the clearing (settlement banks) 
by means of transfers in the books of the central bank, where all settlement 
banks hold account.512 
The Society for Worldwide Interbank Financial Telecommunications (SWIFT) is an 
international message service by banks and other financial institutions worldwide, 
which sends messages that initiate fund transfers.  The SWIFT network provides 
user banks with a private international communications link among themselves and 
security of the messages in assured by encryption of all data.  Other security 
features include log-on and log-off controls, message sequence controls and highly 
structured format for text messages.  SWIFT in addition to customer and bank 
funds transfer transmit foreign exchange confirmations, statements, collections 
and documentary credits. 
 
5.2.2 Correspondent Banking 
Correspondent payment occurs because of payment between those in different 
jurisdictions.  With a credit transfer, the payor's bank will send a payment message 
to its correspondent in the jurisdiction of the payee's bank.  The correspondent, in 
turn, sends a payment message to the payee's bank.  Both banks (the payor and 
payee) will settle payment under the correspondent arrangements between and 
                                                            
512 Ewan McKendrick, Goode on Commercial Law (4th Edition, Penguin Group 2010) 502 
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will probably settle their accounts with the central bank in that jurisdiction.513  The 
Wolfsberg group defined correspondent banking as ‘the provision of a current or 
other liability accounts, and related services, to another financial institution, 
including affiliates, used for the execution of third party payments and trade 
finance, as well as its cash clearing, liquidity management and short-term 
borrowing or investment needs in a particular currency.’514  Correspondent payment 
can also involve payment between two banks in the same jurisdiction if the 
payment involves a foreign currency, in this case, the banks will use their 
correspondents in that foreign country, since settlement facilities need to be 
available in that currency.515  Where payment is in a foreign currency, and it involves 
a string of banks, an intermediary bank is required because, in some situations, 
the payor's bank may not have a correspondent bank in the jurisdiction of payment 
currency.516  The CHIPS system mentioned above helps to cater for this complex 
payment system as it helps to provide settlement between correspondent banks 
interfacing with the New York Federal Reserve Bank.  Correspondence banking 
services are offered in three forms:  First, the most traditional way of 
correspondence banking involves a respondent bank agreeing with a 
correspondent bank to execute payments on its behalf and behalf of its customers.  
Second, nested correspondent banking refers to the use of correspondent banking 
relationships by a respondent bank's intermediate customers, which could then use 
the links for their clients.  Third, payable-through accounts where the respondent 
                                                            
513 Cranston (n425) 237  
514 The Wolfsberg Group, ‘Wolfsberg Anti-Money Laundering Principles for Correspondent Banking’ 
<www.wolfsbergprinciples.com/pdf/home/Wolfsberg-Correspondent-Banking-Principles-2014.pdf.>  
accessed 6 January 2017 
515 Cranston (n425) 237 
516 Cranston (n425) 237 
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bank allows its intermediate customers to access the correspondent account 
directly to conduct business on their behalf.517 
In relation to correspondence banking, the FATF provides that ‘in addition to 
performing normal customer due diligence measures’ financial institutions should 
be required to: 
a. Gather sufficient information about a respondent institution to understand 
the nature of the respondent's business fully and to determine from publicly 
available information the reputation of the institution and the quality of 
supervision, including whether it has been subject to a money laundering or 
terrorist financing investigation or regulatory action;518 
b. Assess the respondent institution's AML/CFT controls; 
c. Obtain approval from senior management before establishing new 
correspondent relationships;519 
d. Understand the respective responsibilities of each Institution;520 and 
e. Concerning ‘payable-through accounts’, be satisfied that the respondent 
bank has conducted CDD on the customers having direct access to 
accounts of correspondent bank, and that it can provide relevant CDD 
information upon request to the correspondent bank.521 
                                                            
517 International Monetary Fund, ‘Recent Trends in Correspondent Banking Relationships - Further 
Considerations’ (21 April 2017) Policy Paper.  
518 FATF2012, recommendation 13 
519 FATF 2012, recommendation 13 
520 FATF 2012, recommendation 13  
521 FATF 2012, recommendation 13 
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The standard specifically provides that financial institutions should ‘be 
prohibited from entering into, or continuing, a correspondent banking 
relationship with shell banks.’522   
The BIS committee on payments and markets infrastructure in respect on 
correspondent banking provides potential measures to facilitate correspondent 
banking activities which includes: (i) Know-your-Customer (KYC) utilities (ii) 
increased use of legal entities identifiers (iii) information sharing initiatives; (iv) 
payment messages; and (v) use of legal entities identifiers as additional information 
in payment messages.523 
Since wire transfers begin with a request by the customer to transfer funds and 
banks examine the amounts involved before initiating a transfer thoroughly,   FATF 
Recommendation 16 establishes the requirements for countries concerning 
transfers.  It provides that states must ensure financial institutions include relevant 
originator and beneficiary information on wire transfers and the information remains 
with the wire transfer throughout the payment chain as set out in the interpretative 
note to recommendation 16.  Recommendation 16 developed with the objective of 
preventing terrorists and other criminals from having unfettered access to wire 
transfers for moving their funds, and for detecting such misuse when it occurs.524  
It aims to ensure that necessary information about the originator and beneficiary of 
wire transfers is immediately available: 
                                                            
522 FATF 2012, recommendation 13.  A shell bank is one in which criminals or their associates holds or are 
the beneficial owners of significant or controlling interest, or holding a management function in, a 
financial institution. 
523 Bank for International Settlement, ‘Committee on Payments and Market Infrastructure: Correspondent 




a. To appropriate law enforcement and prosecutorial authorities to assist them 
in detecting, investigating and prosecuting terrorists or other criminals and 
tracing their assets; 
b. To financial intelligence units for analysing suspicious or unusual activity, 
and disseminating it as necessary; and 
c. To order, intermediary and beneficial financial institutions to facilitate the 
identifications and reporting of suspicious transactions, and to implement 
the requirements to freezing action and comply with prohibitions from 
conducting transactions with designated persons and entities…’ 
Information accompanying all cross-border wire transfer will include: 
a. Name of the originator 
b. The originator account number where such an account where such an 
account is used to process the transaction; 
c. The originator’s address, or national identity number, or customer 
identification number, or date and place of birth; 
d. The name of the beneficiary; and 
e. The beneficiary account number, where such an account processes the 
transaction. 
In addition, the standard requires countries to take adequate measures to ensure 
financial institutions include required and accurate originator information and 
beneficiary information, on wire transfers and related messages, and the 
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information remains with the wire transfer or related message throughout the chain 
of the payment.525   
In recognition of its responsibility to adopt and continually improve its AML policies, 
procedures and controls that are reasonably designed to be operational and 
efficient, including methods for detecting and reporting payments that involve 
suspicious activity that could be related to money laundering or other financial 
crimes an updated procedure was published by the clearinghouse.526  In its 
introductory page, it was acknowledged that the traditional correspondence 
banking had fostered economic prosperity throughout the world by enabling 
business and remittance flow between countries and without having to maintain 
branches in every country, banks can utilise their relationships with other banks to 
serve their customers' global payment needs with essential attributes of 
confidence.  The payment system is vulnerable to money laundering risk due to 
the volume of payments, the speed at which payments move, and the fungibility of 
payments.  It is difficult to identify and intercept suspicious payments unless the 
originator, the beneficiary or the financial institution provides information in 
advance and stated in the payment order.527  It further acknowledged that ‘once a 
person can inject funds into the payment system that are a product of a criminal 
act, are intended to finance a criminal act, or are tied to a party subject to U.S. 
sanctions, it is challenging, and in many cases impossible, to identify those funds 
                                                            
525 Financial Action Task Force, ‘International Standards on Combating Money Laundering and the 
Financing of Terrorism & Proliferation: The FATF Recommendations’ < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/fatfrecommendations/documents/fatf-recommendations.html > accessed 1 August 
2017 
526 The Clearing House, ‘Guiding Principles for Anti-Money Laundering Policies and Procedures in 
Correspondent Banking’ <https://www.theclearinghouse.org/-/media/new/tch/documents/payment-
systems/chips-tch-aml-correspondent-banking-guiding-principles-2016.pdf> accessed 1 August 2017 
527 Ibid, page 4 
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as they move from bank to banks’.528  Furthermore, ‘the scope necessary for an 
effective payment system requires broad availability and thereby greatly limits the 
feasibility of blanket exclusions based on geography or origin’.529   
Wire transfers are an integral part of many money laundering operations as it 
allows for quick delivery of cash, one can confirm receipt quickly and easily, the 
cost of the movement is low, there is a high degree of visibility throughout the 
payment flow, and the chances of detection among the myriads of messages is 
remote.  An estimated $21 to $32 trillion530 of private financial wealth is located in 
secrecy jurisdictions around the world, facilitated by electronic fund transfer 
systems.  Corrupt leaders and their cronies use legitimate business531, trust 
companies,532 or shell companies533 (corporations that exist only on paper) often 
incorporated in other countries to disguise the proceeds of corruption to transfer 
funds within the payment system.  As financial secrecy index indicates, ‘the world's 
most important providers of financial secrecy harbouring looted assets are mostly 
                                                            
528 Ibid 4, bold italics added 
529 Ibid 4 
530 Tax Justice Network, ‘Financial Secrecy Index: Introduction’<http://www.financialsecrecyindex.com/> 
accessed 5 September 2017 
531 [2010]JRC116. In Attorney General v Raj Arjandas Bhojwani, the defendant, an Indian man made a 
criminal fortune of almost $40 million selling vehicles to the Nigerian Government under two separate 
contracts in 1996 and 1997 through a Panamanian shelf company, named Tata Overseas Sales and Services, 
which was, in reality, a front for himself personally.  The actual purchase price of the vehicles was inflated 
by between 400 and 500 percent at the behest of the then President of Nigeria, General Sani Abacha, and 
a second Nigerian figure, Colonel Mohammed Buba Marwa.  The defendant charged the country $184 
million for vehicles which were worth $38 million.  The inflated cost of both contracts was paid by the 
defendant to company bank accounts in Switzerland and elsewhere which he knew were beneficially owned 
by Abacha family members and by Colonel Marwa.  
532 Former Governor of Bayelsa State, DSP Alamieyeseigha, registered the company Solomon & Peters Ltd 
in the UK. Four London Properties purchased for £6.39 million.  The funds came from various sources 
including one which emanated from Triumph Bank Plc. In Nigeria. Some of the purchases were facilitated 
by Solicitors and other registered companies such as Austin and Jed, EBSCO Associates, a UK registered 
company solely owned by one Ebitare Otrofanowei, a former Commissioner of Finance in Bayelsa State 
between 2001 and 2003.  See de Willebois and others, Puppet Masters (n233) 46   
533 drbiggie, ‘Exposed: shady & High Corruption in Nigeri’s Oil Deals 44: Meet Nigeria’s Crude Oil 
Gangsters’ <https://drbiggie.wordpress.com/2017/05/21/shady-and-highly-corruption-in-nigerias-oil-
deals-44-meet-nigerias-crude-oil-gangsters/> accessed 17 July 2017 
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not small, palm-fringed islands as many suppose, but some of the world’s biggest 
and wealthiest countries. Rich OECD member countries and their satellites are the 
main recipients of or conduits for these illicit flows.’534 
To improve the payment process and reduce such risk: payment instructions must 
be transparent so banks can take preventive and cautionary measures;535 parties 
to the transactions should identify in the payment order received, the originator, 
beneficiary and other financial institutions involved;536 and, government 
cooperation in setting and enforcing international standards for anti-money 
laundering and transparency in the financial system537 for banks to detect and 
report potential money laundering transactions.  In its due diligence 
recommendations, banks should develop and maintain enhanced due diligence 
policies, procedures and controls to be applied to high-risk foreign correspondent 
banking customers, and specifically in relation to foreign correspondent banking 
customers to utilize consistent, well documented risk rating methodologies in order 
to determine if the correspondent banking customer falls within the bank's risk 
tolerance.538 
   
5.3 Internet Banking Risk 
The objectives of regulation among others are: to ensure adequate market 
structure and competition; ensure the safety and soundness of the financial 
                                                            





538 Clearing House (n521) 11 
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system; protect consumers of financial services; and provide equitable allocation 
of credit and appropriate monetary controls. In spite of these laudable objectives, 
various risks exist which prudential regulations seek to address.  They can be 
classified into:539 
1. Financial risk 
2. Operational risk 
3. Legal risk 
4. Reputational risk 
5. Other risks 
Financial risk about service delivery over the internet is the probability of loss 
arising from the delivery of services that may impair its ability to provide adequate 
returns.  The following are components of financial risk: credit risk, liquidity risk, 
market risk, foreign exchange risk.  Much emphasis will be devoted to other forms 
of risk since the internet has had a relatively low impact on the profit of the core 
financial risks of financial institutions engaging in online activities.540 
Operational Risk as defined by the Basel Committee refers to the ‘risk of loss 
resulting from inadequate or failed internal processes, people and systems or 
external events.541   Operational risk embodies loses attributable to people; losses 
due to poor internal control systems, processes and corporate governance; poor 
performance and failure in the function of information technology; and 
                                                            
539 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Risk Management 
Principles for Electronic Banking’ <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs98.pdf> accessed 20 August 2016 ;  
540 Ibid, page 13.  Also, Gkoutzinis (n495) 148 states that the impact of the internet on the essential elements 
and structure of banking services and products has mostly been manageable and less dramatic than its 
impact on operational and non-financial risks. 
541 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Principles for Sound 
Management of Operational Risk’ <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs195.pdf> accessed 20 August 2016  
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uncontrollable events (Acts of God) such as fires and natural disasters.  
Operational risk includes: 
 Security is essential since there is a total virtual reliance on automated 
operations and information technology, the remote interaction with 
customers over publicly accessible computer networks, the constant 
innovation in internal systems and procedures and the concentration of 
sensitive data in interconnected and electronically administered 
databases.542  Other issues involved in security includes threats of attack 
from outside or inside sources, confidentiality, protection and integrity of 
information, non-repudiation of properly authorised transactions, 
authentication of users, control and prevention of unauthorised access to 
the system.543  
 System availability.544  Limited capacity to handle large volumes of 
transactions or frequent breakdown of IT infrastructure can cause 
substantial loss to the firms since it can undermine consumer confidence 
and the reputation of operators.  The risk of malicious manipulation of data 
can lead to unauthorised and fraudulent transactions, corruption, duplication 
or alteration of data. 
 Outsourcing if not properly supervised, can have a significant impact on the 
data and system integrity and availability.  There is the risk that service 
providers may not have the requisite expertise to deliver services; fail to 
update their technology and the threat of losing sensitive documents to 
                                                            
542 Gkoutzinis (n495) 149 
543 Ibid 149 




unauthorised users. The following measures can be adopted to mitigate 
against this risk: 
 Conduct appropriate due diligence 
 Ensure the adequacy of contracts concerning e-banking 
 Develop appropriate contingency plans 
 Monitor ongoing viability of third-party services especially when the firm 
has no track record.545 
 
Legal Risk – This is the possibility that assets will turn out to be worthless, or 
liabilities will turn out to be higher than expected because of inadequate or incorrect 
legal advice or documentation.    It arises from violations of, non-conformance with 
laws, rules, regulations, or prescribed practices, or when the legal rights and 
obligations of parties to a transaction are not well established.546  Legal risk can 
arise where: 
 Due to expansion the bank fails to take appropriate care in familiarising itself 
with local laws and regulations before they offer services in a new 
jurisdiction 
 There is uncertainty about legislation applicable (legislation of the 
jurisdiction to e-banking in the area of operation of a virtual bank or an 
institution providing services over the internet 
                                                            
545 Ibid 16 
546 Bank for International Settlement, ‘Basle Committee for Banking Supervision: Risk Management for 




 A risk exists in the enforcement of specific emerging areas of law; an 
example is the case of law relating to electronic contracts and digital 
signatures.547 
 Banks choosing to enhance customer service by linking their internet sites 
to other related sites may face the risk of a hacker using the site to defraud 
the bank's customers, and the bank could face litigation from customers.548 
 There is also the risk concerning customer disclosures and privacy 
protection.549 
 It can become an easy means for money launderers to launder their funds. 
 
Reputational Risk 
This is the risk of significant negative public opinion that results in a critical loss of 
funding or customers.  It can cause a lasting negative public image of overall bank's 
operation such that the bank's ability to establish and maintain customer 
relationships is significantly impaired.550  Reputational risk can arise: 
 If actions by the bank cause a significant loss of public confidence, 
 If systems or products do not work as expected and produce widespread 
adverse public reaction, 
 Inability to timely resolve customers problems, 
 failure to provide adequate information about product use and resolution 
procedures, 
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 where mistakes, malfeasance and fraud by third parties cause the bank to 
lack public confidence, and 
 where there is a significant breach of security.551 
Banks operating on the internet due to its complexity are fraught with particular risk 
different from the traditional face to face system of operations, and worse still is 
offshore banking that has the potential of being less regulated than onshore 
banking and virtual banking which could increase the range of insufficiency 
regulated activities.  Banks risk have been categorised into operational, 
reputational and legal risk.  The Basel Committee for Banking Supervision (BCBS) 
provides fourteen (14) principles of risk management for e-banking that guides 
promote safe and sound banking activities. 
 
5.4 Security in Internet Banking 
The advantages of Internet banking such as the ease it offers irrespective of 
banking hours and holidays, convenience in performing banking transactions, the 
flexibility in making payments, and deterred by one's geographical location attracts 
customers to maintain an e-banking account.   This comes with the fear of losing 
one's savings to cybercriminals, so of interest to banks is the security - both 
technical and legal - of transacting in cyberspace. The threats to the safety of 
Internet banking systems and the consequent losses could derive from many 
sources, such as intentional, external or internal attacks, malfunctions and 
technical problems of the system, customer misuse or inadequate design and 
improper implementation of electronic banking and control systems on the part of 




the banks.  A financial institution can remain a crucial barrier to money laundering 
with the implementation of sound internal control mechanisms - know-your-
customer and know-your-correspondent banks - and other external regulations but 
it is somehow impossible to prevent money laundering in the financial system 
entirely, though security is paramount.  A financial institution viewed as a money 
laundering pipeline may face adverse consequences such as losing loyal and law-
abiding customers, loss of reputation or face sanctions from regulatory authorities 
or having the customer account frozen or seized.  According to Connolly and Berg, 
the increasing accessibility of databases in the public internet and private intranets 
requires a reanalysis and extension of the approaches for the general security 
mechanism for database systems.  The BIS 1996 Report of the Taskforce on 
Security of Electronic Money, on the other hand, grouped security risks of the 
system and the proposed several measures mainly into three categories: 
(a) Preventive measures which includes: tamper-resistance of devices – 
electronic devices used in electronic money products which provides  the 
first line defence against outside attacks; cryptography – techniques which 
contains the logical protection of electronic money by ensuring 
confidentiality, authenticity and integrity of devices used in data during 
transmission or while stored on a devise;  on-line authorization used in card-
based system to ensure that the holder of the card is authorised to access 
funds in a particular account which in most instances would require a 
personal identification number.  This is necessary to deter a user from 
copying a specific electronic note and spending it several times over, 
therefore, a central authority must verify each transaction sequentially, on 
the basis of information about notes that have previously been issued and 
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redeemed; and, additional verifications during operations to prevent frauds 
and malfunctions, supervision and monitoring by a central operator.  
(b) Detection measures, such as transaction traceability and tracking, interac-
tion with a central system, limits on transferability of electronic money and 
statistical analysis of payment flows.  
(c)  Containment measures, including among others, restrictions on the value 
stored, expiration dates on devices and value, registration of the identity of 
the users with the issuer or a central authority.552  
 
5.5 Internet Banking Privacy 
Internet websites collect a great deal of personal information through registration 
pages, survey forms, order forms and other means, and by using systems in ways 
not discernible to online consumers, website owners can gather information about 
consumers preferences and interests.  Lack of privacy may result in the 
proliferation of customer information to unsuspecting users who may perpetuate 
fraud and other criminal activities hence the need for proper regulation of the 
internet space and more specifically internet banking opportunities to promote trust 
and confidentiality in the conduct of the banking business in accordance with 
internationally recognised norms and practices.  Privacy protection laws provide 
series of rights for the individual.  The OECD guidelines offer the following core 
principles on information privacy: 
• The collection limitation principle provides there should be limits to the 
collection of personal data, and any such data should be obtained by lawful 
                                                            
552 Basle Committee on International Settlement, ‘Security of Electronic Money’ 
<https://www.bis.org/cpmi/publ/d18.htm>  accessed 7 August 2017 
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and fair means, and where appropriate, with the knowledge or consent of 
the data subject; 
• Data quality principle entails that personal data should be relevant to the 
purpose for which they are to be used, and, to the extent necessary for those 
purposes, should be accurate, complete and kept up to date; 
• The purpose specification principle ensures that the purpose for which 
personal data are collected should be specified not later that at the time of 
data collection and the subsequent use limited to the fulfilment of those 
objectives or such others as are not incompatible with those purposes and 
are specified on each occasion of change of purpose; 
• Use limitation principle:  personal data should not be disclosed, made 
available or otherwise used for purposes other than those specified by the 
purpose specification principle, except: with the consent of the data subject, 
or, by the authority of law. 
• Security safeguards principle.  Personal data should be protected by 
reasonable security safeguards against such risks as loss or unauthorised 
access, destruction, use, modification or disclosure of data; 
• Openness principle ensures that there is a general policy of openness about 
development, practices and policies with respect to personal data.  Means 
should be readily available of establishing the existence and nature of 
personal data, and the main purpose of their use, as well as the identity and 
usual residence of the data controller; 
• Individual participation rule.  This principle ensures that an individual should 
have the right to:  
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i. obtain from a data controller, or otherwise, confirmation as to 
whether or not the data controller has data relating to him; 
ii. to have communicated to him, data relating to him with 
reasonable time; at a charge, if any, that is not excessive; 
reasonably; and a form that is readily intelligible to him; 
iii. To be given reasons if a request made under subparagraphs (i) 
and (ii) is denied, and be able to challenge such denial; and 
iv. To question data relating to him and, if challenge is successful to 
have the data erased, rectified, completed or amended; and 
• Accountability principle.  This principle ensures that a data controller be held 
accountable for complying with measures, which give effect to the principles 
stated above. 
 
5.6 The Banker-Customer Relationship  
Banks and non-bank financial institutions play a crucial role in intermediation.  
Beyond the process of mediation lies the bane of banking relationship, which is the 
bank-customer relationship.553  This relationship requires that deposits by 
customers kept by the bank with the added responsibility of payment of interest 
and the return of principal on demand.  Technological innovations have also made 
it possible for banks and other financial institutions to render services over the 
internet thus reducing the physical interface between the various intermediaries 
                                                            
553 Customer in this context can refer to anyone who deals with a bank in relation to a banking service and 
they include but not limited to those with accounts with the bank, borrowers, those who use the bank for 
financial advice, fund management, securities and derivatives dealings, other banks and market 
counterparties, commercial customers and private customers.  An account may be opened by any person 




and their clients.  Below we examine, the UK, Nigerian and South African Laws 
relating to the banker-customer relationship and in particular the duty of care and 
confidentiality to the customer compared with its obligation to report financial 
breaches (mainly money laundering laws) to designated regulatory authorities. 
The bank-customer relationship is based on contract, and to refer to the ‘special, 
overarching framework and legal relationship which is established from the 
opening of a bank account.’  The opening of a bank account creates certain legal 
rights and obligations.  Different opinions exist about the nature of the bank-
customer relationship and include: 
i. The bank is the debtor and the customer the creditor.  The customer's 
money in the bank does not represent the customer's money but a debt 
owed by the bank to the customer who is to be repaid to the customer at his 
demand by specified terms and conditions stipulated in the contract.  The 
customer is not entitled to anything more than the repayment of an 
equivalent amount, and he or she is not entitled to inquire about the bank's 
use of the deposited funds.  In the case of Foley v Hill,554 it was held that 
the banker-customer relationship was essentially that of the debtor-creditor 
relationship.  Additionally, the deposit can only be said to be received by the 
bank when it has indicated its acceptance of the money;555 
ii. The obligation of the bank towards the customer is not simply a debt but 
debt for which demand has to be made by the customer at the branch where 
the account is kept and during normal business hours unless agreed 
otherwise.  Unlike the general law relating to repayment of debts, the 
                                                            
554 (1848) 2 HLC 28, 9ER 1002 
555 Balmoral supermarket Ltd v Bank of New Zealand.  [1974] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 164 
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customer is the one to present him or herself in the branch or other 
contractually defined location to demand the repayment of deposit; 
iii. The bank is under a duty to obey the customer's authority and instruction 
(mandate) to transfer funds to bank accounts held by him with the same 
bank or another or to another beneficiary.  The bank is to carry out the 
customer's mandate with reasonable care and skill.  The duty of the 
customer is to exercise care and skill in transmitting their instructions so as 
not to mislead the bank or facilitate fraud and must notify the bank of 
unauthorised instructions that they know of. In the case of Tai Hing Cotton 
Mill Ltd v Lui Chong Hing Bank Ltd,556 it was held, that ‘the business of 
banking is the business not of the customer but of the bank.  They offer a 
service, which is to honour their customer's cheques when drawn upon an 
account in credit or within an agreed overdraft limit.  If they pay out checks 
which are not his, they are acting outside his mandate. 
iv. The bank cannot debit the account of the customer in respect of forged 
cheques.  Customers suspecting that their mandate is abused must notify 
the bank so it can take preventive action but a failure may stop the customer 
from denying that the cheque or wire transfer is proper and authentic557. 
 
                                                            
556 [1985] 3 W.L.R 317 (P.C) 
557 National Westminster Bank Ltd v Barclays Bank International Ltd [1975] Q.B. 654 at P666.  Also in Brown 
v Westminster Bank Ltd [1964] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 187 the bank was permitted to raise an estoppel and defeat 
the action of the plaintiff.   
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5.6.1 Banker’s Duty of Care 
The relationship that exists between the banker and the customer (any one 
providing a service) is based on contract, in tort,558 fiduciary law559 and is imposed 
as a matter of common law.560  The bank has a duty to carry out the mandate of the 
customer with reasonable care and skill.  The required standard of skill is that 
expected from persons of that standing and competence.  The bank cannot debit 
the customer where it has acted outside its mandate.  Banks are generally liable 
to customers where the payment has not been authorised by the customer (unless 
the customer has acted with gross negligence).  The courts have recognised the 
difficulties posed for banks of recognising when a customer may be at risk of being 
defrauded because of the vast number and speed of modern banking transactions 
and have therefore set a high threshold for this duty of care to arise.  In relation to 
providing services over the internet, it must maintain reasonably efficient and 
reliable system of operations to ensure that hardware and software infrastructure 
operates properly, is secured, prevents the disclosure of customer information in 
breach of confidentiality and prevents unauthorised transactions.  Banks are to 
adopt highly sophisticated encryption systems561 to prevent hackers from gaining 
access to its own and its customers' data, and are under strict liability to employ 
                                                            
558 Barclays Bank Plc. v Quincecare Limited and Another [1992] 4 All ER 363.  In the case of Singularis Holdings 
Limited (in official liquidation) v Daiwa Capital Markets Europe Limited [2017] EWHC 2579 (Ch), a bank was 
liable in negligence to a customer since it was on notice that its customer was at risk being defrauded by its 
directors but failed to stop payments made for purpose of misappropriating funds to the company. 
559 As Cranston noted (n425), two situations in which common law courts have imposed fiduciary duties on 
banks outside trust and agency relationship includes: when the bank assumes the role of financial adviser 
as promoter of a particular scheme; and, where the banks have been held to a fiduciary standard. 
560 Cranston (n425) 
561 Building Societies Association, ‘Industry Guidance for FSA Banking Conduct of Business Sourcebook’ 




reasonable and secure software programs for executing its intended purposes and 
such liability does not depend on proof that the bank was negligent.562  
 
5.6.2 Banker’s Duty of Confidentiality 
The banker’s duty of confidentiality was identified in the Tournier563 case in which 
it was held that a legal relationship exist between the bank and its customer arising 
from the banker-customer relationship.   In Attorney General v. Guardian 
Newspapers Ltd, Lord Goff stated the broad principle of confidentiality and 
identified three limiting concepts to this broad principle: namely, that the principle 
of confidentiality does not apply to information that is generally accessible; that the 
duty of confidence does not apply to information that is trivial or useless; and that 
in certain circumstances the public interest in maintaining trust may be outweighed 
by the public interest in disclosure.  He stated thus:    
A duty of confidence arises when confidential information comes to the 
knowledge of a person (the confidant) in circumstances where he has 
noticed, or is held to have agreed, that the information is confidential, with 
the effect that it would be just in all the circumstances that he should be 
precluded from disclosing the information to others…in the vast majority of 
cases… the duty of confidence will arise from a transaction or relationship 
between the parties…But it is well settled that a duty of confidence may 
arise in equity independently of such cases.564  
                                                            
562 St. Alban’s City and District Council v International Computers Ltd [1996] All ER 481 (CA). 
563 Tournier v National Provincial and Union Bank of England 1 KB 461 at 471-473 
564 Attorney General v Guardian Newspapers Ltd [1990] 1 AC 109 at 281 
229 
 
A banker-customer relationship is an agency contract, and the element of privacy 
stems from this agreement. In this relationship, the bank as an agent is under a 
duty of care and confidentiality to his principal.  The bank's duty of confidentiality 
is a facet of the principal’s protection against unwarranted attempts by outsiders to 
inquire into his (or her) affairs.565  This duty of confidentiality includes information 
about the customers themselves,566 their accounts obtained by the bank, for as 
long as the banker-customer relationship exists.  There reasons for obliging banks 
to keep customers' confidential data private before, during, and after their 
relationship.  For one thing, information provided to the bank remains the same 
even after the execution of the transaction, the information could be of a 
commercially sensitive nature that may adversely affect his subsequent business 
if disclosed,567 and it falls under the common law obligation of the bank's duty of 
confidentiality.  Even if such information per se may not be within the ambit of the 
bank's duty of confidentiality, the bank is expected to respect the customer's right 
of privacy as it is a person's right to keep his/her information private. In addition, 
there lies the possibility that disclosure of any confidential information after the 
termination of the banker-customer relationship may cause loss or damage to the 
person.    The duty of confidentiality is linked to the maintenance of customer 
confidence in the banking system, which is a significant source of finance for 
businesses.  A lack of confidence can trigger panic leading to bank runs, resulting 
                                                            
565 E. P Ellinger, Eva Lomnicka and Richard Hooley, Ellinger's Modern Banking Law (3rd ed, Oxford University 
Press 2002) 166 
566 In the case of GS Consultants and Investments Pty Ltd v Datasys Pty Ltd (1988) SA 726 (W), 736 (Stegmann 
J), it was observed that bankers have access to a good deal of information about their customers business, 
which each customer would have reason to conceal from their commercial competitors.  
567 Disclosure of details of a customer's financial affairs to the wrong person or at the wrong time could do 
the customer harm.  See Jackson v Royal Bank of Scotland plc. [2005] 1 WLR 377 
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in widespread withdrawals that could ultimately lead to the collapse of the financial 
system. 
Confidentiality, however, can act as a cloak for wrongdoing, often on a massive 
scale568 as political office holders who have exploited the state’s resources, drug 
barons and other fraudsters can use the banking system to cart away their ill-gotten 
wealth under cover of bank's secrecy arrangements.  Besides, to ensure 
profitability, the banks themselves woo customers to do business and 
confidentiality can act to as a barrier to bring these culprits to book as funds are 
moved to different jurisdictions and make recovery of this booty impossible.  For 
instance, the Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project (OCCRP) an 
NGO, noted that the Panama ‘documents make it clear that major banks are big 
drivers behind the creation of hard-to-trace companies in the British Virgin Islands, 
Panama and other offshore havens. The files list nearly 15,600 paper companies 
that banks set up for clients who want keep their finances under wraps, including 
thousands created by international giants UBS and HSBC.’569  As noted by 
Professor Barry Rider, contemporary money launderers are most probably rather 
more sophisticated in their concealments of proceeds of crime than, for instance, 
Al Capone and his accomplices in the 1920’s so they innovate ways using the 
banking system as a conduit to confuse the onlooker and confound the inquirer.570  
In describing the bank’s quest for cash, a former Executive Director of the United 
Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC), Antonio Mario Costa, once said: ‘the 
penetration of the financial sector by criminal money has been widespread that it 
                                                            
568 Cranston (n425) 
569 Organised Crime and Corruption Reporting Project, ‘Giant Leak of Offshore Financial Records Exposes 
Global Array of Crime and Corruption’ <https://www.occrp.org/en/panamapapers/overview/intro/> 
accessed 25 August 2017 
570 Barry Rider, The Practical and Legal Aspects (n133) 234 
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would probably be more to say that it was not the mafia trying to penetrate the 
banking system, but it was the banking sector which was actively looking for 
capital – including criminal money – not only as deposits but also as share 
acquisitions and in some cases, as a presence in the Boards of Directors’.571 
Limitations to the duty of confidentiality  
The duty of confidentiality to the customer according to Bankes LJ is not an 
absolute one as it is subject to qualifications.  The qualification is characterised by 
four key categories:  These are: 
i. Where the bank is compelled by law to disclose the information.  This 
arises where the bank's officials are required to give evidence about a 
customer's affair in court.  The law requires banks to provide specific 
information about a customer to regulatory/anti-money laundering 
authorities.  For instance, following anti-money laundering laws, banks are 
required to report suspicious transactions to the appropriate financial 
intelligence units or currency transactions report to the central bank.  Where 
disclosure is mandatory, a bank has no obligation to its customers to contest 
an apparently lawful and proper request for access.572  As Cranston noted, 
it is neither part of the duty of confidentiality nor capable of being implied as 
a matter of necessity or efficacy in the bank-customer relationship.573  The 
compulsion by law qualification has facilitated cooperation by piercing the 
veil of bank’s confidentiality thereby assisting in the prosecution of 
                                                            
571 Andrew Spannaus, ‘Former UNODC Head Talks About Drugs in the World Banking System’ 
<http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/2012/eirv39n17-20120427/09-15_3917.pdf> accessed 25 
August 2017. Bold italics added 
572 Cranston (n425) 177 
573 Ibid 177  
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transnational crimes.574  In the fight against money laundering in a global 
scale, the compulsion of law qualification has an apparent setback in the 
sense that disclosure of a bank’s secret to a foreign authority is generally 
only permissible where this is ordered by a local court, or justified under 
local statutory enactment, or by cooperation through appropriate law 
enforcement agencies.575 
The United Kingdom, Nigeria and South Africa as Commonwealth countries 
all apply this first qualification of confidentiality.  For instance, in Nigeria, 
(The Independent Corrupt Practices and other related offences Act 2000, 
Money laundering and prohibition Act 2011) makes provision for a bank to 
disclose information to law enforcement agencies.  The same is true of 
South Africa and the United Kingdom.  For international cooperation, all but 
Nigeria is yet to have the Mutual Legal Assistance legislation in place even 
if the Lower House has passed the bill.  As alluded by several scholars, it is 
essential to relax bank confidentiality to meet the needs of regulators and 
law enforcement to justify the rationale for proper investigation and 
prosecution of financial crimes with the aim of seizing the fruits of crimes.  
Interestingly, the FATF recommendation 21 provides that financial 
institutions, their directors, officers and employees should be: 
a. Protected by law from criminal and civil liability for breach of any 
restriction on disclosure of information imposed by contract or by 
legislative, regulatory or administrative provision, if they report their 
                                                            
574 David Chaikin, ‘Adapting the Qualifications to the Banker’s Duty of Confidentiality to Fight 
Transnational Crime’ [2011] 33(2) SydLawRw 12 
575 The Mutual Legal Assistance provision under the United Nations Convention on Corruption has proved 
to be a reliable tool. 
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suspicion in good faith to the FIU, even if they did not know what the 
underlying criminal activity was, and regardless of whether illegal 
activity actually occurred; and 
b. Prohibited by law from disclosing (tipping-off) the fact that a 
suspicious transaction report (STR) or related information is being 
filed with the FIU.576 
ii. If the bank has a public duty to disclose the information.   
This is applicable when there is a danger to the state or when the public 
needs protection against crime.  Bankes LJ stated that disclosure of 
confidential information is justified ‘where there is a duty to the public to 
disclose.  Disclosure of confidential information must be to the person who 
has a ‘proper interest to receive that information.'577 Disclosure under the 
public interest is described as, 'the difficult and comprehensive meaning of 
the Tournier qualification.'578  These difficulties could be due to a lack of 
clarity regarding the circumstances, which would create exceptions in the 
public interest. 
iii. If the bank's interests require disclosure  
The exception to allow disclosure in the interests of the bank was illustrated in 
Tournier’s case by an example of a bank issuing a writ claiming payment of an 
overdraft stating its amount.579  Disclosure under this exception must be limited 
                                                            
576 Caribbean Financial Action Task Force, ‘Recommendation 21 Tipping-off and confidentiality’ 
<https://cfatf-gafic.org/index.php/documents/fatf-40r/387-fatf-recommendation-21-tipping-off-and-
confidentiality> accessed 25 November 2017  
577 Tournier (n563) 530 
578 Mark Hapgood, Paget's Law of Banking (13th edn., LexisNexis Butterworths 2007) 159 
579 Gwendoline Godfrey and others, ‘Bank Confidentiality – A Dying Duty but Not Dead Yet?’ [2016] 17(3) 
Business Law International  
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strictly to information necessary to protect the bank’s interests, for example, if 
there is litigation between the bank and its customer or if the bank brings an 
action against a guarantor. 
iv. Where the customer agreed to the information being disclosed. 
If a bank notifies a customer that it intends or is entitled to provide a reference 
for a specified information to a third party and the reason for the reference, and 
actually receives consent in writing from the customer,580 there will be no 
breach of duty.581  If notice is given to a customer by the bank and the customer 
does not reply, the bank will not necessarily be entitled to assume implied 
consent.  Express provisions consenting to the disclosure of information can be 
important in documentation for loans where lenders may wish to transfer their 
interests in the future and in inter-creditor deeds where banks with separate 
relationships may want to share information on customers. 
The legal analysis of the bank’s duty of confidentiality have become more complex 
as a result of tipping off offences582 and the requirements for suspicious 
reporting.583  In implementing their regulatory requirements on money laundering 
                                                            
580 Playboy Club London Limited and Others v. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro SPA [2016] EWCA Civ 457. 
581 [1999] 2 All ER (Comm) 664 in Turner v. Royal Bank of Scotland plc it was held that a bank could not rely 
on banking practice to imply its customer's consent to the use by the bank of confidential information in 
order to give other banks references about his creditworthiness; and, Bank of Scotland v A Ltd, B and C 
[2001] 3 All ER 58.  See Richard Hooley, ‘Bankers' References and the Bank's Duty of Confidentiality: When 
Practice does not Make Perfect’ [2000] 59 The Cambridge Law Journal 21–23. 
582 A bank (its directors, officers and employees) that knows or suspects that a report is required to be made 
shall not make any disclosure ‘that is likely to prejudice an investigation that may be conducted following 
the making of the report’, thus, a bank is required to inform on its customer without alerting its customer 
to the fact of its disclosure.  See Squirrel v. National Westminster Bank Plc and HM Customs and Excise  
[2005] EWHC 664.  In the case of C v S, the court of appeal gave guidance on tipping offences reporting. 
JMLC 3(4), 373 - 376 
583 Shah v. HSBC Private Bank [2009] EWHC 78 where it was held that banks will not be liable for losses 
suffered by customers (who are the subject of notifications) due to a delay in implementing their 




standards, banks could inadvertently alert suspected culprits of ongoing money-
laundering investigations. This inadvertent disclosure could invidiously render the 
bank liable for having committed an offence of tipping off.584  The only defence 
available to the bank is when it does not know or suspect that the disclosure was 
likely to be prejudicial. 
 
5.7 Prudential Regulation 
Prudential regulation defined as ‘the imposition by government of controls over the 
decisions of individuals or firms concerning the ‘safety and soundness' of the 
financial institutions under their administrative supervision’.585  Defined also as ‘the 
regulation of deposit-taking institutions and supervision of the conduct of these 
institutions and set down requirements that limit their risk-taking. The prudential 
regulation aims to ensure the safety of depositors' funds and keep the stability of 
the financial system’.586 
Regulations arise most times from bitter historical experiences.587   The primary 
economic argument for prudential regulation includes: 
 Externality - bank runs.  Positive externalities arise from the acceptance of 
deposits as a medium of exchange and a store of value, but these could be 
eroded by bank failures.588  The default of by one institution can spread to 
                                                            
584 The Bank of Scotland v A Ltd [2001] 1 WLR 751.  See also C v S [1991] 1 WLR 1551 
585 Vincent P. Polizatto, ‘Prudential Regulation and Banking Supervision: Building an Institutional 
Framework for Banks’ (Background Paper for the 1989 World Development Report, WPS 340, The World 
Bank January 1990) 
586 Ibid 2 
587 Cranston (n425) 65 
588  Warren P Hogan and Ian G. Sharpe, ‘Prudential Regulation of Financial System:  A Functional Approach’ 
[1997] 4(1) Agenda 2 
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undermine other institutions.  This risk derives from the interbank linkages, 
the linkages between banks in the payment system and the public 
perception that other banks are in the same position as suspect or failed 
banks.589 
 To ensure safety and soundness of the financial system.  The courts have 
recognised that the solvency and soundness of financial institutions are in 
the interest of consumers and a valid ground for restricting the free 
movement of services.590 
 Market power – monopoly institutions can exploit its market power. 
 Information asymmetry – difficulty or cost of obtaining information, giving 
rise to vulnerability to exploitation to uninformed depositors.591   
 To ensure the protection of consumers of financial services, depositors, 
borrowers and investors.  Regulation aimed at protecting consumers so they 
can obtain adequate information to understand financial services and 
markets as well as products offered before making investment decisions.592 
 Transparency and adequate disclosure.  The courts have favoured the 
disclosure of information which aimed at protecting the general interest of 
consumers;593 it also confirmed the consumer's right to information and 
education as a central tenet of the EU consumer protection policy.594 
                                                            
589 Cranston (n425) 67 
590 Gkoutzinis (n495) 141.  See German Insurance case C-205/84 between Commission v Germany [1986] 
ECR 3755, para 39.  In the case of Societe Parodi v. Banque H. Albert de Bary et Cie [1997] ECR I-3899., 
prudential and consumer protection standards such as deposit guarantee schemes were considered to be 
legitimate grounds for national measures because they increased the stability of the banking system and 
the protection of savers. 
591 (n583) 15   
592 Gkoutzinis (n495) 142 
593 Ibid 143 
594 Ibid 143 
237 
 
 To forestall honesty, integrity and accountability.  It is a matter of public 
interest to implant and enhance investor confidence and trustworthiness of 
the financial intermediaries on whom investors are reliant.595 
 The prevention of fraud, money laundering and terrorism.  Fraud can be 
perpetrated by insiders in the form of loans to phoney borrowers or 
borrowers that are nominees of an insider and by outsiders who may involve 
fraudsters using banks and the banking system to facilitate their schemes 
or to secrete their gains.596   
Most national authorities have legislation governing the conduct of banks and non-
bank financial institutions. In the same way, the supervisory agencies empowered 
to regulate the activities of banks are entirely different from non-bank financial 
institutions.  Preference in most cases given to banks due to the nature and scale 
of their operations and the effect they have on the economy.  In Nigeria, for 
example, the Banks and other financial Institutions Act (Bofia 1990) regulates the 
activities of banks and other financial institutions.  However, there still other specific 
legislation such as the Trustee Investment Act, Securities and Exchange Act and 
the Insurance Act regulates other non-bank financial institutions. 
The experience of our time shows that non-bank financial institutions can also 
significantly affect the financial system where a failure occurs.  They experience 
same fundamental ‘nightmares’ as banks.  Examples: 2008 – the collapse of Bear 
Stearns, Lehman Brothers (investment banks), and AIG (insurance company.  The 
financial industry has witnessed significant changes owing to factors such as 
globalisation, deregulation and consolidation.  The result is fierce competition 
                                                            
595 Ibid 143  
596 Cranston (n425) 68,69 
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between banks and non-bank financial intermediaries and banks resorted to the 
use of information technology, computer networks and internet to deliver services 
to improve profitability. 
Banking regulators have recognised that the mechanical use of traditional 
regulatory techniques is not able to address the challenges posed by using the 
internet and have therefore resorted to assessing the overall financial position and 
soundness of the supervised institutions and their specific risks related to the 
nature and scale of operations.597  The concept of technological neutrality is the 
regulatory approach adopted for services delivered over the internet.598  The theory 
holds that in enforcing applicable laws, regulatory authorities shall make no 
distinction between the different channels of delivering financial services except in 
cases where the medium generates particular risks that justify special regulatory 
treatment.599  This approach does not seek to discard the traditional restrictions. 
However, it helps to enforce their application in parallel with the establishment of a 
risk-based monitoring process.  The risk-based process brings within the ambit of 
the regulatory authorities the overall evaluation of the competence of the bank's 
internal systems to identify, monitor and control risks in all aspects of the 
production and delivery of their services.600  Also, there is a full framework of 
statutory and regulatory requirement which reflect the best practices on internal 
                                                            
597 Bank for International Settlement (BIS), ‘Basel Committee for Banking Supervision: Management and 
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accessed 23 May 2016 
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organisation ensuring financial soundness, solvency and liquidity and adequate 
resources; and the protection of the clients' proprietary interests in their assets.601 
5.7.1 Sources of Prudential Regulations 
Regulations primarily derive their origin from the following: 
• National Legislations.  For example, the FiSMA 2000 is the statutory 
framework regulating electronic commerce and financial services in the UK; 
• Directives issued by supervisory/regulatory authorities whose existence has 
been enabled by law; 
• The central bank of the country publishes guidelines on the capital 
adequacy requirements and other requirements to forestall the soundness 
and stability of the financial system; 
• The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision develops standards of 
banking regulation which are adopted by national regulators; 
• Regional regulatory bodies, for example, the European Union Directives put 
forward by the European committee of Banking Standards; 
• International bodies such as the International Organisation of Securities 
Commissioners (IOSCO) also play significant roles in their formulation. 
 
5.7.2 Prudential banking regulation techniques. 
Two basic techniques employed in prudential regulation: Protective and Preventive 
Regulation.  Preventive regulation involves those techniques which are designed 
                                                            
601 BIS Electronic Banking and Electronic Money Activities (n546) 10 
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to forestall crises by reducing the risks facing banks.602  Critical tools employed to 
forestall crises includes:  
1. Initial entry requirements and capitalisation.   
2. Minimum level of capital directly linked to the size and quality of their asset 
portfolio. 
3. Liquidity controls.  Banks are to invest their funds that sufficient liquid assets 
meet immediate obligations.  A recent development suggests that financial 
institutions must understand their liquidity needs at an enterprise-wide 
level.603  Weak liquidity risk controls is a familiar source of failure especially 
when the firm's treasury function lacks information from business lines about 
expected liquidity needs or contingency fund planning.604  For example, 
many contingency funding plans did not adequately prepare for the 
possibility that individual off-balance sheet exposures can substantially 
affect the existence of the institutions in the wake of the global financial 
crises.605 
4. Diversification of loan portfolios to achieve government objectives. 
5. An assessment of the quality of management practices, the value of the 
asset portfolio, the enforcement of regulatory standards and the 
determination of the adequacy of capital through the submission of timely 
reports to the regulators for assessment. 
The protective technique provides support to banks once they are crisis threatened 
or crisis has materialised.  This method aimed at providing financial assistance to 
                                                            






distressed institutions and aggrieved consumers.  The following tools depending 
on the circumstance assist banks when they face crises: 
•  Lender of last resort facilities. 
• The safety net of deposit insurance.  Deposit insurance can take the form 
of state guarantee; depositors conferred with priority over other creditors in 
the advent of insolvency, a deposit insurance or guarantee scheme. 
• Rescue operations (bailout).  A bailout usually justified on the ground of 
preventing contagion in the banking sector.  If a solvent yet illiquid bank is 
not rescued, there may be a bank run on other banks.606  Rescue can take 
the form of an acquisition or the injecting of fresh capital as a loan or 
guarantee to ensure the survival of the institution.  
• Short-term deposits taxation.  The imposition of taxes (or penalties) on early 
withdrawals aimed at indirectly preventing bank panics by increasing the 
cost of rapid consumption.607 
           
5.8 The Significance of Politically Exposed Persons 
There exists some evidence that the international banking community is complicit 
in assisting corrupt government officials world over, either wittingly or unwittingly, 
to transfer, deposit and host monies stolen from their countries.  These corrupt 
officials use agents, companies and other legal entities to control or hold assets on 
their behalf, family members and their cronies, officers of government agencies or 
the military, bribe payers – individuals and corporate entities, third-party 
intermediaries as the means to syphon their illicit wealth to perceived safe 
                                                            
606 ibid 94 
607 H. Zhu, ‘Bank Runs: Welfare and Policy Implications’ [2005] 1(3) Journal of Financial Stability 279 
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territories.  These large cases of grand corruption are in a newly released ‘Grand 
Corruption Database.’  The online database is a project of the Stolen Asset 
Recovery (StAR) Initiative of the World Bank and the United Nations Office on 
Drugs and Crime.608  The database revealed how significant amounts of illicit wealth 
have been amassed by politically exposed persons and also how these funds have 
been hosted in foreign jurisdictions and hidden in trusts companies, private 
companies, and foundations or the name of family members and their associates.    
 
PEPS are high net-worth and prestigious individuals and are highly sought for by 
financial institutions.  PEPS are financial clients who occupy a position within a 
government or similar public structure or their association with political office 
holders.  The FATF defined PEP as ‘an individual entrusted with a prominent public 
function.’ The guidance paper further identifies the following: 
a. Foreign PEPs are ‘individuals who are or have been entrusted with 
prominent public functions by a foreign country, for example, Heads of State 
or government, senior politicians, senior government, judicial or military 
officials, senior executives of state-owned corporations, important political 
party officials;’ 
b. Domestic PEPs are individuals who are or have been entrusted domestically 
with prominent public functions, for example, Head of state or government, 
senior politicians, senior government judicial or military officials, top 
executives of state-owned corporations, important political party officials; 
                                                            
608 Stolen Asset Initiative, ‘StAR Corruption Database: Asset Recovery Watch & Settlements Database’ 
<http://star.worldbank.org/corruption-cases/?db=All> accessed 23 May 2017   
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c. International organisation PEPs are persons who are or have been 
entrusted with a prominent function by a global organisation refers to 
members of senior management or individuals assigned with equivalent 
features, i.e. directors, deputy directors and members of the board or 
equivalent functions; 
d. Family members are individuals who are related to a PEP either directly 
(consanguinity) or through marriage or similar (civil0 forms of partnership; 
and 
e. Close associates – individuals who are intimately connected to a PEP, either 
socially or professionally. 
It is the objective of this standard to identify the various forms of PEPS and help to 
map their activities for financial institutions to detect and report suspicious 
transactions.  PEPs constitute the leading class of high-risk customers of banks.  
What is intriguing is the fact that most FIUs world over has a private list of these 
PEPs yet money gets laundered daily.  It's unlikely if the list gets updated regularly 
or companies fail to disclose PEPs who are disguised beneficial owners or that the 
governments' published list is inadequate.  It is not that PEPs are predisposed to 
committing financial crimes, but instead that their position, about state funds and 
other opportunities, significantly heightens the risk that they may do something 
corrupt, fraudulent or otherwise illegal.   According to the Wolfsburg group 
guidance on politically exposed persons, relationships with PEPs may represent 
increased risks due to the possibility that individuals holding such positions may 
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misuse their power and influence for personal gain or advantage, or for own gain 
or benefit for close family members and close associates.609  
PEPs pose an increased reputational risk to financial and non-bank financial 
institutions.  Corrupt PEPs circumvents AML/CFT and anti-corruption safeguard by 
deliberately disguising the nature of transactions through shell companies, 
corporate entities or professional intermediaries.   
As noted by Michael Levi, ‘public corruption cases typically involve either a legal 
or natural person outside the government who pays a person inside the 
government in exchange for a government benefit or PEP who embezzles public 
funds.’610  In the second case mentioned above, the corruptor may ‘set up corporate 
or other non-transparent vehicles and act as bankers or other types of value 
transfer advisors.’611  In some recent high-profile cases, it has been non-family 
members, including highly respected ‘advisors’ and lawyers, accountants and 
diplomats who have, in most cases unwittingly, assisted in camouflaging and 
laundering dirty money.  One of the most prominent examples of this trend is the 
case of former Zambian President Frederick Chiluba, where Meer Care & Desai, 
the law firm representing him, was implicated as well.  In Peru, a former Head of 
the Intelligence Service, Vladimiro Montesinos was used by President Alberto 
Fujimori, during his reign in office to steal from the state more than US$2 billion, a 
figure equal to nearly 9 percent of Peru's current stock of external debt.  A total of 
US$ 1billion is believed to have been sent overseas, while Montesinos alone is 
                                                            
609 The Wolfsberg Group, ‘Wolfsberg Guidance on Politically Exposed Persons,’ < http://www.wolfsberg-
principles.com/pdf/standards/Wolfsberg-Guidance-on-PEPs-May-2017.pdf> accessed 8 June 2017   
610 Michael Levi, ‘How Well Do Anti-Money Laundering Controls Work In Developing Countries’ in Peter 
Reuter (eds.) Draining Development? Controlling Flows of Illicit Funds from Developing Countries (World 
Bank, 2012) 388 
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suspected to have amassed a fortune of worth US$ 800million.612  Loopholes in the 
domestic legislation were employed to facilitate the repatriation of illegal funds.  
Following the argument of Gordon, Levi posit that in almost all grand corruption 
cases ‘the proceeds of corruption are already within the financial system at the time 
of their generation.  And ‘if before or after the award of a contract, depending on 
the level of trust and other factors, the corrupt government contractor withdraws or 
transfers it to a corrupt PEP, this would break the chain of banks records 
connecting the two.’613 
 
The FATF guidance on PEPs require financial institutions and designated non-
financial businesses and professions,614 (DNFBP) to identify customers (and 
beneficial owners.  If these are different, establish and maintain up-to-date 
customer profiles, monitor transactions to determine if they match customer 
profiles, if they do not match, examine the transactions to determine if these might 
represent the proceeds of crimes, including by reviewing the sources of fund and 
if they appear to represent the proceeds of crime, report the transactions to the 
FIU.  FATF recommendation 12615 on foreign PEPs (whether a customer or 
beneficial owner), provides that in addition to performing regular customer due 
diligence, adopt the following measures:  
• Have appropriate risk management systems to determine whether the 
customer or the beneficial owner is a politically exposed person; 
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• Obtain senior management approval for establishing (or continuing, for 
existing customers) such business relationships; 
• Take reasonable measures to determine the source of wealth and source 
of funds; and 
• Conduct enhanced ongoing monitoring of the business relationship. 
Customer due diligence and record keeping requirement apply to DNFBPs. 
Arguably, the effectiveness of an international AML/CFT regime largely depends 
on the efficacy of its constituents.  A review of compliance with recommendation 
21 - politically exposed persons - based on a recent report,616on the overall 
compliance with FATF recommendations updated in September 2017, shows that 
of the 36 countries sampled 17% complied, 31% primarily complied, 44% partly 
complied and 8% were non-complaint.  This only shows the difficulty associated 
with mapping PEPs as low levels of compliance portends problems in associating 
the actions of PEPS the payment system.  
  
5.9 The Importance of Identifying Beneficial Owners 
Corporate vehicles aid corrupt public office holders to conceal the proceeds of 
grand corruption.  In many instances, these corrupt officials employ the services of 
financial institutions, lawyers, accountants and other professionals – generally 
known as trust and company services providers - to facilitate their schemes. In the 
                                                            
616 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Table of Ratings for Assessment Conducted against the 2012 FATF 
Recommendations, using the 2013 FATF Methodology’ <http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/4th-Round-Ratings.pdf> accessed 13 September 2017. 
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same vein, some have used front companies, legal entities, legal arrangements617 
as well as non-governmental agencies as conduits to conceal illicit enrichment.   
Because beneficial ownership information can be obscured through the use of shell 
companies, complex ownership structures, bearer shares and bearer share 
warrants, unrestricted use of legal persons as directors, informal nominee 
shareholders and directors, trust companies and other financial and non-financial 
intermediaries, it is imperative that appropriate controls are in place to detect 
officials who hide under these structures.  Diepreye Alamieyeseigha, a former 
governor of Bayelsa State, Nigeria created five corporate vehicles that separated 
his name and beneficial interest from the legal ownership and control of various 
financial and real estate assets.  The majority of these companies were private 
limited companies in a variety of jurisdictions acquired and managed through a 
variety of banking and administrative trust and company service providers.618  From 
2004 to 2008 Teodoro Nguema Obiang Mangue, the son of the President of 
Equatorial Guinea, used lawyers, bankers, real estate agents, and escrow agents 
to move over $110 million in suspect funds into the United States.  Joseph Estrada, 
then president of the Philippines, set up the Erap Youth Foundation Inc. and with 
some collaborators, secretly deposited into the foundation's fund account $4.3 
Million collected from illegal ‘junteng’ gambling operations.  Former President Omar 
Bongo of Gabon, employed the services of a U.S. lobbyist, Jeffrey Birrell, to help 
purchase U.S. built armoured vehicles, and obtained U.S. government 
authorization to purchase U.S. built C-130 aircraft in which over $18 million of 
suspect funds were wire transferred from Gabon through an entity called Ariya into 
                                                            
617 These are natural persons at the end of the chain, who ultimately controls or owns the legal 
arrangement. 
618 Nigeria v Santolina Inv. Corp., [2007] EWHC (Ch) 437,  
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U.S bank maintained by Birrell in the name of Grace Group LLC, a corporation 
formed by him and his wife.619  Jennifer Douglas Abubakar, fourth wife of former 
Vice president of Nigeria Atiku Abubakar, between 2000 and 2008, using offshore 
companies brought in over $40 million of suspect funds to the United States.620  It 
is obvious from the above that the beneficial owner's exercises control at arms-
length basis not directly but indirectly and covertly quite invisible from the world.   A 
basic reason for the misuse of these corporate vehicles is the lack of transparency 
involved in identifying the owner621 and control of companies, legal arrangements 
and foundations.   In response to ensure transparency and effective due diligence, 
the FATF recommendation states that: 
‘Competent authorities should be able to obtain or have access in a timely 
fashion too, adequate, accurate and current information on the beneficial 
ownership and control of companies and other legal persons (beneficial 
ownership information) that are created in the country.’622   
Countries are enjoined to have proper mechanisms that identify and describes the 
different types, forms and essential features of legal persons in their countries; 
define the processes for the creation of those legal persons and obtain and record 
crucial and beneficial ownership information; make the information public; and 
access the money laundering and terrorist financing risks associated with different 
types of legal persons created in the country.  Similarly, The FATF definition of 
                                                            
619 Levin (n219) 170  
620 Ibid 173 
621 The concept of beneficial ownership originated in the United Kingdom during the development of trust 
law where a distinction was made between two types of ownership: legal ownership and beneficial 
ownership. 
622 Financial Action Task Force, ‘Recommendation 24: Transparency and Beneficial Ownership of Legal 
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beneficial ownership extends beyond legal ownership and control to consider the 
notion of ultimate (actual) ownership and control.  It defines a beneficial ownership 
as: 
The natural person who ultimately owns or controls a customer and the 
natural person on whose behalf a transaction is being conducted.  It also 
includes those persons who exercise ultimate control over a legal person 
arrangement. 
FATF recommendation 24 on transparency and beneficial ownership of legal 
persons requires that countries that have legal persons that can issue bearer 
shares or bearer share warrants or which allow nominee shareholders or nominee 
directors should take effective measures to ensure that they are not misused for 
money laundering or terrorist financing.  About legal arrangements, countries 
should ensure that there is accurate and timely information on express trusts, 
including information on settlors, trustees and beneficiary that can be obtained or 
accessed on a timely fashion by competent authorities. 
There are practical differences in the implementation of the FATF 
recommendations and; this is evident in the recent compliance rating released for 
36 countries selected from industrialised and developing countries in September 
2017.  Compliance with Recommendation R.33 and R.34 as indicated in the chart 
below shows that of the 36 countries assessed, 14% or 5 countries were compliant, 





Source:  Own analysis of data obtained from http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/publications/mutualevaluations/?hf=10&b=0&s=desc(fatf_releasedate).   
Corporate vehicles are the instruments through which investments are made in the 
economy and globally, so in the majority of cases businesses are conducted 
legitimately, but as it is with deviant behaviour, few companies may be used for 
unlawful purposes including the laundering of the proceeds of corruption.  In one 
study of 150 cases of grand corruption, company's    Financial institutions and law 
enforcement face vital challenge to identify cases involving offshore legal 
structures or corporate vehicles for international customers where in some cases 
the information is limited.  Individual jurisdictions have their peculiar laws allowing 
different types of legal structures and various roles within each type of vehicle or 
structure.  This certainly creates legal conflicts and informed corrupt public officials 
can take advantage of these legal loopholes. 
Enhanced due diligence, internal control measures and beneficial owner risk 
management strategies adopted by financial institutions as well as control 










agencies have not stopped the tide since launderers are always one step ahead.  
This is primarily due to the profits associated with the business which caters to the 
interest of smart professionals who can devise schemes to outsmart controls.  In 
the same vein, lack of political will in strengthening institutional capacity; lack of 
international cooperation regarding information sharing; and government policies 
about secrecy laws and investment drive help to foster illicit laundering of the 
proceeds of corruption. 
 
5.10 International Initiatives on Prudential Regulation and Supervision of 
Internet Banking 
 
An essential aspect of the electronic financial activity is the regulation and 
supervision of financial institutions engaging in electronic commerce in financial 
services.  Prudential regulation of banks implies that the government imposes 
specific controls over the decisions of individuals and firms with the aim of 
maintaining the safety and soundness of the financial institutions prevent bank 
failures and ensure financial stability under its administrative supervision.  These 
regulations seek to prescribe rules which either promote the prudent conduct of 
banking operations or regulate in a legally binding manner the financial position 
(balance sheet) of the financial institution for the bank to absorb losses where they 
materialise.  Where they ultimately fail, the regulation seeks to protect depositors 
by ensuring compensation through deposit insurance schemes or by the provision 
of emergency financial assistance (bailout) to the financial institution to maintain 
public confidence and reduce the adverse effects of bank runs or economic crises. 
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Prudential regulatory intervention seeks to mitigate ‘severe information 
asymmetries between consumers and institutions, providing an important service 
to the former through the imposition of sophisticated rules and the exercise of close 
monitoring on their behalf’.623 It has been recognised that given the changes in the 
financial industry with the advent of information technology and internet banking, 
that the emphasis on prudential approach should preferably be qualitative rather 
than quantitatively based on the specific risks related to the nature and scale of 
banking activities.  Prudential regulation, therefore, entails the identification of risks 
that are likely to undermine the financial condition of banks, thus the development 
of regulatory and supervisory techniques capable of monitoring, managing, 
controlling or reducing the identified risks.  Banks are faced with several forms of 
risk: credit risk, liquidity risk, market risk and foreign exchange risk.  Additional non-
financial risks arise due to the operational characteristics of electronic finance and 
internet banking.  Among these are the high dependence on information 
technology; remote and distant interaction of over a publicly accessible 
telecommunications network; constant innovation in services and procedures; the 
unprecedented value of information acquisition; storage and processing; and, its 
cross-border character of operations.  More so, internet banking is exposed to a 
wide range of legal risks arising from the possibility of losses due to the violation 
of or non-compliance with laws, rules, regulations or prescribed practices.  No 
doubt, with the ease of access through the internet, the impersonal and remote 
nature of the contract between the financial institution and the customer and 
rapidity of electronic transactions, electronic financial activities is particularly 
                                                            




vulnerable to money laundering activities.  Laundering of money on the internet 
entails transferring money from one bank to the other, using different names and 
different locations repeatedly until the funds become clean or untraceable.  In 
recognition of this vulnerability, leading regulatory authorities in each state assume 
the task of overseeing the conduct of banks by monitoring compliance with anti-
money laundering legislation in addition to enforcing such law tailored to banking 
operations.  More worrisome is the entry of non-bank financial institution whereby 
criminal elements opt to use electronic cash as a way of anonymously transferring 
funds.  Corrupt public officials who desire to be unseen and unknown can use 
electronic forms of currency to move their illicit monies globally using the internet 
as the perfect tool. 
The regulator of core banking activities varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction as 
some jurisdictions hive off the prudential regulation of specified banks into separate 
regulatory bodies with their legislative regime624 while other jurisdictions entrust this 
function on central bank.625 Still, other jurisdictions prefer an integrated supervisor 
to reflect the reality of financial institutions and markets, whereby commercial 
banks, investment banks and insurance companies come under a single entity 
other than the Central Bank.626 
Below we consider international and local initiatives geared towards regulating the 
internet banking and associated money-laundering risk.  First is the Basle 
Committee’s work on regulating internet banking and other e-commerce activities, 
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626 The case of the United Kingdom where the Financial Services Authority is responsible for prudential 
regulation.  See Cranston (n425) 83 
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followed by the regulatory provisions of the Financial Action Task Force on 
beneficial ownership and then the local prudential regulatory activities. 
 
5.11 The Basel Committee and electronic financial activities 
In the midst of using internet for banking services, international regulators continue 
to evaluate their roles in managing and monitoring electronic commerce, money 
and electronic banking in particular.  The Basle Committee is a creation of the G-
10 with the aim of improving collaboration between bank supervisors.  This 
committee provides a forum for discussion on the handling of specific banking 
supervision issues; coordinates the sharing of supervisory responsibilities; and 
seeks to enhance standards of supervision.  A preliminary study on the risk 
management implications of electronic banking and its repercussion was 
conducted in 1998 with a full paper.627 The study demonstrated a clear need for 
more work in the area of e-banking risk management.  The document among other 
things suggested, ‘Operational risk, reputational risk and legal risk are the most 
important risk categories for electronic banking and electronic money’.628 As a 
follow up to the preliminary study, a working group comprised of bank supervisors 
and central banks, known as the Electronic Banking Group (EBG) formed in 1999.  
In 2000 the group released a report on risk management and supervisory issues 
which ‘inventoried and assessed the major risk associated with e-banking, namely 
strategic risk, reputational risk, operational risk (including security and legal risks) 
                                                            
627 Bank for International Settlements, ‘Risk Management for Electronic Banking and Electronic Money 
Activities (BS/97/122 March 1998) <https://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs35.pdf> accessed 14 September 2017 
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and credit, market and liquidity risks’.629 The risk management principles fall into 
three broad and often overlapping category of issues:  board and management 
oversight630 encompassing adequate management oversight of e-banking 
activities,631 establishment of a comprehensive security control process,632 
extensive due diligence and management oversight process for outsourcing 
relationships633 and other third-party dependencies;634  Security controls635 which 
includes authentication of e-banking customers,636 non-repudiation and 
accountability for e-banking transactions,637 appropriate measures to ensure 
segregation of duties,638 proper authorisation controls within e-banking 
transactions,639 records and information, establishment of clear audit trails for e-
banking activities640 and confidentiality of crucial bank information;641 and, Legal and 
reputational risk management.642 This involves appropriate disclosures for e-
banking services,643 privacy of customer information,644 capacity, business 
continuity and contingency planning to ensure availability of e-banking systems 
and services and incident response planning.645 The principles are not legal 
provisions in themselves but rather are guides to promote safe and sound internet 
related financial activities.  This is because the committee believes that setting 
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detailed risk management requirements in the area of internet banking might be 
counter-productive as these might become outdated due to the speed of change 
related to product and technological innovation. 
 
5.11.1 Board and Management Oversight 
The first broad category is that the board of directors have the primary 
responsibility of ensuring appropriate adequate controls are in place to safeguard 
e-banking activities including the establishment of specific accountability, policies 
and controls to manage these risks.  The board should ensure that e-banking plans 
integrated within corporate strategic goals, establish transparent processes for the 
identification of specific threat posed by e-banking activities, establish appropriate 
procedures for mitigation and monitoring of identified risk, and conduct reviews to 
evaluate the results of e-banking activities against the business plans and 
objectives of the institution.  The oversight function is summarised in three 
principles. 
Principle 1:  the board of directors and senior management should establish 
effective management oversight over the risks associated with e-banking activities, 
including the establishment of specific accountability, policies and controls to 
manage these risks.  This principle supports the need for a vigilant management 
oversight required for the provision of adequate internal control mechanisms over 
e-banking activities.  As part of management objective, there should be in place a 
defined organisation's risk appetite about electronic banking.  Also, a determined 
delegation and reporting mechanisms, including necessary escalation procedures 
for incidents that impact the bank's safety, soundness or reputation to be 
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established.  Tools in place to address any unique risk factors associated with the 
provision of e-banking products and services that is secure, available and 
maintains integrity; and that appropriate due diligence and risk analysis performed 
before the bank conducts cross-border e-banking activities.646 
Principle 2:  the board of directors and senior management should review and 
approve the critical aspects of the bank's security control processes at all times.  
The development and continued maintenance of security control infrastructure that 
adequately safeguard the e-banking systems and data from internal and external 
threats is a critical fiduciary duty of the board of directors and senior management.  
Given the security challenges e-banking brings especially operating over the public 
internet network, the board needs to ascertain that the bank has a comprehensive 
security process, including policies and procedures that address the challenges 
and threats.  An efficient e-banking security processes would include: (i) 
assignment of explicit management/staff responsibility for overseeing the 
establishment and maintenance of corporate security policies; (ii) sufficient 
physical controls to prevent unauthorised access to the computing environment; 
(iii) enough logical controls and monitoring processes to avoid unauthorised 
internal and external access to e-banking applications and databases, and, (iv) 
regular review and testing of security controls, including the continuous tracking of 
current industry security development and installation of appropriate software 
upgrades, service  packs and other required measures.647 
Principle 3:  The board of directors and senior management should establish a 
comprehensive and on-going due diligence and oversight process for managing 
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the bank's outsourcing relationships and other third-party dependencies supporting 
e-banking.648 Outsourcing critical e-banking functions lessens bank's management 
control. Hence the need to have a comprehensive process to manage third party 
dependence, explicitly focusing on ensuring that  the bank fully understands the 
risk associated with entering into an outsourcing or partnership agreement for its 
e-banking systems and applications.  Conduct an appropriate due diligence review 
of competency and financial viability of any third party service provider or partner 
prior to entering into any contract for e-banking services.  Clearly define contractual 
accountability of all parties to the outsourcing partnership, all outsourcing systems 
and operations are subject to risk management, security and privacy policies that 
meet the bank's standard, periodic internal/external audits on the outsourced 
services and appropriate contingency plans exist for outsourced banking 
activities.649 
 
5.11.2 Security Controls 
The threats to the security of Internet banking systems and the consequent losses 
could derive from many sources such as intentional, external or internal attacks, 
mainly with the aim of financial gain, malfunctions and technical problems of the 
system, customer misuse or inadequate design and improper implementation of 
electronic banking and money systems on the part of the banks.  In the short-term, 
bank customers might be attracted by all the advantages of Internet banking but in 
the long run what seems to interest them more is the security-both technical and 
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legal-of transacting in cyberspace. Due to the enhanced security challenges of 
electronic banking activities, the risk management framework ensures that the 
board of directors and senior management have measure specifically for 
authentication, non-repudiation, data and transaction integrity, segregation of 
duties, authorisation controls, and maintenance of audit trails and confidentiality of 
crucial banking information. 
   
Principle 4:  Banks should act appropriately to authenticate the identity and 
authorisation of customers whom it conducts business over the internet.650 
Customer verification during account origination is vital in reducing the risk of 
identity theft, fraudulent account applications and money laundering.  A customer 
is a person or entity that maintains an account with the bank or whose account are 
kept on its behalf (beneficial owners); the beneficiaries of transactions conducted 
by professional intermediaries; and any person or entity connected with a financial 
transaction who can pose a significant reputational or other risk to the bank.651 The 
general guidelines on customer identification requires that for natural persons, 
banks should verify customer information652 with documents most challenging to 
obtain illicitly and to counterfeit653 by at least one of the following methods: 
i. confirming the date of birth from an official document 
ii. confirming permanent address 
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652 This includes the legal name and other names used (such as maiden name), correct permanent 
address, telephone number and email address, date and place of birth, nationality, occupation, an official 
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type and nature of banking relationship and signature. 
653 Ibid 6 
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iii. contacting the customer by telephone, by letter or by email to verify 
information supplied after the account has been opened 
iv. Establish the validity of the official documentation provided through 
certification by an authorised person.654 
Customer verification could assist the bank to make an initial assessment of the 
risk profile of the customer.  In addition, for those recognised as high-risk 
customers, additional information from independent sources to confirm among 
other things: the individual's source of wealth; verification of employment including 
any public position held; and, any prior bank reference and contact with the bank 
regarding the customer and evidence of permanent home address. 
The general principles of customer identification for natural persons are also 
applicable to institutions655 with particular attention given to the different type of 
risks each institution poses.  The specific institution includes trust, nominee and 
fiduciary accounts;656 corporate vehicles;657 introduced businesses;658 client 
                                                            
654 Bank for International Settlement, ‘Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: Sound Management of 
Risks Related to Money Laundering and Financing of Terrorism’ 
<https://www.bis.org/bcbs/publ/d405.htm> accessed 30 November 2017 
655 The FATF defines Financial Institution as ‘any natural or legal persons who conduct business one more of 
the following activities or operations for or on behalf of a customer: 1. Acceptance of deposits and other 
repayable funds from the public; 2. Lending; 3. Financial leasing; 4. Money or value transfer services; 5. 
Issuing and managing means of payment; 6. Financial guarantees and commitments; 7. Trading in: a. money 
market instruments, b. Foreign Exchange, c. Exchange, interest rate and index instruments, d. Transferable 
securities, e. commodity futures; 8.participation in securities and the provision of financial services related 
to such issues; 9. Individual and collective portfolio management; 10. Safekeeping and administration of 
cash or liquid securities on behalf of other persons; 11. Otherwise investing, administering or managing 
funds or money on behalf of other persons; 12. Underwriting and placement of life insurance and other 
investment related insurance; and 13. Money and currency are changing.’   
656 BIS (CDD n649) 8 
657 Ibid 8 
658 Ibid 8 
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accounts opened by professional intermediaries;659 politically exposed persons;660 
and non-face-to-face customers.661 
For instance, to circumvent customer identification procedures trust, nominee and 
fiduciary accounts can be used whereby the customer may be taking the name of 
another customer acting as a front or acting on behalf of another person or trustee, 
nominee or intermediary.662 In other instances, natural persons as means of 
operating anonymous accounts can use corporate vehicles.663 This underscores 
the need for adequate customer verification to prevent the risk of money laundering 
and other criminal activities perpetrated through the financial institution.  Identifying 
politically exposed persons who pose an increased risk of laundering corrupt funds 
is an essential function of a bank's anti-money laundering controls thus the need 
to ensure proper customer identification, and, more importantly at the account 
opening stage.  Accepting funds from politically exposed persons can severely 
damage a bank's reputation and undermine the public confidence in the entire 
financial centre.664  This may not be said in instances where the banks themselves 
lobby to have accounts of PEPS - legislators as well as top government 
functionaries - in order to shore up their deposit base or to meet other essential 
marketing objectives by willingly compromising the bank's know your customer 
(KYC) policy.  As observed by one commentator, ‘In Nigeria, PEPS are 
untouchable and highly esteemed by financial institutions.  This is not surprising 
                                                            
659 Ibid 8 
660 Ibid 8 
661 Ibid 8 
662 Ibid 8  
663 Ibid 10 
664 Ibid 10 
262 
 
because government institutions and PEPS are the preferred clients of financial 
institutions operating in Nigeria.’665    
Customer due diligence for account opening requires verification of relevant 
documents and identification of those who have authority to operate the account, 
the nature and purpose of the business and its legitimacy, some form of official 
identification such as tax identification number.666 Principally, the aim of customer 
identification is to identify those who have control especially those with ultimate 
control or the principals. 
Secondly, this principle (principle 4) requires financial institutions conducting e-
banking activities to establish and authenticate an individual or corporate body’s 
identity and authorisation to access banking systems in electronic environments.  
This can be a difficult task as hackers and other cyber criminals through the 
alteration of authentication databases can misrepresent legitimate users.  For 
example, according to a Nigerian National Security Adviser, Nigeria losses over 
127billion Naira annually to software piracy, intellectual property theft and malware 
attacks.667    The 2015 annual report of the Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation 
shows that ‘actual loss sustained in respect of internet banking fraud was 
857million Naira (about 4Million USD).668  In a related development, fraudsters 
through phishing and spoofing have defrauded many individuals.  Scammers send 
                                                            
665 Ibrahim Yeku, ‘Politically Exposed Persons: Issues and Matters Arising’ Guardian Newspaper (Lagos, 11 
May 2016) <http://guardian.ng/opinion/politically-exposed-persons-issues-and-matters-arising/> 
accessed 31 October 2016 
666 ibid 
667 Gabriel Ewepu, ‘Nigeria loses N127bn annually to cyber-crime — NSA’ The Vanguard (Lagos, 19 April 
2016) accessed 31 October 2016 
668 Nigerian Deposit Insurance Corporation, ‘NDIC: Annual Report 
for the Year Ended December 31, 2015’ <http://ndic.gov.ng/wp-
content/uploads/2016/01/Links/NDIC%202015%20Combined.pdf> accessed 31 October 2016.  Italics and 
USD equivalent added. 
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e-mails with fake letterheads and logo of banks, pension funds managers and 
similar organisations to unsuspecting members of the public seeking vital personal 
identification information, which may include user login details, pin and password 
with devastating effects to those who fall to their request.  The emails purport to be 
from legitimate businesses and agencies, designed to lead customers to 
counterfeit websites that trick recipients into divulging financial data.  The Anti-
Phishing Working Group report notes that, between quarter 1 and quarter 3, 2015, 
computers around the world continue to be infected with malware at a high rate.  
The global infection rate was 36.51% in Q1, 32.31% in Q2 and 32.12% in Q3 of 
2015.669  The report highlights that business email compromise became a 
significant problem in 2015, as attackers use spear-phishing techniques to fool 
companies into transferring large amounts of money to criminals.670  
Customer authentication involves verifying the identity of a person or entity and is 
dependent upon customers providing a valid means of identification followed by 
one or more authentication credentials to prove their identity.  An efficient 
authentication system is necessary to reduce the risk of doing business with an 
unauthorised or incorrectly identified person which can result in financial loss and 
reputational damage through fraud, the disclosure of customer information, 
corruption of data or unenforceable agreements.  Methods for online customer 
authentication includes the customer passwords, personal identification numbers 
(PIN), digital certificates using a public essential infrastructure, physical devices 
such as smart cards, one-time passwords, tokens, transaction profile scripts, 
biometric identification and most recently in Nigeria the bank verification number 
                                                            
669 Anti-Phishing Working Group, ‘Phishing Activity Trends Report: 1st – 3rd Quarters 2015’ 




(BVN).  Banks, therefore, are required to have a formal policy in place and 
adequate procedure for the authentication of personal identification numbers and 
other 
Principle 5:  banks should use transaction authentication methods that promote 
non-repudiation and establish accountability for e-banking transactions. 
 
5.12 Prudential Requirements in Nigeria  
The Central Bank of Nigeria exercises prudential regulation over financial 
institutions by the provisions of the Central Banks Act 2004 as well as the Banks 
and other Financial Institutions Act 1991 as amended.  S. 2(d) and 33(2) of the 
Central Bank Act confers on the bank power to ‘issue guidelines to any person or 
institution under its direct supervision, this is further corroborated by S.57(2) of the 
Banks and other Financial Institution Act 2007 giving the central bank power to 
‘make rules and regulations for the operation and control of all institutions under 
the supervision of the bank’.671 In keeping with this objective, the bank has sought 
to provide globally accepted risk management standards as regulation to direct 
internet banking activities in Nigeria.  Licenced banks supervised, with a physical 
presence in country can offer electronic banking services,672 whereas, virtual banks 
that exist only in cyberspace are not allowed.673  E-banking products and services 
are offered to designated classes of customers:  Residents of Nigeria with a 
verifiable address within the geographic boundary of Nigeria;674 a person residing 
                                                            
671 Banks and Other Financial Institutions Act (Act No. 25 of 1991) as amended. 
672 Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘Guidelines on Operations of Electronic Payment Channels in Nigeria’ < 
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physically in Nigeria as a citizen under a resident permit or other legal residency 
designation;675 and a ‘classified person’ who is temporarily resident in the country 
may utilize e-banking services which are limited to acceptance services…or other 
acceptance services deployed by a regulated institution.676 The regulation also 
requires e-banking services to be offered only in the local currency (naira) and 
where such service is provided in foreign currency, be provided only to customers 
who own an ordinary domiciliary account and conform to all other foreign currency 
exchange regulations.677   
About the risk management framework, the guideline stipulates that to mitigate all 
risks associated with all e-banking business, banks should have in place a 
comprehensive risk management process that assesses risk, controls risk 
exposure, and monitors risks.  This global risk management framework should be 
integrated into the bank's overall risk management framework678 and the process 
supported by appropriate oversight by the board of directors and senior 
management and carried out by staff with the necessary skill and knowledge to 
deal with the technical complexities of new e-banking developments.679  To achieve 
this objective, the guideline provides among others that banks should: 
i. Establish effective management oversight over the risks associated with e-
banking activities, including the establishment of specific accountability, 
policies and controls to manage these risk;680 









ii. Establish a comprehensive and on-going due diligence and oversight 
process for managing the bank's outsourcing relationships  and third-party 
dependencies supporting e-banking681 
iii. Ensure that appropriate measures are in place to promote adequate 
segregation of duties within e-banking systems, databases and 
applications;682 
iv. Ensure that clear audit trails exist for all e-banking transactions;683 
v. Develop appropriate incident response plans to manage, contain and 
minimise problems arising from unexpected events, including internal and 
external attacks that may hamper the provision of e-banking transactions.684 
Additionally, financial institution's systems should be adequate to manage the risks 
associated with electronic banking customers including remote data capture 
activity, and each management can implement its monitoring and reporting 
systems effectively.685  E-banking systems, which provide electronic delivery 
products, include automated teller machine (ATM) transactions; online account 
opening; internet banking transactions; telephone banking.  As a potentially high-
risk area, management should develop adequate policies, procedures and 
processes for customer identification and monitoring of specific areas of banking. 
 





685 Central Bank of Nigeria, ‘Anti-money Laundering/Combating of the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT) 
risk-based supervision (RBS) Framework 2011’ 





How do banks with such controls over its activities still become conduits for money 
laundering?686 Banks help to facilitate money laundering687 and profit is the motive. 
In its Thursday 16 October 2014 edition, the independent newspaper showed that 
at least 19 UK firms were under investigation for an alleged conspiracy to make 
$20bn seem legitimate.688 The Nigerian Punch newspaper also lamented why 
banks being handlers of the proceeds of corruption fail to report infractions to 
regulatory authorities.689  Baker argued that the global structure to facilitate the 
movement of illicit money was built, since the 1960s.690  After the independence of 
some 48 countries from the European powers, many political office holders and 
wealthy people in business wanted to take money out of these newly independent 
nations, and that was a desire well serviced by western financial institutions.  He 
contends that the driver for illicit financial flow is ‘the shift of money from the bottom 
                                                            
686 Ed Vulliamy, ‘How a big US bank laundered billions from Mexico's murderous drug gangs‘ The Guardian 
(International Edition, 3 April 2011) <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/apr/03/us-bank-mexico-
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accessed 25 August 2017; and,  Philip Mattera, ‘HSBC: Corporate Rap Sheet’ <http://www.corp-
research.org/HSBC> accessed 25 August 2017  
688 Jim Armitage, ‘Dirty money: At least 19 UK firms under investigation for an alleged conspiracy to make 
$20bn seem legitimate’ Independent (UK, 16 October 2014) 
<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/business/news/dirty-money-at-least-19-uk-firms-under-
investigation-for-an-alleged-conspiracy-to-make-20bn-seem-a6728431.html> accessed 25 August 2017 
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to the top, from the poor to the rich and in particular from the hands of 80 percent 
to the hands of the 20 percent.’691 
Thirdly, within the African context the ‘leadership' imposes itself on anti-corruption 
agencies, financial intermediaries and the rule of law is jettisoned to the 
background.  This also affects the operations of banks and their reporting 
requirements.  As Heilbrunn observed: ‘Nigeria's efforts have been problematic 
due to powerful interests in federal, state, and local governments that oppose any 
anti-corruption efforts.  Often these interests are members of the legislature, 
government, or otherwise powerful people, who shield them from investigations 
and prosecution’.692  In other instances, the public official involved may intimidate 
bank officials using the apparatus of government so that reporting would have 
proved hazardous for the bankers, no successful action can be brought upon the 
individual.  Governance has assumed the name, ‘Cabalocracy’ – rulership of the 
cabal, by the cabal and for the cabal.    
Banks and their officials are ‘errand boys’ doing the bid of their masters-in-power, 
who are remarkably the owners of the banks, so they refuse to report the 
infractions.  Concealments by the banks could be ‘repayments’ by the politicians 
to their sponsors of which some bank executives are notable.693  Where suspicious 
                                                            
691 Ibid 
692 John R. Heilbrunn, ‘Anti-corruption Commissions: Panacea or real Medicine to Fight Corruption?’ (2004) 
Word Bank Institute Working Paper 16.   
693 Corrupt political funding undermines the democratic system.  Together with other forms of political 
corruption, it leads to a compromising of democratic ideals, the growth of political apathy among voters 
and mistrust of the authorities.  The financing of political parties is perceived by public opinion as corrupt, 
so when Chairmen of Banks donate huge sums of money for political party campaigns, the public is unable 
to separate the individual and the bank even if he has openly committed himself other than the bank.  
According to Dr Marcin Walecki, ‘one of the motives for political contributions to a political party or 
candidate is the possibility of payoffs in the shape of licences and government contracts.’   
See Marcin Walecki, ‘Political Money and Political Corruption: Considerations for Nigeria. International 
Foundation for Election Systems’ 
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transaction report affects an official covered by immunity, law enforcement waits 
until the incumbent’s tenure of office expires.694  EFCC investigator, involved in the 
investigation of money laundering by a former Nigerian Minister of Petroleum, 
stated how she held meeting with a Bank Chief and requested that the funds 
deposited to the bank ‘must neither be credited into any known account and not 
captured in any transactional platforms of the bank’.695  Interestingly, private 
residences696, secret vaults,697 locked up stores safe havens to secure proceeds of 
crime of corrupt public office holders.    Attempts by the lower cadre of staff to 
report suspicious transactions of politically exposed persons are often turned down 
by senior management since they are complicit.  Furthermore, anti-money 
laundering regulations require banks to adopt measures to ensure that these 
institutions are not used as conduits for money laundering operations.  Results 
                                                            
<https://www.ifes.org/sites/default/files/nigeria_political_money_and_political_corruption.pdf> accessed 
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 ‘Nigeria 2015: Governors, Skye Bank Chairman, others donate N21 billion to PDP’ 
<http://www.premiumtimesng.com/news/top-news/173602-nigeria-2015-governors-skye-bank-
chairman-others-donate-n21-billion-pdp.html> accessed September 4, 2017.  As Rufus Mmadu noted, 
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compromised,…this is one of those essential factors Nigeria's political parties lack and this tends to be 
contributing to the increasing rate of malpractices and corruption.  Politicians placed in apparently 
compromising positions because of the need to solicit contributions for their campaign finance. 
694 The Nigerian Constitution grants the President, Vice President and Governors immunity from prosecution 
– See Chapter 8.  This is different in South Africa as there is no such provision. 
695 Innocent Anaba, ‘Court orders final forfeiture of N7.6bn recovered from Diezani’ Vanguard Newspaper 
(Lagos, 29 August 2017) 
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accessed 4 September 2017 
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697 Economic and Financial Crime Commission, ‘Yakubu Loses Bid to upturn Forfeiture $9.8m’ 
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Yakubu, Ex-NNPC GMD’ <https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/news/2311-how-efcc-recovered-9-8million-from-
yakubu-ex-nnpc-gmd> accessed 8 September 2017  
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have proved otherwise as both local and foreign banks have come under heavy 
sanctions by regulators for failing to strengthen their controls partly due to costs, 
shortage of technical and qualified human resources, government influence when 
it turns a blind eye to certain ‘sponsored' operations or due to the bank's 
negligence. 
Another major setback is the lack of independence of anti-corruption agencies 
including the financial intelligence unit.  In Nigeria, the Financial Intelligence Unit 
is an agency under the EFCC, accused as a tool by the government to tame the 
opposition.   Since the anti-corruption agencies are dependent on executive action, 
certain matters brought to the front burner are whittled down in order not to either 







THE INFORMAL ECONOMY AND REMITTANCE SYSTEMS 
 
The mention of the informal economy brings to mind the myriads of informal 
transactions operated outside the government regulated sphere of the economy, 
including the street vendors, illegal immigrants, home workers, private taxi cabs, 
unofficial labour and all other underground businesses which are illicit in nature 
such as trafficking in humans and arms, prostitution, racketeering, terrorism and 
money laundering.   Alongside the domestic sector is the substantial proportion of 
cross-border trade, which is operated through informal channels.  According to a 
Chatham House report, there are strong indications that ‘unrecorded flows through 
the key economic corridors between Nigeria and its neighbours are several times 
greater than the amount of trade that is officially recorded.’698  Yet another concern 
is the interplay in the area of illicit enrichment and financial flows from the formal 
to the informal sector.  Corruption, illicit enrichment and white-collar crimes are 
criminal activities, which occur in the formal sector and proceeds of these criminal 
activities flow to and through the informal sector to legitimate activities in the formal 
sector.  Interestingly, corruption and the informal (underground economy) share a 
common feature:  they are both in general illegal.  For example, a government 
official who derive financial gains from salaries of ‘ghost workers’ being a criminal 
activity, disguises the wealth to buy property or other tangible assets in the formal 
sector.   
                                                            
698 Leena Koni Hoffmann and Paul Melly, Nigeria’s Booming Borders: The Drivers and Consequences of 
Unrecorded Trade (Chatham House 2015) vii 
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Remittance systems include both formal and informal systems.  The formal 
remittance system includes the use of banks and non-bank institutions, 
microfinance institutions, money transfer operators, credit unions and 
cooperatives, post offices, and technologies using mobile banking, Western Union 
and MoneyGram.699  The informal remittance systems on the other hand consist of 
all value transfer system outside the formal sector as coined by Professor Nikos 
Passas.  He defined IVTS as any system, network, or mechanism used to transfer 
funds or value from place to place either without leaving a formal paper trail of the 
entire transaction or without going through regulated financial institution.700 The 
nexus between the informal economy and informal value transfer systems is 
explored excluding migrant remittance as this not the fulcrum but with emphasis 
on the proceeds of corruption and illicit enrichment.  First, is an attempt to define 
the informal economy within the context of criminal conduct because evidence 
abounds that both legitimate and illegitimate economic actors engage in the 
informal practices, then, highlight features of a cash-based economy and its 
linkages with the informal economy.   Thereafter, consideration is given to the 
linkages between official misconduct and the informal economy as it applies to 
cash-based economies typical of developing economies in the sub region.   
Next, we identify drivers of informality in the narrow sense of corruption and money 
laundering; identify various informal value transfer systems (domestic and cross-
border) other than formal value transfer systems for money laundering; and justify 
the need for reforms.  The chapter concludes with a discussion on possible policy 
                                                            
699 The World Bank, Remittance in Africa: A Catalogue of Studies and Technical Assistance by the World 
Bank, Development Agencies and Government in Africa (The World Bank 2011) 30 
700 Nikos Passas, ‘Informal Value Transfer Systems, Terrorism and Money Laundering’ 
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options to stem the tide of money laundering arising from illicit enrichment through 
the informal economy. 
 
6.1 The Informal Economy in Perspective 
The formal economy of a nation generally refers to the totality of individual and 
corporate incomes, provided in the official GDP estimates.  The informal economy 
on the other hand is that part of the economy of a state that is outside government 
regulation and tax laws.  The informal economy has several names such as the 
unofficial economy, the hidden economy, the shadow economy, the parallel 
economy, the underground economy and the criminal economy.  Several 
definitions abound on the subject of the informal economy.   
From the economic perspective, informal economy is the sector that does not 
contribute to tax revenues and the economy.  Three schools of thoughts701 are: 
• the dualist (ILO 1972) who contend that the informal economy is a separate 
marginal economy not directly linked to the formal economy but is aimed at 
providing income or safety net to the poor;702   
• the structuralist posit that the informal economy is subordinated to the 
formal economy, with the aim to reduce costs whereby privileged capitalists 
seek to subordinate petty producers and trades;703 and,  
                                                            
701 Martha Alter Chen, Renana Jhabvala and Frances Lund, Supporting Workers in the Informal Economy: A 
Policy Framework (Working paper, ILO 2002) 
702 Keith Hart, ‘Informal Income Opportunities and Urban Employment in Ghana’ (1973) 11(1) The Journal 
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• the legalist (de Soto) whose position is that the informal arrangements are 
a rational response by micro-entrepreneurs to over-regulation by 
government bureaucracies.704 
From the legal perspective, the informal economy is the black or forbidden 
economy705 penalised by the law.706  Black’s law dictionary defines the informal or 
shadow economy as ‘collectively, the unregistered economic activity that 
contributes to a country’s gross national index.  It may ‘involve the legal and illegal 
production of goods and services including gambling, prostitution and drug 
dealings as well as barter transactions and unreported income.’707  Smith offers 
definition of the informal economy, as: 
1. ‘market-based production of goods and services whether legal or illegal, that 
escapes detection in the official estimates of GDP;  
2. market-based production of goods and services whether legal or illegal, that 
escapes detection by tax authorities;  
3. market and non-market based production of goods and services whether 
legal or illegal, that escapes detection 
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4. market and non-market based production of goods and services, whether 
legal or illegal that escapes detection and is intentionally excluded from the 
official estimates of GDP’.708   
As noted by Ponsaers et al,709 the various definitions fall mainly into the following 
groups: 
1. Enterprise-based definition, that focuses on the organisation and 
links between different actors. Is this transnational criminality? How 
do goods travel across borders? Is it a form of exploitation? 
2.  Job-related definitions that highlight the potential of the informal 
economy to provide jobs for the marginalised groups; and, 
3.  Activity-based definition, that offers an examination of whether the activity 
itself is criminal. 
The informal economy is characterised by either of the following: ‘profits from legal 
activities but the workers, the scope of work, the product of work is in whole 
unregistered or concealed from the state’ or ‘profits from legal and illegal activities 
for which the whole profit is logically concealed from the state’.  In both instances, 
the illegal profits still enter the legal or formal economy through everyday activities 
or complex money laundering schemes.  Market liberalization has aided in some 
way in the criminalization of the process in an unintended way.  As Andreas 
observed: ‘efforts to open borders to legal trade can make it harder to keep borders 
closed to illegal trade, and efforts to secure borders and enforce prohibitions can 
                                                            
708 Philip Smith, ‘Assessing the Size of the Underground Economy: the Statistics Canada Perspective’ 
<http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/13-604-m/13-604-m1994028-eng.pdf>  accessed 15 December 2016 
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interrupt the smooth flow of legitimate trade and cross border travels’.710   Both licit 
and illicit economy functions through global transportation and communication 
networks, use safe financial system and stake their money in the same tax havens.  
Incidentally, in many cases, both economies even have same actors, that is, same 
companies or individuals engage in legal and illegal activities depending on the 
country of operation.711 
The figure below provides a reasonable consensus definition of the legal and illegal 
underground economy. 
Taxonomy of Types of underground economic activities 
Type of activity Monetary transactions Non-monetary transactions 
ILLEGAL 
ACTIVITIES 
Trade in stolen goods; drug dealing and 
manufacturing, prostitution, gambling, arms 
and human trafficking, corruption, oil 
bunkering, illegal diamond and gold mining 
and fraud (including advance fee fraud)712 
Barter: drugs, stolen goods, 
smuggling etc.  produce or growing 
drugs for own use, theft for own use 





Wages and salaries 
and assets from 
unrelated work related 





Barter of legal 
services and 
goods 
All do it yourself 
work and 
neighbour help 
Figure 5 - Taxonomy of informal economy 
Source: Schneider and Enste (wp/00/26, February 2000, p.5) 
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Any illegal activity resulting in financial gain in which there is no official record of 
the money received thus relates to the informal economy since these are not open 
to scrutiny by the government and subsequently avoids taxation.  Drawing from the 
work of Antinori, writing on the relationship of organised crime, the Mafia and white 
collar crime in Italy, he described a four-step process involved in the links between 
illegal activities and formal activities:  
The Mafia Economic and financial ecosystem is characterised by a money-
for-money cycle consisting of (1) accumulating money from illegal activities; 
(2) using money to pay bribes; (3) creating businesses in new economic 
sectors; (4) laundering money to produce capital.713 
Kratcoski explained the four step process to include714: 
• accumulation of money from illegal activities (predicate offences), any type 
of criminal activity that involves making money would apply (see figure 6 
below) 
• paying bribes, typically requires some type of corruption between the 
criminal element and legitimate businesses or government officials.  The 
motivation for corrupt activities varies and may include to enhance an 
individual’s prestige, power, or to receive/give favour to others. 
                                                            
713 Arije Antinori, Organized Crime, the Mafia, White Collar Crime, and Corruption’ in Maximilian 
Edelbacher, Peter C. Kratcoski, and  and Michael Theil (eds) Financial Crimes: A Threat to Global Security 
(CRC Press 2012)  
714 Peter C. Kratcoski, ‘The Informal Economy: The Connection to Organized Crime, White Collar Crime, 
and Corruption’ in Maximilian Edelbacher, Peter C. Kratcoski, and Bojan Dobovšek (eds) Corruption, Fraud, 
Organized Crime, and the Shadow Economy (CRC Press 2015)  
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• Investing money obtained through illegal means into businesses in new 
economic sectors.  For instance, money gained from bribery and outright 
embezzlement, price-fixing, insider trading, making illegal contributions to 
political candidates (dirty money) can be joined with money obtained and 
invested in legitimate businesses (purchase of property, build hotels or 
supermarkets).  Once the money obtained by illegal means are integrated 
into the flow of money, it is difficult to trace the source of the illegal 
money.715 
• Laundering money to produce capital requires transforming the illegally 
obtained into legitimate money or other assets such as property or business 
interest. 
Figure 6 below shows predicate offences linked with cross border movement of 
cash which ends up in legitimate businesses undetected by law enforcement. 
 
                                                            





Figure 6 – Predicate offences linkages with the informal economy 
Source:  FATF Report on Money Laundering through the physical transportation of cash716 
 
Estimates suggest that Nigeria and Egypt have the largest shadow economies with 
76 percent and 68 percent of GDP, the smallest is Mauritius with 20 percent.  The 
unrecorded informal activity is high which underscores the level of unreported 
illegal activities.  
                                                          
716 FATF and MENAFATF, ‘Money Laundering Through the Physical Transportation of Cash’ (October 2015) 
<http://www.fatf-gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/money-laundering-through-transportation-
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6.2 Determinants of the Informal Economy 
 
The informal economy has become an established phenomenon, grown over the 
years and has become relevant in the future of the global economy. The primary 
reason for informality is the demand for informal goods and services.   Informal 
work done in Africa is estimated to have accounted for almost 80% of non-
agricultural employment, 60 percent of urban jobs and over 90 percent of new jobs.  
For women in sub-Saharan Africa, the informal sector represents 92% of the total 
job opportunities outside of agriculture (against 71 percent for men).717   
The shadow economy are a complex phenomenon not only limited to developing 
economies718 even highly developed economies can have a significant share of 
the informal economy719.  A sizeable informal sector is the nursery of future 
economic growth within the formal economy. Nonetheless, there are associated 
difficulties in which laundering of the proceeds of crime can take centre stage.  
There are many cause-effect interactions in both directions between the formal and 
informal economy.  Among these factors are: the limited absorption of surplus 
labour, barriers of entrance to the formal economy, weak institutions,720 
redundancies, increasing use of capital instead of labour, demand for low cost 
goods and services, uncommitted or unaware government, economic hardship and 
                                                            
717 Martha Alter Chen, The Informal Economy: Definitions, Theories and Policies (WIEGO 2012) Working 
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718 Friedrich Schneider, Andreas Buehn and Claudio E. Montenegro, ‘Shadow Economies All over the 
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719 Andreas Buehn and Friedrich Schneider, ‘Shadow Economies and Corruption All Over the World: 
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poverty, more women entering the labour market;721 macro- and microeconomic 
factors, burden of government regulation,722 burden of taxation723 and social 
security contribution, state of public services,724 social transfer, and labour market 
regulations.725 Moshi argues that in developing countries informality is driven by 
the desire to earn a living other than tax evasion and an aversion to a higher cost 
of doing business regarding increased tax burden, greater government regulation 
and widespread distrust of government.   
 
There are strong enough reasons to believe that government regulations are 
responsible for the expansion of the informal economy in some countries.  For 
example, in the areas of  on cross-border flows, studies indicates that due to the 
formal economic and governance framework within the west and central African 
regions, the vast majority of exporters and importers are accidentally and not by 
design compelled to informality.  The following factors were highlighted in the 
report726 as basic drivers of informality: 
                                                            
721 Kristina Flodman Becker, The Informal Economy: SIDA Fact Find Study (SIDA 2004) 
722 Frederich Schneider and Dominik Enste, ‘Shadow Economies Around the World: Size, Causes, and 
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i. Formal processes for clearing customs are slow, complex and expensive.  
For example, a typical Nigerian business is expected to produce at least 
nine documents in order to send an export shipment and at least 13 
documents to bring in an import consignment.  There are complex 
procedures and inadequate modern technical installations and equipment 
to facilitate the clearing process. 
ii. Foreign exchange and banking regulations are enforced in a manner that is 
so rigid and dysfunctional that it merely serves to push traders to the parallel 
market.  More worrisome is the situation of unavailability of foreign 
exchange in the official market or restrictions imposed on certain items to 
be imported. 
iii. Corruption and unofficial taxation are a heavy burden on traders. 
In conclusion, improvements in government regulations often facilitate the 
shrinking in size of the informal sector activities.   
 
6.3    Cash-Based Payment System and the Informal Economy 
Cash remains an essential means of settlement across the globe.  It is estimated 
that about USD 4 trillion in cash is in circulation worldwide and between 46 percent 
and 82 percent of all transactions are being conducted in cash.   Daily around the 
world, individuals and businesses transport cash according to their needs, perhaps 
for payment of goods and services, spending for a holiday in and outside of one's 
country or for other legitimate/illegitimate reasons.  The same is true of banks and 
other financial institution who need cash for their day to day operations and in most 
cases also transport cash in different currencies across borders according to the 
demand of their businesses to satisfy their clientele.  In the West Africa region 
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similar to the other areas in Africa (Central and Southern Africa), there is free 
movement of goods and services without much restrictions which gives individuals 
and business organisations the opportunity for easy trade.727  Developed 
economies rely less on the use of cash as against a credit-based system in which 
goods and services and even mortgages are paid, nonetheless, Europol Financial 
Intelligence Group found that in spite of growth in non-cash payment methods, the 
demand for high denomination notes, such as the EUR 500 note, has been 
sustained.728   The credit-based system is still alien to most developing economies 
in Africa as items are bought and paid for by cash immediately.  It will not be 
surprising for an individual or company to buy a house worth millions of USD and 
paid in cash without going through a mortgage financier. 
A cash-based economy is one in which the payment for goods and services are 
transacted with cash as a medium of exchange.  A vast majority of the population 
are unbankable and the dominance of cash transactions cuts across formal and 
informal institutions and markets and has over 50 percent of the economic 
transactions in all sectors conducted in cash.  The dominance of cash transaction 
according to a GIABA report is largely due to ‘the legal tender status of banknotes 
as a medium of exchange, their ubiquitous nature, their convenience and the speed 
and certainty in settling financial obligations; the inadequacy of the availability of 
banking services especially in rural areas; the prevailing high level of illiteracy and 
                                                            
727 ESAAMLG, ‘Report on Cash Courier-Based Money Laundering’ ESSAMLG Working Group, Mobasa Kenya, 
18 August 2008.  The report noted that majority ESAAMLG member countries are predominantly cash based 
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the large size and continued growth of the cash-oriented and unregulated informal 
sector in the regional economies.’729   
Recent statistics indicate that Sub Saharan Africa has 28.9% financial inclusion 
compared with the world average of 60.7%, OECD 94%, South Asia 45.5%, East 
Asia and Pacific of 68.8%, Latin America and the Caribbean of 51.1%.  Regarding 
number of individuals who have used an account to receive wages, Sub Saharan 
Africa has 7.3 percent compared with the world average of 17.7 percentage and 
OECD of 44.3 percent.  A central factor enabling criminal economies and illegal 
financial flows (IFFs) is the low level of financial inclusion and access to the formal 
banking system is out of reach to the vast majority of people.730   
   
Figure 7 - Comparison of Financial inclusion 
Source:  Little Databook on financial inclusion 2013. 
                                                            
729 Inter-Governmental Action Group Against Money Laundering in West Africa (GIABA), ‘Typologies 
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<https://www.giaba.org/media/f/107_typologies-report-november-2007.pdf > accessed 16 April 2016  
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Moshi identified some factors responsible for low levels of access to financial 
services: 
i.  lower bank and ATM penetration both demographically and geographically,  
ii.  Increase in cost of market exchange between agents in the economy and 
people,  
iii.  Goods and services arising from disproportional population densities,  
iv.  Macroeconomic instability due to economic and political crises, 
v.  High minimum balances and monthly fees demanded by banks, 
vi.  High levels of illiteracy discourage significant sections of the population from 
using services of formal institutions as documentation are not in the local 
languages.   
Granted, in recent times, especially in Nigeria, as a result of the Vision 2020 
strategy, there is a push to move to a cashless environment dominated by 
electronic and other modes of payment.  In spite of this initiative, cash is still the 
preferred mode for payments.  The FATF acknowledged the following factors 
among others responsible for the preference for cash payments:  
• Cultural issues.  Where the bulk of the population are inherently mistrustful 
of any form of officialdom, and they feel the need to conduct their routine 
financial activities with a minimum of official scrutiny. 
• Cash is widely accepted.  For low valued items even in well-developed 
financial systems, very few retail outlets in the world would sell day to day 
items such as food or clothing will refuse to accept cash. 
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• Cash is quicker: - The activity is conducted in real time, and payment is 
received immediately compared with transactions performed in the banking 
systems which may take longer duration. 
• Cash reduces spending as individuals tend to spend less money as they are 
connected with the transactions they are undertaking which is much 
different when making payments via electronic means as one is detached 
from the real meaning of the purchase. 
A notable feature of cash-based economies is that there is hardly any enforcement 
of regulations regarding how much cash one may physically carry or use.  People 
walk around with big bags (popularly called Ghana must go) and suitcases or 
vehicle compartments filled with cash which is used for the purchase of houses, 
property of high value or anything whatsoever.  Even within the regional economic 
blocks, the same attitude is maintained.  GIABA reports that in West Africa, cash 
transactions remain dominant where ‘payments for intraregional transactions are 
usually made in either local or foreign currencies, especially the US dollar, the 
British Pound and the Euro.  Economic actors, especially in the informal sector, are 
engaged in the free exchange of currencies in the thriving parallel market to make 
cash payment for intraregional transactions.’  In the same vein, cash dominance in 
the region is further aggravated by the cost and complexity of making international 
trade payments through officially approved channels and the impossibility of doing 
so in local currencies.731  It is nevertheless easy to make cross-border naira or CFA 
franc payments informally or on the parallel market.732   
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Some work interchangeably links the informal economy with a cash-based 
economy.  In one definition, the underground economy was referred to as ‘those 
individuals and businesses that deal with cash and use other schemes to conceal 
their activities and their true liability from government licencing, regulatory and tax 
agencies.’   This definition concentrates on the type of questionable business 
transactions and crimes that in their totality make up the informal economy.  The 
definition associating cash transaction with the informal economy will perhaps hold 
true more in developed economies than developing countries because in most 
countries in sub-Saharan Africa the financial systems are shallow regarding the 
scope and the products offered.  The mere fact that most activities are transacted 
by cash in these economies in no way make them illegal because of a lack of legal, 
institutional or administrative framework.   For instance, the geographical spread 
of bank branches (financial inclusion) is highly limited to urban areas and few other 
towns leaving most of the population without access to an account in a financial or 
semi financial institution.  As Moshi observed, ‘factors that lead to the dominance 
of cash transactions in a developing country's economy are not necessarily the 
same set of factors that account for informality’.  For example, except very recently 
where government has adopted the cashless policy in Nigeria, and its institutions 
have been mandated to transact using a recognised bank or other non-bank 
financial institution, salaries of workers were hitherto paid in cash, even to this day 
services provided by formal institutions (water, electricity) are paid in cash by 
beneficiaries of such transactions.  Furthermore, it is not illegal for an individual to 
carry the equivalent of Twenty Five Thousand Dollars (Five Million Naira) in cash 
to transact business in a single day.  Alluding to the prevalence of cash transaction 
in the Nigerian economy, a Secretary to the Economic and Financial Crimes 
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Commission (EFCC) blamed the nation's vulnerability to fraud, terrorism and crime 
on its operation of a cash-based economy.  According to the Secretary as reported 
in the Nigerian Vanguard newspaper, ‘it was difficult to track money as people 
carried huge sums of money in cash and did whatever business they liked without 
being tracked.’733   While cash-based economies and informal economy share one 
standard feature which is the dominance of cash transactions, it is noteworthy that 
in cash-based economies, cash transactions cuts across formal and informal 
institutions and markets.  
About misconduct, a cash-based payment system has excellent potentials for 
misuse because cash has no trail.  It will, therefore, be common for money 
launderers and corrupt government officials to make use of the unregulated 
informal sector to carry out criminal activities undetected.  Because the formal and 
informal economy is ever dependent on cash, movements of cash between the two 
economies go seamlessly.  Illicit funds arising from the abuse of office can be used 
to infiltrate the political landscape and influence governance.  According to 
Otusanya ‘corruption and money laundering are important not just for the volume 
of funds that are shifted out but also because of the damage they do to the integrity 
of judicial and political institutions.’734  For instance, to sustain his third term re-
election bid by amending the constitution to his favour, it is alleged that former 
president Olusegun Obasanjo shared the sum of Thirty billion naira (250 Million US 
Dollars) to influence legislators to accept his proposal.  According to a former 
Speaker of the Nigerian House of Representatives Ghali Umar Na'abba, ‘some 
                                                            
733  ‘Cash-based economy reason for fraud, terrorism in Nigeria’ Vanguard Newspaper (Lagos, 30 
September 2012) <http://www.vanguardngr.com/2012/09/cash-based-economy-reason-for-fraud-
terrorism-in-nigeria/> accessed 18 November 2016 
734 Olatunde Julius Otusanya and Sarah Lauwo, ‘The Role of Offshore Financial Centres in Elite Money 
Laundering Practices: Evidence from Nigeria’ (2012) 15(3) JMLC 336, 356 
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senators collected 50 million Naira each and some House of Representatives 
members collected 40 million Naira each to back his bid.’735 
Cash-based economies are prone to money laundering because of the dominance 
of cash transactions so moving cash from the formal to the informal sector is very 
easy even without the involvement of the financial system.  For instance, proceeds 
arising from bribery, fraud, embezzlement or other unlawful activities in most 
situations denominated in cash can be used to buy property, jewellery, cars or 
other expensive items in either the formal or informal sector.   This occurs without 
recourse to the financial system thus making the conventional three phases of 
money laundering (placement, layering and integration) inapplicable.  Laundering 
money to produce capital requires transforming the illegally obtained money into 
legitimate use by disguising its origin and a cash-based system satisfies the 
requirement.  Money laundering becomes easier when such illicit wealth is invested 
in legitimate businesses in the formal sector to generate income.  Dishonest 
government officials have been linked to the formation of companies that have 
created substantial employment opportunities in the formal sector.  Additionally, 
informal channels used by human traffickers and other criminal groups can be used 
to syphon huge amounts of cash across the border and converted to the desired 
currency which is subsequently lodged in the financial system as legitimate money.    
According to Edelbacher and Kratcoski ‘many times the same trafficking routes that 
                                                            
735 Abdulgafar Alabelewe, ‘Na’abba: Lawmakers got N50m each to Support Obasanjo’s Third Term Bid’ The 
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are used to traffic drugs…..are used for trafficking arms, other military equipment, 
and money’.736 
In developing countries like Africa, corruption has mainly infiltrated all the 
institutional frameworks thereby making them complicit with criminals.  The 
detection and prosecution of suspicious money become very difficult because the 
medium of a financial institution is often absent and its effectiveness is sometimes 
compromised as a result of corruption.  Alternatively, if a politically exposed person 
(PEP) has a substantial measure of control over the treasury, there is no need to 
bribe treasury staff rather he would use his position power to enrich himself illegally 
without recourse to bribe.  Furthermore, in addition to the custom of obedience to 
superior officers, a threat to life, or to any relations of the officer could ultimately 
induce compliance.  Bureaucratic controls are deliberately bypassed and 
approvals secured from the highest level of authority to authorise the withdrawal of 
funds.  For instance, records from the central bank of Nigeria, reveals that a total 
of 2.25 billion US dollars was withdrawn from the bank with the approval of 
President Sani Abacha on the request of the Ismaila Gwarzo – the national security 
adviser – for urgent national issues.  These sums were withdrawn in cash and 
deposited into other foreign bank accounts while others were used to buy for the 
acquisition of property and other assets.  Their money laundering scheme included 
the depositing of a large amount of cash in their houses retained for personal use 
or passed on to associates to be laundered or concealed; cash shipments out of 
the country by private jet or other means.   Notably, multiple accounts were opened 
                                                            
736 Maximilian Edelbacher and Peter C. Kratcoski, ‘Protecting the Borders in a Global Society: An Austrian 
and American Perspective’ in J. Winterdyk, K. Sundberg, and Boca Raton (eds) Border Security in the Al 
Qaeda Era (CRC Press 2010) 90  
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locally by which cash deposits were made and later transferred to other safe 
havens where shell companies were incorporated to receive the inflow of cash. 
 
6.4 Links Between Corruption And Money Laundering in the Informal 
Economy 
Global financial integrity defines illicit financial flows as ‘money that is illegally 
earned, transferred or utilised.  Somewhere at its origin, movement, or use, the 
money broke laws and hence it is considered illicit.’  Admittedly, it is difficult to 
record and track illicit flows.  Baker estimates that illicit flows specifically proceeds 
of crime from drug trafficking, looted money from embezzlement, bribery and 
corruption and commercial money amounts to between USD 1trillion and USD 
1.6trillion yearly.737 Chaikin and Sharman argue that in developing countries 
corruption is often the major source of fund laundered.738 
The proceeds of corruption have been criminalised by international and regional 
conventions as well as local legislation.  There is a close relationship between 
corruption and illicit flows since corruption as a criminal activity result in illicit flows.  
Studies have identified that there is a link between corruption and the informal 
economy.  Bird, Matinez-Vazquez and Torgler argues that if the government and 
the administration have significant discretionary power over the allocation 
resources, the level of corruption will be higher than if they do not.  Cockcroft 
Lawrence identified organised crime and the prevalence of the informal economy 
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(Wiley 2005) 
738 David A Chaikin and Jason C Sharman, Corruption and Money Laundering: A Symbiotic Relationship 
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among other things as significant obstacles to the anti-corruption effort.739  In an 
inefficient state where corruption is rampant, the citizens will have little trust in 
authority and thus a low incentive to cooperate.   The relationship between 
corruption and the informal sector according to Buehn and Schneider is 
‘ambiguous from a theoretical point of view’ and the two may either be 
complements or substitutes.  In one case the shadow economy may reduce bribe 
giving especially when the government is not fair or responsive to the needs of the 
citizens, and they resort to moving their activities to the informal or shadow 
economy thereby restricting the ability of corrupt officials to request and receive 
bribes.  On the other hand, according to Choi and Thum, the presence of the 
informal economy may be a complement to the formal economy, but a substitute 
for corruption and bribes.  Reed Quentin and Fontana Alexander argues that 
corruption and illicit financial flows have a reciprocal causal relationship: Corruption 
facilitates money laundering, and money laundering enables corruption to reap 
large profits.740  They further contend that corruption is linked to money laundering 
in one or more of the following ways:   
1) As the source of proceeds (for example, bribe) that constitute funds to be 
laundered.  They assert that tackling illicit flows clearly has potential in 
dealing with high level of corruption;741  
2) As a means to facilitating the creation of illicit funds through bribery or 
through the corruption of tax administrations so that they ignore evasion of 
                                                            
739 Lawrence Cockcroft, Global Corruption:  Money, Power and Ethics in the Modern World (University of 
Pennsylvania Press 2014) 
740 Reed Quentin, and Fontana Alexander, ‘Corruption and Illicit Financial Flows: The Limits and 
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taxes or other obligations.’742   Bribes can be paid to officials of tax agencies 
as a means to get favourable interpretation of tax regulations thus lowering 
the for instance; and, 
3) As a means for enabling illicit flow itself by the corruption of institutions with 
anti-money laundering obligations.743 
While factors such as the need for survival in an impoverished economy and greed 
are vital determinants for the excessive rate of corruption in developing countries, 
a significant factor responsible for the influx of ill-gotten wealth into the informal 
economy is the desire by politicians to finance their political campaigns.  Since 
money cannot be eliminated from politics and elections have to be financed, this 
financial pressure gives politicians an incentive to loot the treasury to secure their 
future re-election.  The need for political finance according to Cockcroft is ‘probably 
the single driver of large-scale corruption.’744  He noted that world over ‘most of the 
high profile corruption cases of the last 20 years……have had the ultimate 
objective of raising funding for a political party.’745 Specifically, the ill-gotten wealth 
is not only used to fund their political campaigns but to retain power and suppress 
any means of opposition.  The case of President Sani Abacha and the fortunes of 
President Mobutu of Zaire have been cited in much academic literature.  In these 
mentioned instances, these leaders amassed ill-gotten wealth as a political 
strategy to buy loyalists of local elites, bureaucrats, military leaders and would be 
politicians and businessmen who could not be compelled to accept their political 
ideology.  Similarly, some leaders have funnelled resources to promoting militancy 
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as a means of suppressing the discordant voices to perpetuating their stay in office.  
The main purpose of illicit enrichment is to infiltrate the political arena and influence 
governance.  Otunsaya noted that ‘corruption and money laundering are important 
not just for the volume of funds that are shifted out but also because of the damage 
they do to the integrity of judicial and political institutions.’746  According to Rose-
Ackerman ‘the problem of money in politics is not limited to pressures on 
politicians.  On the one side of the equation are inducements given to voters’.747 It 
has been reported that several politicians have paid money to voters to buy their 
votes.  A local newspaper reported that during the 2015 political campaigns, the 
People's Democratic Party (PDP) presidential candidate doled out ‘US dollars and 
local currencies in millions to market leaders, town unions, traditional rulers, actors, 
artisans, transporters’.748  In acknowledgement of money politics, Rose Ackerman 
observed that ‘direct payment to voters have a long history, going back to Great 
Britain and the United States in the nineteenth century’.749  In ‘Italy, political bosses 
attempt to get out the vote not only from campaign funds but also by mobilising 
state resources, patronage jobs and other types of favours to create webs of 
obligations’.750 The same was said of Japan and Korea, where ‘politicians are 
accused of amassing illegal campaign war chests and justified their action by 
reference to the financial demands of campaigning in countries where voters 
expect gifts or other personalised benefits from candidates.751  
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International transactions can sometimes originate from the shadow economy, but 
the product moved to the formal economy.752  An example to illustrate the link 
between the formal and informal sector arising from illicit wealth, corruption and 
money laundering is the large-scale oil bunkering that occurs in the Niger Delta 
region of Nigeria.  Illegal bunkering of Nigerian Crude according to one report 
probably started in the late 1970s or early 1980s when the country was under 
military rule.753  Some top army and navy officers began stealing or allowing others 
to steal crude to enrich themselves and maintain political stability.  Evidence 
provided in the box below shows Nigerian security personnel being complicit in the 
illegal oil bunkering activities. 
Signs of alleged participation of security forces in oil theft 
• Over a dozen retired military officers, including a rear admiral, were 
arrested on suspicion of oil theft during the 2000s; all were later freed 
without a charge. 
• One brigadier general, then a commander in the Joint Task Force – that 
patrols parts of the delta, was relieved of his post in March 2006 owing to 
alleged involvement in oil bunkering; 
• Ships impounded by the JTF or navy have allegedly been released under 
political pressure or have gone missing,754 only to turn up later reflagged 
and repainted 
                                                            
752 Cockcroft (n736)               
753 C. Katsouris and A. Sayne, Nigeria’s Criminal crude:  International Options to Combat the Export of 
Stolen Oil (Chatham House 2013) 5 
754 BBC, ‘Missing tanker found in Nigeria’ (BBC, 24 September 2004) 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/3686284.stm> accessed 8 January 2017 
 It was reported that ‘The MT Jimoh was found at Dutch Island, close to Port Harcourt with a freshly painted 
name - MT Lord on its side.  The MT Jimoh and a Russian oil tanker, the MT African Pride, were seized 
suspected of being used to smuggle crude oil out of Nigeria.  But both disappeared from custody several    
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• Security and oil company sources report having seen ships engaged in oil 
bunkering pass through maritime checkpoints, in full view of military 
patrols. 
   
Oil bunkering involves tapping of oil pipelines out to vessels capable of taking 
sizeable quantities of crude oil and sold out to ready buyers in the Gulf of guinea 
or transported to refineries within the West African sub-region.  Saliu and Luqman 
observed that ‘crude oil is tapped from pipelines and terminals of oil companies 
with advanced technological equipment and pumped into barges, ships and 
tankers on sea.  In some instances, rather than go through pipelines, bunkerers 
and militants go straight to wellheads abandoned by oil companies as a result of 
militant attacks to pump the crude into barges, ships and tankers for transportation 
from the swamps for sale to neighbouring states like Cote d'Ivoire, Benin Republic 
and Togo and to the international market.755  The bunkered pipe location is often 
times controlled by settling communities or through superiority of force.  Local 
youths are normally employed to assist in the bunkering operations mainly through 
provision of labour while local communities are routinely settled.  The local militias 
provide security cover whereas the navy and other government officials are 
‘settled’ to allow access of the barges for safe delivery to the end users.756  One 
                                                            
weeks ago causing huge embarrassment, with navy and police officials blaming each other.’  See also: David 
Blair, ‘Embarrassment as Nigerian navy 'loses' impounded tanker’ The Telegraph (London, 21 September 
2004) 
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/nigeria/1472282/Embarrassment-
as-Nigerian-navy-loses-impounded-tanker.html> accessed 8 January 2017  
755 H.A. Saliu, and S Luqman, ‘Oil, Greed and Conflict in the coastal areas of Nigeria’ (2009) 30(9) Nigerian 
Forum 310 
756 Ben Naanen and Patrick Tolani, Private Gain Public Disaster: Social Context of Oil Bunkering and 
Artisanal Refining in the Niger Delta [NIDEREF 2014] 
<http://www.nideref.org/images/Private%20Gain%20Public%20Disaster%20c.pdf> accessed 9 January 
2017 .  Ben and Patrick noted that ‘some members of the military Joint Task Force (JTF) collaborate or aid 
the illegal bunkering process.  Most of the participants in the business claims that the JTF has at one time 
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study estimates the size of illegal bunkering and artisanal refinery to worth an 
annual cash value of 9 billion US dollars.757  This figure comprises of 6 billion dollars 
in lost government revenues and 3 billion dollars that is generated by other 
activities along the value chain.  While some of the proceeds of oil bunkering is 
used to promote continued militancy of the Niger Delta region through arms 
procurements/exchange of arms for crude, the rest is either deposited into safe 
overseas bank accounts or invested in the formal property sector of the economy 
or in other viable business ventures such as operating a private secondary school, 
university or other viable economic projects in the formal economy.  The chart 
below illustrates the flow of illegal bunkering activities from the informal (illegal 






Figure 8 - Informal economy and oil bunkering 
Source:  Adapted from Cockcroft’s Global Corruption. Money, power and ethics in 
the Modern world. 
                                                            
or the other demanded fees from them in order to allow them continue their business.’  They also report 
that a group interviewed in one community claimed that they paid the JTF N30, 000 per week in order to 
continue. 




6.5 Remittance Systems and Money Laundering Risk 
 
In its report of illicit financial flows, the OECD noted how kleptocrats and despots 
primarily moved illegal wealth out of developing countries by ‘quite a simple means, 
such as wire transfers through complicit banks or carrying of cash in large 
denominations across borders’.758 To move out large sums of illegal money 
requires specialist and experts who are familiar with the international market and 
who are able to determine the risks of detection and to exploit the differences in 
controls and regulations among countries,759which brings to fore the complicity of 
banks and other financial intermediaries.  As Sharman observed, it is relatively 
hard to conceal large amounts of cash which may arouse the suspicion of law 
enforcement, wire transfers or other electronic transactions are generally preferred 
by those engaged in grand corruption.760 To achieve this objective, corrupt officials 
find ways to evade regulations requiring banks to screen and identify suspicious 
financial behaviour and experience over time shows that both domestic and 
international financial institutions lack the commitment to take effective action. 
The prevalence of informal remittances systems in the West African sub region for 
instance is due to the low levels of financial inclusion as access to the formal 
banking system is out of reach for the majority.   Money Transfer Operators (MTOs) 
                                                            
758 OECD (n204) 15; Alexander Cooley, John Heathershaw and J.C. Sharman, ‘The Rise of Kleptocracy: 
Laundering Cash, Whitewashing Reputations’(2018) 29(1) The Journal of Democracy 39,1; Alex Cooley and 
Jason Sharman, ‘How today’s despots and kleptocrats hide their stolen wealth’ The Washington Post (New 
York, 14 November 2017) 
759 Armando Fernández Steinko, ‘Financial Channels of Money Laundering in Spain’ (2012) 52(5) The British 
Journal of Criminology 908, 5; Nicholas Lord and Michael Levi, ‘Organizing the Finances for and the Finances 
from Transnational Corporate Bribery’ (2017) 14(3) European Journal of Criminology 365, 376 
760 Jason Sharman, ‘Chasing Kleptocrats’ Loot: Narrowing the Effectiveness Gap’ (Anti-Corruption Resource 
Centre, U4 Issue 2012) 4  
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are prohibitively expensive which has created a demand for alternative systems 
operating outside of government regulation, thus increasing the risks of money 
laundering.761  To close the remittance gap, various informal solutions have 
emerged to meet the needs of migrants and communities stemming from strong 
regulation in the formal economy and entry barriers, of which hawala dealers forms 
the main.  These provides money transfer services using trust based networks of 
cash exchange, though effective and a low-cost solution, the risks are relatively 
high that they will be used to transfer proceeds of criminal activity.762 Informal 
remittance systems known for speed of service, competitively superior to that of 
wire transfers, can be decisive in making funds available but are vulnerable to 
terrorist groups and activities, with a poor approach to record keeping as no 
records are kept, or if maintained are in aggregate only for settlement purposes.763 
Basic mechanics of IVTS includes: physical transportation of cash; in-kind 
payments, compensatory payments; commodity shipments, false invoicing, Stored 
value transfers, chit, hundi, pre-paid cards, bearer instruments, IVTS operators 
interfacing with formal banking sector, Online gift services, Debit/Credit cards used 
by multiple Individuals; brokerage accounts, Internet-based payment systems, 
Trade diversion, and use of Correspondent accounts.764 
The FATF standard guidance note identifies participants involved in the provision 
of MVTS to include financial institutions, hawala and other similar services 
providers and agents. It requires financial institutions that have MVTS as 
customers to identify, assess and manage the ML/TF risks associated with 
                                                            
761 OECD (n727) 24 
762 OECD (n727) 40 
763 Matteo Vaccani, Alternative Remittance Systems and Terrorism Financing: Issues in Risk Management 
(WP 180, The World Bank 2009) 17 
764 Passas (n700) 23;  
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individual MVTS, rather than avoid this category of customers.765  It defines money 
or value transfer services (MVTS) as: 
Financial services that involve the acceptance of cash, cheques, other 
monetary instruments or other stores of value and the payment of a 
corresponding sun in cash or other form to a beneficiary by means of 
communication, message, transfer or through a clearing network to which 
the MVTS provider belongs.  Transactions performed by such services can 
involve one or more intermediaries and a final payment to a third party and 
may include any new payment methods.  Sometimes these services have 
ties to particular geographic regions and are described using a variety of 
specific terms, including hawala, hundi, and fei-chen.766 
Within various remittance channels, Money or Value Transfer Services (MVTS) are 
usually perceived as vulnerable to ML/FT risks. Scholars agree that the 
contemporary practice of the IVTS involves frequent interfaces with banks and 
other financial institutions  and in most cases, IVTS providers had bank accounts 
or accounts at other financial institutions, which they use in the settlement of 
transactions.  Given that MVTS is a broad term used in the FATF 
recommendations, which include not just money transfer systems but also value 
transfer systems, a country based risk assessment is required to mitigate the 
ML/TF risk.  As the FATF notes, ‘informal players are commonly used by both 
illegal migrants who want to send remittances to their home country for legitimate 
needs and by criminals to move illicit money (such as proceeds from drugs, tax 
                                                            
765 FATF, ‘Guidance for a Risk-Based Approach: Money or Value Transfer Services’ < http://www.fatf-
gafi.org/media/fatf/documents/reports/Guidance-RBA-money-value-transfer-services.pdf> accessed 3 
September 2018 
766 Ibid 3 
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evasion, or other types of illegal activities) across borders’.767  
 
In most cases, inbound remittances are linked to migration to cater for loved ones 
and settle family and other obligations while a few are also are a result of illegal 
activities. Studies indicate that remittances are used mainly for household 
consumption and investment. The evidence from studies reveals remittances 
reduce the level and severity of poverty among households—but the remittance 
market in Africa is largely undeveloped, and a potential exists for the improvement 
of remittance services and consumer products that will be valuable to migrants.768 
Between 2010 and 2015, over US$200 billion was received in Sub Saharan Africa 
in remittances representing an average 5% of GDP based on the 2016 World Bank 
report.769 Actual payment flows for SSA are much higher because as Sander and 
Maimbo shows, remittances are massively underreported770 and informal 
remittance transfers play a significant role.  Except for Somalia with a somewhat 
defined informal remittance system, there are no clear informal remittance 
channels in Sub Saharan Africa, as most remittances are made through trusted 
friends and acquaintances.771  
 
                                                            
767 Emiko Todoroki, Wameek Noor, Kuntay Celik and Anoma Kulathunga, Making Remittances Work: 
Balancing financial integrity and Inclusion (The World Bank, 2014) 
768 The World Bank (Remittance in Africa, n699) 8 
769 The World Bank, ‘Migration and Remittances Data’ 
<http://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migrationremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migration-remittances-
data> accessed 5 September 2016 
770 C. Sander and S. M. Maimbo, ‘Migrant Labour Remittances in Africa: Reducing obstacles to 
Development Contributions’ 
<http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/191171468742795861/Migrant-labor-remittances-in-
Africa-reducing-obstacles-to-developmental-contributions> accessed 5 September 2016 
771 Ehui Adovor, Remittances in Africa: A catalogue of Studies and Technical Assistance by World Bank, 
Development Agencies and Government in Africa (The World Bank, 2011) p.13 
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In contrast with inflows, it is estimated that over the last 50 years, Africa is 
estimated to have lost in excess of $1 trillion in illicit financial flows and more than 
$50 billion annually arising from criminal activities, corruption, tax evasion, bribes 
and transactions from cross-border smuggling.772 Sending funds abroad makes 
tracing the money extremely challenging, particularly when transactions are 
conducted by operators not subject to or complying with AML/CFT obligations. This 
is even more so because reconstructing a money trail requires international 
cooperation, which is challenging, costly, and usually slow.773 To mitigate 
wire/electronic transfer risk as well as risk associated with IVTS, it is vital to assess 
and understand the risk posed since it is a prerequisite in designing risk-based 
regulation and supervision. Risk assessment can be used to evaluate whether the 
current framework needs to be revised.  Already highlighted is the issue of 
despots774 using the financial system to launder the proceeds of crime, therefore, 
the need to redesign and strengthen the system in order to curb the tide.  Faced 
with lack of enforcement and ineffective supervision, non-compliant actors will have 
no incentives to comply with rules, while compliant operators face a powerful 




The informal sector is vast in developing countries and accounts for a sizeable 
portion of its economic activities.  Proceeds of bribery in many instances are either 
                                                            
772 UNECA, ‘Illicit financial flows - why Africa needs to “track it, stop it and get it 
773 Todoroki (n763) 28 
774 Ben Judah, The Kleptocracy Curse: Rethinking Containment (Hudson Institute 2016) 9 
775 Vaccani (n760) 17 
303 
 
received in cash or paid into shell/front companies in order to obscure the identity 
of the recipient.  Cases have been seen where large amounts of cash have been 
stored in secured vaults in private residences, sewage tanks, and other secured 
places to avoid a trail from law enforcement.  The informal economy characterised 
by the cash-based economy is a fertile ground to fester the integration of proceeds 
of financial crimes into the legitimate sector since no distinction can be made 
between ‘dirty money' and clean money. Such accumulated wealth can be easily 
integrated into real estate and other viable business ventures.  It is recommended 
that measures be put in place to reduce cash dependence in the economy 
gradually.  This will entail not only improving on infrastructure for essential social 
amenities as well as financial infrastructure, but also increasing the financial 
inclusion rate of the citizens.  Ensuring rural integration and providing banking 
facilities to all en sundry. 
 
In the area of cross-border remittances, the borders of most developing countries 
are vulnerable to a massive flow of cash across the border in different currencies 
mainly due to the informal markets and regional ties. The research does not 
foresee substantial money laundering issues arising from informal remittance 
transfers except the cross-border movement of cash. Regional authorities should 
improve on cross-border monitoring and encourage through both enforcement and 
persuasion the need for the declaration of cash.  Where improvements in financial 







NON CONVICTION BASED RECOVERY OF THE PROCEEDS OF CRIME 
 
A fundamental principle in the United Nations Convention of Corruption is the need 
for the return of the proceeds of crime to their countries of origin and member states 
to afford one another the widest measure of cooperation776 and assistance777.  
Experience has shown that it takes considerable time to prosecute public office 
holders778 or their associates alleged to have perpetrated financial crimes from a 
conviction based perspective, and even when this is pursued to a reasonable 
conclusion, the results have been very insignificant, and worst still, the convicts 
can enjoy the fruits of their illegality partly due to provisions in the existing laws 
which makes the recovery of those assets either cumbersome or the laws not 
updated to meet the present realities.  From a criminal law perspective, a conviction 
is done in personam and assets can only be seized or forfeited after a sentence 
has been achieved.  The size and scale of illicit flows are very significant, following 
the assets in rem other the individual in personam provides the prosecutor with a 
quick means to seize illegal wealth and return to state coffers before conviction is 
achieved.  In this chapter, we consider the need for non-conviction based recovery 
                                                            
776 Peter D. Hardy, ‘Alleged Nigerian Oil Industry Corruption and Civil Forfeiture: More Extraterritorial 
Application of U.S. Law; More High-End Real Estate; and Advice on Laundering’ 
<https://www.moneylaunderingwatchblog.com/2017/07/the-civil-forfeiture-complaint-regarding-alleged-
nigerian-oil-industry-corruption-more-extraterritorial-application-of-u-s-law-more-high-end-real-estate-
and-new-advice-on-laundering/> accessed 15 January 2018 
777 UNCAC 2004, Art 51 
778 Economic and Financial Crimes Commission, ‘High Profile, Oil Subsidy, etc Matters Being Prosecuted by 
EFCC’ 
<https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/images/HIGH%20PROFILE%20CASES%20BEING%20PROSECUTED%20BY%20T
HE%20EFCC%20FOR%20%20%20%20%20%20%20AG.pdf> accessed 15 January 2018.  For instance, of the 
43 high profile cases of corruption (from 2009 to 2015) being pursued by the Economic and Financial Crimes 
Commission, only one (1) case has been dismissed for abuse of court processes which is subject to appeal, 
but the other 42 are ongoing.     
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procedures in South Africa and Nigeria jurisdictions vis-à-vis the UNCAC.  But first 
we examine the criminal conviction based system to underscore the need for non-
conviction based recoveries, then we appraise existing barriers in asset recovery 
and conclude with some recommendations in the form of prosed reforms to 
improve the system.   
 
7.1 Forfeiture 
The origin of penal forfeiture is traceable to feudal England.779  The principle of 
attainder served to extinguish a person's legal existence upon conviction for a 
felony resulting in death.  The disentitlement included the forfeiture of personal and 
real property.  The old attainder proceedings at common law, which operated to 
deprive persons convicted for capital crimes, e.g. treason, of the use of their land 
for a year and a day, while also heirs lost their rights of inheritance and title.780 
Although attainder and other common law forms of forfeiture have been abolished 
by state,781 the concept has attained prominence as a viable tool of penal policy.  
Modern civil forfeiture originated in the United States in the 1970s and 1980s and 
had proliferated in most common law jurisdictions.  A major advantage of the 
modern forfeiture laws are that they typically have procedural and substantive 
safeguards that protect due process interests and legitimate property rights of 
                                                            
779 Confiscation of property by the state is not a new concept as legal historians have traced its genesis to 
biblical times as contained in Exodus 21:28: ‘when an ox gores a man or woman to death, the ox shall be 
stoned, and its flesh may not be eaten….’  
780 William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England: A Facsimile of the First Edition of 1765 – 1769 
With An Introduction by Thomas A. Green  (Volume 4, University of Chicago Press 1979) 374 
781  The harshness of the attainder resulted in its abolishment in England.  As part of the attainder, the source 
of the property did not matter, no distinction existed between property legally obtained and that arising 
from the proceeds of crime.  The forfeiture laws deprived a traitor or felon of all personal property.  This 
was a disproportionate punishment on the offender as well as his family members.  The laws denied the 
victim the opportunity to obtain money damages from the wrongdoer.  See an Act to Abolish Forfeiture for 
Treason and Felony, and to otherwise amend the law relating thereto, 33&34 Vict. C.23, S.1 (1870).    
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individuals.  They arose as a result of the increasing sophistication of profit-
motivated crime which cuts across national and geographic borders and uses 
every innovative technique to obfuscate the trail of criminal income.782  According 
to some statistics, between $1 trillion and $1.6 trillion is lost each year to various 
illegal activities, and corrupt public officials in developing countries loot as much as 
$40 billion each year, concealing these funds overseas where they are tough to 
recover.783   
Civil forfeiture refers to the exercise of state power to seize an individual's property 
because of its use in the commission of a crime.  This means the state may remove 
and retain the instrumentality of crime, which is the object used in the crime or to 
hide the crime.  The objective of modern forfeiture laws are concerned not so much 
with punishing individuals for their past wrongs but with achieving specific criminal 
justice objectives including disgorging offenders of their ill-gotten gains, disabling 
the financial capacity of criminal organisations, and compensating victims of 
crime.784  The significance of forfeiture laws as a substantive penal measure is 
more noticeable about its deterrence as well as its destabilising effect on criminals 
or criminal organisations. If in addition to conventional corrective measures like 
imprisonment, punishment can strike at the motivating factor of the crime – the 
financial benefit- it is likely to discourage many persons from committing such 
crimes. As noted by Woolf CJ ‘One of the most successful weapons which can be 
used to discourage offences that are committed in order to enrich the offenders is 
to ensure that if the offenders are brought to justice, any profit which they have 
                                                            
782 Mary S.N. Young, Civil forfeiture of criminal property: Legal measures for targeting the proceeds of crime 
[Edward Elgar Publishing Limited 2009] 2 
783 T. S Greenberg and others, Stolen Asset Recovery: A Good Practices Guide for Non-Conviction Based Asset 
Forfeiture (The World Bank 2009) 7 
784 Young (n765) 1 
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made from their offending is confiscated.’785  Invariably crimes that are financially 
motivated involve a deliberate calculation of risks and benefits by the offender. 
Where the risk of detection also includes the risk of losing the benefit, it can be 
argued that this would sufficiently deter criminals.  Also, as a deterrence tool, 
forfeiture serves as a weapon to tackle and weaken crime particularly where it 
occurs in an organised form, it is cliché that money is the lifeblood of crime and 
cutting off the money source serves to strangle or suffocate their operations.  Some 
jurisdictions have increased the stakes significantly by extending forfeiture to 
circumstances where criminal trial does not take place and also to any asset which 
is not necessarily proceeds of the crime. The limitations of criminal forfeiture 
(including the fact that the sentencing process is an inappropriate forum to 
confiscate all crime-tainted property)786 informs the recent trends in some 
jurisdictions that incline more to civil forfeiture processes.  Civil forfeiture 
represents the second generation of modern forfeiture laws. It is evident that the in 
rem787 the character of civil forfeiture which avoids the need to prove a person's 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt would have an undeniable appeal.788 
 
7.1.1 Criminal Forfeiture.   
Criminal forfeiture is an in personam order.  That is, an action against an individual 
which requires a criminal trial and conviction. Criminal forfeiture is often part of the 
sentencing process.  Forfeiture has been described variously as a deterrence, 
punishment and the embodiment of the maxim, ex turpi causa non oritur actio, 
                                                            
785 Lord Woolf CJ in R v Sekhon [2003] 1 WLR 1655, 1658 
786 Jeffrey Simser, ‘An Introduction to Civil Forfeiture’ in Simon N. M. Young, ed. Civil Forfeiture of Criminal 
Property: Legal Measure for Targeting the Proceeds of Crime (Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd, 2009) 3.   
787 Civil forfeiture involves proceedings against the crime-tainted property as opposed to proceedings 
against the person that characterises criminal forfeiture.  
788 Ibid.  
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interpreted to mean ‘a person should not benefit from an illegality in contract, tort 
or criminal law.789  It is an element of the sentence imposed following conviction, 
or as a plea bargain.  Thus, it is unavailable where the defendant is absent because 
of death, elopement, or immunity.  Criminal forfeitures require a conviction for the 
underlying offence, and the guilt of the defendant must be proved beyond 
reasonable doubt790 in common law jurisdictions whereas in civil law jurisdictions 
the court must be intimately convinced of the defendant's guilt.  It is noteworthy 
that criminal forfeiture constitutes part of the sentence and is used to enhance the 
punishment of a defendant who has already been convicted of a particular offence.  
Criminal forfeiture systems can be object-based, which means that the prosecuting 
authority must prove that the assets in question are proceeds or instrumentalities 
of crime, or it can be value based, where in this case, it allows the forfeiture of the 
value of the offender's benefit from the crime, without proving the connection 
between the crime and the specific property.791 If the underlying conviction is 
vacated as a result of an appeal, the forfeiture based on that conviction must also 
be vacated as well.792   
                                                            
789 ‘Oxford Reference: Overview - ex turpi causa non oritur actio’ 
<http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/oi/authority.20110803095806471> accessed 12 January 
2018 
790 The requirements that the prosecution should have the immovable burden to prove the guilt of an 
accused person is enshrined in the Nigerian Constitution.  Specifically, S.36(5) states that ‘every person who 
is charged with a criminal offence shall be presumed innocent until he is proved guilty provided that nothing 
in this section shall invalidate any law by reason only that the law imposes upon such person the burden of 
proving particular facts in a civil or criminal proceedings.’  In the same vein, S. 131(1) of the Nigerian 
Evidence Act states that ‘whoever desires any court to give judgment as to any legal right or liability 
dependent on the existence of facts which he asserts must prove that those facts exist.  S. 131(2) further 
states that when a person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is said that the burden of proof lies 
on that person.  See R. Lawrence [1932] 11 NLR 6 at 7.  Ukolari v. State [1993] 4 SC 167; Bozin v State (1985) 
2 NWLR pt8. P.465 SC.  Also in the common law case of Woolmington v DPP, it was held that ‘it is better 
that ten guilty men should escape than that an innocent man should suffer.’ [1935] AC 462  
791 Greenberg (n781) 13 
792.  It is noteworthy that before the amendment to the Money Laundering Act in 2011, there was no 
penalty for non-declaration of funds at Nigeria's exit points. Most of the cases charged to court for non-
declaration under the Money Laundering Act 2004 and 2006 were dismissed, and the assets recovered 







Forms of criminal forfeitures: 
Adekunle identified three types of forfeiture embedded in Nigerian legislation, 
namely:793 
i. Forfeiture of proceeds of a specified offence or assets acquired through 
proceeds derived from the conviction of an offence.  Various methods 
may be used to transfer, conceal or disguise the proceeds of crime.  
Money obtained from drug trafficking, illegal arms sales, and other 
criminal activities which cannot be channelled through banks and other 
formal institutions for the ‘eagle eyes’ of the law enforcement agencies, 
are laundered through trade malpractices such as massive importation 
of goods like spare parts, pharmaceuticals products, chemicals, 
automobiles.  Once these illegal activities are unmasked, all the 
properties involved are liable to forfeiture on the order of the court.  
S.18(2) of the Money Laundering Act provides that where a body 
corporate has been convicted of an offence under the Act, such body 
corporate shall be wound up and its assets forfeited to the 
government.794 
ii. Where a statute imposes pecuniary penalties or authorises the forfeiture 
of assets equivalent to the penalty or any benefit derived by the convict 
                                                            
793 Adedeji Adekunle, ‘Proceeds of Crime in Nigeria: Getting our act together’[An inaugural lecture by the 
Nigerian Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, 2011] 10 
794 Money Laundering and (Prohibition) Act 2011 as amended.  See also ICPC Act, s 47 
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from the offence.  Any property of the convict may under this process 
be liable for forfeiture to satisfy the penalty.  As practised in the UK, 
whereupon proof that the convict has a criminal lifestyle, all benefits 
attributable to his criminal activities are recoverable;795 and, 
iii. Forfeiture of Instrumentalities of Crime: Forfeiture which is subject to all 
traceable assets of the convicted person.  Under the criminal code, the 
court has the power to order the forfeiture of any property used in the 
commission of an offence. 
Plea Bargain 
A less mild form of sentence on conviction adopted in some common law 
jurisdiction is plea bargain.796  Black’s Law Dictionary defines a plea bargain as: 
                                                            
795 Ibid, page 11.    
796 R v Dougall [2010] EWCA Crim 1048. [2011] 1 Cr. App. R..  In this case, the appellant (D) appealed against 
a sentence of 12 months' imprisonment following his plea of guilty to conspiracy to corrupt.  It was held 
that (1) it was contrary to principle for a plea agreement to be entered into where the prosecution and 
defence agreed what the sentence would be. Accordingly, whilst the prosecution should be involved in the 
process by which the sentencing court was fully informed about matters arising from the evidence that 
might reflect on a defendant's culpability, including any matters of mitigation, and of any positive assistance 
given to the investigating authorities, that process did not involve an agreement about the level of sentence. 
Responsibility for the sentencing decision in cases of fraud or corruption was vested exclusively in the 
courts. There were no circumstances in which it might be displaced. The agreement told the court that only 
a suspended sentence should be imposed, which created in D the inevitable expectation that the court 
would be likely to accept that recommendation. (2) The sentence following a guilty plea would have been 
two years with D serving no longer than 12 months. The allowance for entering into the agreement, and 
taking on the considerable burdens, led to a halving of the appropriate sentence after the guilty plea. The 
effect was that D would serve 12 months and be released after serving six. The difference between a 
defendant who pleaded guilty, but did not give the co-operation and assistance, and a defendant who took 
on the full burden involved in being party to an agreement would be no more than a few months in actual 
custody. The consequence was that the reward for full co-operation was relatively small while the burdens 
taken on were substantial. Where the appropriate sentence of a defendant whose level of criminality, and 
features of mitigation, combined with a guilty plea, and full co-operation with the authorities investigating 
a major crime involving fraud or corruption, with all the consequent burdens of complying with his part of 
the agreement, would be 12 months' imprisonment or less, the argument that the sentence should be 
suspended was compelling. (3) That guidance for cases where the appropriate sentence was 12 months or 
less had nothing to do with any sentencing agreement between the prosecution, and the defence and the 
court were not saying that in similar circumstances a suspended sentence always had to be ordered. 
However, in all the circumstances, and in light of the guidance given, it was appropriate for the 12-month 
sentence imposed on D to be suspended.  The appeal was allowed.  
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‘the process whereby the accused and the prosecutor in a criminal case 
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court 
approval.’797 
Plea bargain usually involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offence or 
to only one or some of the counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter 
sentence than that possible for the graver charge.  Article 37(1) of UNCAC states 
that ‘each state party shall take appropriate measures to encourage persons who 
participate or who have participated in the commission of an offence established 
in accordance with this Convention to supply information useful to competent 
authorities for investigative and evidentiary purposes and to provide factual, 
specific help to competent authorities that may contribute to depriving offenders of 
the proceeds of crime and to recovering such proceeds.’798 On the part of the 
prosecutor providing reduced sentence, Article 37(2) Stipulates that ‘each state 
party shall consider providing for the possibility, in appropriate cases, of mitigating 
punishment of an accused person who provides substantial cooperation in the 
investigation or prosecution of an offence established by this Convention.’799  Article 
37(3) further states that each state party shall consider providing for the possibility, 
by fundamental principles of its domestic law, of granting immunity from 
prosecution to a person who provides substantial cooperation in the investigation 
or prosecution of an offence established by this Convention.800   
                                                            
797 Black’s Law Dictionary 
798 United Nations Convention against Corruption, 2004.   
799 Ibid. UNCAC, 2004 
800 Ibid. UNCAC, 2004 
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This doctrine of plea bargain was alien to the Nigerian criminal procedure law until 
it found its way through the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission Act801  
used to expedite the trial of some cases including high profile cases.802  The 
Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 has made elaborate provisions in this 
regard.  The ACJA provides that the prosecutor may receive and consider a plea 
bargain from the defendant charged of an offence either directly or indirectly from 
that defendant or on his behalf,803 and offer of a plea bargain to a defendant 
charged with an offence,804 where in the opinion of the prosecutor the offer of the 
plea bargain is in the best interest of justice, the public interest, public policy and 
the need to prevent the abuse of legal process.805  The defendant may plead guilty 
for lesser offence(s) than offence charged.   
The EFCC Act and ACJA on plea bargain conviction strategy is consistent with the 
provisions of the United Nations Convention against Corruption as discussed 
above and significantly it allows for the quick dispensation of justice.  Some have 
argued that plea bargaining undermines the basic premise of crime and 
punishment and that it robs the accused of the full chances of full trial whereupon 
                                                            
801 EFCC Act 2004, s 14(2) 
802 Tafa Balogun V. The Federal Republic of Nigeria (FRN).  A former Inspector General of Police (IGP), Tafa 
Balogun was arraigned at the Federal High Court, Abuja, on charges involving about N13 billion obtained 
through money laundering and theft.  The EFCC, in a suit No. FHC/ABJ/CR/14/2005, brought 70 count 
charges against Tafa Balogun covering the period from 2002 to 2004. He entered a plea bargain with the 
court in exchange for returning much of the property, and money. The charges were collapsed into eight 
counts and the former IGP was given a six-month jail term for each of the eight counts, to run concurrently, 
as well as a fine of N500,000 for each count.  
<https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/images/Annexture%20I.docx.pdf> accessed 4 January 2017. 
Another notable case was that of Chief Diepreye Solomon Peter Alamieyeseigha, a former Governor of 
Bayelsa State, charged for stealing public assets worth over $100 million.  He pleaded guilty to 6 count 
charges and was sentenced to two years imprisonment on each charge, to run concurrently and an order of 
asset forfeiture for those assets that were traced. 
See <https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/images/Annexture%20I.docx.pdf> accessed 6 January 2017 
803 Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, s 270(1)(a)   
804 Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, s 270(1)(b)   
805 Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, s 270(2)   
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he might be free though culpable.806  Additionally, some members of the public who 
do not know the working of the law may see the practice as eroding the confidence 
of the judiciary.807  There is also the apprehension that public officials and political 
elites would abuse the process, these being significant stakeholders in illicit 
enrichment.   The advantages of plea bargaining are that the prosecution secures 
faster conviction, it's cost-effective and prevents unnecessary public trial, though 
the offender ends up getting a milder punishment.  Others have seen plea bargain 
as a means to reduce the workload of the court and prosecution list of cases 
especially with the court’s inability to handle the volume of criminal cases.808 
A challenge with S. 270(17)(a) of the ACJA is that a plea can be entered into where 
the evidence of the prosecution is insufficient to prove the offence charged beyond 
reasonable.809  It has been argued that this category of plea bargain will not 
succeed as it is doubtful that the defence counsel would want to advise his client 
to accept criminal liability and be punished without full trial in the face of insufficient 
evidence against his client when he has the option of making a no case 
submission.810 
 
                                                            
806 Oluseyi Olayanju, ‘Relevance of Plea Bargaining in the Administration of Justice System in Nigeria’ 
(2001) viii LASU Law Journal 40 
807 Ibid 43 
808 Oguche Samuel, ‘Development of Plea Bargaining in the Administration of Criminal Justice in Nigeria’ 
[2011] NIALS Journal of law and Development 70 
809 Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, s 271(17) 
810  Marshall Umukoro, Emerging Trends in Criminal Proceedings’ 




7.1.2 Civil forfeiture (Non-Criminal based forfeiture). 
Civil forfeiture is drawn on the backdrop of two policy rationale: first, that gains from 
unlawful activity does not accrue and accumulate in the hands of those who commit 
illegal activity such as corruption, drug trafficking and fraud, therefore, the proceeds 
of their criminal conduct ought to be disgorged and distributed to the victims; and 
secondly, that the state should suppress conditions that lead to those unlawful 
activities.  A conviction for certain offences renders an accused liable to 
punishment, of which forfeiture or restitution may be imposed, among others.  
However there is an array of laws in Nigeria and other jurisdictions which 
empowers the court or agency responsible for implementing those laws to 
confiscate property whether real or in personam in order to preserve the res from 
being destroyed or the title in the property from being transferred to another person, 
pending the time the criminal trial of the accused will be concluded.  The standard 
of proof is usually on the balance of probabilities or preponderance of the evidence 
depending if it is a common law or civil law jurisdiction.  Proceedings in civil 
forfeiture cases are brought in rem, that is, against the proceeds in any unlawful 
activity.  The in rem nature of the proceedings offers the prosecutor to attack 
seemingly tricky problems such as corruption because the looted money may or 
may not be in the jurisdiction the crime was perpetrated, in so far as an offence 
has been committed, the courts can take jurisdiction over the property. 
Below we examine the criminal and civil asset forfeiture regimes in South Africa 
and Nigeria to underpinning areas in which developing countries could curb the 
growing tide of concealing tainted assets. 
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7.2 South African Civil Forfeiture Regime: 
Civil asset forfeiture has been in the statute books811 in South Africa for about 22 
years and made very robust with the enactment of the Prevention of Organised 
Crime Act (No. 21 of 1998).  This Act established a non-conviction based forfeiture 
scheme aimed at the proceeds of unlawful activities and the instrumentalities of 
criminal offences.  The preamble to POCA 1998 (as amended by Provisions of 
Organised Crime Second Amendment Act (No. 38 of 1999) outlines the underlying 
objectives of the asset forfeiture provisions of the Act:  
‘AND WHEREAS no person should benefit from the fruits of unlawful 
activities, nor is any person entitled to use property for the commission of 
an offence, whether such activities or offence took place before or after the 
commencement of this Act, legislation is necessary to provide for a civil 
remedy for the preservation and seizure, and the forfeiture of property which 
is derived from unlawful activities or is concerned in the commission or 
suspected commission of an offence.’812 
The procedure by which this forfeiture scheme is effected is commonly expressed 
as civil.  S. 37(1) states that ‘for the purposes of this Chapter all proceedings under 
this Chapter are civil proceedings, and are not criminal proceedings.’813  A forfeiture 
order under Chapter 6 is focused on tainted money, is only granted and not 
dependent on the institution or completion of any criminal prosecution about 
                                                            
811 A narrow form of civil asset forfeiture was under the South African Drugs and Trafficking Act (No. 140 of 
1992) where a conviction-based scheme of civil forfeiture applied for benefits derived by persons convicted 
of drug trafficking offences.  In 1996, the Proceeds of Crime Act allowed for the forfeiture of the benefits 
derived by persons convicted of any offences.  
812 This relates to the forfeiture scheme established under Chapter 6 of POCA 1998 (as amended). 
813 POCA 1998 as amended. S.37(1) 
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offences concerned.  Civil forfeiture involves a two-stage process: a preservation 
and forfeiture stages. 
a. A Preservation Stage 
A preservation stage is marked by the granting of a preservation of property 
order.814  A preservation order can be made against movable and immovable 
property.815  Chapter 6, part 2 of the Act makes relevant provisions for the 
preservation order.  Section 38(1) provides that ‘the National Director may 
by way of ex parte application apply to a High court for an order prohibiting 
any person, subject to such conditions and exceptions as may be specified 
in the order, from dealing in any manner with any property.816  The court 
according to S. 38(2) shall make an order if ‘there are reasonable grounds 
to believe that the property concerned –  
a. is an instrumentality of an offence referred to in Schedule 1;817 or 
b. is the proceeds of unlawful activities.818 
                                                            
814 Property means money or any other movable, immovable, corporeal or incorporeal thing. 
815 In an editorial article, it was reported that the asset forfeiture unit after obtaining a preservation of 
property order from the Pretoria High Court seized the sum of R76, 725,714 and a Toyota Double Cab pick-
up vehicle believed to have been used in the smuggling of cash.  They were allegedly arrested in possession 
of the pile of cash, which reportedly took police more than five hours to count. 
www.fightagainstcrime.co.za/asset-forfeiture-unit-.  
816 National Director according to Schedule I(x) means ‘the National Director of Public Prosecutions 
appointed regarding Section 179(1)(a) of the Constitution.’ 
817 Schedule 1 of POCA 1998 as amended, defines Instrumentality of an offence to mean ‘any property which 
is concerned in the commission or suspected commission of an offence at any time before or after the 
commencement of this Act, whether committed within the Republic or elsewhere.’ In an appeal brought 
before the Constitutional court by the NDPP in the case of Kumarnath Mohunram and Shelgate Investments 
CC vs The National Director of Public Prosecutions and BOE Bank Limited [2007] ZACC 4, Van Heerden AJ 
held that the gambling operation in issue was an offence covered by POCA.  POCA does not only apply to 
discrete areas of organised crime, but can encompass illegal acts outside of money laundering, racketeering, 
and criminal gang activity. 
818 Schedule 1 of POCA 1998 as amended defined unlawful activities to mean ‘any property or any service 
advantage, benefit or reward which was derived, received or retained directly or indirectly, in the Republic 
or elsewhere, at any time before or after the commencement of this Act, in connection with or as a result 
of any unlawful activity carried on by any person.’ 
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S.43 (1) on the other hand makes provision for the preservation order in respect of 
immovable property and states that ‘A High Court which has made a preservation 
order in respect of immovable property may at any time, with a view to ensuring 
the effective execution of a subsequent order, order the registrar of deeds 
concerned to endorse any one or more of the restrictions….on the title deed of the 
immovable property.’819  Under S.43(2), the following the restrictions can be made: 
a) that the immovable property shall not without the consent of the High 
Court be mortgaged or otherwise encumbered; 
b) that the immovable property shall not without the permission of the 
High Court be attached or sold in execution; and 
c) that the immovable property shall not without the consent of the High 
Court – 
i. vest in the Master of the High Court or trustee concerned, as 
the case may be when the estate of the owner of that 
immovable property is sequestrated: or 
ii. where the owner of that immovable property is a company or 
other corporate body which is being wound up, form part of 
the assets of such company or body corporate body. 
The custody of immovable property on the title deed of which a restriction is 
contemplated according to the Act shall vest as from the date which –  
a) the estate of the owner of the immovable property is 
sequestrated; or 
                                                            
819 POCA 1998 as amended, s43(1) 
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b) where the owner of the immovable property is a company or other 
corporate body, such a company or corporate body is being 
wound up.820 
Where a preservation order has been granted by the High Court, the National 
Director shall ‘give a notice of the order to all persons known to have interest in the 
property which is subject to the order; and publish a notice of the order in the 
Gazette.’821  Any person who has an interest in the property for which a preservation 
order has been granted, may enter an appearance giving notice of his or her 
intention to oppose the making of a forfeiture order or to apply for an order 
excluding his or her interest in the property from the operation thereof.822 
The aim of a preservation order is to preserve the property to prevent it from being 
disposed of, or removed.  Any police officer may seize any such property if he or 
she has reasonable grounds to believe that such property will be so disposed of or 
removed823 but this will be by the directions of the High Court, which made the 
preservation order.824  A preservation order expires within 90 days of the relevant 
notice of the order published in the government gazette unless an application for a 
forfeiture order is pending before the expiry of this period or the order is rescinded 
before that period.825 
 
                                                            
820 POCA 1998 as amended, s 43(4) 
821 POCA 1998 as amended, s 39(1)(a-b) 
822 POCA 1998 as amended, s 39(3).  It has been held that a Preservation order was appealable in 
the case of Singh v NDPP [2007] ZASCA 82, at 10 
823 POCA 1998 as amended, s 41(1) 
824 POCA 1998 as amended, s 41(2) 
825 POCA 1998 as amended, s 40(1-3) 
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b. A forfeiture stage 
This stage is characterised by the granting of a final order regarding which the 
property concerned is forfeited to the government.  For the court to give a forfeiture 
order, the jurisdictional requirement is by balance of probabilities that the property 
involved is either an instrumentality of an offence or that it is the proceeds of 
unlawful activities.   
 
7.3 Implementation of Chapters 5 And 6 of The Act 
The Asset Forfeiture Unit (AFU) established in May 1999 in the office of the 
National Director of Public Prosecutions has the objective of the implementation of 
Chapters 5 and 6 of the Prevention of Organised Crime Act 1998 (as amended).  
It was created to ensure that the powers in the Act to seize criminal assets would 
be used to their maximum effect in the fight against organised crime and unlawful 
activities.  From the outset, the AFU set out long term strategic goals which include: 
to develop the law by taking test cases to court and creating the legal precedents 
that are necessary to allow the efficient use of the law; build the capacity to ensure 
that asset forfeiture is used widely as possible to make a real impact in the fight 
against crime; make an impact on selected categories of priority crimes; establish 
a national presence; develop excellent relationships with its key partners such as 
the South African Police Service (SAPS), The South African Revenue Service 
(SARS); and, build the AFU into a professional and representative organisation. 
Since funding the AFU to carry out its core mandate could be a significant 
challenge, the Act ensured that the monetary value realised from forfeited assets 
be deposited into the Criminal Asset Recovery Account, being a separate account 
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in the National Revenue Fund826 and used to provide financial assistance to law 
enforcement agencies827 involved in combating organised crime, money 
laundering, criminal gang activity and general crime, as well as assisting the victims 
of crime.828  S.64 of the Act regulates the constitution of the Criminal Asset 
Recovery Account (CARA) and shall consist of the following: 
a. All monies derived from the fulfilment of confiscation and forfeiture 
orders contemplated in Chapters 5 and 6;829 
b. All property derived from the fulfilment of forfeiture orders as 
contemplated in section 57;830 
c. The balance of all monies derived from the execution of foreign 
confiscation orders as defined in the International Cooperation in 
Criminal Matters Act, 1996 (act no 75 of 1996), after payments have 
been made to requesting states regarding the Act; 
d. Any property or monies appropriated by Parliament paid into or allocated 
to the CARA;831 
e. Domestic or foreign grants;832 
f. Any property or amount of money received or acquired from any 
source;833 and 
                                                            
826 POCA 1998 as amended, s 63 
827 POCA 1998 as amended, s 68(b).  This is subject to S.65 of the Act establishes a Criminal Assets Recovery 
Committee which is responsible for providing Cabinet with recommendations on the utilisation of the CARA 
and providing advice on specific issues related to the criminal assets recovery process.  Under S. 69(a) of the 
Act, cabinet may utilise the property and money allocated to or standing to the credit of the CARA – after 
considering the recommendations of the committee.  
828 POCA 1998 as amended, s 68(c)  
829 POCA 1998 as amended, s 64(a) 
830 POCA 1998 as amended, s 57(4) states that the curator bonis shall deposit into the Criminal Asset 
Recovery Account any proceeds of any sale or disposition of forfeited property and any monies forfeited. 
831POCA 1998 Act  as amended, s 64(c) 
832 POCA 1998 as amended, s 64(d) 
833 POCA 1998 Act as amended, s 64(f)  
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g. All property or monies transferred to the CARA.834 
The importance of the specific funding mechanism cannot be overemphasized 
given the enormity of the task involved, albeit, the challenges of and litigation 
from wealthy and influential criminal figures anxious to retain their illicitly 
obtained wealth, legal wars of attrition against those lawyers retained to expose 
any weakness or lack of clarity in the civil forfeiture provisions and the need for 
adequately resourced, specialty capability built into the AFU to investigate and 
prosecute civil and criminal asset forfeiture cases. 
 
7.4 Aspect of UK Civil Forfeiture Law  
 
The proceeds of Crime Act 2002 (POCA) introduced civil forfeiture or 
confiscation in rem in the UK.  The aim of the Act among others is to provide 
for confiscation orders in relation to persons who benefit from criminal conduct 
and for restrainst orders to prohibit dealing with property, allow the recovery of 
property obtained through unlawful conduct or which is intended to be used in 
unlawful conduct835.  This law enbles civil action to be taken to restrain and 
recover assets and instrumentalities that represents the proceeds of crime by 
the approriate authorities (earlier the Asset Recovery Agency,836 but not now 
the Financial Conduct Authority, HM Revenue and Customs, the National 
Crime Agency, the Crown Prosecution Service or the Serious Fraud Office).  
Four key elements elements introduced by the Act are: 
                                                            
834POCA 1998 Act  as amended, s 64(e) 
835 Chapter 29 Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 
836 S.74 Serious Crime Act 2007 abolishes the Asset Recovery Agency 
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i. Criminal confiscation:  Part 2 of the POCA sets out powers to confiscate 
the proceeds of crime following a criminal conviction as part of the 
sentencing process.  It also sets out powers to retrain837 or freeze a 
defendant’s assets and prohibit the defendant from dealing with any 
realisable property held by him so that it will be available to satisfy any 
confiscation order that might be made by the Crwon Court upon his being 
convicted of a criminal offence. 
The purpose of the confiscation proceeding provided in the Act is to recover 
the benefit that an offender has obtained from his criminal conduct.   A 
confiscation order is made by the Crown Court and requires the defendant 
to pay a particular sum that the court calculates to be the recoverable 
amount.  Though, the confiscation order is made in personam, it does not 
apply to a particular item of property and the defendant can satisfy  the 
confiscation order with both legitimate and illegitimate income.  In making a 
confication order, the court must decide if he is (i) convicted of a criminal 
offence or committed for sentencing, and (ii) if the Director or the court 
believes it is appropriate to do so. 
ii. Civil Recovery:  Part 5 (Chapter 2) sets out a system of conficating the 
proceeds of Crime in the absence of a criminal conviction through the civil 
courts.  A recent tool introduced by the Act838 is the use of unexplained 
wealth orders aimed at targeting assets held by politically exposed persons 
to disclose the source of their wealth in relation to the assets owned.  The 
general purpose of Part 5 of POCA is to enable the enforcement authority 
                                                            
837 S.80 POCA 2002 
838 S.362A of POCA as amended. 
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to recover in civil proceedings property or cash which is, or represents, 
property or cash obtained through unlawful conduct or which is intended to 
to be used in unlawful conduct.  The definition of property  is deliberately 
wide to include (a) money; (b) all forms of property, real or personal, 
heritable or moveable; and (c) things in action and other intangible or 
incorporeal property.839   Unlawful conduct is one that is deemed unlawful 
by the criminal law of the country and a person obtains property through 
unlawful conduct if he/she obtains property by, or in return for that conduct. 
 
An action for civil recovery can be brought before a court of competent 
jurisdiction where it is specifically provided for even though there have not 
been any criminal proceedings in connection with the property, or where 
criminal proceedings have been instituted and resulted in an acquittal.840  
The standard of proof is the balance of probabilities for which the 
prosecuting authority has to show that the money or asset in question has 
been derived from criminal conduct.841  There must be sufficient evidence 
to enable the court to decide842 whether the conduct so described was 
unlawful under the criminal law of the UK or in relation to cross border 
matters, the unlawful conduct will be under the UK law or the foreign state. 
iii. Cash forfeiture:  part 5 (chapter 3) sets out powers to seize and forfeit cash, 
through a civil process, where there are reasonable grounds to suspect that 
                                                            
839 S 316(4) POCA 2002 
840 SOCA v Olden [2009] EWHC 610 
841 R v Jia Jin He and Dan Dan Chen (2004) EWHC Admin 3021.  Collins J stated that ‘the court should look 
for cogent evidence before deciding that the balance of probabilities has been met.’ 
842 Director of ARA v Jeffrey David Green [2005] EWHC Admin 3168 
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it is the proceeds of crime.843  Seizure of cash is not only at the borders but 
also inland, anywhere in the UK where there are reasonable grounds for 
suspicion.  POCA 2002 also establishes power to search any person or any 
article in his possession where there are grounds that the person is carrying 
cash which constitutes a recoverable property or is intended for an unlawful 
conduct and the amount is not less than the minimum amount.844  Powers 
of search and seizure is subject to the approval of a justice of peace or 
sheriff or a senior officer.  Cash seized can be forfeited upon an order by 
the court. 
iv. Criminal taxation: part 6 allows the National Crime Agency to tax income 
which it suspects are the proceeds of crime without a conviction. 
An evaluation of the UK civil recovery regime shows that only a small proportion of 
criminal gains are ever confiscated which is because much crime is not reported, 
criminal gains are often disposed of quickly or transferred out of reach, and many 
criminals are determined to keep as much as they can regardless of the sanctions 
made against them.845  According to the Fifth report of Session 2016-17,846  the 
actual amount confiscated in 2012-2013 amounted to an estimated 26p in every 
£100 of criminal gains generated.  Given the tough legal framework, ambitous 
goverment goals and weaknesses in a number of areas of the confiscation process 
it was concluded that the recovery ws too small.847   From figure 9 below, the 
                                                            
843 In Commissioners of Customs and Excise v Duffy [2002] EWHC 425, it was held that the court was 
entitled to aggregate to cover ‘smurfing’. 
844 S.294 POCA 2002 
845 House of Commons, ‘Proceeds of Crime: Fifth Report of Session 2016-17.  Report together with formal 
minutes relating to the report’ <http://www.parliament.uk/homeaffairscom> accessed 21 September 
2017 




number of confiscation orders imposed fell by 500 to 5924 in 2014-2015 and a 
further 222 in 2015-16 representing 11.95% over a two year period (2013 being 
the base year in this instance).848  The total value of orders imposed also fell by 
£31.5 million to £247.3 million between 2012-13 and 2014-15 (an 11% reduction) 
after adjusting for inflation.849  The number of criminal conviction also fell over the 




                                                            
848 National Audit office, Confiscation Orders: Progress Review (Report by the Comptroller and Auditor 
General, 11 March 2016) <https://www.nao.org.uk/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Confiscation-orders-
progress-review.pdf> assessed 21 September 2017 





Figure 9 - Confiscation orders imposed, 2011 - 2015 
Source:  National Audit office, Confiscation Orders progress review 2016 
 
OECD members experience the same dismal position of asset recovery. According 
to a STaR report which analyzed data from OECD countries for the periods 2010–
2012 compared with an earlier report of 2006-2009, it observed that the total assets 
frozen in the period 2010-2012 increased by US$0.173 billion from $1.225 billion 
to US$1.398 billion.  The findings also showed that countries were more successful 
in freezing and returning stolen assets through innovative legal avenues and 
powers; more assets were returned to developing countries; and that countries with 
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achieved greater success in returning the proceeds of corruption.  However, a huge 
gap remains between the results achieved and the estimated billions of dollars 
stolen from developing countries each year. Between 2006 and mid-2012, OECD 
members returned US$423.5 million, compared to the estimated US$20-40 billion 
stolen each year.850 
Some factors which explain the shortfall of the UK asset recovery regime includes 
the non-coherent overall strategy for confiscation orders with no agreed success 
measures, insufficient awareness of proceeds of crime and its impact,851 the lack 
of proportionality,852 lack of understanding and experience of civil recovery 
proceedings among law enforcement agencies; restraining orders and property of 
legal entities;853 breaching of the presumption of innocence854 and double jeopardy 
rule.855  Also, the need for more high level commitment to asset recovery, taking 
action to identify and freeze allegedly stolen assets, failure to introduce and 
ecourage incentives for domestic practitioners to initiate cases and low level of 
international cooperation on mutual legal assistance and cross border jurisdiction 
issues.856 
 
                                                            
850 Larrisa Gray, Kjetil Hansen, Pranvera Recica-Kirkbride and Linea Mills, Few and Far: Hard Facts on 
Stolen Asset Recovery (The World Bank 2014) 
851 House of Commons (n843) 6 
852 See McIntosh v. Lord Advocate [2001] 2 All ER 638; Director of ARA v. John and Lord [2007] EWHC 360 
(UK).   
853 R v. Seager and Blatch (2009) EWCA Crim 1303 
854 Director of ARA v. Walsh [2004] NIQB 21.  See also R (on the appeal of Director of ARA) (Paul) v Ashton 
[2006] EWHC (Admin) 1064 where it was held that the imposition of a civil recovery order was not 
punitive and could not therefore violate Article 7 (no punishment without law) and that such orders had a 
compensatory aspect and the fact that deprivation of property is involved does not constitute a penalty 
because the holder of the property was not entitled to the property in the first place. 
855 Angela V. M. Leong, ‘Asset Recovery under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002: The UK Experience’ in 
Simon N. M. Young ed,’Civil Forfeitures of Criminal Property: Legal Means for Targeting the Proceeds of 
Crime (Edward Elgar Publishing 2009) 218 
856 King v. Director of Serious Fraud Office [2009] UKHL 17 
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7.5 Aspects of Criminal and Civil Forfeiture Under Nigerian Law 
The law on the recovery and management of proceeds of crimes in Nigeria are 
fragmented in some existing legislation, including the Independent Corrupt 
Practices Offences and Other Related Matters Act 2000, the Economic and 
Financial Crimes Commission (Establishment) Act 2004, the National Agency for 
the Prohibition of Traffic in Persons Act, 2003, the National Drug Law Enforcement 
Agency Act 2004, the Advance Fee Fraud and other Fraud Related Offences Act 
2006, the Money Laundering (Prohibition) Act 2011 and more recently the 
Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015.  While there are provisions in these 
statutes, which allow the government to recover the proceeds of crime, the results 
have been disjointed and ineffective. Although in recent times the anti-corruption 
agency has been able to make significant recoveries,857 yet criminals still manage 
to hold to sizeable part of their ill-gotten gains since some of these would have 
been laundered to secrecy jurisdictions or invested into other legitimate businesses 
locally and abroad.   As the Stolen Asset Recovery (STAR) Initiative by the World 
Bank and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime indicated, developing 
countries lose between $20 billion and $40 billion each year to bribery, 
embezzlement and other corrupt practices and of these over the past 15 years only 
                                                            
857 Economic and Financial Crimes Commision, ‘Remarks by Ibrahim Magu’ 
<https://efccnigeria.org/efcc/news/2729-remarks-by-ibrahim-magu-ag-chairman-efcc-luncheon-with-
media-executive-rockview-hotel-abuja-august-30-2025> accessed 12 February 2018.  The press briefing 
indicated that ‘the Commission between January and August 30, 2017 recorded the following 
monetary recoveries:  Four Hundred and Nine Billion, Two Hundred and Seventy Million, Seven 
Hundred and Six Thousand, Six Hundred and Eighty Six Naira, Seventy Five 
Kobo(N409,270,706,686.75); Sixty Nine Million, Five Hundred and One Thousand, One Hundred 
and Fifty Six Dollars, Sixty Seven Cents ($69, 501,156.67);  Two Hundred and Thirty One Thousand, 
One Hundred and Eighteen Pounds, Sixty Nine Shillings (Pounds 231,118.69; Six Hundred and Ten 
Thousand, Eight Hundred and Sixteen Thousand, Twenty Euros (Euro 610,816.20); Four Hundred 
and Forty Three Thousand, Four Hundred Dirham (Dirham 443,400.00 and (Seventy Thousand, 
Five Hundred Saudi Riyal (SR70, 500.00).’ 
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$5 billion has been recovered and returned.858  It is noteworthy that the 
unrecovered loot belongs to the people who are being deprived of essential social 
amenities which a responsible government should provide. Another worrisome 
aspect of the present recovery effort of the Nigerian Government is that property 
that has been frozen by order of the court has been allowed to languish and rot; 
businesses have been allowed to die.  There are allegations of misappropriation of 
recovered assets by the law enforcement agencies, or they have been dissipated, 
lost, or in any event, not adequately accounted.   
 
7.5.1 Criminal Forfeiture Procedure 
There is no single legal framework about interim measures for the freezing or 
seizure of the proceeds of crime in Nigeria, the proposed Proceeds of Crime Bill 
seeks to address the proceeds of unlawful activity from both criminal and civil 
recovery perspective.  Part V of the proposed bill aims to establish criminal 
forfeiture and confiscation. 
 
Various statutes in Nigeria make provisions for the forfeiture of property where 
such property is the subject matter or evidence in a criminal action.  Part 34 of the 
Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015 provides for the seizure, forfeiture, 
confiscation and destruction of instrumentality of crime.  Under section 333 of the 
Act, the court may: 
                                                            
858 Jean-Pierre Brun, Larissa Gray, Clive Scott and Kevin M. Stephenson, Asset Recovery Handbook: A Guide 
for Practitioners (The World Bank 2011) 
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a. Order the seizure of any instrument, material or thing which is reason to 
believe are provided or prepared or being prepared, to the commission of 
an offence triable by the court;859 and,  
b. Direct the instrument to, material or thing to be forfeited, confiscated, held 
or otherwise dealt with in the same manner as property under S.336 of the 
Act.860 
Under Sections 336 of the Act,861 a defendant convicted of an offence carried out 
by criminal force and the victim dispossessed of any immovable property, the court, 
where it deems fit, may order the possession of the property to be restored to the 
victim.  
Under the Independent Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act 2000, 
an interim measure, it makes provisions that empower an officer of the Commission 
to seize property in the course of investigation if he or she suspects it is the subject 
matter of an offence or evidence relating to the offence.   The Act empowers the 
Chairman of the Commission, where he or she has reasonable grounds to believe 
that an offence under the Act has been committed, to require a person to identify 
every property, whether movable or immovable, within or outside Nigeria, 
belonging to this person or in their possession, or in which this person has any 
interest, whether legal or equitable, and specify the date on which each of the 
properties identified was acquired and the manner in which each was received. 
 
                                                            
859 Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, s 333(a) 
860 Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, s 33(b) 
861 Administration of Criminal Justice Act 2015, s 336 
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Similarly, under section 27 of the EFCC Act 2004, where a person is arrested for 
committing an offence, he must make a full disclosure of his/her assets and 
property by completing the declaration of assets form as specified in Form A of the 
schedule to the Act which form shall then be investigated by the commission. The 
Act makes it an offence to make a false declaration or refuse to make full disclosure 
or any disclosure at all.  Upon the attachment of any property under the act, the 
Commission shall immediately trace and attach all assets and property of the 
person as a result of such economic or financial crime and shall then obtain an 
interim attachment order from the court.  The Act further provides that where assets 
or property of any person arrested for an offence under the Act has been seized, 
or any assets or property have been seized by the commission under the Act, the 
Commission shall cause an ex parte application to be made to the court for an 
interim order.  This action forfeits the property concerned to the Federal 
Government, and the Court will, if satisfied that there is prima facie evidence that 
the property involved is liable to forfeiture, make an interim order by section 29.   
An arrest under section 27 of the EFCC Act triggers the investigation of assets and 
property of a person arrested for an offence under the act.   
 
Under the proposed Proceeds of Crime Bill, the pre-requisite for ‘criminal 
confiscation’ or ‘criminal forfeiture’ is the conviction of a defendant of an offence 
upon which an order to confiscate or forfeit items is obtained. Items forfeited could 
include such things as property obtained from criminal activity and property that 
directly represents one illegally obtained and the instrumentalities of crime. 
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Proceedings for application of freezing or confiscation orders are of a civil nature,862 
the rules of evidence in civil proceedings will apply863 and question of fact to be 
decided by a court shall be determined on a balance of probabilities864 basis.  This 
is notwithstanding any rule of law or practice relating to hearsay evidence, 
evidence given in respect of freezing, restraint, forfeiture or confiscation in 
furtherance to part V is admissible in court.865   
In criminal matters, a restraint order866 is made on the property for it not to be 
disposed of, or otherwise dealt with by any person before the issuance of a 
forfeiture or confiscation order by the court.  The Bill makes provision that in respect 
of a freezing, restraint, forfeiture or confiscation order, the rules of evidence 
applicable in civil proceedings applies, and question of fact in regard of an 
application for such orders will be made on the basis of balance of probabilities867 
as against proof of beyond reasonable doubt.  Furthermore, the Bill provides for 
freezing orders.  Sections 42 to 50 relates to provisions in respect of freezing order.  
Specifically, Section 43 makes provision for a freezing order to prohibit a financial 
institution from allowing a withdrawal from an account with the financial institution, 
covering the specified amount or any related accounts to which the defendant is a 
signatory.  It also deals with procedure for applying to the court, service of freezing 
orders, renewals, and protection of individuals/corporations from suits for 
compliance and offences relating to non-compliance by financial institutions and 
                                                            
862 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 39(1) 
863 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 39(2) 
864 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 39(4) 
865 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 39(5) 
866 The Bill makes provision for in civil forfeiture for a Preservation order whereas in criminal matters a 
restraint order is provided. 
867 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 39(4) 
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its officials.  During criminal confiscation, however, restraint orders are used which 
prevents the named person from dealing all the property that he owns. 
 
7.5.2 Non Conviction based Recovery Procedure Under The Nigerian 
Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017 
As already shown above, there is no comprehensive legislation in Nigeria in 
respect of the confiscation, forfeiture and management of proceeds of crime 
derived from unlawful activities.  Successes so far achieved by the law 
enforcement agencies, the EFCC, in particular, arose from taking advantage of 
provisions in other legislations to attain interim forfeitures of assets.  The Corrupt 
Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000 provides for the possibility for non-
conviction based forfeiture.  Specifically, S.48(1) provides that ‘where in respect of 
any property seized under the Act there is no prosecution or conviction, the 
Chairman of the Commission, may before the expiration of twelve months from the 
date of the seizure, apply to the High Court for an order of forfeiture, if there is 
satisfactory evidence that such property has been obtained as a result of or in 
connection with an offence under the Act.’868 
To bridge the gap and in conformity with UNCAC, the proposed Proceeds of Crime 
Bill seeks to introduce non-conviction based recovery of the proceeds of crime. At 
the time of this research work, it is awaiting assent by the President.   Expressing 
the sorry state of recovered assets, the Bill sponsor, Senator Mohammed Hassan 
noted: ‘what we have now creates a very consuming system that have left both the 
victim, the state as losers as the values recovered by agencies of government end 
                                                            
868 Corrupt Practices and Other Related Offences Act, 2000, s 48(1) 
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up decrepit and decaying with little or no accountability or ultimate responsibility.’869   
The objective of the Bill is to:  
i. Provide for an adequate legal and institutional framework for the recovery 
and management of the proceeds of crime or benefits derived from unlawful 
activities; 
ii. Deprive a person of the proceeds of illegal activity, the instrumentalities of 
an offence and any other benefit derived from an offence committed within 
or outside Nigeria; 
iii. Prevent the reinvestment of proceeds of unlawful activity in the furtherance 
of criminal enterprise; 
iv. Harmonise and consolidate existing legislative provisions on the recovery 
of proceeds of crime and related matters in Nigeria; and  
v. Make comprehensive provisions for the restraint, seizure, confiscation and 
forfeiture of property derived from unlawful activities used or intended to be 
used in the commission of such unlawful activities.870 
There are three types of asset recovery provided for in the Bill. These are ‘civil 
forfeiture', ‘criminal forfeiture' and ‘criminal confiscation'. Most of these procedures 
will be carried out by law enforcement agencies but will be subject to oversight by 
the Agency. 
Civil forfeiture and related issues such as the nature of proceedings, preservation 
orders and seizure of property subject to a preservation order are covered in Part 
                                                            
869 Senator Mohammed Hassan, ‘Lead Debate on the Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017’ 
<http://placng.org/wp/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/Lead-Debate-on-the-Proceeds-of-Crime-Bill-
2017.pdf> accessed 25 March 2018  
870 A Bill for an Act to make Comprehensive Provisions for the Confiscation, Forfeiture and Management of 
Properties derived from Unlawful Activities and for Related Matters. SB.376 
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II.  Under the Bill, where there is a reasonable ground to believe that a property is 
the proceeds of unlawful activity;871 or represents the proceeds of unlawful 
activity;872 is involved in the facilitation of illegal activity;873 or is intended to be used 
to facilitate unlawful activity,874 the court may make an order875 upon an exparte 
application filled by the agency,876 to restrain any person from dealing in any 
manner with the property.877  ‘Proceeds of unlawful activity means property wholly 
derived or realised, whether directly or indirectly, from unlawful activity, or partly 
derived or realised, from unlawful activity whether property is situated within or 
outside Nigeria.’878  Preservation orders when granted would usually last for 120 
days879 and can be renewed for a further 60 days880 upon application by the agency 
and the court is satisfied that there are reasonable grounds for renewal, the 
preservation order has not been rescinded, and no previous renewal order had 
been sought.  However, the period for the subsistence of the preservation order 
will not lapse where an application for forfeiture order is still pending before the 
Court or where there is an unsatisfied forfeiture order.  A request for a forfeiture 
order can then be made while the preservation order subsists.  A preservation 
order is necessary to prevent crime-tainted property from being disposed of or 
dissipated before a judgment is satisfied.  Additionally, the Bill also makes provision 
                                                            
871 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 4(2)(a) 
872 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 4(2)(b) 
873 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 4(2)(c) 
874 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 4(2)(d) 
875 The Preservation Order is used during the investigation into the assets of the suspect in civil forfeiture 
matters to restrain any person from dealing in any manner with any property. 
876 The Agency here refers to the Proceeds of Crime Recovery and Management Agency  
877 When a preservation order is made, the Agency is required to give notice to all persons known to have 
interest in the property to oppose the making of a forfeiture order or apply to the court for an order 
excluding his or her interest in the property from the operation of a forfeiture order  
878 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 163 
879 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 6 
880 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 7(3) 
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for the seizure of property that is subject to a preservation order where there are 
reasonable grounds to believe that the value of the property may have diminished, 
or be may dispose of, damaged or removed contrary to the subsisting order.881 
Forfeiture of the proceeds of unlawful activity in civil recovery proceedings is 
provided within sections 15 and 25882 and is achieved where the property subject 
to the preservation order has neither been rescinded, nor interest proved by any 
person to the contrary, that the property is not derived from unlawful activities.  With 
effect from the date when the court makes a forfeiture order, the property subject 
to the order shall be forfeited to the agency and vests in the Agency on behalf of 
the Federal Government.883  With the passage of the Bill, civil recovery procedures 
will become very clear which in the first instance does not require the conviction of 
an individual before property arising from unlawful activity is forfeited.  In addition 
to the provisions of Part II discussed above, under Part III of the Bill, on an exparte 
application by the Agency, the Court may make a discovery order in favour of the 
Agency where it is satisfied that the Agency is conducting a civil forfeiture 
investigation.  To justify why unlawful property can be seized and forfeited to the 
government, the Constitution of Nigeria 1999 though guarantees the right to property 
subject to section 44 (2) (b) where it provides that ‘for the imposition of penalties or 
forfeitures for the breach of law, whether under civil process or after conviction for an 
offence’.  In an attempt to ensure that functions are not duplicated, the Bill seeks to 
amend relevant provisions in all existing legislations containing elements of 
confiscation, forfeitures and management of proceeds of unlawful activity884 and 
                                                            
881 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 8(1) 
882 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 15, s 25  
883 Proceeds of crime Bill 2017, s 21(1) 
884 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 162(1) provides amendments to The National Drug Law Enforcement 
Agency Act, 2004, s 162(2) amends The Trafficking in Persons (Prohibition) Law Enforcement and 
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proceeds of unlawful activity, instrumentalities of offences and property recovered 
by the relevant organisations before the commencement of the proposed Bill when 
passed into law that has not been passed to the Federal Government shall vest in 
the Agency.885  It is, however, a cause of concern that with the passage of the Bill, 
due to government bureaucracy and inter-agency squabbles the proposed transfer 
of property seized by the different law enforcement agencies may not be effective 
and property may be lost in the process.  In the same vein, the Act mandates the 
Agency to investigate unlawful activities, which seem to be an outright duplication 
of functions thus the result will be inter-agency rivalry which may result in hiding of 
information or even shielding persons believed to have committed an offence.  
Furthermore, the researcher believes that the modus of receiving information 
necessary for investigation and prosecution of unlawful activity is still inadequate 
and unattended to by the proposed Bill.  For instance, officials of the EFCC and 
ICPC acts on petitions received from individuals, corporate bodies and other 
governmental and non-governmental bodies as the basis for commencing 
investigation into alleged corrupt practices; from political office holders against their 
perceived adversaries; and from the financial intelligence unit for suspicious 
activities report but this is insufficient as it not a holistic approach.  What percentage 
of these unlawful activities are captured in this ring of illicit enrichment? Where 
corrupt leaders/officials are perceived to be ‘good’ to their subordinates or followers 
and have cascaded their illicit proceeds downward to even the office clerk, would 
these perceived ‘good' persons ever be faced with a just trial and forfeiture?  In 
recent times, a whistle-blowers policy has been put in place with an accompanying 
                                                            
Administration Act 2003, s 162(3) amends the Economic and Financial Crimes (Establishment) Commission 
Act, 2004, s 162(4) amends The Corrupt Practices and other related offences Act, 2000. 
885 Proceeds of Crime Bill, s 162(7) 
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legislation in advanced stage of being passed to law aimed at unravelling corrupt 
people and their illicit proceeds, would this also bring about the extensive capture 
corruption reporting? While this may be the subject of another research, it can be 
argued that a more holistic mechanism of information gathering be put in place to 
provide law with all enforcement agencies with information relevant to the fight 
against illicit enrichment.  For instance, overpricing of contract is one of the 
commonest means of stealing of government funds and law enforcement agencies 
should be able to have access to information about major contracts awarded and 
their values compared with market realities.  Whether the full amounts have been 
given executive consent or not, it is imperative that an investigation is launched 
immediately without recourse to receiving petitions because such contracts would 
be at the behest of the incumbent.  Similar to suspicious activity reporting for banks 
and other financial institutions, there should be suspicious transaction reporting in 
the public sector with very low threshold incorporated in the existing public service 
rules and regulations governing the operations of ministries and parastatals of 
government.  Also, law enforcement agencies should be keen to use anecdotal 
audit reports issued by the internal audit units of government, although, admittedly, 
these sometimes are subject to manipulation and connivance as heads of 
ministries and agencies could bribe/intimidate the auditors to dilute the extent of 
graft and non-compliance in their reporting.  In the same vein, law enforcement 
agencies should initiate regular and unannounced special investigations subject to 
an order by the court in the activities of government agencies employing the 
specialised services of forensic accountants and examiners who could help to 
unravel schemes aimed at syphoning funds of government.  There should be a 
paradigm shift by law enforcement from a passive approach (receive petitions and 
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orders from above) before launching an investigation to an aggressive approach 
(special investigations, court orders, bottom-up reporting of corrupt practices) in 
order to nip these activities in the bud. 
 
Proceeds of Crimes Recovery and Management Agency. 
Part VI and VIII of the Bill seeks to create the Proceeds of Crimes Recovery and 
Management Agency.886 The Agency is expected to be a body corporate887 with 
perpetual succession, may be sued or be sued in its corporate name888 and may 
acquire, hold, purchase, mortgage property and shall be an independent body.  
This includes its powers and duties in respect of property seized, procedure for the 
preservation of controlled property, rights attaching to shares, destroying or 
disposing of property and notice of proposed destruction or disposal.  The objects 
of the Agency include the enforcement and administration of the provisions of the 
Bill and the coordination and enforcement of ‘all other laws’ on the investigation, 
identification, tracing and recovery of the proceeds and instrumentalities of 
unlawful activity.  It will also be responsible for overseeing the management of 
recovered assets, authorise and appoint private asset managers and ensure that 
assets managers are adequately bonded and insured.  It will as well maintain:  
disposal systems; lists of approved auctioneers and provide fair process, lists of 
approved valuers and issue instructions for the realisation or security of assets; 
and establish a central database of the activities; and casework of the Agency, it 
will also be responsible for negotiating the return and management of all assets 
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887 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, S 96(2)(a) 
888 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, S 96(2)(b) 
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seized by foreign countries on behalf of the Federal and State Governments for the 
benefit of Nigerians. 
A notable facet of the proposed Bill is the creation of confiscated and forfeited 
properties account.  This is a designated account to be established in the central 
bank of Nigeria which is to be managed by the Accountant General of the 
Federation.  Under Section 147, proceeds to this account will include funds realised 
from sale, management or other forms of disposal of seized, attached, confiscated 
and forfeited property, proceeds of property seized pursuant to the code of conduct 
Bureau Act and other establishment Acts, money paid by foreign countries in 
respect of mutual assistance on criminal matters.  This is laudable because the 
nation lacks a database or account of seized assets.  However, where allegations 
and counter allegations of diversion of recovered assets have been the order of 
the day, it is still doubtful if the account will not be susceptible to corrupt infractions 
and dominance by the executive class since the account will be managed by the 
Accountant General who in itself is subservient to the President.   
While the objectives of the Agency are laudable, creating a new agency to 
investigate, prosecute and manage recovered assets will only contribute to 
additional financial burden to the already heavy cost the government has been 
unable to settle. Under Section 105 the fund accruing to the agency is made up of 
a take-off grants, annual subventions and other budgetary allocations received 
from the federal government, other grants, gifts, aid and five percent of the total 
amount realised from proceeds of unlawful activities that has been paid into the 
confiscated and forfeited properties account.889  A country where ghost workers890 
                                                            
889 Proceeds of Crime Bill 2017, s 105 
890Ismail Akwei, ‘Nigerian rids civil service of 50,000 ghost workers, saving over $600m’ 
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constitute a sizeable portion of recurrent cost, and payment of pension liability is 
not guaranteed may provide further opportunities for corruption and outright 
embezzlement of recovered funds.  
 
CONCLUSION 
Corruption cases abound, and the need for a speedy regime of seizing the 
proceeds of unlawful activity before criminal conviction is attained is a step in the 
right direction in the fight against corruption.  The criminal conviction approach to 
combat high profile cases of corruption is subject to abuse and delays arising from 
the exploitation of court processes.  Since non-conviction based recovery targets 
the proceeds of unlawful activities and the instrumentalities, conscientious effort is 
needed on the part of law enforcement to sharpen their skills in enforcing these 
laws.  Since corrupt public officials are materially wealthy, they would employ the 
best of defence lawyers and other professionals to devise means of legitimising 
their illicit wealth.  It is recommended that law enforcement agencies should have 
regular training to be able to meet these challenges. 
The funding of law enforcement agencies in the fight against illicit enrichment is 
one to be given serious attention. The research noted that the approach adopted 
by the South African CARA is one to be adapted in the proposed Proceeds of Crime 
Bill.  The provisions of CARA gives more focus on crime fighting, it’s independent 
of the executive that may attempt to cripple the activities of law enforcement by 
underfunding or using other antics to slow down the wheels of the prosecution 
                                                            
 <http://www.africanews.com/2016/12/28/nigeria-rids-civil-service-of-50000-ghost-workers-saving-over-
600m//.> accessed 16 March 2018   
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especially where it is complicit.  Allowing the parliament to interface with the 
committee managing the CARA and thoroughly review viable methods to curtail 
criminality provides an immediate opportunity for legislative reviews.  Rather than 
setting up additional agencies of government which will create more cost to the 
state, it is suggested that the Proceeds of Crime bill be merged with existing 
legislation, like the Economic and Financial Crimes Act, 2004 to give the agency 
expanded powers to fight financial crimes from both criminal conviction and asset 
recovery perspective.  The advantage of this uniform approach is that it allows for 









GOVERNANCE ISSUES AND REFORMS 
 
When the righteous are in authority, the people rejoice.891  Sadly, most developing 
countries fall short of the good governance indices. That corruption is destructive 
and complicated is no longer in dispute, yet it remains ubiquitous in the functioning 
of society.  How can one justify that a Health Minister who has the duty to protect 
lives of people divert funds allocated to primary health care or for providing basic 
health care facilities for his personal use? or a public official who converts for 
himself funds allocated for basic welfare needs such as water, road, schools or for 
securing the state? The corrupt nature of the ruling class have filtered down and 
infected the fabric of the socio-political, economic and cultural environment of most 
developing countries.     
Lack of political will at implementing programmes required to provide safety nets 
for the populace has encouraged intending political office holders to view 
governance as a business venture.  Acts of diversion of government fund, diversion 
of foreign aid, outright embezzlement and looting of the treasury is the result.  
Corruption has helped to concentrate income and wealth in the hands of a few 
individuals and exacerbated inequalities and inequalities in the distribution of 
resources. 
 In this chapter, we have argued for the review and strengthening of executive and 
judicial (including constitutional) reforms to close the loopholes used to perpetuate 
corruption.  Additionally, legal tools such as unexplained wealth orders, 
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international cooperation through legal mutual assistance and re-awaking the 
urgency for criminalising all known facets of unjust enrichment to achieve parity in 
society.  Because good governance and political will are essential to sustain the 
wheel of development, we conclude the chapter by suggesting complementary and 
innovative approaches aimed at preserving the wealth of the state to the benefit of 
the masses. 
 
8.1 Good Governance   
Citizens expect a state to protect economic activities from corruption, money 
laundering and other illegal and criminal practices by establishing clear rules to 
govern the economic relationships and consistently enforce them.892 The quality of 
and adherence to these rules have a direct impact on the internal markets, 
fostering trust in the public and democratic institutions, and attract foreign 
investment.  Governance has been be defined as ‘the sum of the many individuals 
and institutions, public and private, manage their common affairs and good 
governance among other things ‘participatory, transparent and accountable.’893  
Governance according to Venter Dennis ‘has a strong normative overtone.  It is the 
practice of good government, and remains essentially a fragile process that 
depends on the restraint of the ruler and the tolerance of the ruled.  Certainly, 
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governance is a more useful concept than government or leadership mainly 
because it does not prejudice the locus or character of real decision making.’894 
The concept of good governance emerged at the end of the 1980s, at a time of 
unprecedented political changes, such as the collapse of the Berlin wall, the 
developmental problems in Sub-Saharan Africa rejecting the standard 
explanations of Africa's failures in development.  Sub-Saharan Africa economist 
had argued that the region's difficulties were due to kleptocratic elites.895  A 1989 
World Bank Study report on SSA observed, that Africa needs ‘not just less 
government but better government – a government that concentrates its efforts 
less on direct interventions and more on enabling others to be productive.’896  In 
that study, the term ‘governance’ described the need for institutional reform and a 
better and more efficient public sector in sub-Saharan countries and defined 
governance as ‘the exercise of political power to manage a nation's affairs.’897  This 
study introduced governance without explicitly referring to the connotation ‘good’, 
however, in the foreword of the report, the then World Bank President Conable 
used the term ‘good governance’, to refer to a ‘public service that is efficient, a 
judicial system that is reliable, and an administration that is accountable to its 
public.’898  Governance according to the study ‘is epitomized by predictable, open, 
                                                            
894 Venter Denis, ‘Democracy, Good Governance and leadership’ <http://foundation-development-
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895 Catherine Weaver, ‘The Meaning of Development: Constructing the World Bank's Good Governance 
Agenda' in Rawi Abdelal, Mark Blyth and Craig Parsons (eds) Constructing the International Economy 
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and enlightened policymaking (that is, transparent processes); a bureaucracy 
imbued with professional ethos; an executive arm of government accountable for 
its actions; and a strong civil society participating in public affairs; and all behaving 
under the rule of law.’899   The concept on governance now refers to ‘the manner 
in which public officials and institutions acquire and exercise the authority to shape 
public policy and provide goods and services.’900   Kauffman and Kraay, further 
defined governance as:  
The traditions and institutions by which authority in a country is exercised.   
This includes the process by which governments are selected, monitored 
and replaced; the capacity of the government to effectively formulate and 
implement sound policies; and the respect of citizens and the state for the 
institutions that govern economic and social interactions.901 
These definitions provide three distinct aspects of governance:  
• the form of political regime;  
• the process by which authority is exercised in the management of the 
country's economic and social resources for development; and 
• the capacity of government to design, formulate and implement policies and 
discharge functions.   
                                                            
899 World Bank 1994, p. vii. 
900 World Bank 1992, p. 1. 
901 Daniel Kaufmann and Aart Kraay, ‘Governance Indicators: Where are we, where should we be going?’ 
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More so, is the importance of a capable state operating under the rule of law, and 
as Kaufmann and Kraay underscore, good governance emphasises the ‘role of 
democratic accountability of governments to their citizens.’902   
There are identified challenges of good governance about sub-Saharan Africa.  
The United Nations Economic Commission903 for Africa noted, that the ‘increasing 
level of corruption in Africa is the result of three factors: 
i. The level of institutional weakness in many African countries makes it 
possible for political leaders and public servants to misuse resources 
and abuse their power without being checked; 
ii. The continued decline in the living standards of public servants 
associated with poor incentives.....makes corruption attractive and a 
viable means of social livelihood; and; 
iii. The blind eye often turned to corruptors by western countries.  Foreign 
companies and private interests usually take advantage of the weak and 
ineffective institutional mechanisms available to deal with corrupt 
practices.  This has allowed international companies to corrupt state 
officials to gain undue advantage or secure political privileges in state 
policies.’ 
In the same vein, the concentration of political and economic power in the hands 
of powerful elites combined with inadequate checks and balances gives rise to the 
abuse of privileges.  This concentration of power facilitates the subversion of 
domestic institutions including law enforcement agencies, suppress the press and 
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ultimately undermine the rule of law.  As Ayittey 2008 observed, the ruling elites 
exercise this power to direct economic activity, dispense government positions, 
extract rents, build personal fortunes and dispense patronage to buy political 
support. Potential rivals are enticed through appointments and favours but 
withdrawn at the first sign of disloyalty.   
The central fact of contemporary African governance is that enormous political and 
economic power is centralised in the hands of African presidents and loyal elites. 
Checks and balances on that power remain inadequate. In particular, the 
separation of powers among the executive, legislative and judicial branches of 
government does not function properly, as it does in western democracies, to 
check the power of African leaders.  Besides, the people often do not have the 
means or power to control the activities of the state custodians, in addition to the 
fact that the existing laws do not adequately constrain the state to be accountable.   
 
The World Bank dataset - from 1996 until 2015, measures six dimensions of 
governance as follows:  
• Voice and accountability, measures the extent to which a country’s citizen 
are able to participate in selecting their government, as well as freedom of 
expression, freedom of association and free media; 
• Political stability and absence of violence measures the perception of the 
likelihood of political instability and or politically motivated violence including 
terrorism. 
• Government effectiveness, measures the quality of the public services, the 
quality of the civil services and the degree of independence from political 
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pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the 
credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies.  
• Regulatory quality captures the perceptions of the ability of the government 
to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development.  
• The rule of law captures perceptions of the extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society and in particular the quality 
of contract enforcement, property rights, the police and the courts, as well 
as the likelihood of crime and violence  
• Control of corruption.  This measures the extent to which public power is 
exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand corruption, as well 
as capture of states by elite and private interests.  The World Bank has 
come with several initiatives designed to ensure that government processes 
are transparent.  These include transparency in procurement especially in 
the tenders process and award of significant contracts, in public-private 
partnership arrangements,  transparency in the extractive industry, 
construction contracts, recommending appropriate freedom of information 
legislation, providing reports to benchmark governments in transparency 
reporting.  Boosting transparency in the areas of budgets, natural resources, 
aid, and the retention of resources can significantly assist citizens in 
developing countries adequately track resources of the country and how 
they are utilised.  For example, in the yearly budgeting process, 
transparency will ensure that governments publish the annual budget 
proposal, the appropriation, the actual expenditure compared with the 
budget and the comprehensive audit report for the year.  This is a far cry 
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from reality which still obscures the activities of government from the citizens 
thus shrouding their actions in secrecy. 
 
8.2   Political Will and The Lack of It  
Governance includes formal institutions, regimes empowered to enforce 
compliance as well as informal arrangements that people, and organisations either 
have agreed to or perceive in their interests.  Poor governance is characterised by 
a culture of impunity, where public officials feel little obligated to be accountable to 
its citizens and the citizens, in turn, have limited expectations that the elected 
leaders should be responsible for their actions.  No anti-corruption mechanism or 
strategy will succeed without strong leadership and political will.  Political will 
involves building legitimacy, credibility and broad-based political support and 
compliance both in society and within the government.  When conceived, political 
will includes leaders in all occupations but especially in governance, the executive, 
legislature and judicial arms to show proper commitment.  Political will has varying 
definitions due to its complexity.  Brinkerhoff defined political will as ‘the 
commitment of political leaders and bureaucrats to undertake actions to achieve 
objectives and to sustain the cost of those actions over time.’  Some have argued 
that for political will to emerge and develop over time, ‘power holders must want to 
take action as a result of their volition, feel capable of successfully implementing 
such action, and be committed to such implementation as would render inaction 
politically costly.’  Another author defines it as ‘the motivation to engage in 
strategic, goal-directed behaviour that advances the personal agenda and 
objectives of the political actor that inherently involves the risk of relational and 
reputational capital.’  Political will is essential success when it comes to promoting 
goals with increased political costs such as corruption, and the lack of it could 
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become the term to describe failure when the underlying reasons for such failure 
are unclear (Post et al. 2010).904  Post et al. defines political will as ‘the extent of 
committed support among key decision makers for a particular policy solution to a 
particular problem.’905  The definition suggests that political will is meaningful only 
at the group level and those decision makers should have sufficient authority, 
capacity and legitimacy, and should be strongly committed to their preferences.  In 
arguing against an individual level concept of political will, the writers contend that 
the Greek idea of ‘polis’ denotes ‘a social collective and political will involves 
aggregating preferences in such a way that is meaningful for outcomes in political 
processes.906 As they noted ‘singular preferences about political issues 
and,…personal willingness to act do not constitute political will unless ‘I’ am a 
totalitarian dictator and can effectively force my preferences on an entire 
jurisdiction.’907  The definition characterises individual level concept of political will 
with an authoritarian state in which the ‘autocrat has control over the military and, 
consequently, control over other political actors and the populace through the use 
of fear and intimidation.908 In the same vein, such climes lack transparency and 
disregard the rule of law which helps to obscure the true identities of the potential 
policy blockers and decision-makers who could contribute significantly to a set of 
policy passage and implementation.909 On the other hand, group level decision 
making is more characterised with ‘democratic regimes, the number of veto players 
depends on the configuration of formal and informal political institutions;’ there is 
                                                            









judicial independence, and the law-making process is devoid of tyranny and 
suppression by the executive arm.  According to Hopkinson and Pelizzo, to curb 
corruption, the commitment of government and parliament is required.910  If the 
political will is absent at the top, there will be a general lack of commitment to 
enforce laws and punish the corrupt.  In the same vein, the duty of elected 
representatives and other public officials is imperative for corruption to be curbed.  
For Strapenhurst and Sedigh, if those who govern a society lack political will to 
refrain from corruption and institute change, real reform is difficult to undertake and 
virtually impossible to sustain.   Kpundeh and Dininio believes that political will, as 
it applies to anti-corruption crusade is most effective when it is institutionalised and 
not dependent on the personality and intentions of a particular person.911  In the 
African context, however, the situation is a bit more different.  Although most 
African governments are democratic, they are saddled with weak institutions, and 
in most instances, as suggested by some writers, ‘Africa needs strong, dedicated 
and self-confident leaders who must be the creators of great ideas, command 
loyalty of their people and be committed to the development of their countries.  
Skilful, visionary and capable leadership is the key to the reforms Africa need, and 
the policy actions that are required for the development of the continent: a true 
leader must have the courage and ability to communicate reality to its followers.’  
In reality, African countries that have experienced some strong effort in its 
determined fight against corruption emanates from the political will of the individual 
leaders other than the institutions.  But as Marshall argues, leadership is necessary 
                                                            
910 John Williams, ‘Building Parliamentary Networks’ in Rick Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston and Riccardo 





but not a sufficient condition for controlling corruption.912  Political will, therefore, 
must be given space to grow from within a political system and eventually becomes 
an integral part of the entire system. 
About Nigeria, Achebe noted that ‘the trouble with Nigeria is simply and squarely 
a failure of leadership. There is nothing wrong with the Nigeria land, or climate or 
water or air or anything else.  The Nigerian problem is the unwillingness of its 
leaders to rise to its responsibility, to the challenge of personal example which is 
the hallmark of true leadership.’913  Prevalent in poor governance structure is one 
of monopolies on power which undermines the operation of institutional checks 
and balances and disrespect for the rule of law.  There is the power of vested 
interest, and civil society organisations who supposedly ought to be voices for the 
masses, as well as check on governance, are silenced, and the viable opposition 
is suppressed.  Factors that could contribute to weak governance includes 
corruption, weak institutions, conflicts of interest, lack of political will, inadequate 
resources, weak enforcement and lack of stakeholder participation in legislation 
and decision making.   The fight against corruption is no longer discussed as a 
matter of transparency and information.  It has the theme which touches on the 
subjects of accountability, the rule of law, public sector management and much 
more. Corruption as earlier defined in this thesis by the World Bank is ‘the abuse 
of public power for private gain’.914 Thus, corruption encompasses two elements: 
first, a moral abjection Court misuse of power, and second, as a result, the 
substantive or incorporeal gain.  
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914 World Bank, WDR 1997, 102 
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The World Bank's realisation that corruption was a much bigger obstacle to 
development than initially anticipated led it in 1996 to launch, by the former World 
Bank President Wolfensohn, ‘that the Bank would focus more on the fight against 
corruption by assisting countries to combat the ‘cancer of corruption.’   The 
following year, 1997, a ‘comprehensive anti-corruption policy framework’ was 
launched which focused mainly on the issue of corruption of governments and 
ensuring that nearly all loans granted by the Bank in that year for public sector 
management contained specific targets relating to the fight against corruption.915 
Therefore, the year 1997 marked a starting point for the Bank's enhanced 
engagement in the fight against corruption. From the end of the 1990s on, the fight 
against corruption became more and more an independent topic on the Bank's 
agenda. As already mentioned, in 2007 former Bank president Wolfowitz and the 
United Nations initiated the Stolen Asset Recovery (StAR) Initiative, which aims to 
return those state assets stolen through corruption.  Also in 2007 ‘Governance and 
Anti-Corruption Strategy’ made clear that governance and anti-corruption are not 
synonymous because corruption would also occur in the private sector while 
governance was looking at the performance of the state and public institutions. 
Former World Bank president Wolfowitz stressed: ‘Improving governance is 
certainly about fighting corruption, although it is also about much more than fighting 
corruption.’916 
One veritable tool to ensure the sustenance of policies and programmes including 
but not limited to the fight against corruption and other social menace is the 
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presence of a strong political will on the part of state actors.  The absence or lack 
of political will on the part of state actors (legislators, bureaucrats and judicial 
officers) has been cited as the most frequent reason for unsuccessful governance 
and economic reform efforts globally.  Lack of political will most often is reflected 
in inaction of politic and judicial leaders in enforcing laws and regulations.  In other 
instances, this is manifest in a lack of commitment of adequate resources 
(underfunding) of viable programmes and institutions of government saddled with 
the responsibility to either regulate or enforce activities of state, or a failure to follow 
through on public declaration or promise.917  Political support is crucial for setting 
strategic direction, securing planning resources, championing the policy change 
and enforcing implementation.  The concept of political will, however, is complex 
for some reasons: first, it involves intent and motivation which are inherently 
intangible phenomena and are hard to access accurately or objectively and is also 
subject to manipulation and misrepresentation.  Second, political will may exist at 
both individual and collective levels – for an individual, it can relate to ones' 
characteristic reflecting personal values, desires and priorities which are different 
from all others. Third, political will is reflected most commonly in actions although 
there could be written or spoken words by the political actor. 
 
As noted by Kpundeh and Dininio identifying political will to fight corruption is not 
always straightforward.918  To defuse opposition, bolster support or placate external 
agencies, anti-corruption rhetoric is used.  In other instances, some politicians 
                                                            
917 Carmen Malena, ‘Building Political Will for Participatory Governance: An Introduction’ in Carmen 
Malena (eds.) From Political won’t to political will: Building Support for Participatory Governance   
[Krumarian Press 2009] 
918 Sahr Kpundeh and Phyllis Dininio, ‘Political will’ in Rick Stapenhurst, Niall Johnston and Riccardo Pelizzo 
(eds.) Role of Parliament in Curbing Corruption (World Bank Development Studies, The World Bank 2006). 
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publicize allegations and evidence of corruption in an effort to demonstrate 
opponents or former administrations’ hypocrisies.919 Kpundeh and Dininio identified 
six indicators of political will, namely:  
i. There must be a domestic origin of the initiative:  that is, the principal 
advocates for change perceive corruption as an issue requiring attention or 
whether an external group has induced or coerced the advocates to endorse 
the anti-corruption point;920 
ii. There must be a high degree of analysis applied to the understanding of the 
context and causes of corruption.  This involves recognising the 
complexities that give rise to the abhorrent behaviour, identifying and 
developing measures to deal with those institutions, mandates and 
practices that either impede or promote integrity in government;921 
iii. There should be a strategy in place to ensure a high degree of participation 
in the change effort, incorporating and mobilising the interest of many 
stakeholders.  This involves shared ownership of the process to engender 
sustainability in spite of the support from the leadership;922 
iv. The inclusion of prevention, education and sanctions in the reform 
strategies.  They noted, ‘the record of failure is exceedingly high for anti-
corruption efforts that use the blunt instrument of prosecution (or fear of 
prosecution) as their principal tool for compliance.’923  Effective strategies as 
they argue must include prevention and education as well as prosecution, 
which will help to provide positive incentives for compliance, publicise 








positive outcomes and establish the for compromised individuals and 
institutions.  Additionally, as noted by Fjelstad and Isaksen, because 
corruption is itself a symptom of governance failure, the higher the incidence 
of corruption, the less an anti-corruption strategy should include tactics that 
are narrowly targeted at corrupt behaviour and the more it should focus on 
the broad underlying features of the governance environment.924 They 
further argued that support for anti-corruption agencies and public 
awareness campaigns are likely to have limited success in environments 
where corruption is rampant and the governance environment flawed.  Doig 
et al. argue that, in such environments, anti-corruption agencies are prone 
to be used as tools for political victimisation.925  For instance, in a recent 
show of now non-support to the ruling party and the President Muhammadu 
Buhari’s administration anti-corruption fight, the opposition party (PDP) 
senators in a signed communique issued to the press, accused the ruling 
party of ‘belligerent attitude toward PDP members’.  Their grievances were 
based on ‘the deployment of state instrument of coercion to intimidate an 
independent arm of government like the legislature…and the glaring witch 
hunt of perceived opposition elements.’926  They argued that the ‘war on 
corruption should not be selective, must be fought with sincerity and not 
politics’ and since the war on corruption had devolved into probing of 
campaign funds, the government should extend the probe to the ruling 
                                                            
924 Italics added 
925 Alan Doig, David Watt, and Robert Williams, ‘Measuring ‘Success’ in Five Anti-Corruption Commissions: 
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926 Hassan Adebayo, ‘PDP Senators to Buhari: We wont support you again’ Premium Times (Lagos, 22 June 
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accessed 2 January 2017 
358 
 
party’s (APC) campaign funds and other parties too other than the deposed 
party (PDP).927 To further bolster the issue of political victimisation and lop-
sidedness in the anti-corruption efforts,  Shah and Schacter contends that 
such interventions are more appropriate in a low corruption setting where 
the governance fundamentals are reasonably sound, and corruption is a 
relatively marginal phenomenon;928 
v. Adequate resources dedicated for anti-corruption reforms. 
A former President Olusegun Obasanjo who during his tenure set up anti-grat 
agencies (the ICPC and EFCC) investigated and prosecuted corrupt government 
officials who misappropriated public money.  However, he received criticism for 
been selective and focused on the president's enemies or the politically 
expendable and doing little to address institutional failings.  ‘Mr President, I must 
be bold to tell you that nobody believes in your anti-corruption war…Although 
corruption is fast trickling to the lowest level of government, over 50% of it occurs 
in the presidency….., in few instances where the government has prosecuted 
people for corruption, they invariably turned out to have political disagreements 
with you.’ The Nigerian Labour Congress, for example, remarked that Nigeria 
needed more thorough, result oriented and comprehensive measures against 
corruption at all levels and spheres of life.  The success rate has been low in 
compliance with Section 308 which permits the investigating agencies like the 
EFCC and ICPC to prosecute erring political office holders including the president. 
  
                                                            
927 ibid 
928 Anwar Shah and Mark Schacter, ‘Combating Corruption: Look before You Leap’ 
<https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2004/12/pdf/shah.pdf> accessed 6 February 2018 
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8.3 Civil Restitution and Unjust Enrichment  
The United Nations Convention on Corruption places emphasis on alternatives to 
the traditional criminal approaches to fighting corruption.  Under Article 51 of 
UNCAC, one fundamental principle of the convention is recovery and restitution of 
the proceeds of corrupt practices.  It requires states to bring proceedings in their 
own and other jurisdictions to pursue ill-gotten gains of those who have been 
involved in corruption. 
Smith asserts that restitution is a legal response to unjust enrichment929 and posit 
that there are two distinct aspects of the law: the cause of action in unjust 
enrichment and the response of disgorgement that is available for certain wrongs. 
Restitution is the restoration of some specific thing to its rightful owner or status.   
It is concerned with a situation whereby benefit is recoverable by way of 
compensation for loss suffered from an individual who had enriched or benefitted 
himself from another’s expense.  Unjust enrichment arises where a party receives 
gains or benefit because of another’s efforts or acts, but for which that other has 
received no compensation.  An enrichment means anything of value whether 
moveable or immovable, money or services.930 Unjust enrichment entitles the 
plaintiff to restitution.  While the standard response to a wrong is compensation for 
certain wrongs,931 gain-based responses are available.932 Other wrongs, which 
may trigger restitution, include property torts933 and breach of fiduciary duty.934  As 
                                                            
929 Lionel D. Smith, ‘The Province of the Law of Restitution’ (1992) 71(4) Canadian Bar Review 672 
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932 James Edelman, Gain Based Damages (Hart Publishing 2002).  See also Attorney-General v Blake [2001] 
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933 Livingstone v Rawyards Coal Co (1880) 5 App cas 25; Strand Electric v Brisford Entertainment [1952] 2 QB 
246 
934 Reading v Attorney-General [1951] AC 507 where it was held that the gain made by Seargeant Reading 
in shielding smugglers with his uniform through road checkpoints was treated as gains made at the expense 
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Rider observed, ‘it is the ability of the law to trace the proceeds of corruption and 
fraud into other property and to regard it as belonging to the person with the 
equitable claim that is perhaps the most significant weapon.’935  We have noted in 
separate chapters of this thesis how government officials have diverted millions of 
US dollar from their countries for private gains.  Based on equitable principles that 
no person is allowed to profit at another’s expense it is imperative that stolen wealth 
is recovered by the state and returned for beneficial use. 
 
8.4 Illicit Enrichment 
Public officials engage in corrupt activities essentially to reap the expected 
monetary rewards. Some officials before been elected or appointed into offices had 
little or modest income.  They enter public service from humble beginnings and 
emerge tremendously wealthy due to lucrative corrupt engagements.  States often 
face vast procedural challenges in successfully detecting and prosecuting corrupt 
officials since they typically leave no evidence trail.  The officials and their 
collaborators most often enter into secret, illegal agreements, usually without third-
party witnesses or documentation.  The only signal that corrupt acts have 
transpired would be in the apparent increase in wealth enjoyed by the officials 
arising from the list of luxury cars, boats, extravagant homes and exotic vacations 
they embark upon.    
 
                                                            
of the Crown in the sense that though the Crown lost no money to him in the substractive sense, the gain 
of reading in breach of his fiduciary duty to the crown.  See also Boardman v Phipps [1967] 2 AC 46 
935 Barry Rider, ‘Strategic Tools – for now and perhaps the future?’ in Barry Rider eds ,Reasearch Handbook 
on International Financial Crime (Edward Elgar Publishing 2015) 741 
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Article 20 of UNCAC requires that subject to the constitution and legal system of a 
state, to consider adopting such legislative and other measures to establish  as a 
criminal offence, when committed intentionally, illicit enrichment, that is, a 
significant increase of the assets of a public official that he or she cannot 
reasonably explain in relation to his or her lawful income.  It makes provision for 
the requirement of intention (mensrea) for the crime to be committed. The Bribery 
ordinance in Hongkong is of interest in this respect as it creates a statutory 
presumption that any wealth over and above the lawful remuneration of a public 
official is the proceeds of corruption.936  Similar provision is contained in the 
Nigerian Code of Conduct Bureau and Tribunal Act where political office holders 
are expected to declare their assets immediately after taking and thereafter after 
every four years or at the end of his term of office.  Any property acquired by a 
public officer after declaration which is not fairly attributable to income, gifts or 
loans approved by the Act shall be deemed to have been acquired in breach of the 
Act.  Any property acquired in abuse or corruption of a public officer found will be 
seized and forfeited to the State.937  Chaikin recommends conducting a net worth 
analysis to determine whether a political leader has accumulated wealth.938  Net 
worth analysis is an invaluable tool in circumstances where there is no direct link 
between the political leader and alleged activity, and where the target has acquired 
many assets, or where the records or documents showing the financial activities of 
the political leader are missing, destroyed or are unreliable.939 
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Some have argued that criminalizing illicit enrichment violates human rights940 
because it puts burden on the accused person to put forth evidence demonstrating 
the origins of the assets at issue.941 Others disagree that the right to corruption-
free society constitutes a fundamental human right and that, as a corollary, a 
breach of this right is a crime of universal interest under international law, therefore, 
it does not amount to a violation.942  Besides, the criminalization of illicit enrichment 
by UNCAC for instance does not necessarily include a reversal of the burden of 
proof, rather, the onus is upon the prosecutor to prove his case beyond a 
reasonable doubt which is confined to the disproportionate assets of the accused.   
I contend that given the scale of grand corruption perpetuated by corrupt officials 
that there is the need to amend the burden of proof provision in corruption matters 
whereby the onus is shifted from the prosecution to the accused. 
 
8.5 Executive Immunity, Corruption and Reforms 
 
‘a system is corrupt when it is strictly profit-driven, not driven to serve 
the best interest of the people’943 – Suzy Kassem 
 
Immunity is an ancient concept with roots in the old feudal structure of medieval 
England at the time of absolute monarchies in which 'it was the norm that 
sovereignty and governmental powers were personified in the person on the throne 
of England'. The English crown was at the top rung of the feudal ladder and as 
                                                            
940 The presumption of innocence, the right to silence and the privilege against self-incrimination.  This line 
of argument overlooks the fact that corruption is a clandestine offence and that certain corrupt acts are 
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941 Jeffrey R. Boles, ‘Criminalizing the Problem of Unexplained Wealth: Illicit Enrichment Offences and 
Human Rights Violations’ (2013) 17 NYUJ Legislation Policy 835 
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Comparative Analysis’ [2007] Cornell Int’l L.J 691, 729.  See Ndiva Kofele-Kale, op cit, 97 
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such the person occupying it was not subject to the court within the realm. It is 
founded on the antiquated legal principle of rex non-potest peccare (the king can 
commit no wrong). As the king enjoyed absolute immunity, he could neither be 
impeded in his courts nor subject to any foreign jurisdiction.  Menelaus of Sparta 
confirmed that the king was above the law of the Realm when he said: ‘when a 
king takes spoils, he robs no one; when a king kills, he commits no murder, he only 
fulfils justice.’  Black’s dictionary defines immunity as ‘any exemption from a duty, 
liability, or service or process…such as exemption granted to a public official.’  
Immunity insulates and shields the beneficiary from liability that would otherwise 
have been imposed.  An immunity is a defence to tort liability which is conferred 
upon an entire group or class of persons or entities under circumstances where 
considerations of public policy are thought to require special protection for the 
persons, activity or entity in question at the expense of those injuries by its tortuous 
act.  Immunity protects the holder from liability that would otherwise have been 
imposed.  Immunity is not a defence to a legal action; it eliminates or postpones a 
person's ability to advance a legal claim against the immune for wrongful action.  If 
a legal claim is filed against the immune, he or she only needs to ask the court to 
dismiss the claim by the immunity, without necessarily filing a defence to the claim.  
Immunity may be qualified or absolute.  Qualified immunity exempts the beneficiary 
from civil liability that is conditional or limited, for instance, by a requirement of good 
faith or due care.  This applies to judges and lawmakers in Nigeria.  Absolute 
immunity, on the other hand, provides an exemption from civil liability that is 
accorded to officials while performing their duties.  In Nigeria, for instance, by 
Section 308 (1) of the 1999 Constitution ‘no civil or criminal proceedings shall be 
instituted or continued against the President, Vice President, Governors and 
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Deputy Governors during their period of office.’ The purpose of the immunity 
contained in the Constitution is to bar any form of inhibition of the office holder in 
the performance of his duties during his tenure in office.  It is a temporary privilege 
which ensures that no one is allowed to stop the wheel of governance by holding 
the President or Governor to ransom under any guise. It is a temporary protection 
intended to shield the occupant of the office from distractions while executing the 
duties inherent in that office.944 The implication of the immunity clause is that any 
of the persons to whom the section applies shall not be arrested or imprisoned 
either, in pursuance of the process of any court or otherwise and no process of any 
court requiring or compelling the appearance of the person shall be applied for or 
issued.  The immunity granted under section 308 of the Nigerian Constitution is 
personal and not official. Thus, the immunity covers them in their private capacity 
and does not extend to the following situations:   
1. Civil proceedings against that person in his official capacity.  
2. Civil or criminal proceedings where he/she is only a nominal party.945 
 
It implies therefore that the person occupying the position of president or Governor 
is exempt from legal action whereas the office of the president or governor may be 
sued or joined in a suit.  Additionally, the person so protected under the immunity 
clause cannot continue to pursue an appeal or any other court action against other 
                                                            
944 Dalhatu v. Muazu [2002] 16 NWLR (Pt 793) 319 , supra, note 12. By s. 308(3) of the 1999 Constitution, a 
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persons, once he assumes office.946 This immunity does not extend beyond the 
tenure in office of the officials captured in section 308 of the constitution.   
It has been argued that the immunity clause is one of the root causes of endemic 
corruption in Nigeria.  As Pluto states: 
No man can be imagined to be of such iron nature that he would stand fast 
in justice.  No man would keep his hands off what was not his own when he 
could safely take what he liked out of the market. Plato, Politeia II, 359-360 
Studies shows that immunity has a pernicious effect on the quality of governance 
in established democracies.   Immunity provides politicians with extra means to 
reward those that help them put them in power.  It also reduces accountability and 
encourages those disposed to criminal activities to run for public office, thereby 
producing poor governance outcomes in modern democracies.947   
 
Remarkably, the South African Constitution make no express provision for 
immunity of the President or his vice.  In their study of constitutional immunity in 
relation to the various immunity regimes, legislators and head of state of 
government, they contend that immunity provisions are strongly associated with 
poorer governance, stronger immunity is associated with more significant 
corruption, bribery, and the diversion of public funds.948 While in reality executive 
immunity still exists, there is the need to review existing laws to accommodate the 
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Immunity_Oct2012.pdf> accessed 12 September 2017 
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present realities.  Although constitutional provision exists for the removal of 
executives from office, this is impracticable in an environment characterised by the 
weak institution and the parliament which is conferred with the responsibility to 
institute impeachment proceedings is also accused of corruption, lacks the moral 
capacity to dispense its function correctly. 
 
8.6 Judicial Corruption and Reforms 
Judicial corruption is a global problem.949   In a recent survey of the judicial system 
in Africa, 33% believe that most or all of the judges and magistrates are corrupt, 
54% reported that obtaining assistance from courts was difficult and 30% paid a 
bribe to get assistance from courts.  Judicial corruption is the ‘abuse of court 
process or judicial process by judicial or non-judicial officers, for purposes of 
satisfying their pecuniary or personal needs, which may carry monetary or non-
monetary values.’  Judicial corruption involves the misuse of public power or 
entrusted power for private gain by people charged with the administration of 
justice.950  Judicial corruption also includes all forms of inappropriate influence that 
would damage the impartiality of the justice system, which includes lawyers and 
other administrative support personnel.    Weak public trust, high perceptions of 
corruption, and difficulties encountered when engaging with the courts make 
access to justice a challenge in many African countries.  According to the former 
chair of Transparency International, Huguette Labelle, ‘equal treatment before the 
law is a pillar for democratic societies.  When greed or political expediency corrupt 
                                                            
949 The United Nations Office for Drug Control and Crime Prevention (UNODC), ‘Judicial Integrity and its 
capacity to enhance the Public Interest’ 
<http://www.unodc.org/documents/nigeria/publications/Otherpublications/Judicial_Integrity_and_its_Ca
pacity_to_Enhance_the_Public_Interest_2002.pdf> accessed 12 February 2018  




courts, the scales of justice are tipped, and the ordinary people suffer.  Judicial 
corruption means the voice of the innocent goes unheard, while the guilty act with 
impunity.’951  The evidence on judicial corruption underscores the need for justice 
to be served at the right time to achieve the desired objective especially in the fight 
against illicit enrichment.  
Causes of corruption especially in Africa are varied.  From ‘survival factor’ due to 
abject poverty,952 institutional weakness, unemployment, the deteriorating living 
standard of public office holders coupled with low salaries make corruption a viable 
means of livelihood.  The same with private interests by multinational corporations 
who bribe officials to gain undue advantage.  Other identified factors include short 
term of office, political instability and democratic insecurity, non-transparency in 
the recruitment process, the absence of technological equipment, lack of 
transparency in the court administration and court procedures, and complex 
procedural rules. One study identified fear of retribution by political leaders, 
appellate judges, influential individuals, the public and the media.953  However, 
Matei and Matei contend that where governance generally is weak and corruption 
levels high, traditional and anti-corruption reform measures that rely on reducing 
incentives for corrupt behaviour (higher wages, improved case-handling systems 
and disciplinary measures) have little effect unless accompanied by attitudinal 
change.954   Also, one of the most significant challenges to strengthen a public 
institution (the judiciary inclusive) lies in changing the prevailing culture and value 
                                                            
951 Transparency International, Global Corruption Report 2007: Corruption in Judicial Systems (Cambridge 
University Press 2007) XVI, XXI 
952 ibid 
953 Ernesto D. et al 
954 Ani Matei and Lucica Matei, ‘Assessing the Anti-Corruption Strategies, Theoretical and Empirical 
Models’ [2011] 2(1) Journal of Men’s Studies 23 
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system of the organisation.  Where roles and relationships prevail over rules and 
regulations, due process will be compromised.  Judicial corruption is classified into: 
1. Petty corruption, this involves the exchange of money or favour between a 
plaintiff and a judge to have a positive outcome of the judicial matter, and where a 
bribe has to be given in the administrative process in return for the performance of 
a task.  This form of corruption can be addressed by improvement in material 
condition of judicial personnel and support staff, normative change in the attitude 
towards bribery primarily within the legal profession and the broad society, 
increased transparency in the different types of transactions within the judiciary 
and ensuring systems of discipline and accountability;  
2. Grand corruption: which refers to situations where ‘the highest level of 
government gets involved in the work of the judiciary.’  Executive interference has 
been widely reported in election matters in Nigeria.  For instance, in one election 
petition tribunal case between two political parties,955 the Appeal Court and the 
Supreme Court were severely affected and created rancour between the President 
of the Court of Appeal and the Chief Justice of the Federation, which led to the 
compulsory retirement of the former, approved by the President upon the 
recommendation of the national Judicial Council.956 
                                                            
955 Aregbesola v Oyinlola (2009) 14 NWLR (Pt 1162) 429 
956 Abimboye D (5 September 2011) ‘Anarchy in the Temple of Justice’ in Newswatch Judiciary in disarray, 
Lagos: Newswatch communications limited to 12.  In the words of Professor Sagay, ‘Salami (the President 
of the Court of Appeal) has filed an action to restrain them from taking any further steps on the matter. In 
spite of being aware of that, the NJC went ahead and recommended that Salami should be suspended and 
removed. That is an act of lawlessness. It is shameful given the fact that these people are senior judicial 
officers.’  He further condemned the action of the Chief Justice of the Federation when he said: ‘If you 
should go through all the facts of this crisis, the only person whose guilt was established but not punished 
is Katsina-Alu, the CJN. It was established that he illegally and unconstitutionally interfered in the Court of 
Appeal case in Sokoto governorship election over which he has no jurisdiction. All of his friends who have 
now ganged up to try to remove Salami admitted that. But he wasn't punished for it. Nothing was 
recommended to him. The NJC merely said that he carried out his unconstitutional act in good faith. So, you 
can have good faith in doing something wrong, and that would be alright.’  
369 
 
Another common area of judicial corruption is the frivolous abuse of legal process.  
In the case of Saraki v Kotoye,957 the court observed that ‘the abuse process may 
lie in both proper and improper use of the judicial process in litigation.  The 
employment of a judicial process is only regarded as abuse when a party 
improperly uses the issue of the judicial process to the irritation and annoyance of 
his opponent and the efficient and effective administration of justice.  It can also 
arise by instituting a multiplicity of actions on the same subject matter against the 
same opponent on the same issues.’958  Lawyers and judges have been accused 
of frustrating the anti-graft agencies from successfully prosecuting politically 
exposed persons and other members of the ruling class charged with corrupt 
practices and money laundering by exploiting the legal system in favour of rich and 
powerful criminal suspects to the detriment of accountability and transparency in 
the society.  The granting of perpetual injunctions, allowing criminal defendants to 
have criminal cases suspended or adjourned sine die and conferring immunity 
have been graciously used to delay high profile suspects accused of money 
laundering and illicit enrichment. 
Effective deterrence sanctions for abuse of discretionary powers by judicial officers 
and administrators, including those institutions responsible for legal education, 
gazetting of penalties prescribed for actions, inactions, and practices that 
undermine the integrity of the judiciary, collaboration with clearly defined 
                                                            
<http://articles.onlinenigeria.com/news/3219-anarchy-in-the-temple-of-justice.html>. assessed 28 August 
2017  
957 (1990) 6 NILR 8 
958 (1992) 9 NWLR (Pt264) 256 
370 
 
governmental and non-governmental agencies in expanding access to justice have 




In this chapter, the need for good governance especially in bringing about 
democratic dividends have been examined.  Governance entails the exercise of 
political, economic, judicial and administrative authority in a manner that meets the 
aspirations and needs of the citizens.  It has been showed that commitment from 
all stakeholders in the good governance process is essential for the realisation and 
prevention or at best reduction of the looting and embezzlement of state resources.  
Furthermore, for the fight against corruption and money laundering to be 
successful requires political will on the part of the executive in enforcing the extant 
laws devoid of interference in the activities of the law enforcement agencies.  The 
executive arm should work at strengthening the respective institutions rather than 
relying on the president to initiate the fight on corruption and money laundering.  
Judicial officers are to restrain from involvement in partisan politics by maintaining 
neutrality in political matters or adjudicating matters in favour political office holders 
either for fear of intimidation or in response to bribes offered.  There is a need to 
review the judicial process to proffer sanctions even to senior lawyers who have 
formed the practice of abusing court processes.   
  
                                                            
959 Peter Chukwuma Obutte, ‘Corruption, Administration of Justice and Judiciary in Nigeria (Feb. 2016) < 




CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
 
This research work finds that anti-money laundering controls play a significant role 
in electronic banking and informal remittance systems but are inadequate to 
prevent theft and diversion of stolen wealth, primarily due the structure and 
incentives associated with governance and the lack of accountability by leaders.  
The rich and powerful elites affect the performance of institutions and influence 
their outcomes.  The unrecorded nature of informal remittance systems, size and 
nature of the informal economy especially its cash based nature, gives room for 
stolen wealth laundered to legitimate use with ease.  Illicit wealth as a crime, are 
committed by the custodians of the common wealth, and except good governance 
is entrenched in the fabric of developing countries, laws not minding its framework, 
will be inadequate and with the situation will either remain unchanged or get worse.  
The following measures will strengthen the efficacy of money laundering controls. 
 
Reduce incentives for corruption 
The incentive structures in a country largely determined by its institutional 
arrangement may create opportunities for corruption and provide an environment 
in which the honest and ethical individuals engage in corrupt activities in order to 
survive.  Following the rationality theory, if the cost associated with financial crimes 
is less than the benefits derivable from the commission of the offence, there is a 
high likelihood for individuals to exploit the opportunities of corruption. The use of 
discretionary authority, poor remuneration, exercise of monitoring and supervisory 
powers, failure to punish erring officials, and power to sanction are notable 
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incentives at the disposition of government officials.  It has been argued that low 
remuneration does not necessarily lead to corrupt behaviour as those who loot 
government coffers are the very well paid and top civil servants who do not have 
any problem meeting their basic needs.  I differ in that line of thought, since the 
absence of welfare opportunities breeds corrupt behaviour because the average 
employee seeks to provide basic infrastructure at high cost to himself (both highly 
and poorly paid employees).  A key component of the effort to decrease the 
opportunities and incentives for corruption is to follow the Singapore model 
whereby salaries of civil servants and political leaders were increased but made 
the definition of corrupt behaviour clear to the public and enforced penalties for 
violating regulations against corrupt behaviour. 
 
Changes in institutional design can be through a thorough examination of the way 
in which responsibilities and compensation are structured, and, to understand the 
system through which corrupt transactions take place.  As Mbaku observed, to rid 
African economies of pervasive corruption, is to ‘reconstruct and reconstitute the 
state and provide institutional arrangements that meet the following criteria. 
i. They effectively constrain civil servants and politicians and prevent them 
from engaging in opportunistic behaviours (e.g. rent seeking and 
corruption); 
ii. They enhance entrepreneurship and wealth creation; and 
iii. They provide an environment within which all of a country’s diverse 
population groups can live together peacefully, while they compete for 
the benefits of economic growth.’960 
                                                            





Improved enforcement strategies effectively reduces corruption by increasing the 
likelihood that key participants engaging in corrupt activities can be caught and 
punished.  This can be achieved by increased funding of infrastructure necessary 
to improve monitoring and detection of corrupt cases.   
 
Strengthen institutional capacity and independence 
In Nigeria, serving or retired police officers have held the Chairman of the EFCC 
based on the provisions of the Act.  While their depth of knowledge and expertise 
is invaluable, I differ in the choice of these personnel to hold such sensitive office 
given the corruption perception ranking of the police.  The Nigerian Police ranks 
foremost among the institutions adjudged corrupt in Nigeria, not less with other 
agencies of government like the custom service or even the military.  If these law 
enforcement agencies are the panacea for the detection and prevention of corrupt 
practices in the presence of an existing Police Force, structured with special anti-
fraud/crime units, why then are members of the police seconded to the anti-
corruption agencies to fight corruption?  Would it make any difference?  It should 
suffice that the Nigerian Police and other responsible departments of government 
are members of the board of the anti-graft agency and no more as these will be 
able to provide oversight and policy framework for the efficiency and effectiveness 
of the anti-graft agencies.  The selection and screening process of the chairperson 
and other principal officers is through placed advertisement961 regulated by an 
                                                            
961 The qualification of the principal officers is provided by the EFCC Act, however, we suggest an amended 
removing serving or retired police, military and other para-military personnel and replacing it with persons 
with integrity and substantial knowledge of criminal justice system.  
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internationally reputable/independent firm and selected finalist ratified by the 
Legislative arm, thereafter the President appoints.  To ensure balance and 
independence in the choice of the Chairman of any law enforcement agency, the 




Sequel to the issue of choice of personnel and composition of the anti-graft 
agencies is that of funding.  The framework of the South African civil recovery 
regime helps the law enforcement agency to be self-funding, effective and 
accountable.  Where law enforcement agencies depend largely on the executive 
for funds needed to fight financial crimes, it in itself limits their operational capacity 
and effectiveness more less their independence.  The law enforcement agency will 
no doubt become the tool of the executive to witch hunt whomever it perceives to 
be an enemy because he who pays the piper calls the tune.  The proposed 
Proceeds of Crime Bill on the establishment of the Proceeds of Crime Recovery 
and Management Agency, while it makes provision for the establishment of the 
Confiscated and Forfeited Properties Account it vests the appropriation powers to 
the president unlike the South African POCA which vest the appropriation authority 
to the cabinet on the recommendation of the committee.  The South African 
legislation has more control in the administration of the Asset Recovery Account 
(ARA) as the committee members report to the Cabinet rather than the President 
who is responsible for reviewing the recommendations made by it in respect of 
allocation of moneys from the account to specific law enforcement agencies.  There 
is still no parliamentary oversight though.  Outright independence of the anti-
corruption agencies will limit executive interference in the fight against graft and 
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illicit enrichment.  
 
Attitudinal Change - Culture/role expectation 
An important factor in the individual’s attempt to rationalise corruption is the 
physical or cultural distance to the victims of crime, typically the members of the 
society where the corruption takes place.  Some cultural and institutional factors 
lead to corruption. For instance, Nepotism and the strength of family values are 
linked to the feeling of obligation. Robert K. Merton’s means-ends schema implies 
that corruption is at times a motivated behaviour responding to social pressures to 
violate the norms, in order to meet the set goals and objectives of a social 
system962.  An individuals’ feeling of guilt or shame depends on how the society 
responds to the specific form of crime.  Society’s general opinion963 is a factor in 
understanding the extent of corruption, different from perception elicited by 
politicians of an individual who has been alleged or even convicted of a corruption 
offence.  In some occasions political/public office holders who maintained their 
integrity while in office and had nothing to show for, have been scuffed by his fellow 
kinsmen for not utilizing the benefits of the position he or she occupied.  As Dowden 
observed, any politician who does not end up a multi-millionaire is regarded a 
fool964.  On the other hand, political/public office holders who had embezzled state 
resources but were perceived to have performed while in office are celebrated in 
the community.  Lack of state legitimacy in this case is characterised by 
government’s inability to provide for the economic wellbeing of its citizens and this 
has created a general low perception of corrupt behaviour. 
                                                            
962 Robert K. Merton, Social Theory and Social Structure (Free Press 1968) 246-248 
963 Tina Soreide, Drivers of Corruption: A Brief Review (The World Bank 2014) 





Articles 51 – 59 of UNCAC emphasise and provide for international cooperation 
mechanisms for states to employ to recover stolen assets. 
The following suggested features are to be included in a legal framework for 
effective civil forfeiture and the development of the law: 
• Introduce the reverse onus clause in all corruption related matters; 
• Direct enforcement of overseas orders; 
• Provision within state law for the transfer of the proceeds or 
instrumentalities to the foreign state following the enforcement of foreign 
forfeiture order; 
• Increase the penalties associated with stolen wealth; 
• Bilateral and multilateral cooperation in information sharing, training; 
• Jurisdictional cooperation in enforcement; 
• Strengthen mutual legal assistance; and  
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